State v. Burks

2026 Ohio 259

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: January 29, 2026
• Docket: 115054
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Burks, 2026-Ohio-259.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO, :

Plaintiff- Appellee, : No. 115054 v. :

JUSTIN L. BURKS, :

Defendant-Appellant. : _______________________________________

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: VACATED AND REMANDED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: January 29, 2026

Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CR-24-691559-A

Appearances:

Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Sarah J. Denney, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

Cullen Sweeney, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and Jennifer J. Pritchard, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.

MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, A.J.:

Defendant-appellant Justin L. Burks (“Burks”) appeals from the

judgment of his conviction and sentence for sexual battery. On appeal, Burks focuses his challenge on the trial court’s decision to classify him as a sexual predator.

He alleges that (1) the trial court’s determination that he is a sexual predator is

against the manifest weight of the evidence; (2) the evidence presented at the sexual-

predator hearing was insufficient to support the trial court’s finding him to be a

sexual predator; and (3) he was provided constitutionally ineffective assistance of

counsel.

Upon a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we find that

the record concerning the court’s classification of Burks as a sexual predator is

insufficient for appellate review. For this reason, we vacate Burks’s classification as

a sexual predator and remand this case back to the trial court to conduct a sexual-

predator hearing consistent with this opinion.

I. Procedural History and Relevant Facts

A. Indictment and Plea Agreement

In April 2024, the Cuyahoga County Grand Jury charged Burks with

one count of rape, in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(2), a felony of the first degree.

The indictment alleged that Burks “did engage in sexual conduct with [the victim]

by purposely compelling her to submit by force or threat of force. To wit: vaginal

intercourse.” The indictment indicated that the offense occurred “[o]n or about

August 18, 1999[.]”

On January 8, 2025, Burks entered into a plea agreement with the

State. As consideration for the plea, the State amended the sole charge in the

indictment to sexual battery, a felony of the third degree, to which Burks pleaded guilty. Prior to his plea, Burks was notified he would be required to report under the

statutory-sex-offender-registration scheme that was in place at the time of the

offense (commonly referred to as “Megan’s Law.”). The parties agreed that Burks

would be classified as either (1) a sexually oriented offender or (2) a sexual predator.

The parties agreed that the third possible classification, habitual-sexual offender,

was not applicable.

B. Sexual-Predator Hearing and Sentencing

On February 12, 2025, the State filed a sentencing memorandum

requesting the trial court to impose a prison term. The State’s memorandum set

forth the relevant facts that led to Burks’s conviction and referenced four separate

police reports concerning prior offenses in which Burks was allegedly involved.

With respect to the conviction underlying Burks’s instant plea, the

State’s memorandum explained that on August 18, 1999, the female victim was

living with her cousin in an apartment complex in Cleveland, OH. Burks came to

the residence in the early morning hours with a friend of the victim. The victim had

never met Burks before. At some point during the night, Burks grabbed the victim,

forced her onto a living room couch, removed her clothes, placed his hand over the

victim’s mouth, and forced his penis into her vagina.

The State’s memorandum indicated that the victim sought medical

treatment at the Cleveland Clinic where a sexual-assault kit was collected. In 2014,

there was a Combined DNA Index System (“CODIS”) match between the samples

collected from the victim’s sexual-assault kit. The suspect remained unknown until 2017, when another CODIS hit matched Burks with the sperm found in the samples

collected in the sexual-assault kit of the victim.

Sentencing occurred on March 27, 2025. Prior to sentencing, the court

held a sexual-predator hearing to determine whether Burks would be classified as

either a sexually oriented offender or a sexual predator under Megan’s Law. The

State urged the trial court to classify Burks as a sexual predator. In support, the

State addressed the relevant statutory factors the court was required to consider.

The State also introduced four police reports purporting to set forth previous

criminal and sexual offenses allegedly committed by Burks.1 Burks’s attorney

argued against classifying Burks a sexual predator and argued to instead classify him

as a sexually oriented offender, the least restrictive classification.

At the conclusion of the sexual-predator hearing, the court stated:

After listening to everything stated on the record and reviewing the record, I do find that the State has proved by clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Burks is a sexual predator. Therefore, he will have to register for a lifetime with verification every 90 days after the date of initial registration.

The court proceeded to sentencing. The court imposed a sentence of

24 months in prison and advised that after he is released from prison, Burks will be

1 These reports were introduced as State’s exhibit Nos. 1 – 4. It should be noted that while

the prosecutor stated that State’s exhibit Nos. 1 and 2 were police reports concerning Burks, the reports do not name “Justin Burks” as the suspect. Exhibit No. 1 concerns a sexually oriented offense but lists the suspect’s name as “Justin Smalls.” Exhibit No. 2 also concerns a sexually oriented offense and lists the suspect as “unknown” but the victim’s narrative indicates that the suspect’s first name as Justin. Exhibits Nos. 3 and 4 concern menacing-by-stalking and domestic-violence offenses concerning Justin Burks but neither concern a sexually oriented offense. subject to five years of postrelease control. The court also notified Burks of the

reporting requirements as the result of being classified as a sexual predator.

