OPINION
CORCORAN, Justice.
Defendant Jay Martin Jonas (defendant) petitions for review of the court of appeals decision affirming his convictions for trafficking in stolen property and transferring marijuana to a minor under the age of 15 years, and his resulting consecutive sentences totalling 46 years. We granted review of the following question:
Under the facts of this case, does the 25-year sentence, imposed consecutively to the other sentence, violate the proscription against cruel and unusual punishment when imposed for the act of selling to a 14-year-old minor one marijuana cigarette for the price of $1.00?
We have jurisdiction pursuant to Ariz. Const, art. 6, § 5(3), and A.R.S. § 12-120.24. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that defendant’s sentence does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the facts of this case.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In late September 1987 the victim, a 14-year-old friend of defendant’s younger brother, broke into a lawyer’s office and stole, among other things, a Smith & Wesson .357 magnum pistol valued at $350.00. A few weeks later, the victim told defendant, who was then 21 years old, that he had a stolen gun he wanted defendant to sell for him. Defendant took the gun and promised to give the victim money or drugs for it, but told the victim the gun “was very hot and that he had to keep a low profile on it.”
During the time period before and after the burglary, the victim twice obtained marijuana from defendant, purchasing one marijuana cigarette for $1.00 each time. Once defendant actually handed the marijuana to the victim in exchange for money; the other time, the victim purchased the drug through defendant’s younger brother, who had obtained it from defendant. After the sale that involved defendant personally, defendant smoked the marijuana with his brother and the victim in defendant’s yard. The victim had never smoked marijuana in the past, and the experience made him feel dizzy.
In early October the victim spoke to investigating police officers and admitted to the law office burglary, that he had taken [244]*244the gun from that office, and that he had committed 3 other burglaries. He also told the police he had given the gun to defendant to sell for him, and that defendant had sold him marijuana. As a result of that investigation, defendant was indicted on 7 counts, including 4 counts of burglary and one count of conspiracy to commit burglary that were later dismissed, as well as the present counts of trafficking in stolen property and sale of marijuana to a minor under 15. The state filed an allegation that defendant had one prior felony conviction for theft.
At trial, the victim testified that defendant had offered to sell the stolen gun and had twice sold him marijuana. Defendant denied that these incidents had ever occurred, but admitted his prior felony conviction for theft. Defendant’s younger brother, who was 15 at the time of these incidents, testified that the victim had told him about stealing the gun from a law office, but that he was not present when the victim asked defendant to sell the pistol. Defendant’s brother also denied that the incidents involving the marijuana had occurred, although he admitted on cross-examination that he once smoked marijuana with the victim in defendant’s yard and that defendant was present and saw them. He also testified that his brother had supplied him with marijuana in the past but had not done so since the burglary.
The investigating officer testified that the victim had cooperated with police throughout the investigation of these incidents, had received no promises in return for the information he gave them about defendant, and had been charged with and pleaded guilty in juvenile court to several counts involving 6 burglaries, as a result of the information he provided.
The jury found defendant guilty of trafficking in stolen property and sale of marijuana to a minor under 15 years old, both class 2 felonies. After the verdict, defendant admitted to his prior conviction after the trial court advised him of the rights he was waiving and the consequences of his admission. The court continued the sentencing hearing to allow time for preparation of a presentence report. Defendant did not request a mitigation hearing. At sentencing, the court imposed consecutive aggravated maximum terms of 21 years for trafficking in stolen property and 25 years for transferring marijuana to a minor, and ordered defendant to pay $350.00 in restitution to the owner of the gun. Defendant timely appealed, arguing, among other things, that the 25-year sentence imposed on him for selling marijuana to a minor constituted cruel and unusual punishment proscribed by the eighth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution. The court of appeals affirmed defendant’s convictions and sentences. State v. Jonas, 162 Ariz. 32, 780 P.2d 1080 (App.1989). Defendant then sought review in this court.
DISCUSSION
1. Defendant’s Sentence
Defendant challenges the 25-year maximum sentence he received for his conviction of transfer of marijuana to a minor under the age of 15, in violation of A.R.S. § 13-3409. That statute provides, in relevant part:
A. A person shall not knowingly:
2. Sell, transfer or offer to sell or transfer to a minor any substance if its possession is prohibited by ... A.R.S. § 13-3405 [which includes marijuana] ____
B. A person who violates a provision of this section is guilty of a class 2 felony and is not eligible for suspension or commutation of sentence, probation, pardon, parole, work furlough or release from confinement on any other basis until the sentence imposed by the court has been served, and if the minor is under fifteen years of age it is punishable pursuant to § 13-604.01, subsection A.
