[Cite as State v. Goodwin, 2013-Ohio-4591.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION No. 99254
STATE OF OHIO PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
vs.
TONY GOODWIN DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED
Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CR-550777
BEFORE: Celebrezze, J., Stewart, A.J., and S. Gallagher, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: October 17, 2013 ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
John T. Castele 614 West Superior Avenue Suite 1310 Cleveland, Ohio 44113
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Timothy J. McGinty Cuyahoga County Prosecutor BY: Holly Welsh Assistant Prosecuting Attorney The Justice Center 1200 Ontario Street Cleveland, Ohio 44113 FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., J.:
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Tony Goodwin, appeals from the judgment of the
common pleas court denying his motion to suppress. He further appeals from his
subsequent conviction and sentence for discharging a firearm on or near prohibited
premises, which was rendered after a jury trial. After a careful review of the record and
relevant case law, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.
I. Factual and Procedural History
{¶2} On March 18, 2011, Dewayne Rhym, the victim in this case, was found lying
on the ground near a storefront on Broadway Avenue in the city of Cleveland, having
been shot in the back. At approximately 6:30 p.m., paramedics responded and
transported Rhym to MetroHealth Medical Center, where he was later pronounced dead.
{¶3} The following day, appellant, then a 17-year-old juvenile, went to the
Cuyahoga County juvenile detention center with his mother and his attorney and
attempted to turn himself in for his involvement in Rhym’s death. The rationale for
turning himself in so quickly was that he was remorseful and feared for his own safety.
However, the police, having no probable cause to arrest appellant, were unable to admit
him into the detention center. Instead, appellant was taken to police headquarters to
speak with Cleveland Homicide Unit detectives.
{¶4} Detective Tom Armelli of the Cleveland Homicide Unit led the investigation
in this matter. Once appellant was delivered to police headquarters, Detective Armelli
spoke with appellant’s attorney, who stated that his client did not yet wish to make a formal statement. Thereafter, Detective Armelli contacted the juvenile detention center
to see if they would hold appellant. Detective Armelli was informed that appellant could
not be held until charges were brought against him. As a result, Detective Armelli began
driving appellant home. During that drive home, Detective Armelli called appellant’s
mother and explained to her that his only option was to return appellant to her. Shortly
thereafter, Detective Armelli received a call from appellant’s attorney who “expressed
that [appellant] was depressed, remorseful, possibly suicidal, and afraid of retribution on
the street,” and therefore “it was imperative that he not be returned home.” Once
Detective Armelli explained that he had no options without sufficient probable cause to
hold appellant, he permitted appellant to use his cell phone to briefly speak with his
attorney. After those conversations, Detective Armelli was advised by appellant’s
attorney that appellant would make a short statement.
{¶5} At that time, Detective Armelli drove appellant back to the Homicide Unit,
advised him of his Miranda rights, and took a video-recorded and written statement from
appellant. In his statement, appellant implicated himself in the shooting death of Rhym.
{¶6} Subsequently, appellant was charged as a juvenile with aggravated murder,
murder, and discharge of a firearm on or near a protected premises, with one- and
three-year firearm specifications attached to each count. Appellant was bound over to
the Cuyahoga County Grand Jury and charged as an adult.
{¶7} Prior to trial, appellant’s counsel filed a motion to suppress the statement
given to Detective Armelli, arguing that appellant did not receive effective assistance of counsel at the time the statement was made and that his statement was not voluntarily
made due to appellant’s age and low I.Q. After conducting a thorough suppression
hearing, the trial court denied appellant’s motion to suppress.
{¶8} On August 27, 2012, the matter proceeded to a jury trial. At trial, Allen
Smith, the director of the Boys and Girls Club located on Broadway Avenue, testified that
he was in the lobby of the Boys and Girls Club when he witnessed a young male running
down the street with a weapon. Smith testified that he observed the male fire the weapon
as he was running at a fast pace.
{¶9} Denise Jones testified that she was on a RTA bus on her way home from
work when she saw two individuals run past the bus window. She testified that the first
person who passed her window had a look of fear on his face and was running as fast as
he could. Seconds later, a second male ran past her window. Jones testified that she
stood up to see what was happening and then heard what sounded like a firecracker.
