[Cite as M.L.H. v. S.R.S., 2025-Ohio-5860.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
M.L.H., :
Petitioner-Appellee, : No. 115152
v. :
S.R.S., II, :
Respondent-Appellant. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: December 31, 2025
Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court Domestic Relations Division Case No. DV-24-401281
Appearances:
S.R.S., II, pro se.
Stephen P. Hanudel, for appellee.
MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, P.J.:
Respondent-appellant S.R.S., II (“Respondent”) appeals the domestic
relations court granting petitioner-appellee M.L.H.’s (“Petitioner”) petition for a
domestic violence civil protection order (“DVCPO”) against Respondent.
Respondent claims that the evidence presented at the full hearing on the petition is insufficient to support the court’s order and that the court’s judgment is against the
manifest weight of the evidence. Respondent also challenges the scope of the
DVCPO, alleging that it is “overly restrictive, prejudicial and burdensome[.]”
Upon a thorough review of the record, we find that the lower court’s
judgment is supported by sufficient evidence, is not against the manifest weight of
the evidence, and is not overly restrictive, prejudicial, or burdensome. For the
following reasons, we affirm the judgement of the court below.
I. Procedural History and Relevant Facts
A. Relevant Facts
Petitioner is an associate professor at Cleveland State University,
Monte Ahuja College of Business. Respondent has been a licensed attorney in the
State of Ohio since 2003. The two were married for seven years and have two
children together, ages six and four. They separated in July 2021, and their marriage
officially ended in divorce in September 2023 in Cuyahoga D.R. No. DR-21-387421
(“the divorce case”). They have been involved in post-decree litigation in that case
ever since, wherein Respondent has represented himself pro se. Petitioner has been
represented by counsel in the post-decree litigation since July 8, 2024.
1. Legal Filings — Service
On February 20, 2024, while litigation was ongoing in the divorce
case, Respondent, acting pro se, filed a lawsuit against Petitioner, in Cuyahoga C.P.
No. CV-24-993122, which was eventually dismissed by Respondent. When the
lawsuit was filed, Respondent requested the clerk to serve the filing at Petitioner’s home address and her place of employment, Cleveland State University, Monte
Ahuja College of Business, Dean’s Office. On May 23, 2024, Respondent filed a
separate motion in the unrelated divorce case. He again requested the clerk to serve
Petitioner at her home address and her place of employment, Cleveland State
University, Monte Ahuja College of Business, Dean’s Office.
On June 3, 2024, the Dean of the Cleveland State University, Monte
Ahuja College of Business sent a cease-and-desist letter to Respondent advising him
to stop serving Petitioner at the Dean’s office. Respondent acknowledged that he
had received the cease-and-desist letter but continued to serve Petitioner at her
place of employment and instructed the clerk to serve the Dean’s office on at least
six additional occasions.
In the divorce case, Respondent filed multiple filings in which he
instructed the clerk to serve her place of employment, even after the cease-and-
desist letter was sent and while she was represented by counsel. On the following
dates, Respondent requested the clerk to serve Petitioner at her place of
employment: August 1, 2024, August 22, 2024, September 16, 2024, October 8,
2024, January 21, 2025, January 28, 2025, February 14, 2025, March 20, 2025, and
March 25, 2025. In Cuyahoga C.P. No. CV-24-102000, Respondent had refiled the
civil case against Petitioner and requested the clerk to serve Petitioner at her place
of employment on the following date: August 13, 2024. Respondent filed another
civil case against Petitioner and requested the clerk to serve Petitioner at her place
of employment on the following date: February 11, 2025. 2. Specific Incidents
a. March 10, 2024 — Welfare Check
The custody arrangement between the parties designates Petitioner
as the residential parent. Respondent has parenting time with the children every
Wednesday evening until the next day and every other weekend during which time
the children stay at Respondent’s residence.
Petitioner and Respondent communicate through a program called
“Our Family Wizard.” The children were with Respondent at his residence on
March 10, 2025, when Petitioner testified that she received a message that one of
her children had vomited and that the child had been given medicine. Petitioner
was concerned, stating that the child had a history of strep throat. Petitioner called
the police to request a welfare check be conducted to make sure her children were
okay. Petitioner testified that she did not go to Respondent’s house herself “because
in the past, there’s been a high conflict situation” and she stated that she wanted to
avoid a confrontation with Respondent. Officer Bambauer of the Cleveland Heights
Police Department conducted the welfare check and ultimately determined the
children were okay but just sick. He testified that it was a “fairly normal” welfare
check.