A.R.S. § 13-3409. Because the jury found that the minor was under the age of 15 years, the sentencing provisions of A.R.S. § 13-604.01 applied:
A. Except as otherwise provided in this section, a person who is at least eighteen [245]*245years of age ... and who stands convicted of a dangerous crime against children in the first degree involving ... using minors in drug offenses shall be sentenced to a presumptive term of imprisonment for twenty years____
D. The presumptive sentences prescribed in subsections A, B, and C of this section may be increased or decreased by up to five years pursuant to the provisions of § 13-702, subsections C, D and E.
The sentencing provisions of A.R.S. § 13-702 detail the factors the court shall consider in determining whether the sentence imposed shall be aggravated or mitigated. Thus, under these provisions, defendant faced a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years, a presumptive term of 20 years, and a maximum sentence of 25 years, to be served without possibility of early release. Additionally, any sentence imposed had to be served consecutively to any other sentence imposed on the other count of trafficking in stolen property. See A.R.S. § 13-604.01(J).
The court considered the presentence report before imposing sentence. That report indicated that defendant denied committing any crime, and had told the probation officer who prepared the report, “I hope no one that got me in here is around when I get out____ they better not be around.” Defendant’s adult criminal record included 4 prior felonies in New York and Arizona, including convictions of violent felonies for attempted robbery and assault. Additionally, defendant had numerous misdemeanor convictions in Arizona, including several instances of furnishing alcohol to a minor, disorderly conduct, assault, DUI, and reckless driving. The presentence report evaluation concluded:
Although only twenty-one, the defendant has accumulated a total of six felony convictions since the age of seventeen. He has exhibited a continued pattern of illegal activity and the safety of the pub-lie appears at risk when the defendant is at liberty. Attempts to change his behavior through probation (both juvenile and adult), counseling and incarceration have proven useless as the defendant appears unwilling to conform to the rules of society.
Although no violence was involved in the instant offense, his record shows various violent offenses in the past____ His somewhat threatening comments at the time of the presentence investigation, coupled with his past behaviors, may require some consideration in assessing his potential for involvement in further crime. A lengthy incarceration in the Department of Corrections should help insure the safety of the community.
At sentencing, the trial judge noted that his original inclination was to seek reasons to be lenient with defendant so that he could impose a mitigated sentence, but that the presentence report had convinced him to impose the maximum sentence. As aggravating factors, the judge mentioned defendant’s extensive prior criminal record “that is rare to find in somebody 21 years of age,” involving both violent felonies and a history of crimes involving children. The court also pointed out that both of the crimes for which defendant was being sentenced involved assisting juveniles in criminal acts, and that defendant’s record “in and of itself shows shockingly aggravating circumstances.” Furthermore, the presen-tence report indicated that defendant had threatened to harm those involved in the prosecution of this case after his release. This factor, said the judge, “is the most shockingly and seriously important reason for putting you behind bars as long as the law will permit me to do it.” The complete text of the comments by the trial court at sentencing is attached as an Appendix.
The trial court then imposed the maximum sentence of 25 years for the drug offense involving the minor, to be served consecutively to the maximum aggravated sentence of 21 years for trafficking in stolen property.1
[246]*2462. The Court of Appeals Opinion
Division Two of the court of appeals held that defendant’s sentence of 25 years for selling marijuana to a 14-year-old did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment in the following two-paragraph analysis:
Certain offenses are defined by A.R.S. § 13-604.01 as “dangerous crimes against children” and the statute mandates an enhanced punishment for these offenses. Selling drugs to a minor under the age of 15 is one of these crimes. The trial court aggravated the sentence and mandated a term of 25 years to be served without possibility of parole. Appellant contends that a proportionality analysis like that conducted in Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983) would result in the conclusion that his sentence is unconstitutionally severe. We do not agree. Pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-604.01(A) the defendant is required to be sentenced to a presumptive term of imprisonment for 20 years and under subsection D of the same statute this sentence can be increased up to 25 years pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-702(D). The trial judge imposed the additional five-year sentence because of the defendant’s lengthy criminal record. A.R.S. § 13-604.01(E) provides that a person sentenced for a dangerous crime against children in the first degree is not eligible for parole.