Thereafter, she witnessed the first individual collapse.
{¶10} Appellant testified that on March 18, 2011, he got off the RTA bus on
Broadway when he saw Rhym. Appellant stated that ever since his brother had been shot
and killed a year earlier, he kept a gun on his person for protection. Approximately three
years earlier, appellant and Rhym had an altercation that resulted in Rhym punching
appellant and breaking his jaw. Appellant testified that he had not planned on seeing
Rhym that day, but when he did, he immediately became upset and told Rhym he wanted
to fight. According to appellant, Rhym laughed at the threat, but once he realized appellant was serious, he took off running. Appellant pursued, but when he could not
catch up, he pulled out his gun and fired a shot. Appellant testified that he only fired the
shot in an attempt to scare Rhym and get him to stop running. According to appellant,
Rhym stumbled a little and then slowed down. Appellant caught up to him and punched
him numerous times before Rhym managed to run away. Appellant testified that he was
not trying to kill Rhym or even shoot him, but that he just wanted Rhym to stop running
so that they could fight.
{¶11} At the conclusion of the trial, appellant was acquitted of the aggravated
murder and murder charges, but found guilty of discharging a firearm on or near a
premises along with a three-year firearm specification. On August 29, 2012, the trial
court sentenced him to a three-year term of incarceration for the firearm specification, to
be served consecutively and prior to a six-year sentence for the underlying felony of the
first degree, for an aggregate sentence of nine years.
II. Law and Analysis
A. Insufficient Jury Verdict Form
{¶12} In his first assignment of error, appellant argues that because the verdict
form provided to the jury contained incorrect statutory language, the trial court erred in
entering a judgment against him for a felony of the first degree.
{¶13} Appellant did not object to the verdict form at the trial court level, and thus
we review for plain error. Notice of plain error under Crim.R. 52(B) is to be taken with
the utmost caution, under exceptional circumstances, and only to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice. State v. Long, 53 Ohio St.2d 91, 372 N.E.2d 804 (1978),
paragraph three of the syllabus.
{¶14} Appellant was charged with discharging a firearm on or near a protected
premises in violation of R.C. 2923.162(A)(3), which states in pertinent part:
(A) No person shall do any of the following:
***
(3) Discharge a firearm upon or over a public road or highway. The penalty section of R.C. 2923.162 states as follows:
(C) Whoever violates this section is guilty of discharge of a firearm on or near prohibited premises. * * * A violation of division (A)(3) of this section shall be punished as follows:
(1) Except as otherwise provided in division (C)(2), (3), or (4) of this section, a violation of division (A)(3) of this section is a misdemeanor of the first degree.
(2) Except as otherwise provided in division (C)(3) or (4) of this section, if the violation created a substantial risk of physical harm to any person or caused serious physical harm to property, a violation of division (A)(3) of this section is a felony of the third degree.
(3) Except as otherwise provided in division (C)(4) of this section, if the violation caused physical harm to any person, a violation of division (A)(3) of this section is a felony of the second degree.
(4) If the violation caused serious physical harm to any person, a violation of division (A)(3) of this section is a felony of the first degree.
{¶15} In the case at hand, the indictment charged appellant with a violation of R.C.
2923.162 and furthermore alleged that in committing the offense, appellant did cause
serious physical harm to Dewayne Rhym in violation of R.C. 2923.162(C)(4), thereby elevating the offense to a first-degree felony. However, the record reflects that the trial
court did not utilize the express statutory language of R.C. 2923.162(C)(4) when
providing its instructions to the jury. Rather, the trial court provided an inherently
“hybrid” instruction, which combined the “created a substantial risk” language contained
in R.C. 2923.162(C)(2) with the “caused serious physical harm” language found in R.C.
2923.162(C)(4). We note that the difference between an individual “creating a
substantial risk of physical harm” and actually “causing serious physical harm” is
substantial.
