Jones v. State

• Court: Supreme Court of Delaware
• Decided: January 23, 2025
• Docket: 487, 2023
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

GUY JONES, § § No. 487, 2023 Defendant Below, § Appellant, § Court Below: Superior Court § of the State of Delaware v. § § Cr. ID No. 1701006494 (K) STATE OF DELAWARE, § § Appellee. §

Submitted: November 20, 2024 Decided: January 23, 2025

Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and LEGROW, Justices.

ORDER

On this 23rd day of January, 2025, after consideration of the parties’ briefs

and the record below, it appears to the Court that:

(1) The appellant, Guy Jones, was convicted of murder and associated firearm

charges in August 2018. Jones’ convictions were upheld on direct appeal, and the

Superior Court denied his timely, first motion for post-conviction relief. Jones now

appeals from that decision, arguing that we should reverse the Superior Court for

three reasons: (1) the court abused its discretion by resolving disputed issues of

material fact without an evidentiary hearing; (2) the court erred in denying Jones’

claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to sever Jones’ trial from his co-defendant’s; and (3) the court erred in holding that trial counsel made a

strategic decision not to call two individuals as trial witnesses.

(2) Jones and DePaul Wilson were arrested on February 14, 2017. They were

tried together on charges of first-degree murder, second-degree murder, attempted

robbery, two counts of possession of a firearm during commission of a felony

(“PFDCF”), and second-degree conspiracy. After an eight-day trial, a Kent County

jury convicted both men on all counts. On August 29, 2018, the Superior Court

sentenced Jones to life imprisonment for the first-degree murder charge and an

additional 40 years in prison followed by decreasing levels of supervision for the

remaining charges. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed Jones’ convictions and

sentences.1

(3) Jones filed a timely motion for postconviction relief under Superior Court

Criminal Rule 61 (“Rule 61”) on July 14, 2020. His motion included a request for

an evidentiary hearing and was supplemented by an affidavit that Jones authored.2

At the Superior Court’s request, trial counsel filed an affidavit responding to Jones’

ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims. After full briefing, a Superior Court

Commissioner recommended that the court deny the motion. Jones appealed the

Commissioner’s report and recommendation. On November 30, 2023, the Superior

1 Jones v. State, 213 A.3d 1186, 2019 WL 3206964, at *2 (Del. Jul. 16, 2019) (TABLE). 2 App. to Opening Br. at A6–55 (R. 61 Mot.); A76–77 (Jones’ affidavit). 2 Court issued an opinion adopting the Commissioner’s report and denying

postconviction relief.3 Jones filed a timely notice of appeal and retained new counsel

when his appointed post-conviction counsel filed a Rule 26(c) brief and a motion to

withdraw.

(4) This Court reviews the Superior Court’s denial of a motion for

postconviction relief for an abuse of discretion.4 We review legal or constitutional

questions, including ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims, de novo.5

(5) We affirm the Superior Court’s decision denying Jones’ postconviction

motion on the basis of and for the reasons stated in the November 30, 2023 Order

Denying Jones’ Motion for Postconviction Relief.6 That affirmance addresses most

of Jones’ appellate arguments, including his claim that trial counsel was ineffective

by failing to call two witnesses. Jones also raises two new arguments on appeal that

he did not raise in the Superior Court, neither of which supports reversal.

(6) First, Jones argues that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to

hold an evidentiary hearing to resolve disputed issues of material fact that, in Jones’

view, required the court to weigh witness credibility. Jones acknowledges that Rule

61 gives the court broad discretion to decide whether to hold an evidentiary hearing.

3 State v. Jones, 2023 WL 8281375 (Del. Super. Nov. 30, 2023). 4 Purnell v. State, 254 A.3d 1053, 1093 (Del. 2021); Swan v. State, 248 A.3d 839, 856 (citing Richardson v. State, 3 A.3d 233, 237 (Del. 2010)). 5 Thompson v. State, 296 A.3d 872, 877 (Del. 2023) (citing Green v. State, 238 A.3d 160, 174 (Del. 2020)). 6 Jones, 2023 WL 8281375. 3 But he contends that the Rule’s language permitting the Superior Court to hold an

evidentiary hearing if one is “desirable” is “standardless” and “amorphous.”7

Although he did not advance this argument in his Motion, Jones now invites us to

adopt what he views as a more “appropriate” standard like those used in

Pennsylvania and the federal courts, which require a court to conduct an evidentiary

hearing when there are disputed, material factual issues.8 Applying his preferred

standard in this case, Jones argues that an evidentiary hearing was necessary because

(1) trial counsel’s affidavit conflicted with Jones’ affidavit as to the substance of

their discussions and the decision about whether to move to sever Jones’ trial from

his co-defendant’s; and (2) Jones’ affidavit averred that trial counsel advised Jones

that severance would not be strategically advantageous because both the defendants

7 Opening Br. at 20–21. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(h)(1) (“After considering the motion for postconviction relief, the state’s response, the movant’s reply, if any, the record of prior proceedings in the case, and any added materials, the judge shall determine whether an evidentiary hearing is desirable.”). See Hazout v. Tsang Mun Ting, 134 A.3d 274, 286 (Del. 2016) (in interpreting statutes, we give effect to the plain meaning of language); see also State v. Lewis, 797 A.2d 1198, 1201 (Del. 2002) (plain meaning analysis “equally applicable to the interpretation of a court rule”). 8 Under the Pennsylvania rules, a lower court has the discretion to choose whether to have an evidentiary hearing “if the court is satisfied that there are no genuine issues concerning any material fact; that the defendant is not entitled to post-conviction collateral relief; and that no legitimate purpose would be served by further proceedings.” Pa. R. Crim. P. 907, 908; see also Commonwealth v. Burton, 158 A.3d 618, 622 (Pa. 2017); Opening Br. at 21. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a hearing “shall” be ordered “[u]nless the motions and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.” The court “‘must accept the truth of the movant’s factual allegations unless they are clearly frivolous on the basis of the existing record.’” United States v. Tolliver, 800 F.3d 138, 141 (3d Cir. 2015); but see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) (in federal review of state proceedings, the court “shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim” except for enumerated reasons). 4 and the victim were of the same race, which Jones argues mandates an evidentiary

hearing under Reed v. State.9

(7) Jones’ arguments regarding the need for an evidentiary hearing were not

raised to the Superior Court and therefore were not preserved.10 Although Jones

made a formulaic request for an evidentiary hearing in his motion for post-conviction

relief,11 the Superior Court Commissioner elected not to hold a hearing and instead

issued her report based on the parties’ written submissions.12 Jones did not raise the

absence of an evidentiary hearing in his objections to the Commissioner’s report,

and none of Jones’ submissions to the Superior Court cited the need to assess the

affiants’ credibility or the application of our decision in Reed v. State.

(8) Questions that were not fairly presented to the trial court may not be

considered on appeal unless the interests of justice so require.13 A boilerplate request

to the Superior Court to hold an evidentiary hearing, which was not later raised in

the objections to the Commissioner’s report, does not fairly present Jones’ appellate

arguments regarding the Rule 61 standard, the need to resolve disputed factual

issues, or Reed’s applicability. Nor do the interests of justice require us to consider

9 258 A.3d 807, 826 (Del. 2021). 10 App. to Opening Br. at A64–75 (Objections to Comissioner’s Report and Recommendation). 11 Id. at A22, 54 (R. 61 Mot.). 12 Jones, 2023 WL 8281375. 13 Supr. Ct. R. 8; Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (Del. 1986) (“. . . the general rule is that evidentiary questions may not be raised for the first time on appeal.”); Turner v. State, 5 A.3d 612, 615 (Del. 2010) (this court may excuse a waiver if it finds that the trial court committed plain error “requiring review in the interests of justice”). 5 the issue because—as the Superior Court explained—the undisputed record shows

that trial counsel made a strategic decision not to seek severance, and that tactical

choice is not one that required the court to conduct an evidentiary hearing.14

(9) Jones also argues for the first time on appeal that trial counsel’s decision

not to seek to sever Jones’ trial prejudiced him because it allowed the jury to hear a

redacted statement given by Jones’ co-defendant—Wilson—which Jones now

argues violated his rights under the Sixth Amendment.15

(10) Specifically, Jones contends that the admission of Wilson’s redacted

statement at trial violated Bruton v. United States16 and its progeny,17 which prohibit

one defendant’s out-of-court statement from referring to any co-defendant. This

argument suffers from a number of flaws. First, Jones never raised this issue in his

14 See Owens v. State, 301 A.3d 580, 590 (Del. 2023) (evidentiary hearing was not required even when disputed facts required a credibility determination); see also Johnson v. State, 129 A.3d 882 (Del. 2015) (evidentiary hearing was not required “[b]ecause the record is sufficient to determine that [] counsel was not ineffective.”); Perkins v. State, 962 A.2d 917 (Del. 2008) (evidentiary hearing was not necessary given the judge’s extensive familiarity with background of the case); Jackson v. State, 869 A.2d 327 (Del. 2005) (evidentiary hearing was not required when petitioner did not “substantiate concrete allegations of actual prejudice”); Grace v. State, 682 A.2d 626 (Del. 1996) (evidentiary hearing was not required because the argument was “at best diversionary” to finding possible prejudice); Duffy v. State, 1986 WL 17363, at *2 (Del. Jul. 31, 1986) (evidentiary hearing was not required when the trial record was sufficient to resolve claims). It is also well settled that the Superior Court is not required to conduct an evidentiary hearing if, on the face of the motion, the petitioner is not entitled to relief. Hawkins v. State, 839 A.2d 666 (Del. 2003); see also State v. Winn, 2014 WL 5025792, at *4 (Del. Super. Oct. 2, 2014), aff’d, 2015 WL 1469116 (Del. Mar. 30, 2015); State v. Gregg, 2021 WL 2580713, at *7 (Del. Super. June 23, 2021), aff'd, 275 A.3d 257 (Del. 2022). 15 Jones’ other arguments regarding trial counsel’s decision not to move to sever were thoroughly addressed by the Superior Court in its November 30, 2023 Order. 16 391 U.S. 123 (1968). 17 Samia v. United States 599 U.S. 635 (2023); Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185 (1998); Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 (1987). 6 postconviction motion, so it is not preserved on appeal. The issue also is

procedurally barred because it was not raised during trial or on direct appeal.18

Second, this argument does not relate directly to the prejudice that Jones purportedly

suffered from counsel’s decision not to move to sever. Whether Jones’ Sixth

Amendment rights were violated is not evidence that he was prejudiced by trial

counsel’s decision not to move to sever. Jones seems to suggest that trial counsel’s

decision not to sever exposed Jones to additional ineffective assistance when trial

counsel allowed the jury to hear a statement that purportedly violated Bruton.19 But

Jones cannot introduce on appeal an entirely new ineffective-assistance-of-counsel

claim that he did not raise in his Rule 61 motion.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior

Court is AFFIRMED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Abigail M. LeGrow Justice

18 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3). 19 Opening Br. 32–34. 7