In State v. Crego, 154 Ariz. 278, 742 P.2d 289 (App.1987) and State v. Byrd, 160 Ariz. 282, 772 P.2d 1135 (App.1988), we applied the Solem test to A.R.S. § 13-604.01 and determined that the sentences mandated were not unconstitutional. For the reasons set forth in the latter two cases, we affirm the sentence here.
State v. Jonas, 162 Ariz. 32, 34, 780 P.2d 1080, 1082 (App.1989).
3. Cruel and Unusual Punishment: The Solem v. Helm Test
The eighth amendment to the United States Constitution provides: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” The eighth amendment applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 82 S.Ct. 1417, 8 L.Ed.2d 758 (1962).
The United States Supreme Court has enunciated a 3-prong objective test to determine if a sentence is so disproportionate to the crime for which it is imposed that it constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983). First, we must examine the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; second, we compare sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction for more serious crimes; and third, we compare sentences imposed in other jurisdictions for the same crime. Solem, 463 U.S. at 292, 103 S.Ct. at 3010. No one factor is controlling in determining proportionality, but the combination of factors makes the analysis possible. Solem, 463 U.S. at 291 n. 17, 103 S.Ct. at 3010 n. 17. In Solem, a defendant who was previously convicted of nonviolent felonies was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole for passing a fraudulent $100.00 check. The Supreme Court found, under the 3-prong analysis, that the sentence was disproportionate to the crime and violated the eighth amendment.
In this case, defendant challenges the application of the statute imposing punishment for “dangerous crimes against children,” A.R.S. § 13-604.01, as applied to the facts of his case. He concedes that the statute may be validly applied to other crimes against children for other offenses, and thus does not challenge the constitutionality of the statute on its face.
[247]*247We note that A.R.S. § 13-604.01 previously has withstood eighth amendment attacks in the context of crimes against children involving child molestation or sexual offenses. See State v. Taylor, 160 Ariz. 415, 773 P.2d 974 (1989) (aggregate sentence of 2,975 years for 85 counts of crimes against children not cruel and unusual punishment); State v. Byrd, 160 Ariz. 282, 772 P.2d 1135 (App.1988); State v. Smith, 156 Ariz. 518, 526, 753 P.2d 1174, 1182 (App. 1987); State v. Crego, 154 Ariz. 278, 280, 742 P.2d 289, 291 (App.1987). We must now decide whether the statute withstands eighth amendment scrutiny2 under the particular facts of this case, involving the sale of a small quantity of marijuana to a 14-year-old child.
a. Gravity of the Offense and Harshness of the Penalty
Under Solem, the gravity of the offense is determined by the type of harm threatened or inflicted and the level of defendant’s culpability. 463 U.S. at 292, 103 S.Ct. at 3010. We measure the type of harm by the seriousness of the crime, whether the crime was committed against a person or property, and whether the crime was violent in nature. Solem, 463 U.S. at 292-93, 103 S.Ct. at 3010-11.
In this case, defendant’s offense involved the sale of a prohibited drug. See A.R.S. § 13-3405. Drug abuse has been recognized as “one of the most serious problems confronting our society today.” National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 109 S.Ct. 1384, 1395, 103 L.Ed.2d 685 (1989).
Defendant’s crime was also one defined by our legislature as a “dangerous crime against children.” See A.R.S. § 13-604.01. In 1987 the legislature specifically added the crime of “involving or using minors in drug offenses” to the list of crimes considered dangerous when committed against children. See A.R.S. § 13-604.01(A), (K)(l)(m), added by Laws 1987, Ch. 307, § 4; A.R.S. § 13-3409, added by Laws 1987, Ch. 307, § 24. This court long ago recognized the particular seriousness of crimes that involve children and drugs:
It is true that the sentence imposed upon the defendant is severe. However, the social, economic, and moral fabric of the state is constantly threatened by those unscrupulous individuals who turn minors into spineless creatures craving for narcotics.
