Jones v. State

Supreme Court of Delaware·Decided October 27, 2025·No. 323, 2025·Published

Opinion

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STEVIE A. JONES, § § Defendant Below, § No. 323, 2025 Appellant, § § Court Below—Superior Court v. § of the State of Delaware § STATE OF DELAWARE, § Cr. ID No. 0609013400 (S) § Appellee. §

Submitted: September 29, 2025 Decided: October 27, 2025

Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; LEGROW and GRIFFITHS, Justices.

ORDER

Upon consideration of the appellant’s opening brief, the appellee’s motion to

affirm, and the record below, it appears to the Court that:

(1) The appellant, Stevie A. Jones, filed this appeal from a Superior Court

order denying his motion to vacate sentence or, in the alternative, to certify a

question of law. The State of Delaware has moved to affirm the Superior Court’s

judgment on the grounds that it is manifest on the face of Jones’s opening brief that

the appeal is without merit. We agree and affirm.

(2) In 2008, Jones pleaded guilty to first-degree robbery, aggravated

menacing, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (“PFDCF”),

reckless endangering, and second-degree assault. The Superior Court immediately imposed the sentence recommended by the parties: (i) for PFDCF, three years of

Level V incarceration; (ii) for first-degree robbery, twenty-five years of Level V

incarceration, suspended after three years for Level III probation; (iii) for aggravated

menacing, five years of Level V incarceration; (iv) for first-degree reckless

endangering, four years of Level V incarceration; and (v) for second-degree assault

of a person over the age of sixty-two, eight years of Level V incarceration, suspended

for two years of Level III probation. Jones did not appeal his convictions or

sentence, but has filed unsuccessful motions for postconviction relief or challenging

his sentences.

(3) In June 2025, Jones filed a motion to vacate sentence or, in the

alternative, to certify a question of law. He argued that Erlinger v. United States1

required reconsideration of his previously unsuccessful claim that his sentences for

first-degree robbery and aggravated menacing were illegal because they violated the

Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.2

The Superior Court treated the motion as a motion for correction of illegal sentence

and denied it. This appeal followed.

1 602 U.S. 821 (2024). 2 See Jones v. State, 258 A.3d 145, 2021 WL 3179449, at *1 (Del. July 27, 2021) (TABLE) (affirming the Superior Court’s denial of Jones’s motion for correction of his first-degree robbery and aggravated menacing sentences because his voluntary guilty plea constituted a waiver of any claim of a Double Jeopardy violation).

2 (4) We review the Superior Court’s denial of a motion for correction of

illegal sentence for abuse of discretion.3 To the extent a claim involves a question

of law, we review the claim de novo.4 A sentence is illegal if it exceeds statutory

limits, violates the Double Jeopardy Clause, is ambiguous with respect to the time

and manner in which it is to be served, is internally contradictory, omits a term

required to be imposed by statute, is uncertain as to its substance, or is a sentence

that the judgment of conviction did not authorize.5

(5) As he did below, Jones argues that Erlinger requires reconsideration of

his previously unsuccessful claim that his sentences for first-degree robbery and

aggravated menacing violated the Double Jeopardy Clause. He is mistaken. This

Court previously held that Jones’s guilty plea waived his Double Jeopardy claim,6

and Erlinger does not change this result. In Erlinger, the United State Supreme

Court considered a sentence imposed under the federal Armed Career Criminal Act

and stated that “[v]irtually ‘any fact’ that ‘increase[s] the prescribed range of

penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed’ must be resolved by a unanimous

jury beyond a reasonable doubt (or freely admitted in a guilty plea).”7 Erlinger does

not apply to Jones’s sentences for first-degree robbery and aggravated menacing

3 Fountain v. State, 100 A.3d 1021, 2014 WL 4102069, at *1 (Del. Aug. 19, 2014) (TABLE). 4 Id. 5 Brittingham v. State, 705 A.2d 577, 578 (Del. 1998). 6 See supra n.2. 7 Erlinger, 602 U.S. at 834 (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000)). 3 because the Superior Court made no factual determinations exposing Jones to higher

maximum or minimum sentences, and the sentences fell within the statutory range.8

The Superior Court did not err in denying Jones’s motion.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the motion to affirm is

GRANTED, and the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ N. Christopher Griffiths Justice

8 11 Del. C. § 602(b) (providing that aggravated menacing is a class E felony); 11 Del. C. § 832(a), (b)(1) (providing that first-degree robbery is a class B felony with a three-year minimum Level V sentence); 11 Del. C. § 4205(b) (providing that the sentencing range for a class B felony is two to twenty-five years of Level V incarceration and that the sentencing range for a class E felony is up to five years of Level V incarceration).

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Related

Apprendi v. New Jersey
530 U.S. 466 (Supreme Court, 2000)
Brittingham v. State
705 A.2d 577 (Supreme Court of Delaware, 1998)