The following day, when the children were back in Petitioner’s
custody, Petitioner and Respondent were communicating via a Facetime call. A
video of that call was introduced as Petitioner’s Exhibit R. On the video, Respondent
can be heard saying something along the lines of “[t]hat’s the last time you’re calling the cops on me. Do it again. Do it again.” Respondent can also be heard saying:
“So you got your last time to call the cops to my house and then come to my house
when I tell you not to come. So keep doing this and see what happens.” Petitioner
testified that this conversation made her feel scared and intimidated.
Respondent testified that what he said was not meant as a physical
threat. Rather, he explained that what he meant was that he was “going to take
appropriate legal action against her, whether it’s criminal or civil.”
b. September 2024 — MetroHealth Incident
In September 2024, prior to filing for the DVCPO, Petitioner stated
she and Respondent were at MetroHealth attending therapy with their son.
Petitioner testified that as they were exiting an elevator, Respondent started to get
upset about a haircut that their son had received. Respondent kept getting louder
and louder, eventually calling her a “cunt.” Petitioner testified that Respondent then
told their son, “I can’t wait to tell you later about your mom.” Petitioner stated that
during this interaction, she was fearful for her physical safety. She contacted
MetroHealth security and made a report.
Respondent claims that Petitioner was untruthful concerning this
incident. Respondent testified that he was having a conversation with the doctor
regarding his son’s medical diagnosis and condition and that he mentioned that he
had been blocked from getting access to medical records. He stated that Petitioner
suddenly jumped up and “explode[d] in anger and direct[ed] the doctor to call the police.” Respondent speculated that Petitioner did this because she did not want it
to get out that she had blocked his access to medical records.
Petitioner testified that she is concerned for her safety and well-being
with respect to Respondent. She explained that she believes things are escalating in
that this situation has made it to her place of employment. She also stated that she
does not feel safe when she is around Respondent in one-on-one situations.
B. DVCPO Procedural History
On September 9, 2024, Petitioner filed a petition for a DVCPO against
her ex-husband, Respondent (“the DVCPO case”). The petition indicated that
Respondent had “made open threats during a facetime call with the kids.” It also
stated that Respondent had been serving her with legal filings at her home and at
her place of work addressed to the Dean’s office at Cleveland State University, Monte
Ahuja College of Business. The petition alleged that Respondent continued to serve
these filings at the Dean’s office, even after being sent a cease-and-desist letter. An
ex parte DVCPO was issued the same day.
A full evidentiary hearing was held on April 4, 2025. On April 23,
2025, the lower court granted Petitioner’s request for a DVCPO. Petitioner is the
only protected party listed on the order. The DVCPO provides, in relevant part, that
Respondent is not to (1) contact Petitioner, (2) be present within 500 feet of
Petitioner, (3) interfere with Petitioner’s residence, school, business, or place of
employment, or (4) use any form of electronic surveillance on Petitioner. It is this DVCPO from which Respondent appeals. He raises the
following three assignments of error for our review:
1. The trial court erred in granting [DVCPO] as the evidence that [Petitioner] presented was insufficient to meet the standard required pursuant to R.C. 3113.31.
2. The Judgment in favor of [Petitioner] was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
3. The trial court’s [DVCPO] is overly restrictive, prejudicial and burdensome as it prohibits [Respondent] from attending the school activities, doctor’s appointments and extracurricular activities of the parties’ minor children despite the minor children not being protected parties pursuant to the [DVCPO.]
II. Law and Argument
A. First Assignment of Error — Sufficiency of the Evidence
In his first assignment of error, Respondent alleges that the evidence
was insufficient to support the DVCPO issued by the domestic relations court. Since
we find that the evidence presented at the full hearing is sufficient to support the
court’s issuance of the DVCPO, we overrule Respondent’s first assignment of error.