State v. Valenzuela, 101 Ariz. 230, 233, 418 P.2d 386, 389 (1966). Other courts have also recognized that a drug sale to a child is “significantly more culpable” than a sale to an adult. See In re Flores, 58 Cal.App.3d 222, 225, 128 Cal.Rptr. 847, 849 (1976); People v. Carbonie, 48 Cal.App.3d 679, 686, 121 Cal.Rptr. 831, 834 (1975) (higher penalties justified “to discourage adults from apprenticing minors in the drug trade”). In a similar case, the California court of appeal reasoned:
Here, the mandatory minimum term is but a means to the ultimate end of protecting children from those adults who might otherwise be tempted to involve them in drug traffic. Indeed, the need for such a sanction seems particularly acute when we consider the fact that society’s policy of leniency toward minors has the unfortunate side effect of making them ideal retail outlets in a narcotics distribution scheme.
Carbonie, 48 Cal.App.3d at 686-87, 121 Cal.Rptr. at 834-35. We also agree with that court that “[i]n the hierarchy of baseness of crimes involving drug traffic, the sale or furnishing of drugs to minors ranks at the very top.” In re Flores, 58 Cal. App.3d at 226, 128 Cal.Rptr. at 850.
We disagree with the dissent that this victim “was not an innocent corrupted by defendant.” The record clearly discloses that this was the victim’s first experience with drugs; he testified he had never been around or smoked marijuana in the past, and that the experience “got me dizzy.” He also testified that defendant offered [248]*248him marijuana for the stolen gun. Furthermore, we do not consider the fact that the victim had a juvenile record for non-drug related offenses to be either relevant or mitigating in our consideration of the seriousness of a crime that involves the introduction of drugs into the life of a 14-year-old, as does the dissent.
Additionally, defendant’s conduct was an intentional offense against a person, not property, which makes it a more serious crime. Although the offense appears on its face to be nonviolent, “the presence or absence of violence does not always affect the strength of society’s interest in deterring a particular crime or in punishing a particular criminal.” Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 275, 100 S.Ct. 1133, 1140, 63 L.Ed.2d 382 (1980). Indeed, other courts have rejected the argument that drug-dealing can be compared to the nonviolent crime of passing bad checks involved in Solem v. Helm:
Drug dealing cannot be said to be as nonviolent as writing a bad check.' Even ignoring the violence typically associated with narcotics operations, heroin dealing can readily lead to violence, theft, robbery, or the like on the part of a buyer to support his habit.
United States v. Ortiz, 742 F.2d 712, 715 (2d Cir.1984); see also United States v. Klein, 860 F.2d 1489, 1497 (9th Cir.1988). In this case, the record indicates that defendant implicitly encouraged the juvenile victim’s drug use and burglary attempts by promising him more drugs in lieu of money for the sale of the stolen gun. Under these facts, we will not ignore the potential connection between drug use and violence by classifying this a “nonviolent” crime to lessen its gravity within the context of the Solem analysis. See In re Flores, 58 Cal. App.3d at 228, 128 Cal.Rptr. at 851 (sale of heroin to a minor cannot be classified as nonviolent because “it possesses the potential to cause the commission of innumerable acts of violence____”).
Defendant concedes in his petition for review that “sale of marijuana to a minor is a serious act of misconduct,” but argues that the seriousness of that crime does not justify a sentence of 25 years without possibility of parole when the sale involved only one marijuana cigarette. However, it is not the function of this court to engage in determining what minimum amount of marijuana need be involved in a “serious” offense; that line-drawing function is properly one for the legislature. See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 100 S.Ct. 1133, 63 L.Ed.2d 382 (1980) (fact that defendant stole only a “small” amount of money did not make his sentence disproportionate). The Arizona legislature, by enacting A.R.S. § 13-3409, has already determined that sale of any amount of marijuana to a minor under 15 years old is a serious crime. If this statute “makes a mockery of the law and creates an aura of disrespect,” as the dissent contends, it is for the legislature, and not this court, to correct.
After weighing the seriousness of the crime of transferring an illegal drug to a minor under 15 years old, we do not consider a 25-year prison sentence to be excessively harsh. We note that other sentences of the same or greater duration have been upheld for similar crimes. See, e.g., Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 102 S.Ct. 703, 70 L.Ed.2d 556 (1982) (40-year sentence for possession of less than 9 ounces of marijuana was not cruel and unusual punishment); Pickard v. State, 94 Nev. 681, 585 P.2d 1342 (1978) (mandatory life sentence for selling less than one ounce of marijuana to a minor was not cruel and unusual punishment).
However, defendant also argues that the defect in application of the sentencing provisions of A.R.S. § 13-604.01 to the circumstances of his conviction is not merely the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment; he notes that he is not afforded any possibility of parole, and that the statute robs the court of any discretion to consider the individual facts of a particular case and the defendant’s personal culpability. The state acknowledges that the length of defendant’s sentence in this case was the result of “several analytically separate factors,” including: (1) the presumptive term of 20 years required by A.R.S. § 13-604.01(A); (2) the additional 5 years [249]*249added because of aggravating factors pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-702; (3) the unavailability of parole under § 13-604.01(E); and (4) the mandatory consecutive terms imposed by A.R.S. § 13-604.01(J). Thus, in this case the severity of the sentence involves more than just the imposition of a prison term of 25 years for the crime.
We have previously held that the mandatory nature of a sentence does not render it disproportionate. State v. Day, 148 Ariz. 490, 715 P.2d 743 (1986). In this case, the trial court retained discretion to consider defendant’s personal circumstances in mitigation and aggravation and sentenced him within the statutory range of 15 to 25 years for this offense. See A.R.S. §§ 13-604.01(D), -702. This was not a case in which the court felt constrained by the mandatory minimum sentence to give defendant a harsher sentence than he deserved; rather, here the court used its statutory discretion to give defendant the maximum penalty allowed.
We also do not find the consecutive nature of the sentences to be a factor rendering defendant’s second sentence disproportionate to his crime. Á defendant has no constitutional right to concurrent sentences for two separate crimes involving separate acts. State v. Wesley, 131 Ariz. 246, 640 P.2d 177 (1982); State v. Young, 106 Ariz. 589, 480 P.2d 345 (1971). We therefore do not consider the fact that defendant must serve one sentence for a separate crime before beginning the other as a factor that disproportionately lengthens the second sentence.
Whether the sentence precludes the possibility of parole, however, is a factor in determining its severity. Solem, 463 U.S. at 297, 103 S.Ct. at 3013. The absence of parole, in itself, however, does not make a sentence disproportionate. See Solem, 463 U.S. at 297 n. 24, 103 S.Ct. at 3013-n. 24 (“We raise no question as to the general validity of sentences without possibility of parole”). In this case, the absence of parole availability merely requires us to realistically consider that defendant will serve the entire 25-year term as punishment for his crime instead of a lesser sentence.
Under the facts of this case, we do not find this 25-year sentence excessive. The record indicates defendant’s lengthy prior criminal record, including prior crimes involving children as well as violent offenses, his inability to benefit from alternatives to incarceration, his threats to harm those involved in the prosecution of his case upon his release, and his unwillingness to cooperate with the criminal justice system. Under these circumstances, and considering the seriousness of the crime, we do not find this penalty to be disproportionately harsh under the first prong of the Solem test.
b. Sentences Imposed for Other Crimes in Arizona
The second prong of Solem involves the inquiry whether criminals in Arizona who commit more serious crimes receive less severe sentences than this defendant. 463 U.S. at 292, 103 S.Ct. at 3010. The legislature has determined that dangerous crimes against children are among the most serious crimes possible. In applying this prong, the court of appeals has often compared other dangerous crimes against children to conclude that a sentence “is not disproportionate when compared with other sentences imposed upon similarly situated defendants in Arizona,” because “[a]ll persons convicted of offenses against children such as child molestation, aggravated assault, sexual exploitation, child abuse, or kidnapping, are subjected to the penalties which were imposed upon appellant.” State v. Crego, 154 Ariz. at 280, 742 P.2d at 291; see also State v. Smith, 156 Ariz. at 526, 753 P.2d at 1182 (“all similarly situated defendants who commit multiple dangerous crimes against children fall within the same range of sentencing, and all must serve their sentences in consecutive sequence”). However, we believe the inquiry must be broader than simply comparing all crimes involving minors under 15 years old punishable under the statute that is presently challenged as imposing cruel and unusual punishment. To the extent that Cre-go and Smith limited their inquiry to crimes punishable under A.R.S. [250]*250§ 13-604.01, we disapprove of their analy-ses.
In comparing the punishments for more serious crimes, we consider what the punishment would be for a criminal with defendant’s prior criminal history. Although defendant’s sentence for transferring marijuana to a minor could not be enhanced by his prior convictions because they did not constitute predicate offenses, his prior felony convictions could enhance his sentence for other serious crimes. See generally A.R.S. § 13-604. For example, if this defendant were charged with sale of marijuana in a quantity much larger than that involved here, he would be convicted of a class 2 felony; if the state alleged his prior adult felony convictions, he could be sentenced to a maximum term of 28 years in prison, ineligible for release until two-thirds of the sentence was served. See A.R.S. § 13-3405(B)(9), -(C); A.R.S. §§ 13-701, -702, -604(B). Other class 2 felonies have similarly long sentences for recidivists when the court finds aggravating circumstances as extensive as those shown by defendant’s record.3 For example, the following serious crimes have maximum sentences ranging from 28 years for a nondan-gerous offense to 35 years for a dangerous offense, pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-604(G): sexual assault, A.R.S. § 13-1406; armed robbery, A.R.S. § 13-1904; and kidnapping, A.R.S. § 13-1304. See State v. Byrd, 160 Ariz. 282, 772 P.2d 1135 (App.1988). We thus do not find defendant’s sentence of 25 years without possibility of early release to be disproportionate to the punishments Arizona imposes for more serious crimes, under the second prong of the So-lem test.
c. Sentences for the Same Crime in Other Jurisdictions
The third prong of the Solem test involves a comparison of the punishment im[251]*251posed for the same crime in other jurisdictions.
The state has included in its answering brief a lengthy matrix of the sentencing provisions for sale of marijuana in the other 49 states and the District of Columbia. A review of that information reveals that 35 of the other 50 jurisdictions listed also have more stringent penalties for sale of marijuana to a minor than sale to an adult. Additionally, at least 22 jurisdictions could have sentenced a defendant with 4 prior felony convictions and defendant’s background to a maximum term of 25 years or more for the same crime, some of them up to life sentences.4
However, this comparison again is made more difficult in our analysis by the fact that A.R.S. § 13-604.01 precludes the possibility of parole during the entire term of the sentence. Thus, as a practical matter, defendant’s 25-year sentence is among the harshest in the nation, because he will not be eligible for release until every day of his sentence is served.
We note, however, that this factor alone will not cause a sentence to be considered cruel and unusual under the Solem test. A state’s deviation from the punishment chosen by a majority of other states does not necessarily result in a violation of the eighth amendment. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 464, 104 S.Ct. 3154, 3164, 82 L.Ed.2d 340 (1984). Providing parole is an act of “executive grace” that is not within the “normal expectation” of those that traffic in narcotics, unlike the defendant in Solem, who may have had a “normal expectation” of parole for passing a bad check. United States v. Klein, 860 F.2d 1489, 1497-98 (9th Cir.1988). The nonexistence of parole provisions in mandatory minimum sentences historically has been upheld as constitutional. See Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 267, 95 S.Ct. 379, 385, 42 L.Ed.2d 430 (1974); United States v. Valenzuela, 646 F.2d 352, 354 (9th Cir. 1980); Moore v. Cowan, 560 F.2d 1298, 1302-03 (6th Cir.1977); United States v. Bergdoll, 412 F.Supp. 1308, 1319 (D.Del. 1976). We therefore do not find defendant’s sentence to be cruel and unusual simply because it does not provide the possibility of parole.5
The Ninth Circuit recently upheld another Arizona sentencing scheme against an eighth amendment attack, even though it resulted in the harshest penalties for recidivists in the nation:
The fact that one state has the distinction of setting the most stringent prison sentence for a particular crime does not automatically render such punishment “grossly disproportionate” to the offense or to the punishment dictated by other states. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 281 [100 S.Ct. at 1143]. As the Supreme Court has stated, “[a]bsent a constitutionally imposed uniformity inimical to traditional notions of federalism, some state will always bear the distinction of treating particular offenders more severely than [252]*252any other state.” Id. at 282, 100 S.Ct. at 1143.
Cocio v. Bramlett, 872 F.2d 889, 897 (9th Cir.1989). We similarly find that defendant’s 25-year sentence without possibility of early release, for transferring marijuana to minors, although harsh, is not cruel and unusual as violative of the eighth amendment under the third prong of the Solemn test.
CONCLUSION
We hold that defendant’s 25-year sentence for the sale of one marijuana cigarette to a 14-year-old, to be served without parole and consecutive to his 21-year sentence for trafficking in stolen property, is not disproportionate to his crime, and thus does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the facts of this case.6 His sentence pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-604.01 does not violate the eighth amendment; it is therefore affirmed as modified.
GORDON, C.J., and CAMERON and MOELLER, JJ., concur