C. Appeal

Burks filed a timely notice of appeal from the trial court’s judgment

entry imposing sentence and classifying him as a sexual predator. He presents three

assignments of error for our review:

1. [Burks’s] classification as a sexual predator is against the manifest weight of the evidence as the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that [Burks] is “likely to engage in the future in one or more sexual oriented offenses.”

2. There was insufficient evidence to find [Burks] a sexual predator.

3. [Burks’s] constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel was violated.

II. Law and Analysis

In his first and second assigned errors for review, Burks alleges that

his classification as a sexual predator under Megan’s Law is against the manifest

weight of the evidence and that the evidence presented at the sexual-predator

hearing was insufficient to support the trial court’s order finding him to be a sexual

predator. The arguments Burks presents in each assignment of error are

substantially similar. And since an appellate court reviews a trial court’s sexual-

predator designation under the manifest weight of the evidence rather than a

sufficiency challenge, we will address these arguments together under the manifest

weight standard of review. A. Applicable Law

Former version of R.C. 2950, also known as Megan’s Law, classifies

sex offenders into three categories: “(1) sexually oriented offenders, (2) habitual

sexual offenders, and (3) sexual predators.” State v. Holloway, 2021-Ohio-204, ¶ 8

(8th Dist.), citing State v. Cook, 83 Ohio St.3d 404, 407 (1998). “To be classified as

a ‘sexual predator,’ the most severe designation, the trial court must find, by clear

and convincing evidence (1) that the defendant has been convicted of, or pleaded

guilty to, a sexually oriented offense and (2) that he is likely to engage in one or more

sexually oriented offenses in the future.” Id., citing State v. Eppinger, 91 Ohio St.3d

158, 163 (2001), citing former R.C. 2950.01(E) and former R.C. 2950.09(B)(3).

Clear and convincing evidence has been defined as “‘that measure or

degree of proof which is more than a mere “preponderance of the evidence” but not

to the extent of such certainty as is required “beyond a reasonable doubt” in criminal

cases, and which will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or

conviction as to the facts sought to be established.’” In re K.H., 2008-Ohio-4825,

¶ 42, quoting Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469 (1954).

Former R.C. 2950.09(B)(3) lists ten factors a trial court must

consider when determining whether a sex offender should be classified a sexual

predator. These factors include the following:

(a) The offender’s or delinquent child’s age;

(b) The offender’s or delinquent child’s prior criminal or delinquency record regarding all offenses, including, but not limited to, all sexual offenses; (c) The age of the victim of the sexually oriented offense for which sentence is to be imposed or the order of disposition is to be made;

(d) Whether the sexually oriented offense for which sentence is to be imposed or the order of disposition is to be made involved multiple victims;

(e) Whether the offender or delinquent child used drugs or alcohol to impair the victim of the sexually oriented offense or to prevent the victim from resisting;

(f) If the offender or delinquent child previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to, or been adjudicated a delinquent child for committing an act that if committed by an adult would be, a criminal offense, whether the offender or delinquent child completed any sentence or dispositional order imposed for the prior offense or act and, if the prior offense or act was a sex offense or a sexually oriented offense, whether the offender or delinquent child participated in available programs for sexual offenders;

(g) Any mental illness or mental disability of the offender or delinquent child;

(h) The nature of the offender’s or delinquent child’s sexual conduct, sexual contact, or interaction in a sexual context with the victim of the sexually oriented offense and whether the sexual conduct, sexual contact, or interaction in a sexual context was part of a demonstrated pattern of abuse;

(i) Whether the offender or delinquent child, during the commission of the sexually oriented offense for which sentence is to be imposed or the order of disposition is to be made, displayed cruelty or made one or more threats of cruelty;

(j) Any additional behavioral characteristics that contribute to the offender's or delinquent child's conduct.

Former R.C. 2950.09(B)(3). B. Standard of Review

Sex-offender classifications under Megan’s Law are civil in nature

and are therefore reviewed under a manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard. See

Holloway, 2021-Ohio-204, at ¶ 11 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Wilson, 2007-Ohio-

2202, syllabus. A challenge concerning the weight of the evidence concerns “‘“the

inclination of the greater amount of credible evidence, offered in a trial, to support

one side of the issue rather than the other. . . . Weight is not a question of

mathematics, but depends on its effect in inducing belief.”’” State v. Hughes-Davis,

2025-Ohio-3151, ¶ 24 (8th Dist.), quoting Eastley v. Volkman, 2012-Ohio-2179,

¶ 12, quoting State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387 (1997). The Ohio Supreme

Court has stated that when conducting a manifest-weight review, the reviewing

court “must weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the

credibility of the witnesses, and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the

evidence, the finder of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest

miscarriage of justice that the judgment must be reversed and a new trial ordered.”

In re Z.C., 2023-Ohio-4703, ¶ 14, citing Eastley at ¶ 20.

“This court may not reverse a sexual predator classification ‘simply

because it holds a different opinion concerning the credibility of witnesses and

evidence submitted before the trial court.’” State v. Clark, 2008-Ohio-3358, ¶ 30

(8th Dist.), quoting Wilson at ¶ 24. As such, a manifest-weight-of-the-evidence

challenge will be sustained “‘“only in the exceptional case in which the evidence

weighs heavily against the conviction.”’” State v. Dodson, 2025-Ohio-1733, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.), quoting Thompkins at 387, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175

(1st Dist. 1983).

C. Analysis

1. Admissibility of Police Reports

As a preliminary matter, we note that Burks discusses the

admissibility of the police reports introduced by the State at the sexual-predator

hearing but has not challenged the admissibility of these reports in a separately

captioned assignment of error. App.R. 16(A)(3) provides that an appellant’s brief

must include “[a] statement of the assignments of error presented for review, with

reference to the place in the record where each error is reflected.” The appellant’s

captioned assignment of error “provides this Court with a roadmap on appeal and

directs this Court’s analysis.” State v. Marzolf, 2009-Ohio-3001, ¶ 16 (9th Dist.).

Pursuant to App.R. 12(A)(1)(b), we are required to determine the appeal based upon

the assignments of error set forth in the briefs under App.R. 16 and may decline to

address arguments not separately assigned as error. State v. Blade, 2023-Ohio-

3054, ¶ 54 - 55 (8th Dist.).

Nonetheless, it has been well recognized that “the Rules of Evidence

do not strictly apply in a sexual predator hearing.” State v. Hinton, 2005-Ohio-

3427, ¶ 21 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Cook, 83 Ohio St.3d 404, 425 (1998). This is

because such hearings are like sentencing and probation hearings where the Rules

of Evidence do not strictly apply. State v. Walker, 2023-Ohio-810, ¶ 18 (8th Dist.).

“As long as the evidence sought to be admitted meets the minimum standard of ‘reliable hearsay,’ the evidence is admissible.” State v. Baron, 2002-Ohio-4588, ¶ 12

(8th Dist.), citing State v. Reed, 2001-Ohio-3271 (7th Dist.). Reliable hearsay, such

as police reports submitted by the State, may be relied upon by the trial judge in

coming to its determination that an offender be classified as a sexual predator. See

Hinton at ¶ 21-22.

2. The Trial Court’s Determination

In determining whether an offender should be classified a sexual

predator, the “‘trial court is not required to individually assess each of [the] statutory

factors on the record nor is it required to find a specific number of [the] factors

before it can adjudicate an offender a sexual predator so long as its determination is

grounded upon clear and convincing evidence.’” Walker at ¶ 16, quoting State v.

Caraballo, 2008-Ohio-2046, ¶ 8 (8th Dist.). Nor must the court “‘elaborate on its

reasons for finding certain factors as long as the record includes the particular

evidence upon which the trial court relied in making its adjudication.’” Walker at

¶ 16, quoting Caraballo at ¶ 8.

However, the Ohio Supreme Court has stated that when making its

decision, the trial court “should discuss on the record the particular evidence and

factors upon which it relies in making its determination regarding the likelihood of

recidivism.” Eppinger, 91 Ohio St.3d at 166. The Court explained that this is to “aid

the appellate courts in reviewing the evidence on appeal and ensure a fair and

complete hearing for the offender.” Id. at 167. This court has previously found that

a trial court’s determination of an appellant’s sex-offender classification without any discussion on the record is subject to reversal. See State v. McLaughlin, 2004-Ohio-

2334, ¶ 41 (8th Dist.) (noting that a review of the transcript of the hearing shows

that the trial court presented no discussion about its decision, nor mentioned either

the facts or the factors it considered and remanded the case back to the trial court).

See also State v. Lee, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 4071, *15 (8th Dist. Sept. 13, 2001)

(stating that “the trial court’s pronouncement of its determination of appellant’s

classification without any discussion constitutes reversible error”); State v. Grimes,

2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 1707 (8th Dist. Apr. 12, 2001).

Here, at the conclusion of the sexual-predator hearing, the court

stated:

After listening to everything stated on the record and reviewing the record, I do find that the State has proved by clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Burks is a sexual predator. Therefore, he will have to register for a lifetime with verification every 90 days after the date of initial registration.

There was no discussion about its decision nor did the court mention

either the relevant facts, evidence, or statutory factors it considered in reaching its

decision. The record is unclear to the extent the trial court relied on the police

reports challenged by Burks or which, if any, of the statutory factors the trial court

considered.

As a result, appellant’s first assignment of error is sustained. We

vacate Burks’s sexual-predator designation and remand the case to the trial court

for a new sexual-predator hearing consistent with this opinion. All other aspects of

Burks’s conviction and sentence remain intact. Accordingly, Burks’s remaining assignment of error is rendered moot

by our disposition of the first assignment of error and we decline to address it.

Burks’s sexual-predator classification is vacated; cause remanded to

the lower court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is ordered that appellant recover of appellee costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule

27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

______________________________________ MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J., and MARY J. BOYLE, J., CONCUR