1. Applicable Law
a. DVCPO
R.C. 3113.31 governs issuances of DVCPO’s in Ohio. To obtain a
DVCPO, “the petitioner must establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, ‘that
petitioner or petitioner’s family or household members are in danger of domestic
violence.’” R.E.S. v. M.J.M, 2025-Ohio-546, ¶ 15 (8th Dist.), quoting Croone v. Arif,
2014-Ohio-5546, ¶ 18 (8th Dist.), citing Felton v. Felton, 79 Ohio St.3d 34 (1997), paragraph two of the syllabus. R.C. 3113.31(A)(1)(a) defines “domestic violence,” in
pertinent part, as the occurrence of one or more of the following acts against a family
or household member:
(i) Attempting to cause or recklessly causing bodily injury;
(ii) Placing another person by threat of force in fear of imminent serious physical harm or committing a violation of section 2903.211 or 2911.211 of the Revised Code;
R.C. 2903.211(A)(1) governs the offense of menacing by stalking, and
it provides, in relevant part: “No person by engaging in a pattern of conduct shall
knowingly cause another person to believe that the offender will cause physical harm
to the other person . . . or cause mental distress to the other person[.]” (Emphasis
added.)
b. Standard of Review
The decision to grant a protection order lies within the discretion of
the trial court and “will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion.” R.E.S.
at ¶ 18, citing E.A. v. A.A., 2024-Ohio-2807, ¶ 37 (8th Dist.). Abuse of discretion
implies that the court’s decision was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable, not
merely that an appellate court might have reached a different conclusion. State v.
Morris, 2012-Ohio-2407, ¶ 14. With respect to the issuance of a DVCPO, the
question on review thus becomes “‘whether there was sufficient credible evidence to
support a finding that the respondent had engaged in acts or threats of domestic
violence.’” C.A.P. v. M.D.P., 2021-Ohio-3030, ¶ 22 (8th Dist.), quoting Abuhamda-
Sliman v. Sliman, 2005-Ohio-2836, ¶ 10 (8th Dist.). “We must be mindful that when applying the abuse of discretion standard, ‘we should not substitute our
judgment for that of the trial court.’” T.C. v. R.B.C., 2025-Ohio-1554, ¶ 10 (8th
Dist.), quoting Mills v. Mills, 2025-Ohio-452, ¶ 28 (8th Dist.).
c. Analysis
Respondent argues that the evidence does not support the lower
court’s issuance of the DVCPO since there was no physical contact or threats of
bodily harm made by Respondent towards Petitioner. Respondent directs this court
to the fact Petitioner testified that Respondent never physically threatened or
assaulted Petitioner.
However, “‘“[t]he statutory criterion to determine whether or not to
grant a civil protection order pursuant to R.C. 3113.31 is the existence or threatened
existence of domestic violence.”’” R.E.S., 2025-Ohio-546, at ¶ 17 (8th Dist.), quoting
Tyler v. Tyler, 2016-Ohio-7419, ¶ 18 (2d Dist.), quoting Thomas v. Thomas, 44 Ohio
App.3d 6, 8 (10th Dist. 1988). “Explicit threats of domestic violence are not required
in order to support the issuance of a civil protection order. Instead, statements,
conduct, and actions, taken with all surrounding facts and circumstances, can
constitute a threat.” R.E.S. at ¶ 17, citing J.S. v. L.S., 2022-Ohio-2485 (10th Dist.)
Here, the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that
Respondent’s conduct caused or may cause mental distress to Petitioner in violation
of R.C. 2903.211 (menacing by stalking). R.C. 2903.211(A)(1) defines mental
distress as any of the following: (a) Any mental illness or condition that involves some temporary substantial incapacity;
(b) Any mental illness or condition that would normally require psychiatric treatment, psychological treatment, or other mental health services, whether or not any person requested or received psychiatric treatment, psychological treatment, or other mental health services.
We have recognized that “a court may issue a DVCPO based on
evidence of menacing by stalking . . . [and] may be established absent an ‘act that
placed another person by the threat of force in fear of imminent serious physical
harm.’” C.A.P., 2021-Ohio-3030, at ¶ 21 (8th Dist.).
A video of a Facetime call between Respondent and Petitioner was
presented at the hearing. The call took place the day following the welfare check. In
the video, Respondent can be heard saying to Petitioner: “That’s the last time you’re
calling the cops on me. Do it again. Do it again” and “So you got your last time to
call the cops to my house and then come to my house when I tell you not to come.
So keep doing this and see what happens.” As a result, Petitioner testified that she
felt scared and intimidated. She explained that she did not know what would
happen next.
Another incident occurred a few months later at MetroHealth.
Petitioner testified that while Petitioner was with Respondent at a therapy
appointment with their son, Respondent got upset about a haircut her son had
received, leading Respondent to call her a “cunt.” This led to Petitioner contacting
MetroHealth security and filing a report. Petitioner testified that she was fearful of
“what was going to come next like.” Respondent disputes Petitioner’s testimony concerning the
MetroHealth incident, going so far as calling it “untruthful.” However, a claim of
insufficiency questions “whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support a
verdict as a matter of law.” State v. Parker, 2022-Ohio-1237, ¶ 7 (8th Dist.), citing
State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386 (1997). Thus, we will not consider the
credibility of a witness when reviewing whether there was sufficient evidence to
support the lower court’s findings. In re C.A., 2015-Ohio-4768, ¶ 51 (8th Dist.),
citing State v. Williams, 2013-Ohio-1181, ¶ 27 (8th Dist.). As such, “[t]he testimony
of one witness, if believed by the factfinder, is enough.” Id., citing State v. Adams,
2014-Ohio-4233, ¶ 14 (5th Dist.).
Petitioner presented multiple legal filings filed by Respondent
wherein Respondent had instructed the clerk of courts to serve upon Petitioner at
her place of employment and her home residence. R.C. 2903.211(A)(1) provides that
a person’s mental distress “may be based on words or conduct of the offender that
are directed at or identify a corporation, association, or other organization that
employs the other person or to which the other person belongs.” (Emphasis added.)
R.C. 2903.211(A)(1). Respondent continued to instruct the clerk to serve Petitioner
at her place of employment for multiple legal filings, even after Petitioner had
obtained counsel in the divorce case and the Dean of the Cleveland State University,
Monte Ahuja College of Business had sent a cease-and-desist letter to Respondent.
Petitioner testified that while she was being served with these filings
at her place of employment, other faculty members became aware of legal filings that had been mailed to her. Other faculty members had come up to her asking her
if they are safe, or if they had anything to worry about concerning these filings.
Petitioner stated that at least ten people from the university approached her
concerning these filings.
As a result, Petitioner testified that she had to have discussions with
the police chief and general counsel. The provost of the university also contacted
her. She became distraught and worried about losing her job. She stated that she
was stressed every day with other people she worked with questioning her and
asking her if the other party is going to come to the school. Her colleagues were
concerned for their own safety.
Respondent states that service of filings through the clerk at
Petitioner’s place of employment was lawful and cannot be considered
“harassment.” Civ.R. 5(B)(1) provides, in relevant part, that “[i]f a party is
represented by an attorney, service under this rule shall be made on the attorney
unless the court orders service on the party.” On July 8, 2024, an attorney for
Petitioner filed a notice of appearance in the divorce case. Respondent does not
direct us to anywhere in the record where the lower court ordered service to be made
on Petitioner rather than her attorney. Nonetheless, on multiple occasions after
Petitioner obtained counsel, Respondent continued to instruct to clerk to serve
Petitioner rather than her attorney at her place of employment even though he was
not required to do so. In viewing the totality of the evidence presented at the full hearing,
we find that there was sufficient credible evidence to support a finding that the
DVCPO was necessary to protect Petitioner from domestic violence, i.e. menacing
by stalking pursuant to R.C. 2903.211. Accordingly, Respondent’s first assignment
of error is overruled.
B. Second Assignment of Error – Manifest Weight of the Evidence
In his second assigned error for review, Respondent contends that the
lower court’s judgement granting the DVCPO is against the manifest weight of the
evidence that was presented at the full hearing.
1. Standard of Review
In contrast to a sufficiency challenge, a challenge with respect to the
weight of the evidence concerns “‘“the inclination of the greater amount of credible
evidence, offered in a trial, to support one side of the issue rather than the other. . . .
Weight is not a question of mathematics, but depends on its effect in inducing
belief.”’” State v. Hughes-Davis, 2025-Ohio-3151, ¶ 24 (8th Dist.), quoting Eastley
v. Volkman, 2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 12, quoting Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387. The
Ohio Supreme Court has stated that when conducting a manifest-weight review, the
reviewing court “must weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider
the credibility of the witnesses, and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the
evidence, the finder of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest
miscarriage of justice that the judgment must be reversed and a new trial ordered.”
In re Z.C., 2023-Ohio-4703, ¶ 14, citing Eastley at ¶ 20. In conducting this review, the Ohio Supreme Court noted that we
must be mindful of the presumption in favor of the finder of fact and, “‘[i]f the
evidence is susceptible of more than one construction, the reviewing court is bound
to give it that interpretation which is consistent with the verdict and judgment, most
favorable to sustaining the verdict and judgment.’” Parma Hts. v. Brett, 2025-Ohio-
4, ¶ 21 (8th Dist.), quoting In re Z.C. at ¶ 14. The underlying rationale of giving
deference to the findings of the finder of fact is that “the finder of fact is in the ‘best
position to view the witnesses and observe their demeanor, gestures, and voice
inflections that are critical observations in determining the credibility of a witness
and his or her testimony.’” State v. Jones, 2025-Ohio-2866, ¶ 47 (8th Dist.), quoting
State v. Sheline, 2019-Ohio-528, ¶ 100 (8th Dist.). As such, a manifest-weight-of-
the-evidence challenge will be sustained “‘“‘only in the exceptional case in which the
evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.’”’” State v. Dodson, 2025-Ohio-
1733, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.), quoting Thompkins at 387, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio
App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist. 1983).
2. Analysis
Respondent raises the same claims made in his sufficiency claim
above only now he challenges the credibility of Petitioner’s testimony claiming that
it contained “numerous inconsistencies and unsubstantiated allegations” and that
the lower court’s decision was “based disproportionately on [Petitioner’s] subjective
fears rather than objective evidence[.]” While Respondent claims that Petitioner’s testimony contained
numerous inconsistencies, he fails to direct this court any specific inconsistencies.
In short, Respondent claims that the lower court “ignored or discounted”
Respondent’s testimony, which he believes is more credible than Petitioner’s. It is
well-established that a “finder of fact is free to believe some, all, or none of a
witness’s testimony.” Melenick v. McManamon, 2010-Ohio-1051, ¶ 28 (8th Dist.),
citing State v. Ghaster, 2009-Ohio-2134, ¶ 46 (8th Dist.).
After reviewing all the evidence presented at the full hearing, we
cannot say that this is one of those exceptional cases where the court’s decision is
against the manifest weight of the evidence. Accordingly, Respondent’s second
assignment of error is overruled.
C. Third Assignment of Error — Scope of the DVCPO
In his third and final assigned error for review, Respondent
challenges the scope of the DVCPO. Respondent claims the DVCPO violates his
constitutional right to parent his children because its terms “unduly restrict[ him]
from attending educational and extracurricular activities, despite the absence of
allegations or evidence of harm or threats towards the minor children.”
We have held that “[b]ecause R.C. 3113.31 expressly authorizes the
courts to craft protection orders that are tailored to the particular circumstances, it
follows that the trial court has discretion in establishing the scope of a protection
order and that judgment ought not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.” Abuhamda-Sliman, 2005-Ohio-2836, at ¶ 9 (8th Dist.). As such, we will not disturb
the scope of the lower court’s DVCPO absent a showing that the court abused its
discretion.
Respondent argues the scope of the DVCPO is overly broad and
interferes with his fundamental right to parent because it prevents him from
attending his children’s extracurricular events and school activities “simply because
Petitioner may be present.” We recognize that “the ‘right to parent one’s children is
a fundamental right.’” In re B.W., 2015-Ohio-2768, ¶ 21 (8th Dist.), quoting In re
C.F., 2007-Ohio-1104, ¶ 28, citing Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000). This
right includes the “right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody,
and control of their children.” Troxel at 66.
As a preliminary matter we note there is nothing specific in the
DVCPO preventing Respondent from making decisions concerning the care,
custody, and control of his children.
To the extent that Respondent argues that the collateral
consequences arising from the terms of the DVCPO violate his fundamental
constitutional right to parent his children, this issue was neither raised below nor
addressed by the lower court. This court has consistently held that we “‘will not
consider a question not presented, considered or decided by a lower court.’” First
Rehab. Funding, LLC v. Milton, 2025-Ohio-2677, ¶ 23 (8th Dist.), quoting Spy v. Arbor Park Phase One Assoc., 2020-Ohio-2944, ¶ 16 (8th Dist.). Since this
constitutional issue was not addressed below, we decline to address it now.
Respondent also claims that there was no evidence that Respondent
caused harm or made threats to the minor children, and therefore the DVCPO is
overbroad. But again, the only protected person listed on the DVCPO is Petitioner,
not the children. The purpose of a DVCPO is to “‘“prevent the type of persistent and
threatening harassment that leaves victims in constant fear of physical danger or
mental distress.”’” J.A.C. v. A.L., 2022-Ohio-2275, ¶ 18, quoting McKinley v. Kuhn,
2011-Ohio-134, ¶ 14 (4th Dist.), quoting Kramer v. Kramer, 2002-Ohio-4383, ¶ 17
(3d Dist.). Whether there was evidence of threats or harm made towards the
children is irrelevant with respect to DVCPO naming the Petitioner as the sole
protected person.