{¶16} Specifically, the trial court provided the following instruction to the jury:
Now, in the event and only in the event your verdict is guilty of discharge of firearm on or near a prohibited premises as charged in Count 3, then you must go further and decide beyond a reasonable doubt whether the defendant did or did not cause a substantial risk of serious physical harm to Dewayne Rhym.
(Emphasis added.)
{¶17} Furthermore, the verdict form returned by the jury contained the same
language. The verdict form read as follows:
We, the Jury in this case, having found the Defendant, Tony Goodwin, guilty of Discharge of Firearm On or Near Prohibited Premises, further find and specify that the Defendant DID cause a substantial risk of serious physical harm to Dewayne Rhym.
{¶18} Based on the language used by the trial court during its instructions to the
jury and the jury’s finding that appellant created “a substantial risk of physical harm,”
appellant asserts that the trial court erred in convicting him of a first-degree felony where there was no finding by the jury that appellant did, in fact, cause serious physical harm, as
required by R.C. 2923.162(C)(4). We reluctantly agree, finding plain error.
{¶19} It is clear from the record that the trial court gave an inaccurate recitation of
R.C. 2923.162(C)(4) when it provided its instructions to the jury. It is equally clear that
the verdict forms provided to the jury contained the same incorrect language. As a
result, there was simply no finding by the jury, serving as the trier of fact, that appellant
“caused serious physical harm” while committing the underlying offense. Accordingly,
the element necessary for elevating appellant’s underlying offense to a felony of the first
degree was not met. We recognize the weight of our conclusion given the tragic
circumstances of this case. However, as an appellate court, we are unable to
retroactively make findings on behalf of the jury based on how we believe the jury would
have concluded had they been provided with a proper jury instruction and verdict form.
{¶20} Notwithstanding, we find that the jury verdict form was sufficient to
enhance appellant’s conviction to a felony of the third degree pursuant to R.C.
2923.162(C)(2). Here, the jury determined that appellant created a substantial risk of
serious physical harm. Such a finding encompasses the “created a substantial risk of
physical harm to any person” language contained in R.C. 2923.162(C)(2). Accordingly,
appellant’s conviction for a felony of the first degree is vacated, and the matter is
remanded for an entry of conviction consistent with this opinion and resentencing.
{¶21} Appellant’s first assignment of error is sustained.
B. Manifest Weight {¶22} In his second assignment of error, appellant argues that his conviction was
against the manifest weight of the evidence. As stated, R.C. 2923.162(A)(3) prohibits
any person from discharging a firearm on or over a public road or highway. In
challenging the manifest weight of the evidence supporting his conviction, appellant
asserts that “the shooting did not take place upon or over a public road or highway, but
adjacent to a public road or highway, i.e., on the sidewalk.”
{¶23} When reviewing a claim challenging the manifest weight of the evidence,
this court, after reviewing the entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable
inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and determines whether in resolving
conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and created such a manifest
miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered. State
v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). Reversal on manifest
weight grounds is reserved for the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily
against the conviction. Id. In addition, this court must remain mindful that the weight
to be given the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses are matters left primarily to
the jury. State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 227 N.E.2d 212 (1967).
{¶24} After a careful review of the record and relevant testimony, we find that
appellant’s conviction for discharging a firearm on or near a prohibited premises was not
against the manifest weight of the evidence. At trial, the state presented testimony that
appellant was seen running down Broadway Avenue just moments before the alleged
shots were fired. Additionally, Detective Armelli testified that he discovered a shell casing in the street. Based on these facts, appellant’s conviction was supported by
sufficient evidence, and we are unable to determine that the jury clearly lost its way and
created a manifest miscarriage of justice.
{¶25} Appellant’s second assignment of error is overruled.
C. Motion to Suppress
{¶26} In his third assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred in
denying his motion to suppress his statement to the police. Within this assignment of
error, appellant raises several arguments relating to the waiver of his Miranda rights and
the effectiveness of his counsel prior to the trial proceedings.
1. Standard of Review
{¶27} “Appellate review of a decision on a motion to suppress presents a mixed
question of law and fact.” State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797
N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8. The trial court serves as the trier of fact and is the primary judge of the
credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to the evidence presented. State v.
Johnson, 137 Ohio App.3d 847, 850, 739 N.E.2d 1249 (12th Dist.2000). Therefore,
when an appellate court reviews a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, it must
accept the trial court’s findings of facts so long as they are supported by competent,
credible evidence. State v. Roberts, 110 Ohio St.3d 71, 2006-Ohio-3665, 850 N.E.2d
1168, ¶ 100. The appellate court must then review the application of the law to the facts
de novo. Burnside at ¶ 8.
2. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel {¶28} Initially, appellant argues that his statements to the officers should be
suppressed based on his counsel’s ineffective assistance at the time he provided the
officers with a statement.
{¶29} The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that “the exclusionary
rule is an essential part of both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.” Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643, 657, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961). Thus, there is not sufficient
legal authority to permit a trial court to apply the exclusionary rule to a claim based solely
on the Sixth Amendment guarantee of the effective assistance of counsel in the context of
a pretrial meeting with police officers. State v. Radford, 1st Dist. Hamilton No.
C-980998, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 5792 (Dec. 3, 1999).
{¶30} Nevertheless, we agree with the trial court’s determination that defense
counsel’s conduct during the investigation stages of this matter did not fall below an
objective standard of reasonable performance. The record reflects that the decision to
speak to the police was made by appellant and his mother. Furthermore, the testimony
presented at the suppression hearing overwhelmingly demonstrates that defense counsel
frequently advised appellant of the consequences associated with making a statement to
the police and that he only agreed to allow appellant to speak with Detective Armelli
based on appellant’s adamant desire to make a statement for “his own needs.” Under
these circumstances, we are unable to conclude that defense counsel rendered ineffective
assistance.
3. Waiver of Miranda Rights {¶31} Next, appellant argues that his statements to the police should have been
suppressed due to his low I.Q.; that is, that his intellectual limitations prevented him from
making a knowing and intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights.
i. Miranda Standard
{¶32} A suspect in police custody “must be warned prior to any questioning that he
has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of
law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an
attorney, one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.”
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Absent
such a warning, a suspect’s statements during a custodial interrogation are subject to
suppression. In re J.C., 173 Ohio App.3d 405, 2007-Ohio-5763, 878 N.E.2d 719, ¶ 14
(2d Dist.). However, if the suspect voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his
Miranda rights before the interrogation, then suppression is inappropriate. State v.
Wheatley, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-10-75, 2011-Ohio-1997, ¶ 11, citing Miranda at 444.
{¶33} The United States Supreme Court has stated that consideration of Miranda
waivers must focus on two separate factors: (1) the voluntary nature of the defendant’s
confession and (2) the defendant’s ability to comprehend and waive his rights. Moran v.
Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986). The burden to
prove the existence of a valid waiver rests on the state and requires proof by a
preponderance of the evidence. State v. Broom, 40 Ohio St.3d 277, 285, 533 N.E.2d 682
(1988). {¶34} Miranda is an embodiment of the long-standing principle that police officers
in the United States are precluded from improperly coercing criminal suspects into giving
up confessions. See Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320-321, 79 S.Ct. 1202, 3
L.Ed.2d 1265 (1959) (“The abhorrence of society to the use of involuntary confessions
does not turn alone on their inherent untrustworthiness. It also turns on the deep-rooted
feeling that the police must obey the law while enforcing the law; that in the end life and
liberty can be as much endangered from illegal methods used to convict those thought to
be criminals as from the actual criminal themselves”); Bram v. United States, 168 U.S.
532, 542-543, 18 S.Ct. 183, 42 L.Ed. 568 (1897) (“[For a] confession * * * to be
admissible, * * * [it] must not be extracted by any sorts of threats or violence, nor
obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight, nor by exertion of any
improper influence”). Accordingly, the rationale for Miranda’s protections is that they
are necessary to “reduce the likelihood that suspects would fall victim to constitutionally
impermissible practices of police interrogation.” New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649,
656, 104 S.Ct. 2626, 81 L.Ed.2d 550 (1984). Based on this underlying principle, when
courts have assessed the validity of a suspect’s Miranda waiver, they have generally
focused on the interrogation’s circumstances “from the perspective of the police.”
Garner v. Mitchell, 557 F.3d 257, 263 (6th Cir.2009). Such a focus is especially
appropriate in the context of Fifth Amendment protections since Fifth Amendment
jurisprudence often revolves around objective determinations, as opposed to the
subjective beliefs of the suspect. {¶35} With these principles in mind, we now turn to appellant’s purported waiver
of his Miranda rights.
ii. Voluntariness of Appellant’s Waiver
{¶36} Coercive police activity during the course of an interrogation is a necessary
predicate for finding that a suspect’s Miranda waiver was involuntary. State v. Kirk, 3d
Dist. Crawford No. 3-12-09, 2013-Ohio-1941. Here, appellant does not claim that there
was any coercive police conduct, and the testimony presented at the suppression hearing
confirms that appellant’s waiver was indeed voluntary. Nevertheless, he argues that his
statement should be suppressed inasmuch as it was not made knowingly or intelligently,
as a result of his low I.Q. and the advice of counsel that fell below the minimum standard
of effective assistance.
iii. Knowing and Intelligent Nature of Waiver
{¶37} Since appellant’s waiver was voluntary, we must consider whether it was
also knowing and intelligent. The question of whether a waiver was knowing and
intelligent is a factual issue that must be determined based on the totality of the
circumstances. State v. Mulkey, 98 Ohio App.3d 773, 781, 649 N.E.2d 897 (10th
Dist.1994). The totality approach requires inquiry into all the circumstances surrounding
the interrogation. Id. This includes evaluation of age, experience, education,
background, intelligence, and whether the offender has the capacity to understand the
warnings given him, the nature of his Fifth Amendment rights, and the consequences of waiving those rights. State v. Lynn, 7th Dist. Belmont No. 11 BE 18, 2011-Ohio-6404, ¶
13.
{¶38} Thus, an individual’s low intellect does not necessarily render him or her
incapable of waiving Miranda rights. See State v. Jenkins, 15 Ohio St.3d 164, 233, 473
N.E.2d 264 (1984); State v. Hall, 48 Ohio St.2d 325, 333, 358 N.E.2d 590 (1976).
Rather, a person’s low intellect is but one of many factors under the totality of
circumstances that a court must consider in assessing the voluntariness of a Miranda
waiver or confession. State v. Frazier, 115 Ohio St.3d 139, 154, 2007-Ohio-5048, 873
N.E.2d 1263.
{¶39} Based on our review of the record, we find that appellant’s waiver of his
Miranda rights was knowingly and intelligently given. At the suppression hearing,
appellant testified that prior to making a statement, Detective Armelli read him his
Miranda rights and instructed him to read the text of those rights from a large chart on the
wall of the interrogation room. After a brief conversation with his attorney over the
phone, appellant stated that he understood the rights he was waiving and wished to make
a statement at that time. Aside from appellant’s own admission, the totality of the
circumstances supports our conclusion that the waiver was knowingly and intelligently
made. Here, appellant displayed no outward signs that he was of diminished mental
capacity at the time he made his statement. Furthermore, appellant’s testimony at the
suppression hearing demonstrated that he had at least a rudimentary understanding of the criminal process at the time he made his statement, in part, due to his observations of the
criminal proceedings involving the shooting death of his older brother.
{¶40} In our view, there is no doubt that appellant understood the seriousness of
the situation and the possible consequences he faced at the time he made his statement.
In fact, appellant admitted that he felt he needed to turn himself in because “it was the
right thing to do” and he felt “remorseful” because someone was shot. This testimony
demonstrates that appellant had the capacity to understand the criminal nature of his
actions, which suggests that he also had the capacity to understand and appreciate the
consequences of speaking to the police about his criminal conduct.
{¶41} In light of the above circumstances, the trial court did not err in denying
appellant’s motion to suppress.
iv. Failure to Obtain Expert Evaluation
{¶42} Within this assignment of error, appellant further contends that defense
counsel was ineffective for failing to request that an independent expert evaluate his
capacity to provide a knowing and intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights. Appellant
argues that had defense counsel requested an expert evaluation of his capacity to waive
his Miranda rights, the outcome of his suppression hearing would have been different.
After a careful review of the suppression hearing transcript, we are unable to determine
that the outcome of the hearing would have been different had an expert evaluation been
obtained. Accordingly, appellant cannot establish prejudice.
{¶43} Appellant’s third assignment of error is overruled. D. Jury Polling
{¶44} In his fourth assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred in
entering a judgment of conviction when the jury affirmatively stated at the time they were
polled that they found him not guilty.
{¶45} An appellate court reviews a court’s acceptance of a jury’s verdict under an
abuse of discretion standard. State v. Brumback, 109 Ohio App.3d 65, 73, 671 N.E.2d
1064 (9th Dist.1996). We will not disturb the trial court’s ruling unless it has exhibited
an “unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable” attitude. State v. Lowe, 69 Ohio St.3d
527, 532, 634 N.E.2d 616 (1994).
{¶46} Crim.R. 31(D) provides that, on the motion of a party or on a trial court’s
own initiative, the court is to poll a jury when a verdict is returned. R.C. 2945.77 also
provides for the polling of the jury after the verdict to determine whether it is unanimous.
In the event a juror declares that a verdict is not his own, the court may direct further
deliberations or discharge the jury, per Crim.R. 31(D). R.C. 2945.77 requires the jury to
deliberate further if a juror contradicts his own verdict.
{¶47} In this case, the trial court asked the jury at the conclusion of its verdict if it
was, in fact, their verdict, to which the jury responded “yes.” Thereafter, the state
expressed its wish to poll the jury, and the following statements were made:
BAILIFF: Juror number one, is this your verdict? JUROR ONE: Not guilty. BAILIFF: Juror number two? JUROR TWO: Not guilty. BAILIFF: Juror number three? JUROR THREE: Not guilty. BAILIFF: Juror number four? JUROR FOUR: Not guilty. BAILIFF: Juror number five? JUROR FIVE: Not guilty. BAILIFF: Juror number six? JUROR SIX: Not guilty. BAILIFF: Juror number seven? JUROR SEVEN: Not guilty. BAILIFF: Juror number eight? JUROR EIGHT: Not guilty. BAILIFF: Juror number nine? JUROR NINE: Yes. BAILIFF: Juror number ten? JUROR TEN: Yes. BAILIFF: Juror number eleven? JUROR ELEVEN: Not guilty. BAILIFF: Juror number twelve? JUROR TWELVE: Not guilty. THE COURT: Thank you, ladies and gentleman.
{¶48} In light of the above statements, appellant asserts that “the polling of the
jury conflicted with the written jury verdict and, therefore, he ought not to have been
convicted of the charge of discharging a firearm on or near a prohibited premises.”
While we recognize appellant’s argument, we are convinced that the jury’s verdict in this
matter was unanimous despite their apparent confusion during the polling process. Here,
it is clear from the record that the state requested the polling based on appellant’s
acquittal on the counts of murder and aggravated murder. Thus, it is equally clear from
the record that the jurors’ statements of “not guilty” when polled related to their
determinations on the murder and aggravated murder counts. We emphasize that it
would have been preferable for the trial court to inquire further to clarify any confusion
stemming from the jurors’ responses in light of the jury finding appellant guilty of discharging a firearm on or near a prohibited premises. However, we cannot conclude
that the trial court’s acceptance of the jury’s verdict was arbitrary, unreasonable, or
unconscionable. See Lowe, 69 Ohio St.3d at 532.
{¶49} Appellant’s fourth assignment of error is overruled.
{¶50} Based on the foregoing, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for
the purposes of reducing appellant’s conviction to a felony of the third degree and for
resentencing.
It is ordered that appellant and appellee share the costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common
pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. Case remanded to the trial court for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., JUDGE
MELODY J. STEWART, A.J., and SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR