State v. Hughes-Davis

2025 Ohio 3151

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: September 4, 2025
• Docket: 114695
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Hughes-Davis, 2025-Ohio-3151.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO, :

Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 114695 v. :

CHRISTOPHER HUGHES-DAVIS, :

Defendant-Appellant. :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: September 4, 2025

Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CR-24-693449-A

Appearances:

Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Steven N. Szelagiewicz, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

James J. Hofelich, for appellant.

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J.:

Appellant Christopher Hughes-Davis appeals his convictions for

rape and gross sexual imposition following a bench trial. For the reasons that

follow, we affirm. I. Procedural Background

In July 2024, the State named Hughes-Davis in a 14-count

indictment charging him with two counts of rape, in violation of R.C.

2907.02(A)(1)(b) (Counts 1 and 3); two counts of rape, in violation of R.C.

2907.02(A)(2) (Counts 9 and 11); four counts of gross sexual imposition, in

violation of R.C. 2907.05(A)(4) (Counts 2, 4, 13, and 14); and six counts of gross

sexual imposition, in violation of R.C. 2907.05(A)(1) (Counts 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, and 12).

Counts 1-4, 9, 11, and 13-14 each contained a sexually violent predator specification

(“SVP specification”). Hughes-Davis waived his right to a jury trial.

II. Bench Trial

A. Victim 1’s Testimony

Victim 1, age 16, testified that Hughes-Davis started “sexually

touching” her when she was around ten years old when they lived in Maple

Heights. She stated that he told her they were going to play a game, and he took

her to the basement where he made her perform fellatio. She stated that she was

confused because she was so young and did not understand.

Victim 1 explained that a subsequent instance of abuse occurred

when she was 12 or 13 years old when they lived on Glenmont Road in Cleveland

Heights. She stated that one incident occurred in his bedroom when he again

invited her to play a game. Victim 1 stated that during this time he tried to “hump”

her, explaining that he tried to have sex with her by making her lay on his bed and

he laid on top of her. Victim 1 said that he tried to take her clothes off and “just tr[ied] to have sex with me” by moving “up and down.” She stated that he tried to

insert his penis in her vagina but was unable to do so.

Victim 1 testified about another incident of abuse that occurred

when she lived in South Euclid. She stated the “same things” happened where

Hughes-Davis would lay her down and try to have sex with her. She stated these

instances of abuse continued even after she moved to Preyer Avenue in Cleveland

Heights, where Hughes-Davis would try to have sex with her. The State elicited

testimony from Victim 1 that Hughes-Davis also made her perform fellatio at that

address, along with all the prior locations where they had lived. She explained that

she could not remember specific times because the abuse started when she was ten

years old.

Victim 1 stated that she did not disclose the abuse until she learned

that her sister, Victim 2, disclosed similar abuse by Hughes-Davis. She explained

that after talking with her sister’s social worker, she wrote her mom a letter

disclosing the abuse. She further testified that she learned that Hughes-Davis had

also abused two other girls in Ravenna, Ohio.

B. Victim 2’s Testimony

Victim 2, age 11, testified that her relationship with Hughes-Davis

was “bad.” She explained that he sexually touched her two times when she was six

years old at the Preyer address. Victim 2 said the first incident occurred in her

brother’s bedroom where Hughes-Davis laid on top of her and moved his body “up

and down” on her body. She described that they were both clothed but she could feel his “private part” rubbing back and forth on her “private part.” She stated that

Hughes-Davis stopped when her mother walked into the room and told him to get

off her. Victim 2 testified that the second incident occurred in Hughes-Davis’s

bedroom where he again laid on top of her. She stated that she disclosed the abuse

to her mother and sisters.

C. Victims 1 and 2 Mother’s Testimony

Mother of both Victims 1 and 2 testified that she believed the

relationship between Victim 1 and Hughes-Davis was a close bond and she never

suspected any inappropriate behavior. She stated that Hughes-Davis denied that

he abused Victim 2 and, even though Mother contacted the police, he was not

arrested at that time. She was not questioned about Victim 2’s allegation that she

walked in on Hughes-Davis abusing Victim 2.

Mother testified that she followed up with a social worker at a child

advocacy center and learned from the social worker that Victim 1 also disclosed

abuse by Hughes-Davis. She stated that Victim 1 wrote her letter about the abuse

— identified as State’s exhibit No. 1.

D. Social Worker’s Testimony

J’nae Bennett, a social worker with Cuyahoga County Division of

Children and Family Services, was assigned to Victim 2’s report. She testified that

during her investigation, she discovered that Victim 1 also reported abuse by

Hughes-Davis. She stated that in delayed disclosure cases, typically no physical

evidence is found. Nevertheless, the agency made a disposition of “indicated” based on the “emotional aspect” of Victim 2’s report. Regarding Victim 1’s report,

the agency again made a disposition of “indicated.” According to Bennett, Victim 1

was hesitant to speak, but appeared emotional and described her body language as

“closed,” because she sat hunched, with her head down.