Here, the trial court’s order is tailored to prevent future harassment
of Petitioner from Respondent. Petitioner is the only protected person listed on the
DVCPO. Respondent is ordered, in relevant part, to (1) “not be present within 500
feet” of Petitioner, (2) “not interfere with the residence, school, business, place of
employment” of Petitioner, and (3) “not initiate or have any contact with [Petitioner]
or their residences, businesses, [or] places of employment.” In light of the evidence
presented at trial as discussed above, we find that the scope of the order was tailored
to prevent Petitioner from suffering from the mental distress inflicted by
Respondent in person and at her place of employment. Accordingly, we find that the court’s issuance of the DVCPO was
tailored to prevent Petitioner from future harm or mental distress caused by
Respondent. As a result, the trial court did not abuse its discretion with respect to
the scope of the DVCPO. Respondent’s third assignment of error is overruled.
III. Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the domestic relations court. The trial
court did not abuse its discretion by issuing the DVCPO in favor of Petitioner against
the Respondent, since there was sufficient evidence presented below to support the
court’s order and that the court’s order was not against the manifest weight of the
evidence. Nor do we find that the DVCPO is overbroad in scope.
Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
common pleas court, domestic relations division, to carry this judgment into
execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
_________________________________ MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, PRESIDING JUDGE
WILLIAM A. KLATT, J.,* CONCURS; EMANUELLA D. GROVES, J., DISSENTS (WITH SEPARATE OPINION)
(*Sitting by assignment: William A. Klatt, J., retired, of the Tenth District Court of Appeals.)
EMANUELLA D. GROVES, J., DISSENTING:
Respectfully, I dissent from the resolution of the third assignment of
error. I agree with the majority opinion’s resolution of the first and second
assignments of error. However, I would find that DVCPO’s scope is overly broad
since it does not make any accommodations for Respondent’s shared-parenting
responsibilities.
I recognize that the record before us does not include an
overabundance of information regarding Respondent’s argument that the scope of
the DVCPO interferes with his fundamental right to parent his children by
preventing him from attending their extracurricular events, school activities, and
appointments. I further recognize that Respondent’s argument is being further
developed through his pending motion to modify the DVCPO.
However, the record before us does, in fact, establish that Respondent
and Petitioner have two children whom they co-parent. The record further reveals that Respondent and Petitioner both attend certain child-related events and have
procedures in place for picking up and dropping off their children. Nevertheless,
the DVCPO orders Respondent to “not be present within 500 feet of Petitioner” and
does not make any accommodations for the Respondent and Petitioner’s children or
their parenting responsibilities. Thus, while the order only lists the Petitioner as a
protected person, the broad 500-foot restriction — absent any provision allowing for
the Respondent and Petitioner’s shared-parenting arrangement — effectively
encompasses the children any time Petitioner is present. Consequently, the
DVCPO’s scope goes beyond the mere prevention of Respondent’s future
harassment of the Petitioner.
To compare, in In re R.K., 2020-Ohio-35, ¶ 79-81 (8th Dist.), we
found that the trial court carefully considered the totality of the circumstances in
crafting the scope of a protection order. There, the petitioner and respondent
attended the same school and their families lived next door to each other. The trial
court considered the close proximity of the families, making accommodations for
sidewalks and bus stops, and did not impose any conditions that would significantly
disrupt the education of either party. We concluded that the scope of the protection
sufficiently protected the petitioner and her family without unnecessarily burdening
the respondent and his family. Unlike In re R.K., the trial court in this case did not
consider the totality of the circumstances — namely, that Respondent and Petitioner
are co-parents — and the DVCPO’s scope unduly intrudes on Respondent’s ability
to care for and be present with his children. Accordingly, I would find that the trial court abused its discretion by
including a broad 500-foot restriction in the DVCPO without accounting for any of
Respondent’s parenting responsibilities. Therefore, I would sustain Respondent’s
third assignment of error, reverse the judgment, and remand the matter for the trial
court to impose a less restrictive condition in consideration of Respondent’s shared-
parenting arrangement.