E. Verdict and Sentence

After deliberating, the trial judge found Hughes-Davis guilty of all

charges. The trial judge then considered evidence and arguments regarding the

SVP specifications. After taking the matter under advisement, the trial court found

Hughes-Davis not guilty of the SVP specifications. The trial court ordered Hughes-

Davis to serve a prison term of life with the possibility of parole after 13 years.

This appeal followed.

III. The Appeal

A. Admission of the Letter

Victim 1 testified that she delayed reporting the abuse because she

was scared of Hughes-Davis and did not understand why he did this to her because

he should have been her protector. She stated that once she found out that he was

also sexually abusing her sister, she came forward and told the sister’s social

worker about the abuse she suffered by Hughes-Davis. Because she was scared to

speak in front of her mother about the abuse, she wrote her a letter. The State

marked the letter as State’s exhibit No. 1 and showed Victim 1 the letter. Defense

counsel objected to Victim 1 reading the letter, but raised no objection to Victim 1 identifying the letter as the same letter she wrote to her mother. She did not

discuss the contents of the letter.

Victim 1’s mother testified that her daughter wrote her a letter

disclosing the abuse. Mother did not read the letter during her testimony, but

identified it as the letter she received from Victim 1.

Following the close of testimony, the State moved to admit the letter

into evidence. Defense counsel objected, contending that mother and Victim 1

testified and, thus, the State was using the letter merely to bolster Victim 1’s

testimony. Over objection, the trial court admitted the letter into evidence. In his

first assignment of error, Hughes-Davis challenges the court’s evidentiary ruling.

“‘It is well established that, pursuant to Evid.R. 104, the introduction

of evidence at trial falls within the sound discretion of the trial court.’” Caruso v.

Leneghan, 2014-Ohio-1824, ¶ 32 (8th Dist.), quoting State v. Heinish, 50 Ohio

St.3d 231, 239 (1990). An abuse of that discretion occurs when “a court exercis[es]

its judgment, in an unwarranted way, in regard to a matter over which it has

discretionary authority.” Johnson v. Abdullah, 2021-Ohio-3304, ¶ 35.

Hughes-Davis contends that the trial court abused its discretion when

it admitted Victim 1’s letter into evidence. He contends that the letter was

inadmissible because no foundation was established, no questions were posed to

Victim 1 about the letter or that it was used to refresh her recollection, and the State

impermissibly used the letter to bolster Victim 1’s testimony about why she delayed

reporting the sexual assault. The State contends that the letter was admissible pursuant to an

exception to the hearsay rule, but even if inadmissible, it was harmless because the

contents of the letter were cumulative to Victim 1’s testimony. The State has not

identified the applicable hearsay exception, and upon our review, we find that no

exception to the hearsay rule applies.

Victim 1’s letter was hearsay, and the trial court should not have

admitted letter into evidence. See State v. Johnson, 2025-Ohio-2770 (8th Dist.)

(letter written by mother to the police requesting that charges be dropped was

deemed inadmissible hearsay when the defense attempted to introduce the letter

during the investigating detective’s testimony); State v. Lott, 2002-Ohio-4540 (5th

Dist.) (letters written by victim to bus driver and school counselor, disclosing prior

sexual abuse were ruled as inadmissible hearsay).

Finding the letter inadmissible, however, does not end our review

because under a harmless-error standard of review, we must further decide whether

the error affected Hughes-Davis’s substantial rights, i.e., that he was prejudiced by

the admission of the letter. Crim.R. 52(A) provides that “[a]ny error, defect,

irregularity, or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be

disregarded.” See State v. Harris, 2015-Ohio-166. Under the harmless-error

standard of review, the State “bears the burden of demonstrating that the error did

not affect the substantial rights of the defendant.” State v. Perry, 2004-Ohio-297,

¶ 15, citing United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 741 (1993). Moreover, when reviewing a conviction following a bench trial, “an

appellate court presumes that a trial court considered nothing but relevant and

competent evidence in reaching its verdict” and this presumption “may be overcome

only by an affirmative showing to the contrary by the appellant.” State v. Wiles, 59

Ohio St.3d 71, 86 (1991), citing State v. Post, 32 Ohio St.3d 380, 384 (1987), see also

State v. Primous, 2020-Ohio-912, ¶ 57 (8th Dist.).

We agree with the State that the error was harmless. Although the

trial judge noted when rendering his verdict that he reviewed the letter, the trial

judge did not elaborate or discuss the contents of the letter in explaining his

verdict. (Tr. 152.) Rather, he focused on the victims’ testimony, finding the

testimonies both credible and consistent.

Based on our review of the letter and the trial testimony, we find that

the letter drafted by Victim 1 did not prejudice Hughes-Davis. The statements and

allegations made in the letter were similar to Victim 1’s testimony. During cross-

examination, Hughes-Davis identified inconsistencies in Victim 1’s testimony and

questioned her on allegations made in the letter about abuse that other girls

suffered from Hughes-Davis. Accordingly, even though it was improper to admit

the letter into evidence, we find that it did not affect his substantial rights, thus

denying him a fair trial. The first assignment of error is overruled.

B. Manifest Weight of the Evidence

“Weight of the evidence concerns ‘the inclination of the greater

amount of credible evidence, offered in a trial, to support one side of the issue rather than the other. . . . Weight is not a question of mathematics, but depends on

its effect in inducing belief.’” (Emphasis omitted.) Eastley v. Volkman, 2012-

Ohio-2179, ¶ 12, quoting State v. Thompkins, 1997-Ohio-52, ¶ 24.

“In our manifest-weight review of a bench trial verdict, we recognize

that the trial court serves as the factfinder, and not the jury.” State v. Crenshaw,

2020-Ohio-4922, ¶ 23 (8th Dist.). “‘When considering whether a judgment is

against the manifest weight of the evidence in a bench trial, an appellate court will

not reverse a conviction where the trial court could reasonably conclude from

substantial evidence that the state has proved the offense beyond a reasonable

doubt.’” State v. Worship, 2022-Ohio-52, ¶ 34 (12th Dist.), quoting State v.

Tranovich, 2009-Ohio-2338, ¶ 7 (12th Dist.). To warrant reversal from a bench

trial under a manifest-weight-of-the-evidence claim, this court must determine

that “‘the trial court clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of

justice that the judgment must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’” Crenshaw at

id., quoting State v. Bell, 2019-Ohio-340 ¶ 41. “A conviction should be reversed as

against the manifest weight of the evidence only in the most ‘exceptional case in

which evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.’” Id., quoting Thompkins at

¶ 25; see also State v. Brown, 2025-Ohio-2804, ¶ 30-31 (reiterating the Thompkins

manifest-weight standard of review).

Hughes-Davis contends in his second assignment of error that his

convictions are against the manifest weight of the evidence. He makes no

argument challenging the actual elements of the offenses or whether the evidence supports the elements Rather, he contends that his convictions are against the

weight of the evidence because there was no physical evidence presented,

Victim 2’s testimony was “spar[s]e,” and Victim 1’s testimony was not credible

because of the delayed reporting and because it included another allegation of

abuse by a different individual.

First, physical evidence is not required to support a conviction for

rape or gross sexual imposition. See generally State v. Scott, 2022-Ohio-2768,

¶ 39 (8th Dist.). Accordingly, the fact that Hughes-Davis’s conviction was based

solely on the victim and witness testimony and not any physical evidence does not

render his conviction against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Moreover, this court has held that a delayed disclosure by a minor

victim of sexual misconduct does not render a conviction against the manifest

weight of the evidence. State v. Peterson, 2024-Ohio-2903, ¶ 20 (8th Dist.), citing

State v. Harris, 2018-Ohio-578, ¶ 53 (8th Dist.). Here, the trial court considered

the testimony of both victims, including any details surrounding the abuse and the

reasons for disclosing or the delay in disclosing. A trier of fact is free to believe all,

some, or none of the testimony of each witness testifying at trial. State v. Jones,

2020-Ohio-3367, ¶ 85 (8th Dist.). Thus, a conviction is not against the manifest

weight of the evidence “solely because the [trier of fact] heard inconsistent or

contradictory testimony.” State v. Rudd, 2016-Ohio-106, ¶ 72 (8th Dist.), citing

State v. Wade, 2008-Ohio-4574, ¶ 38 (8th Dist.). Finally, Hughes-Davis misconstrues the testimony that Victim 1

accused another individual of abuse. The trial court was presented with testimony

that although Hughes-Davis suspected that Victim 1 was abused by another

individual, Victim 1 stated that his allegation was false. Nevertheless, whether

Victim 1 suffered abuse by another individual does not render the allegations

against Hughes-Davis unfounded or his convictions against the manifest weight of

the evidence. The trial court heard the testimony, reviewed the evidence, and

determined that Hughes-Davis committed the sexual offenses against both

victims. Hughes-Davis has not demonstrated that this is the exceptional case

where the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage

of justice that his convictions must be reversed. The second assignment of error is

overruled.

Judgment affirmed.

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s

conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case

remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule

27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, JUDGE

MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, P.J., and SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR