State v. D.T.

2024 Ohio 4482

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: September 12, 2024
• Docket: 112955
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. D.T., 2024-Ohio-4482.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO, :

Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 112955

v. :

D.T., :

Defendant-Appellant. :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: REVERSED; VACATED; REMANDED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: September 12, 2024

Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CR-22-674056-A

Appearances:

Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Yasmine M. Hasan and Anthony Miranda, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee.

Elizabeth Miller, Ohio Public Defender, and Lauren Hammersmith, Assistant State Public Defender, for appellant.

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, P.J.:

Defendant-appellant, D.T., appeals his convictions after he was bound

over from the Juvenile Division of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas

(the “juvenile court”) to the General Division of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas (the “general division”), and pled guilty to multiple counts in

connection with four armed robberies and one attempted armed robbery. D.T.

contends that his convictions and bindover should be reversed and the case

remanded to juvenile court because (1) although his competency was in question,

neither the juvenile court nor the adult court complied with statutory procedures to

determine his competency, (2) D.T. was permitted to waive key rights and be

subjected to bindover proceedings while his competency was in question and (3) the

juvenile court abused its discretion in transferring D.T.’s case to the general division

for criminal prosecution without sufficient credible evidence of nonamenability.

For the reasons that follow, we find that the juvenile court erred in

failing to hold a competency hearing and to issue a written determination regarding

D.T.’s competency as required under R.C. 2152.58. In addition, we find that there

is insufficient information in the record regarding the juvenile court’s reasoning

when ordering D.T. to be bound over to adult court for criminal prosecution in order

that this court can determine whether the juvenile court abused its discretion in

determining that D.T. was not amenable to care or rehabilitation in the juvenile

justice system.

Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s judgment, vacate D.T.’s

convictions, vacate the juvenile court’s transfer order and remand the case to the

juvenile court for further proceedings. Factual Background and Procedural History

The Juvenile Court Proceedings

From December 30, 2021 to January 3, 2022, the State filed five

delinquency complaints against D.T. (d.o.b. July 23, 2007) in juvenile court. The

complaints related to then 14-year-old D.T.’s alleged involvement in five carjackings

(or attempted carjackings) that occurred from December 19-27, 2021. In each

incident, D.T. allegedly used or displayed a firearm. The complaints alleged that

D.T. had committed acts that would constitute the following crimes if he were an

adult:

Case No. DL22100012 (December 19, 2021 incident; victim Katherine Ives): one count of aggravated robbery, three counts of robbery, one count of having weapons while under disability, one count of grand theft, one count of improperly handling firearms in a motor vehicle, one count of theft and one count of aggravated menacing.

Case No. DL22100011 (December 21-22, 2021 incident; victim Ya Gao): one count of aggravated robbery, three counts of robbery, one count of having weapons while under disability, one count of grand theft, one count of improperly handling firearms in a motor vehicle, one count of theft, one count of identity fraud, one count of telecommunications fraud and one count of misuse of credit cards.

Case No. DL22100010 (December 25, 2021 incident; victim Elena Donofrio): one count of aggravated robbery, three counts of robbery, one count of having weapons while under disability, one count of grand theft, one count of improperly handling firearms in a motor vehicle and one count of theft.

Case No. DL22100086 (Dec. 26, 2021 incident; victim Ross Guidotti): one count of aggravated robbery, three counts of robbery, one count of having weapons while under disability and one count of attempted grand theft. Case No. DL21111746 (Dec. 27, 2021 incident; victim Francis Collins): one count of attempted murder, two counts of aggravated robbery, three counts of robbery, two counts of felonious assault, one count of grand theft, one count of improperly handling firearms in a motor vehicle and one count of having weapons while under disability.

Certain of the counts in each case included one- and three-year firearm

specifications.

In each case, the State filed a motion for an order to relinquish

jurisdiction for the purpose of criminal prosecution pursuant to R.C. 2152.10(B).

D.T. denied the allegations of the complaints and objected to the motions to

relinquish jurisdiction.

Request for a Competency Evaluation

On February 17, 2022, D.T.’s counsel made an oral motion requesting

that the juvenile court order a competency evaluation of D.T.1 The juvenile court

granted the motion and referred D.T. to the Cuyahoga County Juvenile Court

Diagnostic Clinic (“juvenile court diagnostic clinic”) for a competency evaluation.

On March 2, 2022, D.T.’s counsel again made an oral motion requesting

that the juvenile court order a competency evaluation of D.T. In a March 4, 2022

1 No transcripts from the February 17, 2022 or March 2, 2022 hearings are in the

record. Accordingly, it is unclear from the record what, if any, specific concerns led defense counsel to request a competency evaluation at that time. At his arraignment on January 18, 2022, D.T.’s mother expressed concerns regarding D.T.’s mental state — although there is an issue with the transcription of her comments. See 1/18/22 tr. at 20 (“[D.T.] has a lot of health concerns, and his mental state, he needs to be evaluated based on that at home [D.T.] has attended before his mental state with his life [sic].”). At the January 18, 2022 hearing, defense counsel stated: “I do think [D.T.] is struggling with his mental health and it is deteriorating while in the Detention Center.” 1/18/22 tr. at 19. journal entry, the juvenile court indicated that it had previously granted the motion

and referred D.T. to the juvenile court diagnostic clinic for a competency evaluation.

On March 21, 2022, Dr. Frank Ezzo (“Ezzo”), a psychologist with the

juvenile court diagnostic clinic, conducted a “competency to stand trial” evaluation

of D.T. On March 23, 2022, Ezzo issued a report in which he concluded that D.T.

“does not have deficits that substantially compromise his ability to understand the

nature and objective of his court proceedings or to assist in his defense.” The report

indicates that the evaluation was “precipitated by [D.T.’s] parents raising concerns

to [D.T.’s] attorney that his mental health was ‘diminishing’ and upon visiting the

juvenile in the Detention Center his defense counsel also had similar concerns that

[D.T.] may not be competent to stand trial.” The report further indicates that, at the

time of the evaluation, D.T. was on “Mental Health Watch” at the detention center.

He reported that Jacqueline Zavatchen, a social service coordinator at the Cuyahoga

County Juvenile Detention Center (the “juvenile detention center”), had informed

him that D.T. was “doing pretty good” while at the juvenile detention center and had

not been in any fights. Zavatchen described D.T. as “hyperactive” but stated that

there were “no immediate mental health concerns.” He noted that a resident

adjustment report authored by Zavatchen dated March 9, 2022 indicated that D.T.

was “respectful” and “cooperative” with “no behavior concerns.”

According to Ezzo’s report, psychological testing administered by a

graduate student from Cleveland State University “place[d] [D.T.]’s intelligence

within the average classification range” for children of his age. Ezzo reported that D.T. scored in the 50th percentile in verbal comprehension (which measures the

ability to understand, use and think with spoken language), that D.T. scored in the

18th percentile in perceptual reasoning (which measures nonverbal reasoning skills

and the ability to accurately interpret, organize and think using visual perceptual

abilities), that D.T.’s reading ability (at a fourth-grade level) was in the 12th

percentile and that D.T.’s full scale-4 composite score corresponded to the 30th

percentile.

Ezzo reported that D.T. scored in the 3rd percentile on the Inventory

of Legal Knowledge assessment (which quantifies an evaluee’s approach to

responding to a testing measure), indicating that “some questions should be raised

about an irrelevant response style.” The results of a personality assessment

administered to D.T. were deemed invalid.

Ezzo reported that he conducted a juvenile adjudicative competence

interview to assess D.T.’s ability to understand and appreciate the legal charges

against him, the potential penalties he faced, the operation of the adversarial system,

the roles of various trial participants and D.T.’s ability to communicate with and

assist defense counsel. Ezzo discussed D.T.’s responses to questions regarding

various legal topics and reported that D.T. “demonstrated a capacity for the

following functions: comprehending and appreciating the severity of the charges

and the possibility of a bindover; comprehending and appreciating possible

consequences; understanding the adversarial nature of court and the roles of trial

participants; and he can communicate with his defense attorney and assist in his own defense.” Ezzo noted, however, that “developmentally appropriate

communication” by defense counsel and hearing officers was an important “part of

the systemic equation in a juvenile’s competency to stand trial.”

A copy of Ezzo’s report was included in the materials forwarded to this

court under seal with the record on appeal. Accordingly — although there is no

reference to the report in any journal entries — it appears that the report was, in fact,

at some time submitted to the juvenile court. There is, however, no indication in the

record that the juvenile court ever reviewed the report. There is likewise no

indication in the record to that defense counsel stipulated to the report or to any of

the findings set forth in the report. No hearing was held on the issue of D.T.’s

competency, and no written findings were made by the juvenile court regarding his

competency.

Waiver of Probable Cause Hearing

On June 13, 2022, after discussing the charges against him with

counsel, his mother and his grandmother, D.T. agreed to waive the probable cause

hearing and stipulated that the State would have been able to show probable cause

as to all of the charges in the cases at issue. Before accepting D.T.’s waiver and

stipulation, the juvenile court asked defense counsel whether she believed, at that

time, that D.T. understood “all of the ramifications and what can occur in this

Juvenile Rule 30 bindover request by the State.” Defense counsel responded:

I do, your Honor. As the Court is aware we did send [D.T.] for a competency evaluation and he came back as competent. I do think he understands the nature of the proceedings. We don’t think he’s — he’s not seasoned like some young men are that have been in the Detention Center, but I do think he understands what he’s doing.

After engaging in a colloquy with D.T. regarding the charges at issue

and the effect of waiving the probable cause hearing and stipulating to probable

cause, the juvenile court accepted D.T.’s waiver and stipulation, finding that they

were made knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily. The juvenile court ordered an

investigation into D.T.’s social history, education, family situation and any other

factor relevant to whether D.T. was amenable to juvenile rehabilitation and referred

D.T. to the juvenile court diagnostic clinic for a psychological evaluation.

Dr. Lynn Williams, a forensic psychologist with the juvenile court

diagnostic clinic, conducted a psychological evaluation of D.T. and prepared a

psychological evaluation report. The State stipulated to the findings set forth in

Williams’ report. D.T. did not stipulate to the admissibility of, or the findings set

forth in, Williams’ report.

Amenability Hearing

On August 30, 2022, the juvenile court conducted an amenability

hearing to determine whether D.T.’s cases should be transferred to the general

division for criminal prosecution. Williams, the five victims and Cleveland police

officer Victoria Shucofsky testified on behalf of the State. D.T.’s mother, D.T.’s sister

and Zavatchen testified on behalf of D.T. The State’s Witnesses

Williams testified regarding the results of her psychological evaluation

of D.T. as stated in her report. Williams stated that her opinions were based on (1)

a clinical interview of D.T. on June 16, 2022; (2) communications with Applewood

Centers (“Applewood”) regarding D.T.’s treatment for mental health issues; (3) a

risk-sophistication-treatment inventory assessment, a structured assessment of

violence risk in youth and psychological testing conducted on June 15 and 16, 2022

and (4) her review of various documents, including: (a) Ezzo’s competency

evaluation report and the test results reported therein, (b) journal entries and other

court records relating to the pending cases, (c) a juvenile evaluation referral from

the probation department, (d) certain school records, (e) Ohio youth assessment

system reports and detention center resident adjustment reports, (f) various

probation court records from 2019-2022, (g) a Catholic Charities substance abuse

assessment dated November 8, 2021, (h) police reports in the pending cases and (i)

a history of charges and continuum history in the juvenile detention center from the

juvenile court’s iCase system.

Williams testified that she tried reaching out to D.T.’s mother and

maternal grandmother (D.T.’s legal guardian) on two occasions but that they did not

return her calls prior to the completion of her report. Although Williams was aware

that D.T. had been living primarily with his adult sister prior to his arrest, Williams

did not attempt to contact her. Williams likewise did not speak with D.T.’s social

service coordinator at the juvenile detention center. Williams stated that in conducting psychological evaluations, “we focus on the custodian and . . . anything

above whose ever custody [sic] is above and beyond.”

Williams testified that D.T. had been residing in the juvenile detention

center since December 29, 2021 and was on Level 1 of the behavior management

program. Prior to being remanded to the juvenile detention center, D.T. lived with

his maternal grandmother (who became his legal guardian in, or around, 2008 due

to his mother’s substance abuse and mental health issues) or his adult sister.

Williams stated that, according to the most recent adjustment report from the

juvenile detention center, dated June 10, 2022, although D.T. had been in a physical

altercation on May 16, 2022, no behavioral concerns were noted.

Williams testified that D.T. told her that when he was living at home

with family, he had “numerous AWOL (absence without permission) incidents” and

had a probation violation for leaving home without permission. She indicated that

D.T. told her that he did not feel he needed to ask for permission to leave because he

was not doing anything that would get him into trouble, e.g., leaving home without

permission to go to the Salvation Army. Williams stated that D.T. told her that most

of his friends were “negative and court involved” and that court records indicated

that he associates with older peers. She noted that D.T. denied any gang

involvement.

Williams stated, that based on his school records, D.T. had a total of

14 “behavior incidents” between 2017 (when he was 9 or 10) and 2022, including an

expulsion from school in 2017 when D.T. and a friend stole his teacher’s phone and hid it in his backyard, a dismissal from school in October 2021 for inappropriately

touching a school staff member and a suspension for smoking marijuana in the

school restroom (no date provided). She stated that he also had excessive unexcused

school absences.

With respect to D.T.’s intellectual ability and academic performance,

Williams testified that, at the time of her report, D.T. was in the 8th grade, that D.T.

had never qualified for special education services2 and that from 2017-2022, his

grades varied widely from As to Fs, with all Fs in 2022. Williams stated that D.T.’s

teacher in the juvenile detention center had described D.T. as an “excellent student,”

who was working ahead on 9th grade credits while completing his 8th grade credits.

The teacher further commented: “He stays on track and very rarely needs to be

redirected. He is polite and gets along well with other students and staff. [D.T.] has

been no major problem. He participates well and follows my instructions.”

Referring to the results of intellectual testing administered on

March 21, 2022, i.e., the intellectual testing referenced in Ezzo’s report, Williams

stated that D.T. scored “within the average classification range” with an IQ of 92 in

the 30th percentile, meaning that he was “above the range for intellectual

deficiency.” She noted, however, that D.T. lacks basic reading skills (scoring in the

12th percentile at a fourth-grade level) and likely meets the criteria for functional

illiteracy.

2 There is nothing in the record to indicate whether D.T. was ever evaluated for

special education services. Williams reported that the first personality test that was administered

to D.T., i.e., the personality test referenced in Ezzo’s report, was deemed invalid

based on the validity scales. She reported that in a second personality test she

and/or her staff administered, D.T. “endorsed multiple items at a high level of

symptoms,” indicating “a possible exaggeration, which is also considered a cry for

help.” She reported that D.T. endorsed “high levels of anxiety, depression and

trauma symptoms” in the trauma symptom checklist for children (a self-report

inventory used to assess trauma-related symptoms).

With respect to D.T.’s mental health, Williams testified that D.T. had

been receiving mental health services through Applewood while at the juvenile

detention center. Applewood’s Director of Mental Health advised Williams that D.T.

was reported to have “high levels of distractibility, hyperactivity, impulsivity and

troubles [sic] concentrating” and to have exposed himself to female staff. Although

D.T. had “no history of mental health diagnoses or intervention in the community,”

Williams stated that, while at the juvenile detention center, he had been diagnosed

with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (“ADHD”) for which he was taking

psychiatric medication.

Williams reported that D.T. began using marijuana at age 11, that he

used it daily and that he had completed a substance abuse assessment through

Catholic Charities, which diagnosed him with a cannabis use disorder-moderate

severity and recommended outpatient services. She stated that probation records

indicated that D.T. had a positive drug screen (no date provided). Williams testified that during her evaluation of D.T., he “endorsed

some symptoms consistent with mood changes and anxiety” but that there were “no

complaints related to reality testing impairments.” Williams stated that, based on

her evaluation, she believed D.T. could be diagnosed with conduct disorder-

unspecified onset-moderate severity and adjustment disorder with anxiety.

Williams stated that she did not yet have sufficient information to support a

diagnosis of ADHD, cannabis use disorder-moderate-in early remission-in a

controlled environment or a specific learning disorder with impairment in reading

and that these would need to be “rule[d] out.” Williams explained that because her

evaluation was a “limited scope evaluation,” she did not have sufficient information

or assessments to determine whether all the criteria were met “to give a definite

diagnosis.” She stated that D.T. did not then meet the criteria for a trauma-informed

diagnosis.

Williams testified that this was D.T.’s fourth involvement with the

juvenile court but that he had never been sentenced to the Ohio Department of

Youth Services (“ODYS”). In May 2019, when D.T. was 12 years old, he was

adjudicated a delinquent on charges of burglary and theft for which he was

sentenced to community control and ordered to participate in a mentoring program.

In October 2020, when D.T. was 14, he was adjudicated a delinquent on charges of

attempted breaking and entering, theft, criminal damaging, obstructing official

business and unauthorized use of a vehicle. An unspecified probation violation

occurred on May 13, 2021. In July 2021, D.T. was adjudicated a delinquent on charges of theft and referred to drug court. The drug court referral was not

completed because of the new offenses with which D.T. was charged in the matter at

issue. In her report, Williams noted that D.T. “did not have an adjudicated history

of carrying or using weapons.”

Williams indicated that when D.T. was on home detention, he had

numerous home detention violations for leaving home without permission as well

as school suspensions. She also noted that D.T. had completed 24 hours of

community service.

Williams stated that while on probation, D.T. had been referred to two

mentoring programs, Cleveland Peace Makers Alliance and Renounce Denounce,

but that she was “not aware” whether the programs had been successfully

completed. Williams indicated that D.T. had also been working with a mentor

though his school, but that that mentoring stopped after D.T. refused to attend.

When asked to summarize D.T.’s “risk for violence,” Williams stated

that, “[b]ased on the risk factors” — including D.T.’s previously adjudicated cases

and the charges in the cases at issue, his history of conduct problems (school

expulsions and suspensions), truancy, negative associations, difficulties in school

achievement while in the community — D.T. “scored in the high range” on the

structured assessment of violence risk in youth (an assessment composed of 24

factors in three risk domains — historical risk factors, social/contextual risk factors

and individual/clinical risk factors — “drawn from existing research and the professional literature on adolescent development as well as on violence and

aggression in youth”).

Williams testified that on the sophistication-maturity subscale of the

risk-sophistication-treatment inventory, D.T. scored in the 91st percentile — the

“high offender range” as compared with other juvenile offenders. Williams

explained:

This construct can have two different meanings in the juvenile justice population. These skills can be used toward prosocial goals as a favorable and positive attribute; however, when this attribute is used for delinquent or criminogenic purposes, sophistication and maturity become a distinct liability. On a subscale capturing a youth’s level of autonomy, [D.T.] was in the high range, reflecting that he has begun to develop a sense of himself as an independent person. This high score indicates that [D.T.] has some internal locus of control (the belief that outcome of his action is a result of his own ability) and ability to consider potential consequences in a larger framework. He has developed some decision-making skills including cost-benefit analysis, or the ability to weigh the consequences of different outcomes ahead of the action. [D.T.] has the ability to manage and regulate emotions to attain goals, but he does not consistently apply the ability to control his emotions and behavior to attain prosocial goals. He is aware of the wrongness of crimes and understands behavioral norms. Taking into consideration probable cause found for the instant offenses, [D.T.] is displaying a higher level of sophistication and maturity and using these emerging skills in a criminogenic manner.

With respect to treatment amenability, Williams stated that D.T.

scored in the 21st percentile — the “middle range” as compared with other juvenile

offenders. She indicated that this means D.T.’s characteristics are “mixed for

treatment amenability” — i.e., there are “some positive characteristics, but also

characteristics that are difficult to treat.” Williams stated that D.T.’s classification

in the “middle range” was based on the fact that D.T. had had several prior unsuccessful treatment interventions, i.e., multisystemic therapy, the Tapestry

program and mentoring, and the fact that D.T. displayed a negative attitude toward

authority and had difficulty adhering to rules and expectations while being

monitored on probation, on home detention and in the juvenile detention center.

Williams indicated that the prior treatment interventions were unsuccessful

“primarily due to [D.T.]’s poor motivation coupled with a lack of consistent family

involvement that did not produce sustainable gain.”

On cross-examination, Williams acknowledged that both

multisystemic therapy and the Tapestry program require a “high” level of family

involvement and that the reason multisystemic therapy was “unsuccessful” was not

attributable to D.T., i.e., the case was closed due to his mother’s mental health issues

and lack of response from his grandmother/legal guardian. Williams reported that

CCDCFS had referred the family to the Applewood Tapestry program but had

minimal success due to inconsistent attendance. She could not state whether the

lack of success with the Tapestry program was attributable to D.T. or to his family.

Williams agreed that if D.T. were sent to ODYS, he would not be dependent on his

family for completion of his therapeutic intervention.

With respect to “sentencing treatment considerations,” Williams

identified several “behavioral health needs” of D.T. that “may need to be addressed

in the interest of attempting to reduce recidivism,” including (1) continuation of

mental health services and the monitoring of the psychiatric medication D.T. was

taking for “attention issues,” (2) cognitive behavioral and anger management programming to assist D.T. with dysfunctional thinking and oppositional behaviors,

(3) further assessment and services to address D.T.’s chemical dependency issues

and (4) a psychoeducational assessment to determine if literacy or behavioral issues

negatively impacted D.T.’s academic performance.

The State also presented testimony from each of the five victims.

Katherine Ives testified that she was exiting the parking garage of her apartment

building in Little Italy in Cleveland during the late afternoon on December 19, 2021

when a male “grab[bed] [her] sides” and said, “Give me your keys,” while pointing a

gun at her stomach. Ives handed the male her keys, which were attached to her

wallet, and the male asked her for the codes for her debit cards. Ives told the male

that she did not have any debit cards in her wallet. The male asked Ives if that was

all the money she had and she said, “Yes.” The male then drove off in her car, a 2015

or 2016 Audi Q3. Police recovered the vehicle, but it was totaled. The vehicle was

insured, and Ives was compensated for the damage to the vehicle. Ives testified that

due to her continuing anxiety, she has not driven since the incident and lost two of

her three jobs because she can no longer drive to them. Ives was 20 at the time of

the incident.

Ya Goa testified that at approximately 9:00 p.m. on December 21,

2021, she was sitting in her vehicle, a 2015 Mercedes, in Little Italy, trying to get the

vehicle’s navigation system to work, when a male suddenly opened her car door,

pointed a gun at her and forced her out of the vehicle. She testified that another

male circled around the front of the vehicle and entered it from the passenger’s side. That male pointed a gun at her and told her to log out of her Apple id, remove her

password from her phone and give him her phone. The male told her that if she did

not do this quickly, he would shoot her. The male asked Goa if she had any money

and she said, “No.” The male drove off in her car, which contained her wallet. Goa

stated that the male used the information from her phone and wallet to access her

bank account and her Amazon, DoorDash and Ebay accounts, to purchase various

items using her accounts and to apply for credit cards. When police recovered her

vehicle, there was significant damage to it, and it took several months for the vehicle

to be repaired. As a result of the incident, Goa suffered more than $9,000 in out of-

pocket losses. Goa testified that she was “upset” and “devastated” as a result of the

incident, that for months she was afraid to go out at night, that she had flashbacks

regarding the incident and that she still cannot sit alone in her car. At the time of

the incident, Goa was 21 and an international student at Case Western Reserve

University.

Elena Donofrio testified that on December 25, 2021, she was parking

her car and gathering her belongings, getting ready to enter her building, when she

was approached by a male with a gun who said, “I’ll shoot you if you don’t give me

your car.” Donofrio asked if she could get her house key off her key fob, removed

her house key, then said, “I’m taking my bag too,” and ran off. Donofrio stated that

she was about to walk into the door of her building when the male got out of the

vehicle, approached her, pointed a gun at her, and asked her how to start the vehicle.

Donofrio told him how to start the vehicle, then ran inside. When police recovered the vehicle, there was significant damage to it. Donofrio stated that she had over

$20,000 in out-of-pocket losses because insurance did not cover the damage. She

stated that, as a result of the incident, she is “like on edge always” and got a gun. At

the time of the incident, Donofrio was 26 or 27.

Ross Guidotti testified that on the early morning of December 26,

2021, he was sitting in his vehicle, a 2019 Honda CRV, in the parking garage for

Target in University Heights. A male opened his car door, pointed a gun at Guidotti

and told him to give him his keys. Guidotti stated that he told the male he did not

have any keys because it was a push-to-start vehicle. The male then said, “Give me

your keys, I’m gonna shoot you.” Guidotti replied, “No, you’re not,” fell back into

his seat, “slam[med] it into drive” and drove away as quickly as he could. Guidotti

stated that the incident still has him “shooken up,” that he has taken self-defense

classes, that he now waits until daylight to shop and that he “stay[s] away from

parking garages at all costs.” Guidotti was 28 at the time of the incident.

Francis Collins testified that on December 27, 2021, she was sitting in

her vehicle, a 2019 Volkswagen Jetta, on Random Road in Little Italy, grabbing a

few items from her backseat before she entered her boyfriend’s apartment when a

male approached her from the rear of her vehicle. The male “had a gun brandished

in front of him the entire time,” and asked her for her keys. Collins gave him her

keys. He asked her if she had any money, she said, “No,” and he said, “Okay.” The

male then asked her if she needed anything out of her car and she said, “Sure.” She grabbed a few things out of the vehicle, including her purse. The male offered to

carry her stuff inside but Collins refused.

Collins testified that the male was in her car with her keys in his right

hand and that they “were just kind of looking at each other.” She stated that she

“wasn’t really ready for him to leave,” so she approached him and “made a reach to

grab [the keys]” from him. She testified that “there was a lot of noise and [she] felt

a lot of warmth in [her] leg.” Collins stated that the male shot her in the upper left

thigh and stomach. The male then got out of the car, took her purse and drove away.

Collins testified that it took several months for her wounds to heal, that she was

afraid to go outside at night and that she was stressed, anxious and had difficulty

sleeping for fear of “something like that happening again.” When police recovered

her vehicle, there was significant damage to it. As a result of the incident, Collins

sustained over $1,200 in damages in addition to amounts paid by insurance to repair

her vehicle. At the time of the incident, Collins was a 21- or 22-year-old law student

at Case Western Reserve University.

Shucofsky, who was then a detective with the Cleveland Police

Department, testified that she was assigned to investigate the shooting of Collins.

She stated that after locating video footage of the incident, Cleveland police

identified D.T. as a suspect. Shucofsky testified that the multiple carjackings made

the community “very nervous” and that Little Italy was “an easy target area” given

that a lot of young college students and international students lived in the area.

Shucofsky stated that after D.T. was arrested, she interviewed him and he admitted to having been involved in four aggravated robberies in Cleveland, all of which

involved the use of a firearm. She indicated that D.T.’s manner was “very

nonchalant” and that he did not seem remorseful. Shucofsky could not recall how

long D.T. was interviewed or whether a parent or lawyer was with him at the time of

the interview.3

D.T.’s Witnesses

Zavatchen testified that she had been working with D.T. since he was

remanded to the juvenile detention center on December 29, 2021. She indicated

that D.T. is currently on Level 1 or 2 — a “medium” level — of the juvenile detention

center’s behavior management plan. Zavatchen indicated that D.T. had been

involved in fight in May 2022 but that, otherwise, he had had no issues while in the

juvenile detention center. With respect to the incident in which D.T. reportedly

exposed himself to a female staff member, Zavatchen stated that it was her

understanding that “the incident took place when he was in his room, like laying

down and a staff [member] happened to peek in.”

Zavatchen testified that when school is in session, D.T. was in school

for most of the day, with an hour of gym time and sometimes afternoon

programming. She stated that D.T. was “pretty consistent,” that he had “matured”

in the eight months he had been at the detention center, that staff described him as

3 In addition to the witness testimony, the State introduced Williams’ report,

surveillance video footage of the incidents involving Donofrio and Collins and photos of Collins’ injuries. It is unclear from the record whether these exhibits were ever admitted into evidence. Aside from Williams’ report, they were not included in the record forwarded to this court on appeal. “respectful, polite, kind, things like that” and that he was “able to step back” and

“stay out” of a lot of issues others had in the detention center. Zavatchen stated that

she had only worked with D.T. while he was in the juvenile detention center and not

while he was out in the community but that, in her experience, D.T. did well while

he was in a controlled environment like the juvenile detention center.

Zavatchen indicated that when D.T. had been in Pod B, his teacher

had described him as a “very hard worker.” She stated that although she had not

received an updated progress report since D.T. had been moved to Pod C, she

“imagine[d] nothing’s changed.” She indicated that D.T. had recently participated

in a detention center program about making better choices and that he had passed

it.

Zavatchen testified that visitation was every Saturday and that D.T.’s

mother, father and paternal grandmother had visited D.T. at the detention home.

D.T.’s adult half-sister, Melissa Dixon, testified that she has a “good

relationship” with D.T. and that he and her daughter, who is six months apart in age,

“grew up together.” Dixon stated that she has three children ages 14, 10 and 2 and

they have no criminal background.

Dixon testified that she believes that D.T. “has it in him to change,”

that programming would help him and D.T. had not had an opportunity to get

treatment while he was in the community “probably because of their mother.” She

explained that their mother has “a lot of mental health problems,” and that, as a

result, she is “really not able to like be there constantly like as much as [D.T.] probably needs her to.” Dixon indicated that she had, at times, “stepped up” to “be

a parent” to D.T. when her mother was not acting as a parent. Dixon stated that if

her brother were returned to the community, she would be there to help him to the

extent she was able. Dixon indicated that she had never been contacted by the

juvenile court diagnostic clinic about D.T. and had not been responsible for

organizing multisystemic treatment therapy for D.T.

When asked to describe D.T.’s level of maturity, Dixon replied, “He

has some sense, but I think he can have more.” She stated that he was not more

mature than the average 14-year-old, i.e., that he was just “a regular kid,” and she

was surprised that D.T. ended up in the juvenile detention center.

D.T.’s mother, Florence Daniels, testified that she has posttraumatic

stress disorder due to a traumatic event that occurred when she was seven months’

pregnant with D.T. Daniels described her mental health issue as a “nervous

condition”: “Sometimes I’m quiet. Sometimes I move faster — like my body moves

faster than my brain when there’s a whole bunch happening.” She stated that she

had been on medication for mental health issues since 2008 and currently takes six

different medications to attempt to control her mental health.

Daniels acknowledged that she had never returned Williams’ calls

from the juvenile court diagnostic clinic regarding D.T. and stated that there were a

number of “miscommunication” issues for which she was not responsible that

precluded D.T. from participating in programming. She explained: Q. . . . Earlier today we heard testimony that you [did] not follow through with something called MST so [D.T.] wasn’t able to engage in that. Is that accurate?

A. Well, I think it was a lack of miscommunication [sic] where they were mailing me some stuff and we didn’t live at that address. We had moved from there for like four years.

Q. Did you call the Court and make them aware of your new address?

A. Well, I winded up calling Miss Capers after they were like they can’t get in touch with me.

Q. To your knowledge is it [D.T.’s] fault that he didn’t complete that MST?

A. No, because it was a lack of communication I strongly believe. But I had gave them my number and my mom’s number. My mom doesn’t answer her phone all the time, so I was trying to like listen to voicemails a lot, but I had so many voicemails I probably missed a couple voicemails, but no, it wasn’t his fault.

Q. What about Tapestry or Tapestries?

A. Tapestry, I don't know what was going on — something was going on with Tapestry. It had to be like a miscommunication because the lady didn’t get in touch with me, but I had seen her twice when she visited at my mom’s house. I was at work. I did work a lot, I have to admit that, but the time — the couple times that she came I was on FaceTime when she was there, so it wasn’t like she didn’t see me.

Q. Are you aware of why he was unsuccessfully terminated from Tapestry?

A. Yeah, because they say that I didn’t return the calls.

Daniels testified that D.T. had been staying with Dixon because D.T.’s

grandmother, his legal guardian, was elderly and Daniels worked all the time.

Daniels testified that she was “kind of shocked” and “confused” to learn that, when

D.T. was on house arrest, he had a number of AWOLs. She indicated that when disciplining D.T., she would “just talk” to him and stated that she had “never been

through anything like this” with any of her other children.

At the conclusion of the amenability hearing, the juvenile court stated:

So for this hearing the Court is required to consider all the discretionary bindover factors under ORC 2152.12(D) and (E), and the Court did consider all of those factors as well as the Court did take into account factors in addition to these that are listed, other information factors the Court had at its disposal.

And based on the information that the Court has and considering all these factors the Court finds that [D.T.] is not amenable to our juvenile justice system.

The factors in favor of transfer outweigh the factors that are against transfer.

So with this finding the Court transfers — this is a discretionary transfer, so the Court will transfer these cases to the Adult Court.

The juvenile court did not identify the “other information factors” it considered in

addition to those listed in R.C. 2152.12(D) and (E), did not explain its findings with

respect to, its evaluation of, or the weight given, any of the factors it considered and

did not discuss the facts or evidence that supported its findings as to any of the

factors.

On September 7, 2022, the juvenile court issued journal entries in

which it set forth its findings on the issue of amenability as follows:

The court finds after a full investigation, including a mental examination of said child made by a duly qualified person, and after full consideration of the child’s prior juvenile record, family environment, school record, efforts previously made to treat and rehabilitate the child, including prior commitments to the Department of Youth Services, the nature and severity of the offense herein, the age, physical, and mental condition of the victim as effected by the matter herein, and other matters of evidence, that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the child herein is not amenable to care or rehabilitation within the juvenile system.

The court further finds that the safety of the community may require that the child be subject to adult sanctions.

The court considered the relevant factors in favor of transfer pursuant to R.C. 2152.12(D) and makes the following findings:

1. The victim of the act charged suffered physical or psychological harm, or serious economic harm, as a result of the alleged act.

2. The physical or psychological harm suffered by the victim due to the alleged act of the child was exacerbated because of the physical or psychological vulnerability or the age of the victim.

3. The child had a firearm on or about the child’s person or under the child’s control at the time of the act charged, the act charged is not a violation of section 2923.12 of the Revised Code, and the child, during the commission of the act charged, allegedly used or displayed the firearm, brandished the firearm, or indicated that the child possessed a firearm.

4. At the time of the act charged, the child was awaiting adjudication or disposition as a delinquent child, was under a community control sanction, or was on parole for a prior delinquent child adjudication or conviction.

5. The results of any previous juvenile sanctions and programs indicate that rehabilitation of the child will not occur in the juvenile system.

6. The child is emotionally, physically, or psychologically mature enough for the transfer.

7. There is not sufficient time to rehabilitate the child within the juvenile system.

The Court considered the relevant factors against transfer pursuant to R.C. 21152.12(E) and finds that no factors apply.

(Emphasis in original.) The juvenile court then transferred the cases to the general division

for further proceedings.

Proceedings in the General Division

Once D.T. was in the general division, a Cuyahoga County Grand Jury

indicted D.T. on 42 counts related to the five incidents: six counts of aggravated

robbery (Counts 1, 8, 15, 22, 29 and 30), 15 counts of robbery (Counts 2-4, 9-11, 16-

18, 23-25, 31, 32 and 35), six counts of having weapons while under disability

(Counts 5, 12, 19, 26, 38 and 39), four counts of grand theft (Counts 6, 13, 20 and

36), one count of attempted grand theft (Count 27), five counts of improperly

handling firearms in a motor vehicle (Counts 7, 14, 21, 37 and 42), one count of

attempted murder (Count 28), two counts of felonious assault (Counts 33 and 34),

one count of tampering with evidence (Count 40) and one count of carrying a

concealed weapon (Count 41). The aggravated robbery, robbery, grand theft,

attempted grand theft, attempted murder and felonious assault counts included

one- and three-year firearm specifications. Several of the other counts included

forfeiture of weapon specifications. D.T. initially pled not guilty to all charges.

At his arraignment on October 12, 2022, the trial court entered orders

referring D.T. to the Cuyahoga County Court Psychiatric Clinic (the “court

psychiatric clinic”) for evaluation and scheduling an initial pretrial conference. The

trial court’s October 12, 2022 referral order stated, in relevant part:

Defendant is referred to court psychiatric clinic. Director, psychiatric clinic: In accordance with provisions of the Ohio Revised Code, 2947.06(B) reports for the purpose of determining the disposition of a case: Eligibility for transfer to mental health court (Defendant has a psychotic disorder or intellectual function below I.Q. of 75). You are directed to examine [D.T.].

The trial court ordered the custodian of records for the Cuyahoga County Jail to

provide copies of “all jail records for the current or most recent jail stay” to the court

psychiatric clinic “for purposes of competency evaluation.”

After the pretrial conference on October 19, 2022, the trial court

issued a second order referring D.T. to the court psychiatric clinic for evaluation:

Defendant is referred to court psychiatric clinic. Director, psychiatric clinic: In accordance with provisions of the Ohio Revised Code, 2945.371 competence to stand trial; etc. 2947.06(B) reports for the purpose of determining the disposition of a case: Eligibility for transfer to mental health court (Defendant has a psychotic disorder or intellectual function below I.Q. of 75). You are directed to examine [D.T.].

Once again, the trial court ordered the custodian of records for the Cuyahoga County

Jail to provide copies of “all jail records for the current or most recent jail stay” to

the court psychiatric clinic “for purposes of competency evaluation.”4

On November 7, 2022, D.T. was evaluated by Dr. Jacqueline Heath

(“Heath”), a forensic psychologist at the court psychiatric clinic. In her report, dated

November 7, 2022, Heath opined that D.T. “currently presents with signs and

symptoms” of adjustment disorder with depressed mood and cannabis use disorder,

mild, in sustained remission in a controlled environment. She further opined that

4 The transcripts from D.T.’s arraignment on October 12, 2022 and the initial

pretrial conference on October 19, 2022 were not included in the record on appeal. Accordingly, it is unknown what, if anything, in particular occurred during those proceedings that led the court to request a second competency evaluation of D.T. D.T. “currently” has “the capacity to understand the nature and objectives of the

proceedings against him and to assist in his defense” and that, “[b]ecause he does

not have an I.Q. score below 75 and does not have a psychotic disorder diagnosis, he

would not be eligible for transfer to the Mental Health Court Docket.” Based on the

record before us, it does not appear that the issue of D.T.’s competency was raised

again by the trial court or the parties until the parties reached a plea agreement on

March 20, 2023.

At the outset of the change-of-plea hearing, the State requested that a

stipulation to the findings of Heath’s report be placed on the record:

THE COURT: . . . I understand that there is an opportunity here for a change of plea? . . . Would you please put that on the record?

MS. HASAN: Yes, Your Honor. And just prior to that, I believe there was previously a competency report done, and the parties stipulated on November 17, 2022. And the State would just like to place that stipulation on the record as well. . . .

THE COURT: All right. I have before me a hearing — a report from the court psychiatric clinic that is dated November 7, 2022. That is penned by Dr. Jacqueline Heath, a forensic psychologist. Counsel for the defense, have you had the opportunity to review this report?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I have, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Do you stipulate to the findings of this report?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I do, Judge.

THE COURT: And on behalf of the State of Ohio, do you stipulate to the findings of the report?

MS. HASAN: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: You may proceed. No further inquiry or findings were made by the trial court as to D.T.’s competency

nor did the trial court accept the stipulations.

Pursuant to the parties’ plea agreement, D.T. agreed to plead guilty to

five amended counts of aggravated robbery in violation of R.C. 2911.01(A)(1), first-

degree felony, each with three-year firearm specifications (amended Counts 1, 8, 15,

22 and 29); one amended count of felonious assault in violation of R.C.

2903.11(A)(2), a second-degree felony (amended Count 34); one count of having

weapons while under disability in violation of R.C. 2923.13(A)(2), a third-degree

felony, with a weapon forfeiture specification (Count 38) and one count of carrying

concealed weapons in violation of R.C. 2923.12(A)(1), a third-degree felony, with a

weapon forfeiture specification (Count 40). The parties further agreed to a

recommended minimum sentencing range of 18 to 25 years and that all firearm

specifications were from different acts or transactions and must be run

consecutively pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(C)(1)(a). In exchange for his guilty pleas,

the remaining counts were nolled.

In June 2023, the trial court “adopted the parties’ recommended

agreed sentencing range” and sentenced D.T. to an aggregate prison sentence of 21

to 24 years as follows: On amended Count 1, the trial court sentenced D.T. to three

years on the firearm specification and six-to-nine years on the underlying offense;

on amended Counts 8, 15, 22 and 29, the trial court sentenced D.T. to three years on

the firearm specification and six years on the underlying offense; on Count 34, the trial court imposed a two-year sentence and on Counts 38 and 40, the trial court

imposed a one-year sentence. The trial court ordered that the sentences on the five

firearm specifications be served consecutively (15 years) and prior to the sentences

on the underlying offenses and that the sentences on the underlying offenses be

served concurrently to one another (six to nine years). The trial court also imposed

postrelease control.

[D.T.] appealed, raising the following two assignments of error for

review:

Assignment of Error I:

[D.T.’s] statutory rights were violated when both the juvenile court and adult court failed to hold a hearing to determine his competency and failed to issue a written competency determination, in violation of R.C. 2152.58 and R.C. 2945.37, the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and Article I, Section 16 of the Ohio Constitution; In re K.A., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107938, 2017-Ohio-6979, ¶ 10-19; State v. Bennett, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107078, 2019-Ohio-2213, ¶ 21. (2/17/2022 Journal Entry; 6/13/2022 T. p. 12; 8/30/2022 T. p. 15; 10/11/2023 Journal Entry; 3/20/2023 T. p. 37).

Assignment of Error II:

The juvenile court abused its discretion when it transferred [D.T.’s] case for criminal prosecution, without sufficient credible evidence of non-amenability, in violation of R.C. 2152.12(B); the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; and Article I, Section 16 of the Ohio Constitution; State v. Nicholas, 171 Ohio St. 3d 278, 2022-Ohio-4276, 217 N.E.3d 745, ¶ 3.

Law and Analysis

As the United States Supreme Court has long held, due process

protections must be afforded to children. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30-31

(1967); see also State v. Aalim, 2017-Ohio-2956, ¶ 23 (“Due-process rights are applicable to juveniles through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 16 of the Ohio

Constitution.”).

Few, if any, determinations are more significant in the life of an

accused juvenile offender than whether he or she will be tried in an adult court. See,

e.g., State v. Smith, 2022-Ohio-274, ¶ 21 (“‘The transfer hearing implicates far more

significant issues than the venue or forum of trial; it serves as a vehicle by which a

child offender is deprived of the rehabilitation and treatment potential of the

juvenile-justice system.’”), quoting Aalim at ¶ 73 (O’Connor, C.J., dissenting).

Because of the “tremendous consequences” following a decision that a child must

lose the protections of the juvenile system and face trial as an adult, a bindover

proceeding — a “critically important” stage in juvenile proceedings — must

“measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment.” Kent v. United

States, 383 U.S. 541, 553-554, 556, 560-562 (1966); see also In re D.M., 2014-Ohio-

3628, ¶ 11; In re D.R., 2022-Ohio-4493, ¶ 14 (Juvenile procedural due process

claims are examined “through a framework of fundamental fairness.”), citing In re

C.P., 2012-Ohio-1446, ¶ 72. Given that “the General Assembly has vested the

juvenile courts with exclusive jurisdiction over juvenile cases, . . . juveniles are

statutorily entitled to some procedure.” In re D.R at ¶ 18, citing Kent at 557.

As the Ohio Supreme Court stated in Smith:

Ohio juvenile law is organized around the tenet that children who are charged with acts that would be felonies if committed by adults must be recognized by courts as children when adjudicating and determining the consequences to be imposed on them if they are found to have committed those acts. In the statutory scheme for juvenile justice, “[i]nstead of ‘defendants,’ children are ‘respondents’ or simply ‘juveniles’; instead of a trial, children receive ‘hearings’; children are not found guilty, they are ‘adjudicated delinquent’; and instead of sentencing, children’s cases are terminated through ‘disposition.’” State v. Hanning, 89 Ohio St.3d 86, 89, 728 N.E.2d 1059 (2000). Legislatures and courts, including this court, have recognized that the special interests involved in juvenile cases cannot be adequately addressed by the adult criminal-justice system, but they have also recognized that juveniles accused of crimes must be afforded the same procedural-due-process protections as adult criminal defendants . . . .

“[J]uvenile law and criminal law are not synonymous,” State v. Hand, 149 Ohio St.3d 94, 2016-Ohio-5504, 73 N.E.3d 448, ¶ 13[.] . . . “[T]he very purpose of the state juvenile code is ‘to avoid treatment of youngsters as criminals and insulate them from the reputation and answerability of criminals,’” id. at ¶ 19, quoting In re Agler, 19 Ohio St.2d 70, 80, 249 N.E.2d 808 (1969). Stated another way, the juvenile- justice system must provide for accountability; yet it must also meet society’s need to secure its future through its youth. Thus, the juvenile- justice system must hold juveniles accountable for their actions and, whenever possible, provide them with opportunities for learning and growth toward a better path.

Smith at ¶ 1-2.

As set forth in R.C. 2152.01(A), the “overriding purposes” for juvenile

dispositions are “to provide for the care, protection, and mental and physical

development of children subject to this chapter, protect the public interest and

safety, hold the offender accountable for the offender’s actions, restore the victim,

and rehabilitate the offender.” These purposes are to be achieved “by a system of

graduated sanctions and services.” Id. “We should respect those stated statutory

purposes when examining, applying, and, when necessary, interpreting the statutes

for juvenile bindovers for prosecution in adult court.” Smith at ¶ 2. To that end, R.C. Chapters 2151 and 2152 are to be “liberally

interpreted and construed” “[t]o provide judicial procedures” through which their

provisions are “executed and enforced” and in which “the parties are assured of a

fair hearing, and their constitutional and other legal rights are recognized and

enforced.” R.C. 2151.01; 2152.01(C). “Judicial discretion is essential to preserving

that special nature of the juvenile process and to maintaining fundamental fairness

in the juvenile-justice system.” In re D.R. at ¶ 15. “To ensure that orders are

‘reasonably calculated to achieve the overriding purposes’ of the statutes that govern

the juvenile-justice system, R.C. 2152.01(B), juvenile courts must evaluate the

particular facts and circumstances of each case and discern the particular problems

and needs of the juvenile appearing before them.” Id. “A juvenile court’s ability to

individually assess and treat juvenile offenders is a key element to maintaining

fairness in our juvenile-justice system. So, too, is shielding juveniles from carrying

the consequences and stigma of their juvenile delinquency into adulthood.” Id. at ¶

5.

It is against this backdrop that we review the assignments of error

raised in this appeal.

Whether D.T.’s Guilty Pleas in Adult Court Waived Any Appealable Errors

Before we turn to the merits of D.T.’s assignments of error, we first

address the State’s contention that D.T. waived any appealable errors by entering

guilty pleas to various offenses after he was bound over to adult court. The State asserts that D.T. waived all errors claimed in this appeal, including any errors related

to the failure to comply with competency statutes and any errors in the juvenile

court’s “discretionary consideration of amenability factors,” “as none of the alleged

errors cited precluded him from entering a knowing and voluntary plea.”

In response, D.T. asserts that the State’s argument puts the cart before

the horse — i.e., that “it is precisely the court’s failure to comply with the

[competency] statute that prevented [D.T.] from entering a knowing, intelligent,

and voluntary plea” — and points out that this court has previously evaluated lower

courts’ compliance with statutory competency procedures on appeal following a

defendant’s or a delinquent child’s guilty plea (citing In re K.A. 2017-Ohio-6979,

¶ 10-19 (8th Dist.), and State v. Dowdy, 2012-Ohio-2382, ¶ 15 (8th Dist.)), and

“routinely decides challenges to amenability decisions following a child’s guilty plea

in adult court” (citing State v. Jordan, 2023-Ohio-311, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.), State v.

Carter, 2023-Ohio-4310, ¶ 18 (8th Dist.), and State v. Walker, 2024-Ohio-729, ¶ 14

(8th Dist.)). (Emphasis deleted.) D.T. also asserts that the juvenile court’s failure

to comply with the juvenile competency statutes and requirements for determining

amenability deprived the adult court of jurisdiction, which could not be waived by

D.T.’s guilty pleas in adult court.

“[A]bsent a proper bindover procedure . . ., the juvenile court has the

exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over any case concerning a child who is alleged

to be a delinquent.” State v. Wilson, 73 Ohio St.3d 40, 44-46 (1995). A court’s

subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived — even by the entry of a guilty plea. However, not every error in a bindover proceeding is a jurisdictional error. See, e.g.,

Smith v. May, 2020-Ohio-61, ¶ 31 (“‘[N]ot every requirement [in R.C. 2152.12], even

if mandatory, is jurisdictional in nature.’”), quoting Pryor v. Dir., Dept. of Job &

Family Servs., 2016-Ohio-2907, ¶ 15.

In support of its waiver argument, the State cites cases in which this

court and the Ohio Supreme Court have held that a voluntary guilty plea in adult

court waives the ability to challenge the ruling on a pretrial suppression motion,

State v. Obermiller, 2016-Ohio-1594, ¶ 56, to claim his or her statutory speedy trial

rights were violated, State v. Kelley, 57 Ohio St.3d 127, 130 (1991), or to claim

ineffective assistance of counsel, unless the plea was induced by that ineffective

assistance, State v. Geraci, 2015-Ohio-2699, ¶ 14 (8th Dist.). None of these cases

involved failure to make a competency determination or a discretionary transfer

from juvenile court.

The State also cites cases from other appellate districts in which courts

have recognized that a juvenile’s guilty plea in adult court “‘waives the ability to

contest the sufficiency and weight of the evidence presented at the probable cause

hearing in the juvenile court,’” Appellee’s Br. at 16, quoting State v. Zarlengo, 2021-

Ohio-4631, ¶ 46 (7th Dist.), and citing State v. Powell, 2021-Ohio-200, ¶ 55 (4th

Dist.) (defendant waived claim that juvenile court’s probable cause finding was not

supported by sufficient evidence, claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on

counsels’ failure to adequately prepare for probable cause hearing and any errors in

juvenile court’s failure to appoint a criminal investigator, denial of motion to suppress and colloquy regarding waiver of amenability hearing when he entered

guilty pleas in adult court after bindover; “[i]f an error in a bindover proceeding is

nonjurisdictional, it can be waived by a voluntary guilty plea or forfeited by the

failure to preserve it in the juvenile court proceedings”).5 This case is different.

First, a challenge based on a lower court’s failure to hold a competency

hearing or make a competency determination “goes directly” to whether a

defendant’s plea was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. See, e.g., In re K.A., 2017-

Ohio-6979, at ¶ 19, fn. 2 (8th Dist.) (juvenile’s plea did not waive a challenge to the

juvenile court’s failure to conduct required competency hearing when the issue was

raised before juvenile admitted to rape and kidnaping charges because challenge

went “directly to whether his plea was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent”); see also

State v. Allen, 2020-Ohio-4444, ¶ 15 (8th Dist.).

Second, errors related to the juvenile court’s failure to comply with

mandatory procedures designed to ensure the competency of a juvenile offender —

5 The State asserts that “[w]hether a guilty plea waives claims relating to the

juvenile transfer hearing is an issue currently pending in the Supreme Court.” Appellee’s Br. at 16, citing State v. Turner, No. 2023-1242, Proposition of Law II. In Turner, this court held that a juvenile court’s failure to make a finding of probable cause for a charge that was transferred to adult court could not be waived by virtue of a defendant’s guilty plea in adult court because the issue was jurisdictional. State v. Turner, 2023-Ohio-2874, ¶ 10, 23 (8th Dist.) No issues were raised regarding competency or the juvenile court’s amenability determination. The State appealed that decision to the Ohio Supreme Court, which accepted the appeal for review. Proposition of Law II specifically addresses only alleged errors in the juvenile court’s probable-cause finding, not alleged errors in a juvenile court’s determination of competency or amenability. Accordingly, it is not clear that any ruling in that case would resolve the issues here. Proposition of Law II states: “In juvenile bindover cases, guilty pleas in criminal court waive claims arising out of the underlying bindover hearing because a grand jury determination superseded the juvenile court’s probable cause finding.” which had been called into question during proceedings in juvenile court — or

related to deficiencies in the juvenile court’s amenability determination are very

different from a challenge to the factual or evidentiary basis for a juvenile court’s

probable-cause determination. Such defects in the juvenile court’s bindover

proceedings do not relate to an offender’s factual guilt. While a defendant, when

entering a guilty plea in adult court, admits committing the acts that constituted the

offenses to which he pleads guilty (and which were the subject of the juvenile court’s

probable-cause determination), he does not make any admission as to his

competency during prior juvenile proceedings or that he was not amenable to care

or rehabilitation in the juvenile justice system.

In State v. Pickens, 2024-Ohio-951 (8th Dist.), the defendant appealed

his convictions for involuntary manslaughter and improper discharge of a firearm

at or into habitation or school after his case was transferred to adult court and he

pled guilty to the offenses. Id. at ¶ 1, 4-5. On appeal, the defendant challenged the

sufficiency of the evidence that supported the juvenile court’s probable-cause

determination, claiming that there was insufficient evidence that he shot the weapon

into the victim’s home. Id. at ¶ 14. This court held that there could be no reversible

error in the juvenile court’s probable-cause determination because the defendant’s

subsequent admissions through his guilty pleas “subsume[d] the quantum of

evidence necessary to the probable-cause determination.” Id. at ¶ 15. The court

explained: The probable-cause determination is a preliminary, sufficiency determination requiring the state to present evidence that raises more than mere suspicion of guilt — but that need not rise to the level of beyond a reasonable doubt. In re E.S., Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio- 4273, at ¶ 23.

The effect of a guilty plea is a complete admission of guilt to the offense to which the plea is entered, which goes well beyond proof beyond a reasonable doubt if a guilty plea is to be quantified. Crim.R. 11(B)(1). . . . Pickens entered his guilty plea and the effect of that plea is a complete admission to committing the acts that constituted the offenses to which he pleaded guilty.

Pickens’s guilty plea to improper discharge of a firearm into a habitation . . . was based on the same facts underlying the probable- cause determination. . . . His guilty plea effectively concedes there was sufficient evidence of his committing acts that would constitute the felony offenses, . . . and as a result, there can be no error with the juvenile court’s factual determination. See, e.g., State v. Griggs, 103 Ohio St.3d 85, 2004-Ohio-4415, 814 N.E.2d 51, ¶ 19 (guilty plea subsumes an admission of guilt, and therefore, the guilty plea is an admission to committing the underlying acts on which the conviction is based).

Pickens at ¶ 16-18.

In Pickens, as in this case, the State argued that a defendant bound

over to the general division cannot raise any nonjurisdictional error relating to that

bindover on appeal after pleading guilty to the offenses for which the defendant was

bound over. Id. at ¶ 14, 19. This court, however, rejected the State’s attempt to seek

“a definitive, bright-line rule that an offender waives all nonjurisdictional errors in

the juvenile proceedings after the case is transferred to the general division if the

offender pleads guilty to the felony offenses,” concluding that it “need not reach that

broad of a conclusion” in resolving the case. Id. (“[W]e do not take any position on

the applicability of that general principle [i.e., that pleading guilty waives all nonjurisdictional defects in the proceedings that occur prior to the plea] to other

aspects of an appeal involving bindover and guilty plea.”), citing Jordan, 2023-

Ohio-311, at ¶ 7 (8th Dist.) (after a discretionary bindover and pleading guilty,

defendant unsuccessfully challenged amenability determination on appeal); see also

State v. Walker, 2024-Ohio-729, ¶ 26-27 (8th Dist.) (declining to address the issue

of whether defendant waived his right to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence

supporting the juvenile court’s amenability finding by entering guilty pleas in adult

court because it found the juvenile court’s amenability finding was supported by

sufficient information in the record); State v. Poole, 2012-Ohio-5739, ¶ 1, 8-26, fn. 1

(8th Dist.) (when addressing defendant’s claims that juvenile court should not have

ordered his discretionary transfer to the general division because (1) the juvenile

court failed to state its specific reasons in support of bindover on the record and (2)

the juvenile court abused its discretion by finding the amenability factors set forth

in R.C. 2152.12(D) justified his transfer, noting “[a] guilty plea made following a

bindover or transfer from the juvenile division does not waive the right to appeal the

bindover or transfer”). But see State v. Moore, 2022-Ohio-460, ¶ 24 (4th Dist.) (By

pleading guilty to offenses in adult court, defendant waived alleged

nonjurisdictional errors challenging the juvenile court’s exercise of its discretion

finding probable cause that defendant committed offenses and concluding that

defendant was not amenable to rehabilitation within the juvenile justice system).

There are other considerations as well. The Ohio Supreme Court has

held that a defendant may not immediately appeal a juvenile court’s order transferring jurisdiction of his or her case to adult court but must wait to appeal any

error stemming from the order until it becomes a final judgment, following

conviction and sentencing, in the general division. See In re D.H., 2018-Ohio-17,

¶ 1, 22; In re Becker, 39 Ohio St.2d 84 (1974), syllabus. We do not believe a

defendant must choose to go to trial, rather than enter a guilty plea, in order to

preserve his or her right to challenge errors in the juvenile court’s handling of

competency issues or its amenability determination. See Smith v. May, 2020-Ohio-

61, ¶ 29 (“Juveniles facing bindover to an adult court maintain the right to object to

a juvenile court’s noncompliance with bindover procedures and the right to appeal

from any error in the ordinary course of law.”)(emphasis deleted).

Based on these considerations, we find that D.T.’s guilty pleas in adult

court do not preclude us from considering on appeal the issues he has raised with

the juvenile court proceedings in this case. We need not decide and, therefore, do

not decide whether such alleged errors are the type of errors that would deprive the

adult court of jurisdiction.

Juvenile Court’s Failure to Hold Competency Hearing and Make Competency Determination

In his first assignment of error, D.T. contends that his statutory and

constitutional rights were violated when (1) the juvenile court failed to hold a

competency hearing and issue a written competency determination, as required

under the juvenile competency statute, R.C. 2152.58, and (2) the adult court

accepted D.T.’s guilty pleas and convicted him without following the statutory procedures set forth in the adult competency statute, R.C. 2945.37. D.T. contends

that continuing to hold proceedings, when an issue has been raised regarding a

child’s competency, without first determining that child’s competency is a structural

error that requires reversal of his bindover and remand to the juvenile court for a

new competency evaluation and determination.

“Fundamental to our adversarial system of justice is the due process

right of a criminal defendant who is legally incompetent not to be subjected to trial.”

State v. Were, 94 Ohio St.3d 173, 174 (2002); see also State v. Thomas, 2002-Ohio-

6624, ¶ 36 (“Fundamental principles of due process require that a criminal

defendant who is legally incompetent may not be tried.”). This principle applies with

equal force to juvenile offenders. See, e.g., In re K.A., 2017-Ohio-6979, at ¶ 10 (8th

Dist.) (“[T]he right not be tried or convicted while incompetent is as fundamental in

juvenile proceedings as it is in criminal trials of adults.’”) (Bracketed text in

original.), quoting In re Bailey, 2002-Ohio-6792, ¶ 10 (2d Dist.); see also In re A.H.,

2018-Ohio-364, ¶ 12 (12th Dist.).

R.C. 2152.51 through R.C. 2152.59 govern juvenile competency

determinations. R.C. 2152.52(A)(1) states: “In any proceeding under this chapter

other than a proceeding alleging that a child is an unruly child or a juvenile traffic

offender, any party or the court may move for a determination regarding the child’s

competency to participate in the proceeding.” “[C]ompetency” refers to “a child’s

ability to understand the nature and objectives of a proceeding against the child and

to assist in the child’s defense.” R.C. 2152.51(A)(1). A child is incompetent if, “due to mental illness, due to developmental disability, or otherwise due to a lack of

mental capacity, the child is presently incapable of understanding the nature and

objective of proceedings against the child or of assisting in the child’s defense.” Id.

It is “rebuttably presumed” that a child does not have a lack of mental capacity if the

child is: (1) fourteen years of age or older and (2) not otherwise found to have a

mental illness or developmental disability. R.C. 2152.52(A)(2).

If a party requests a competency determination of a child, the juvenile

court may (1) declare the child incompetent, (2) determine that there is a reasonable

basis to conduct a competency evaluation or (3) hold a hearing to determine whether

there is a reasonable basis to conduct a competency evaluation. R.C. 2152.53(A)(3).

If the juvenile court determines there is a reasonable basis to conduct a competency

evaluation (or the prosecuting attorney and the child’s attorney agree to the

evaluation), the juvenile court “shall order a competency evaluation” and appoint a

qualified evaluator. R.C. 2152.53(B); R.C. 2152.54. The evaluator is required to

“assess whether the individual, in conjunction with advice from legal counsel, is

capable of assisting counsel, understanding those things necessary for a proper

defense, and for the individual to make informed decisions.” In re S.D., 2014-Ohio-

2528, ¶ 21 (8th Dist.).

After the competency evaluation is completed, the evaluator must

submit a written competency assessment report to the juvenile court that includes

the evaluator’s opinion “as to whether the child, due to mental illness, due to

developmental disability, or otherwise due to a lack of mental capacity, is currently incapable of understanding the nature and objective of the proceedings against the

child or of assisting in the child’s defense.” R.C. 2152.56(A); R.C. 2152.57(A).

Specifically, the report must address the child’s capacity to: (1) comprehend and

appreciate the charges or allegations against the child; (2) understand the

adversarial nature of the proceedings, including the role of the judge, defense

counsel, prosecuting attorney, guardian ad litem or court-appointed special

assistant and witnesses; (3) assist in the child’s defense and communicate with

counsel and (4) comprehend and appreciate the consequences that may be imposed

or result from the proceedings. R.C. 2152.56(B).

After receiving the evaluator’s competency assessment report, R.C.

2152.58 mandates that the juvenile court “hold a hearing to determine the child’s

competency to participate in the proceeding” and thereafter “make a written

determination as to the child’s competency or incompetency based on a

preponderance of the evidence.” R.C. 2152.58(A) and (D)(1). In determining the

competency of the child to participate in the proceeding, the juvenile court “shall

consider the content of all competency assessment reports admitted as evidence”

and may also consider “additional evidence, including the court’s own observations

of the child’s conduct and demeanor in the courtroom.” R.C. 2152.58(C).

In this case, a competency evaluation was conducted on March 21,

2022 and a competency evaluation report dated March 23, 2022 was, at some point,

apparently submitted to the juvenile court. However, there is nothing in the record

to indicate that the juvenile court ever reviewed the report. The juvenile court does not reference the report in any journal entry and makes no mention of it during the

June 13, 2022 probable cause hearing (at which D.T. stipulated to probable cause)

or the August 30, 2022 amenability hearing.

There is no indication in the record that defense counsel stipulated to

the report or to any of the findings set forth in the report. No hearing was held on

the issue of D.T.’s competency, and no written findings were made by the juvenile

court regarding his competency as required under R.C. 2152.58.

The State concedes that the juvenile court never held a competency

hearing and never issued a written determination regarding D.T.’s competency.

However, it maintains that “competency” is a matter only for trial i.e., that

“[f]undamental principles of due process require that a criminal defendant who is

legally incompetent may not be tried” and does not extend to bindover proceedings.

The State further asserts that the “competency” of a juvenile offender is “not one of

the factors” the juvenile court must consider in determining whether to transfer a

case to adult court because “[b]ind-over proceedings are to determine jurisdiction

of a case, not the merits of a case triggering competency.” The State contends that

any error by the juvenile court in failing to hold a competency hearing and issue a

written competency determination was harmless because “there was nothing in the

record to suggest that [D.T.] lacked competency to stand trial” and both parties

“stipulated to the findings of competency” after D.T. was reevaluated when the case

was in the general division. We disagree. First, there is nothing in R.C. 2152.51 through 2152.58 that limits

application of the juvenile competency statutes to competency for trial. R.C.

2152.52(A) states: “In any proceeding under this chapter other than a proceeding

alleging that a child is an unruly child or a juvenile traffic offender, any party or the

court may move for a determination regarding the child’s competency to

participate in the proceeding.” (Emphasis added.) R.C. 2152.58(A) states that after

receiving the evaluator’s competency assessment report, the juvenile court “shall

hold a hearing to determine the child’s competency to participate in the proceeding.”

(Emphasis added.) Proceedings relating to a request for discretionary transfer,

including probable cause and amenability hearings, are proceedings under R.C. Ch.

2152. See R.C. 2152.12.

In support of its argument that competency was “not an issue that

needs to be addressed” prior to transfer to adult court, the State cites this court’s

decision in State v. Cruz, 2010-Ohio-3717 (8th Dist.). In Cruz, the juvenile’s counsel

moved for a full competency evaluation, while the case was pending in juvenile

court, based on a “suggestion of incompetency” contained in the psychological

assessment report prepared for the defendant’s amenability hearing. Id. at ¶ 3-4.

The juvenile court denied the motion and ruled that the issue of the juvenile’s

competency could be raised later in juvenile court if jurisdiction was not transferred

or in the common pleas court if jurisdiction was transferred. Id. at ¶ 4. The case

was transferred to the common pleas court and the juvenile again requested a

competency evaluation. The trial court referred him to the court psychiatric clinic for a competency evaluation, but no competency report was ever filed. Id. at ¶ 7.

The juvenile defendant thereafter pled guilty to several offenses. Id. at ¶ 8.

On appeal, the defendant argued that the juvenile court's failure to

address the issue of his competency prior to transferring his case to the common

pleas court was an abuse of discretion and constituted reversible error. Id. at ¶ 9.

The court held that “there was no error in denying [the juvenile’s] request for a

competency evaluation” while he was in juvenile court, noting that “[t]he proceeding

before the juvenile court was an amenability hearing under R.C. 2152.12(B) held to

assess the factors for and against transfer of jurisdiction to common pleas court.”

Id. at ¶ 10.

However, Cruz was decided before the enactment of the juvenile

competency statute, R.C. 2152.51-2152.59, which became effective on September 30,

2011. At the time Cruz was decided, only the adult competency statute existed. See

R.C. 2945.37(B) (“In a criminal action in a court of common pleas, a county court,

or a municipal court, the court, prosecutor, or defense may raise the issue of the

defendant’s competence to stand trial. If the issue is raised before the trial has

commenced, the court shall hold a hearing on the issue as provided in this section.

If the issue is raised after the trial has commenced, the court shall hold a hearing on

the issue only for good cause shown or on the court’s own motion.”); former R.C.

2945.371(A)(“If the issue of a defendant’s competence to stand trial is raised . . . the

court may order one or more evaluations of the defendant’s present mental

condition . . . .”). Further, although the court held that there was no error in the juvenile

court’s failure to hold a competency hearing before transferring the case to adult

court, it reversed the defendant’s convictions, and remanded the case with

instructions to vacate his pleas and conduct a competency hearing pursuant to R.C.

2945.37, concluding that the common pleas court erred in accepting the defendant’s

guilty pleas “without holding a hearing on his competency where the issue was

raised before trial, both in juvenile court and common pleas court.” Id. at ¶ 11, 21.

The court held that, where the issue of competency is raised, a trial court “cannot

make a reliable determination of the defendant’s competency to enter a knowing,

intelligent, and voluntary plea under Crim.R. 11” without first determining the

defendant’s competency and that a trial court “commits reversible error” by failing

to hold a competency hearing before accepting a guilty plea or make the result of the

psychiatric report part of the record where defense counsel did not stipulate to a

finding of competency or waive the requirement of a hearing. Id. at ¶ 17-18. The

court further held that it “could not glean sufficient information from [the] record”

to conclude that the error was harmless and that the defendant did not waive a

challenge to the trial court’s failure to conduct the required competency hearing by

his guilty pleas because the issue went “directly to whether his plea was voluntary,

knowing, and intelligent.” Id. at ¶ 19-20.

This court and others have held that a juvenile court commits

reversible error when a juvenile is referred for a competency evaluation and the

juvenile court fails to hold a competency hearing and issue a written competency determination in accordance with R.C. 2152.58. See, e.g., In re K.A., 2017-Ohio-

6979, at ¶ 10-19, 22 (8th Dist.) (juvenile court committed reversible error in

accepting juvenile’s plea; although the juvenile court referred juvenile to the court

psychiatric clinic for a competency evaluation, no competency hearing was held,

defense counsel did not stipulate to a finding of competency and no written order

was entered determining his competency before the juvenile court accepted his

guilty plea); In re A.H., 2018-Ohio-364, ¶ 13-15 (12th Dist.) (juvenile court

committed reversible error in adjudicating juvenile a delinquent child where it failed

to make a written determination of juvenile’s competency prior to accepting his

admission to a rape charge; fact that defense counsel stipulated that he received the

psychologist’s written evaluation and was not going to contest the findings did not

relieve the juvenile court of its statutory duty to make a written determination as to

juvenile’s competency); In re Andrew W., 2014-Ohio-1576, ¶ 10-27 (5th Dist.)

(juvenile court erred in failing to hold a competency hearing and make a written

determination regarding juvenile’s competency notwithstanding that court-ordered

competency evaluation found him competent where the juvenile had been receiving

mental health treatment, had learning and understanding problems and

“present[ed] with Borderline Intellectual Functioning”).

Second, contrary to the State’s assertion that “there is nothing in the

record to suggest that [D.T.] lacked competency,” the transcript from D.T.’s

arraignment in juvenile court on January 18, 2022, reflects that both D.T.’s mother

and defense counsel raised concerns regarding D.T.’s mental state at that time. Ezzo’s competency evaluation report states that D.T.’s competency evaluation was

“precipitated by [D.T.’s] parents raising concerns to [D.T.’s] attorney that his mental

health was ‘diminishing’ and upon visiting the juvenile in the Detention Center his

defense counsel also had similar concerns that [D.T.] may not be competent to stand

trial.”

Although the transcripts from the February 17, 2022 and March 2,

2022 hearings — at which defense counsel requested a competency evaluation of

D.T. — are not part of the record forwarded to this court on appeal, the juvenile court

apparently believed there were sufficient grounds for concern regarding D.T.’s

competency because after defense counsel raised the issue, the juvenile court

immediately ordered a competency evaluation of D.T. without first conducting a

hearing to determine whether there was a reasonable basis to conduct a competency

evaluation. See R.C. 2152.53(A)(3).

At the time of the amenability hearing, D.T. was in the eighth or ninth

grade. Testimony at the amenability hearing established that he was functionally

illiterate with an “extremely low” reading score. D.T. had limited juvenile court

experience, had not previously been subject to bindover and was, in large part,

unfamiliar with the issues and court procedures related to those proceedings —

proceedings that could expose him to significant prison time if transferred to adult

court. Further, the record reflects that there were continued concerns regarding

D.T.’s competency after he was transferred to the general division. On October 12,

2022 and October 19, 2022 — shortly after D.T. was transferred to adult court — the trial court entered two orders referring D.T. to the court psychiatric clinic for

evaluation.

The fact that defense counsel ultimately stipulated to D.T.’s

competency at the time of his change-of-plea hearing in adult court in March 2023

does not negate concerns regarding D.T.’s competency, including D.T.’s mental

capacity to comprehend and his ability to assist his counsel in his defense in March

2022 through August 2022, when critical decisions were being made in juvenile

court, including the decision to waive a probable cause hearing and the juvenile

court’s decision regarding amenability. R.C. 2152.56(D) and 2152.59 recognize that

a juvenile’s mental capacity (and competency) may change over time. Where a

juvenile is facing the prospect of being bound over to adult court to be tried as an

adult court, no one should be left to doubt whether the juvenile was competent

during the proceedings.

R.C. 2152.58(A) and (D)(1) require a juvenile court, after receiving

a competency evaluation report, to hold a hearing and make a written

determination as to the juvenile’s competency. The juvenile court erred in failing

to do so. Based on the record before us, we cannot say that this error was

harmless. We, therefore, sustain D.T.’s first assignment of error as it relates to

the juvenile court’s failure to hold a competency hearing and make a written

determination of D.T.’s competency.6

6 Based on our ruling here and our resolution of D.T.’s second assignment of error

below, we need not address D.T.’s first assignment of error as it relates to the general Juvenile Court’s Decision to Transfer D.T.’s Cases to Adult Court

In his second assignment of error, D.T. contends that the juvenile

court abused its discretion when it transferred his case to adult court “without

sufficient credible evidence of non-amenability.”

Ohio’s juvenile courts possess “exclusive jurisdiction over children

alleged to be delinquent for committing acts that would constitute crimes if

committed by an adult.” In re M.P., 2010-Ohio-599, ¶ 11, citing R.C. 2151.23(A);

State v. Mays, 2014-Ohio-3815, ¶ 17 (8th Dist.). Under certain circumstances,

however, if a child is old enough and is alleged to have committed an act that would

be a felony if committed by an adult, the juvenile court may transfer a case, or bind

a juvenile over, to the general division where the juvenile may be tried as an adult

and face criminal sanctions. R.C. 2152.10; 2152.12; 2151.23(H); In re M.P. at ¶ 11.

There are two types of transfers in Ohio’s juvenile justice system:

discretionary transfers and mandatory transfers. State v. Nicholas, 2022-Ohio-

4276, ¶ 3. With discretionary transfer, the juvenile court has the discretion to

transfer to adult court certain juveniles who do not appear to be amenable to care or

rehabilitation within the juvenile system and who appear to be a threat to public

safety. R.C. 2152.12(B). Mandatory transfer removes discretion from juvenile court

division’s failure to make a competency determination prior to the entry of his guilty pleas. judges and requires the transfer of a juvenile to adult court. Nicholas at ¶ 3; R.C.

2152.12(A). This case involves discretionary transfer.

R.C. 2152.12(B) governs discretionary transfer of cases from juvenile

court to the general division. After a complaint has been filed charging a child with

an offense that would be a felony if committed by an adult, a juvenile court may

transfer jurisdiction of the case to the general division if it finds, following a hearing,

that (1) the child was 14 years of age or older at the time of the act charged in the

complaint, (2) probable cause exists that the child committed the act charged in the

complaint and (3) “[t]he child is not amenable to care or rehabilitation within the

juvenile system, and the safety of the community may require that the child be

subject to adult sanctions.” R.C. 2152.12(B)(1)-(3).

If the juvenile court finds that the age and probable cause elements

are met, the juvenile court must order a “full investigation” into “the child’s social

history, education, family situation, and any other factor bearing on whether the

child is amenable to juvenile rehabilitation, including a mental examination of the

child by a public or private agency or a person qualified to make the examination.”

R.C. 2152.12(C); Juv.R. 30(C).

After the investigation is complete, the juvenile court holds an

amenability hearing to determine whether to exercise its discretion to transfer a

juvenile to adult court under R.C. 2152.12(B). In making its determination, the

juvenile court must consider all “relevant factors,” including specific factors identified in R.C. 2152.12(D) and (E), that weigh in favor of and against a transfer.

R.C. 2152.12(B)(3), (D), (E).

The specific statutory factors “in favor of a transfer” the juvenile

court must consider in determining whether to transfer a child’s case to adult court

include whether:

(1) The victim of the act charged suffered physical or psychological harm, or serious economic harm, as a result of the alleged act.

(2) The physical or psychological harm suffered by the victim due to the alleged act of the child was exacerbated because of the physical or psychological vulnerability or the age of the victim.

(3) The child’s relationship with the victim facilitated the act charged.

(4) The child allegedly committed the act charged for hire or as a part of a gang or other organized criminal activity.

(5) The child had a firearm on or about the child's person or under the child's control at the time of the act charged, the act charged is not a violation of section 2923.12 of the Revised Code, and the child, during the commission of the act charged, allegedly used or displayed the firearm, brandished the firearm, or indicated that the child possessed a firearm.

(6) At the time of the act charged, the child was awaiting adjudication or disposition as a delinquent child, was under a community control sanction, or was on parole for a prior delinquent child adjudication or conviction.

(7) The results of any previous juvenile sanctions and programs indicate that rehabilitation of the child will not occur in the juvenile system.

(8) The child is emotionally, physically, or psychologically mature enough for the transfer.

(9) There is not sufficient time to rehabilitate the child within the juvenile system. R.C. 2152.12(D). The specific statutory factors “against a transfer” the

juvenile court must consider in determining whether to transfer a child’s case

to adult court include whether:

(1) The victim induced or facilitated the act charged.

(2) The child acted under provocation in allegedly committing the act charged.

(3) The child was not the principal actor in the act charged, or, at the time of the act charged, the child was under the negative influence or coercion of another person.

(4) The child did not cause physical harm to any person or property, or have reasonable cause to believe that harm of that nature would occur, in allegedly committing the act charged.

(5) The child previously has not been adjudicated a delinquent child.

(6) The child is not emotionally, physically, or psychologically mature enough for the transfer.

(7) The child has a mental illness or intellectual disability.

(8) There is sufficient time to rehabilitate the child within the juvenile system and the level of security available in the juvenile system provides a reasonable assurance of public safety.

R.C. 2152.12(E). R.C. 2152.12(B)(3) requires that the juvenile court record “indicate

the specific factors that were applicable and that the court weighed.” R.C.

2152.12(B)(3). R.C. 2152.12 is silent with regard to how a juvenile court should

weigh the factors in R.C. 2152.12(D) and (E). See, e.g., State v. Ramsden, 2021-

Ohio-3071, ¶ 23 (12th Dist.); State v. Marshall, 2016-Ohio-3184, ¶ 15 (1st Dist.).

“There is no requirement that every factor must be ‘resolved against the juvenile so long as the totality of the evidence supports a finding that the juvenile is not

amenable to treatment.’” State v. Bryant, 2024-Ohio-1192, ¶ 16 (2d Dist.), quoting

State v. Haynie, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 517, *13 (12th Dist. Feb. 13, 1995). “No one

factor controls over any other.” Jordan, 2023-Ohio-311, at ¶ 8, 11 (8th Dist.) (“No

one factor under R.C. 2152.12(D) or (E) is outcome determinative.”).

If the juvenile court determines that transfer is warranted, the

juvenile court must state the reasons for transfer on the record and in the order of

transfer. R.C. 2152.12(I); Juv.R. 30(G). A juvenile court’s decision to exercise its

discretion to transfer a juvenile to adult court must be supported by a

preponderance of the evidence. Nicholas, 2022-Ohio-4276, at ¶ 29, 35. Further, the

State bears the burden of persuasion when it asks the juvenile court to transfer a

case to adult court. Id. at ¶ 27. “Thus, the facts presented to the juvenile court with

respect to a discretionary transfer must persuade the court that the juvenile is not

amenable to care or rehabilitation in the juvenile system.” Id.; see also Walker,

2024-Ohio-729, at ¶ 21 (8th Dist.).

Because an amenability hearing is “a broad assessment of individual

circumstances,” “inherently individualized and fact-based” and because R.C.

2152.12 is silent with regard to how a juvenile court should weigh the relevant

factors, the decision regarding amenability rests in the discretion of the juvenile

court. In re M.P., 2010-Ohio-599, at ¶ 14; State v. Gregory, 2020-Ohio-5207, ¶ 32

(2d Dist.). We, therefore, review a juvenile court’s amenability decision for abuse of

discretion. In re M.P., 2010-Ohio-599, ¶ 14. A court abuses its discretion “when a legal rule entrusts a decision to

a judge’s discretion and the judge’s exercise of that discretion is outside of the legally

permissible range of choices.” State v. Hackett, 2020-Ohio-6699, ¶ 19; see also

Johnson v. Abdullah, 2021-Ohio-3304, ¶ 35 (describing the “common

understanding of what constitutes an abuse of discretion” as “a court exercising its

judgment, in an unwarranted way, in regard to a matter over which it has

discretionary authority”). A decision is an abuse of discretion when it is

unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable. See, e.g., State v. Brusiter, 2023-Ohio-

3794, ¶ 10 (8th Dist.); Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983). A

decision is “unreasonable” when “‘no sound reasoning process’” supports that

decision. State v. Ford, 2019-Ohio-4539, ¶ 106, quoting AAAA Ents. v. River Place

Community Urban Redevelopment Corp., 50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161 (1990). A decision

is “arbitrary” if “made ‘without consideration of or regard for facts [or]

circumstances.’” State v. Beasley, 2018-Ohio-16, ¶ 12, quoting Black’s Law

Dictionary 125 (10th Ed. 2014).

When applying an abuse-of-discretion standard, this court may not

substitute its judgment for that of the lower court. State v. McFarland, 2022-Ohio-

4638, ¶ 21 (8th Dist.). Ordinarily, given the discretion afforded the juvenile court

by the legislature in determining a juvenile’s amenability to the juvenile justice

system, so long as the juvenile court considers the appropriate statutory factors and

there is some rational, factual basis in the record to support the juvenile court’s

findings when applying those factors, the juvenile court’s amenability determination cannot be reversed. State v. Nicholson, 2022-Ohio-2037, ¶ 206 (8th Dist.); Jordan,

2023-Ohio-311, at ¶ 11 (8th Dist.).

Here, the juvenile court found, with little to no discussion or

explanation, that every “relevant factor” in favor of transfer under R.C. 2152.12(D)

applied and that none of the “relevant factors” against transfer under R.C.

2152.12(E) applied. D.T. argues that the juvenile court acted unreasonably in

transferring D.T. to adult court because (1) the juvenile court’s nonamenability

finding was based on the “demonstrably false premise” that there were no remaining

juvenile court options to hold D.T. accountable and restore and rehabilitate him and

was “at odds with the principles and purposes of juvenile sentencing,” (2) the record

“completely lacks information” explaining why “the time the juvenile court had left

in its jurisdiction,” was not sufficient time to rehabilitate D.T. or why D.T. was

considered sufficiently “mature” to be transferred, (3) its bindover decision was not

based on “a thorough or particularized discussion of disposition options vis-à-vis

[D.T.’s] specific needs” and (4) certain of the juvenile court’s findings were clearly

erroneous based on the evidence in the record. D.T. also contends that the trial court

abused its discretion because it did not provide an explanation — at the amenability

hearing or in its transfer order — of its bindover decision sufficient to allow this court

to conduct a meaningful appellate review of that decision.

The State responds that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion

in finding D.T. not amenable to juvenile court sanctions because (1) it considered all

relevant factors related to transfer, (2) there was “some competent, credible evidence” in the record to support the juvenile court’s findings, including testimony

from Williams, the victims and law enforcement, (3) “the juvenile court ‘was not

required to individually analyze each and every possible avenue for juvenile

rehabilitation and decide that [D.T.] was not amenable to them,’” quoting State v.

Curtis, 2016-Ohio-6978, ¶ 50 (3d Dist.), and (4) R.C. 2152.12 and Juv.R. 30 do not

“require a juvenile court to issue written findings regarding the reasons for transfer,”

citing State v. Douglas, 20 Ohio St.3d 34, 36 (1985) (holding that no written findings

were required under prior version of transfer statute and juvenile rule regarding

transfer).

We agree that certain of the juvenile court’s findings do not appear to

be supported by the record. With respect to the juvenile court’s finding that R.C.

2152.12(D)(2) — i.e., “[t]he physical or psychological harm suffered by the victim

was exacerbated because of the physical or psychological vulnerability or the age of

the victim” — applied, the State argued below that D.T. “frequently targeted”

vulnerable victims, i.e., “young women who were in their 20s, who were smaller in

stature except for one.” Here, the victims were approximately 20, 21, 22, 26 or 27

and 28 years old on the dates of the offenses at issue. Four of the five victims were

women; one was a man. Each victim testified at the amenability hearing. Ives

testified that she was 5′6″ tall. There is no evidence in the record regarding the

stature of any of the other victims. According to the juvenile court’s fact sheet, 14-

year-old D.T. was 5′4″ tall and weighed 120 pounds at the time of the incidents.

None of the victims testified that the harm he or she suffered as a result of the incident was made any worse due to his or her age. None of the victims testified to

having any physical or psychological condition that made him or her more

vulnerable or exacerbated his or her harm.

With respect to the juvenile court’s finding that R.C. 2152.12(E)(7) —

i.e., “[t]he child has a mental illness or intellectual disability” — did not apply, the

State argued at the amenability hearing that this factor did not apply because D.T.

“did not specify or qualify for any trauma diagnosis or anything like that, just

cannabis use disorder and conduct disorder.”

As D.T. points out, however, Williams testified that D.T. was

functionally illiterate, reading at a fourth-grade level. Despite this and a history of

poor and widely varying grades, D.T. never received any special education services

in school. D.T. was, however, doing well with schoolwork at the juvenile detention

center.

Williams also testified that while receiving mental health services

through Applewood at the juvenile detention center, D.T. had been diagnosed with

ADHD and was taking psychiatric medication for the condition. Although Williams

stated in her evaluation report that D.T.’s diagnosis for ADHD was “not conclusively

supported” by her limited evaluation and that she would need more information for

her to “rule out” ADHD or a specific learning disorder, she indicated that

“psychiatric diagnoses” of conduct disorder-unspecified onset-moderate severity

and adjustment disorder with anxiety were suggested based on her diagnostic

impressions. D.T. asserts that “while a juvenile court is permitted to assign

whatever weight it wants to [a particular] factor, it is not permitted to find that [a]

factor doesn’t apply [where] there is evidence presented that it does.” We agree.

See, e.g., State v. J.L.S., 2019-Ohio-4173, ¶ 52-55 (10th Dist.) (juvenile court’s

finding that R.C. 2152.12(E)(7) did not apply was not supported by the record where

the record reflected that appellant qualified for several mental health diagnoses).

It is likewise unclear from the record on what basis the juvenile court

concluded that R.C. 2152.12(D)(7) — i.e., “the results of any previous juvenile

sanctions and programs indicate that rehabilitation of the child will not occur in the

juvenile system” — and R.C. 2152.12(D)(9) — i.e., “[t]here is not sufficient time to

rehabilitate the child within the juvenile system” — applied and that R.C.

2152.12(E)(8) — i.e., ““[t]here is sufficient time to rehabilitate the child within the

juvenile system and the level of security available in the juvenile system provides a

reasonable assurance of public safety” — did not apply.

At the time of amenability hearing, D.T. had just turned 15.

Accordingly, the juvenile justice system would have had nearly six years to

rehabilitate him. Although “‘there is no requirement that a juvenile first be

committed to the [ODYS] before he may be transferred to the general division for

trial as an adult offender,’” Bryant, 2024-Ohio-1192, at ¶ 19, quoting State v.

Whisenant, 127 Ohio App.3d 75, 91 (11th Dist.1998), it is noteworthy that, prior to

the cases at issue, D.T. had never been “locked up” in ODYS or any other type of

secure facility. In its transfer orders, the juvenile court stated that it considered

D.T.’s “prior commitments to the Department of Youth Services” in deciding to

transfer D.T. to adult court; however, the evidence presented at the amenability

hearing established that D.T. had never been committed to ODYS. The extent to

which the juvenile court may have relied on this erroneous finding in determining

that D.T. was not amenable to rehabilitation in the juvenile justice system is unclear

from the record.

Williams testified that D.T. had had three prior juvenile cases, that

while on probation for other offenses, he had home detention violations for leaving

home without permission and school suspensions for inappropriately touching staff

and smoking marijuana in the restroom. She stated that prior attempted

interventions in the form of multisystemic therapy, the Tapestry program and

mentoring had not been successful. Williams testified that a school mentoring

program was discontinued because D.T. refused to attend. She acknowledged,

however, that successful engagement in multisystemic therapy and the Tapestry

program required family participation. Williams admitted that D.T.’s lack of success

with multisystemic therapy was attributable, in significant part, to D.T.’s family’s

failure to communicate with the program’s staff, such that D.T. never even had an

opportunity to engage in the program. Williams stated that she did not know

whether the unsuccessful engagement within the Tapestry program was attributable

to D.T. or to his family. D.T.’s mother admitted that she had failed to return calls to

Williams and representatives of the multisystem treatment and Tapestry programs and claimed that D.T.’s termination from, or failure to engage in, those programs

was due to “miscommunication” issues between herself and representatives of those

programs.

The record reflects that, with the exception of his involvement in one

fight and one incident in which he allegedly exposed himself to a female staff

member, D.T. had no behavioral issues and had been making significant academic

progress during the eight months he was in the juvenile detention center.

D.T. also challenges the juvenile court’s finding that R.C.

2152.12(D)(8) — i.e., “[t]he child is emotionally, physically, or psychologically

mature enough for the transfer” — applied and that R.C. 2152.12(E)(6) — i.e., “[t]he

child is not emotionally, physically, or psychologically mature enough for the

transfer” — did not apply. At the amenability hearing, the State argued that D.T.

was physically, emotionally and psychologically mature for transfer to adult court

“because he is a male,” “had no problem approaching these young women and a

male with a firearm at gunpoint” and was “calm, cool and collected,” “acting like an

adult” and not “a scared little kid,” when he committed the robberies. The State

further argued that D.T. “understands the rights and wrongs of his actions when he

commits these crimes and that he has the capacity to go to school . . . it could just be

that he didn’t want to perform well on these testings [sic] . . . and that he is in the

high-offender range and (inaudible) for a criminogenic mindset.”

As stated above, D.T. was a 5′4″, 120-pound, 15-year-old black male.

D.T. asserts that courts must be vigilant to ensure that “false racist stereotypes,” including the “adultification” of black children, are not at work when assessing the

maturity of black juvenile offenders. Appellant’s Br. at 32, citing The Center for

Policing Equity, The Adultification of Black Children,

https://policingequity.org/resources/blog/the-adultification-of-black-children

(accessed Jan. 18, 2024); American Psychological Association (Mar. 6, 2014), Black

boys viewed as older, less innocent than Whites, research finds,

https://www.apa.org/news/press/releases/2014/03/black-boys-older; In the

Matter of the Personal Restraint of Asaria Justice Miller, 21 Wash.App.2d 257

(2022). D.T. argues that because the court “fail[ed] to articulate the reasoning

behind its finding of maturity” and relied on “conclusory statements without

accounting for the role racist stereotypes play in those perceptions,” the juvenile

court “erred in its assessment of [D.T.’s] maturity.” Appellant’s Br. at 33-34. We

are mindful of these concerns.

Lack of Sufficient Information to Conduct a Meaningful Appellate Review of Juvenile Court’s Amenability Determination

In this case, the juvenile court did not identify or discuss the facts or

evidence that supported its findings as to any of the amenability factors and did not

explain its evaluation of, or the weight given to, any of the factors it considered in

favor of or against transfer at the amenability hearing or in its transfer orders.

At the conclusion of the amenability hearing, the juvenile court stated

that it had considered all of the “discretionary bindover factors under ORC

2152.12(D) and (E)” it was “required to consider” and had also “take[n] into account” “factors in addition to these that are listed, other information factors the Court had

at its disposal.” Although R.C. 2152.12(B)(3) requires that the juvenile court record

“indicate the specific factors that were applicable and that the court weighed,” the

juvenile court did not identify the “other information factors” that it considered. It

simply stated that, “based on the information that the Court has and considering all

these factors,” “[t]he factors in favor of transfer outweigh the factors that are against

transfer” and, therefore, “the Court finds that [D.T.] is not amenable to our juvenile

justice system.”

The judgment entries the juvenile court issued following the

amenability hearing shed little additional light on the juvenile court’s amenability

determination. In its judgment entries, the juvenile court listed the records and

information it considered in making its amenability determination as follows:

The court finds after a full investigation, including a mental examination of said child made by a duly qualified person, and after full consideration of the child’s prior juvenile record, family environment, school record, efforts previously made to treat and rehabilitate the child, including prior commitments to the Department of Youth Services, the nature and severity of the offense herein, the age, physical, and mental condition of the victim as effected by the matter herein, and other matters of evidence, that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the child herein is not amenable to care or rehabilitation within the juvenile system.7

7 Although the juvenile court announced its finding, at the conclusion of the

amenability hearing, that D.T. “is not amenable to our juvenile justice system,” in its journal entries transferring the cases and setting forth its amenability findings, the juvenile court stated, “The court finds . . . that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the child herein is not amenable to care or rehabilitation within the juvenile system,” — not that it had, in fact, been persuaded, based on the evidence presented, that D.T. was not amenable to care or rehabilitation in the juvenile justice system. (Emphasis added; emphasis deleted.) Although the parties have not raised the issue, we believe there is a difference between finding that there are “reasonable grounds to believe” a fact or The juvenile court indicated that it had “considered the relevant

factors in favor of transfer pursuant to R.C. 2152.12(D)” and it made specific findings

that the factors set forth in R.C. 2152.12(D)(1), (2) and (5)-(9), applied. The juvenile

court further stated that it had “considered the relevant factors against transfer

pursuant to R.C. 2152.12(E)” and found that “no factors apply.” Once again, the

juvenile did not identify the “other information factors” it considered that it

referenced at the amenability hearing. Based on its findings as to which R.C.

2152.12(D) and (E) factors applied, the juvenile court made the further findings that

“there are reasonable grounds to believe that the child herein is not amenable to care

or rehabilitation within the juvenile system” and that “the safety of the community

may require that the child be subject to adult sanctions.”

Let there be no doubt. We acknowledge that the offenses with which

D.T. has been charged in these cases are very serious. It is alleged that when he was

14 years old, D.T. used a firearm to commit four carjackings (and one attempted

carjacking), shot one victim and caused serious emotional and psychological injury

and/or significant monetary losses to five victims. But the seriousness of D.T.’s

alleged offenses cannot be the only consideration in determining whether D.T. was

circumstance exists and finding that a fact or circumstance, in fact, exists. The “reasonable grounds to believe” language was found in an earlier version of the statute. See former R.C. 2151.26. Effective 2002, R.C. 2151.26 was amended and recodified as R.C. 2152.12. Smith, 2022-Ohio-274, at ¶ 39, fn. 5, citing Am.Sub.S.B. No. 179, 148 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 9447, 9549. properly bound over to adult court.8 Were it otherwise, the General Assembly would

have made such cases subject to mandatory transfer. A juvenile’s amenability to

rehabilitation and the need for community safety are separate, cumulative inquiries

under the statute. R.C. 2152.12(B)(3).

{¶ 131} We take our responsibility reviewing cases involving the

discretionary transfer of juvenile cases to adult court very seriously. In the past

decade, Cuyahoga County has consistently bound over more children to adult court

than any other Ohio county. In 2023, nearly one-third of all children transferred to

adult court in the state of Ohio were in Cuyahoga County. In 2023, Cuyahoga

County transferred more children to adult court than Franklin, Hamilton and

Summit counties combined. Most of those children — over 90 percent in the last

decade and over 91 percent in 2023 — are black. Nearly all of them are male.

DataOhio, Youth Transferred to Adult Court,

https://data.ohio.gov/wps/portal/gov/data/view/youth-transferred-to-adult-

court (accessed Sept. 4, 2024). These statistics are concerning — particularly given

the consequences of a transfer order. As the Ohio Supreme Court has stated:

Research has shown that transferring a youth to adult court can have long-lasting negative impacts, including increased recidivism, a higher likelihood of physical and sexual abuse throughout their stay in prison, a significantly increased risk of suicide, inability to access appropriate

8 We are aware that Ohio courts have repeatedly recognized that “‘[t]he more

serious the offense, the less amenable the juvenile will be to rehabilitation in the juvenile system.’” State v. Johnson, 2015-Ohio-96, ¶ 43 (8th Dist.), quoting State v. West, 2006- Ohio-3518, ¶ 24 (4th Dist.), citing State v. Watson, 47 Ohio St.3d 93, 96 (1989). However, this is little more than a recognition that “‘a juvenile who has committed a major felony such as murder may require more time for rehabilitation than a juvenile whose offense is less serious.’” Johnson at ¶ 43, quoting West at ¶ 25. education, and being subjected to harmful isolation. Research recommends transferring youth to the adult court system rarely.

Ohio Supreme Court, Youth in Adult Court (2018),

https://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/JCS/CFC/resources/juvenileBenchCards/8y

outhAdultCourt.pdf (accessed Sept. 4, 2024) [https://perma.cc/ZUU7-C6KK],

citing Children’s Law Center, Falling Through the Cracks: A New Look at Ohio

Youth in the Adult Criminal Justice System (2012), available at

nicic.gov/library/026406 (reporting that youth who are bound over and sentenced

to prison are five times more likely to be sexually assaulted and two times more likely

to be physically attacked by other inmates or injuries by staff, that youth in adult

prisons are eight times more likely to commit suicide than youth held in juvenile

detention centers and that, on average, children who are prosecuted as adults are 34

percent more likely to commit additional felonies than children who commit similar

offenses but remain in the juvenile system).

We recognize that a juvenile court has discretion to decide how much

weight to give to each factor in R.C. 2152.12(D) and (E) and that any disagreement

with the way the juvenile court weighed the factors is not a reason to reverse the

court’s discretionary decision regarding transfer to adult court. State v. Carter,

2023-Ohio-4310, ¶ 26 (8th Dist.), citing Jordan, 2023-Ohio-311, at ¶ 10, 12 (8th

Dist.). However, although our review is deferential, our role is not to simply “rubber

stamp” the juvenile court’s amenability determination. We must conduct a

meaningful review to ensure that the juvenile court’s determination is the product of an accurate, reasoned, individualized assessment of the alleged juvenile offender

and his or her particular circumstances as supported by the record. See, e.g., Jordan

at ¶ 11 (“Because the [juvenile] court concluded that the R.C. 2152.12(D) factors

outweighed the factors considered under R.C. 2152.12(E), appellate review must

include analysis and discussion of the totality of that consideration.”). Here,

following a thorough, careful examination of the record, we find that there is

insufficient information in the record regarding the juvenile court’s reasoning for

this court to determine whether the juvenile court abused its discretion in

determining that D.T. was not amenable to care or rehabilitation in the juvenile

justice system. Because the juvenile court (1) did not identify all of the factors it

considered, i.e., the “other information factors” referenced at the amenability

hearing, (2) did not identify or discuss the factual or evidentiary basis for its

determination that particular factors did or did not apply and (3) did not explain its

weighing of those factors, we do not know, as detailed above, to what extent the

juvenile court’s decision may have been based on erroneous facts and cannot

properly assess whether the juvenile court’s decision was the product of a sound

reasoning process or an unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable one. Certain

courts, when faced with similarly deficient records, have reversed or vacated the

juvenile court’s amenability determination and remanded the cases for further

proceedings. See, e.g., J.L.S., 2019-Ohio-4173, at ¶ 80 (10th Dist.) (where juvenile

court’s amenability decision “fail[ed] to comply with R.C. 2152.12(B)(3) and lack[ed]

sufficient clarity to enable meaningful appellate review” such that appellate court could not determine whether any errors in its decision were prejudicial, matter

remanded for juvenile court “to apply the proper standard, consider the evidence

and weigh the same, resolve inconsistencies in its findings, and properly journalize

its findings”); State v. D. H., 2015-Ohio-3259, ¶ 17-19 (2d Dist.) (where juvenile

court’s transfer order contained “insufficient factual findings to identify how the

court reached its conclusion that juvenile could not be rehabilitated in the juvenile

system to permit meaningful appellate reviewing, reversing trial court’s judgment

and remanding case to juvenile court for reconsideration of its decision to relinquish

jurisdiction and to provide a more thorough explanation as to why juvenile could, or

could not, be rehabilitated in the juvenile system); see also Nicholas, 2022-Ohio-

4276, at ¶ 58 (reversing transfer order where juvenile court’s findings regarding the

requirements for treating juvenile offender’s dissociative-identity disorder and the

capability of ODYS to meet those requirements were based on the court’s

mischaracterization of witness testimony and were not supported by evidence in the

record and it was based upon those unsupported findings that court determined that

juvenile was not amenable to care or rehabilitation in the juvenile system); Carter,

2023-Ohio-4310, at ¶ 26 (8th Dist.) (juvenile court abused its discretion by

transferring the juvenile’s case to adult court where its findings that there were no

other mental health or rehabilitative services in the juvenile system to offer juvenile

and that the victim suffered economic and psychological harm, were not supported

by evidence in the record and absent such findings, the juvenile court’s amenability

determination was not supported by the preponderance of the evidence). But see State v. Blair, 2017-Ohio-5865, ¶ 39 (5th Dist.) (criticizing In re D.H. and stating

“[w]hile we agree that a court needs to genuinely consider the factors, and the record

needs to reflect that fact consistent with R.C. 2152.12(B)(3), other courts have never

gone as far as the Second District in directing the juvenile court’s analysis”).

We do the same here. D.T.’s second assignment of error is sustained.

We reverse the trial court’s judgment, vacate D.T.’s convictions, vacate the juvenile

court’s transfer order and remand the case to the juvenile court for (1) a competency

hearing and written determination of D.T.’s competency in accordance with R.C.

2152.58 and (2) if D.T. is deemed competent to proceed, for the juvenile court to

reconsider the evidence and its amenability determination, resolve any

inconsistencies in its findings, identify on the record all factors it considered in

determining D.T.’s amenability, weigh those factors and explain the basis for its

amenability determination. See J.L.S., 2019-Ohio-4173, at ¶ 80.

Judgment reversed; convictions vacated; bindover vacated;

remanded to the juvenile court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is ordered that appellant recover from appellee the costs herein taxed.

The court finds that there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, to carry this judgment

into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, PRESIDING JUDGE

EMANUELLA D. GROVES, J., CONCURS; EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J., DISSENTS (WITH SEPARATE OPINION)

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J., DISSENTING:

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s resolution of the first and

second assignments of error. In my view, the juvenile court did not commit plain

error by failing to strictly comply with R.C. 2152.58 in resolving issues of

competency. Furthermore, the record contains competent and credible evidence

supporting the juvenile court’s determination that D.T. “is not amenable to care or

rehabilitation within the juvenile system, and the safety of the community may

require that [he] be subject to adult sanctions.” Accordingly, I would affirm the

lower courts’ judgments and D.T.’s resulting convictions.

A. Legal Competency

In the first assignment of error, D.T. argues his statutory rights were

violated when the juvenile court failed to hold a competency hearing or otherwise

issue a written competency determination pursuant to R.C. 2152.58. D.T. contends

that the court’s failure to follow the required statutory procedures for competency

before entering a bindover order deprived the adult court of jurisdiction over his

cases. In this case, there is no dispute that on February 17, 2022, the

juvenile court found good cause to refer D.T. for a competency evaluation pursuant

to R.C. 2152.52(A). Thereafter, Dr. Frank Ezzo issued a written competency-

assessment report, dated March 23, 2022, finding D.T. to be competent. However,

as found by the majority, it is equally undisputed that the juvenile court failed to

strictly comply with certain requirements of R.C. 2152.58 after the competency-

assessment report was submitted for review.

Relevant to this appeal, R.C. 2152.58 sets forth the following

procedural requirements:

(A) Not less than fifteen nor more than thirty business days after receiving an evaluation . . . the court shall hold a hearing to determine the child’s competency to participate in the proceeding.

...

(C) In determining the competency of the child to participate in the proceeding, the court shall consider the content of all competency assessment reports admitted as evidence. The court may consider additional evidence, including the court’s own observations of the child’s conduct and demeanor in the courtroom.

(D)(1) Except as otherwise provided in this division, the court shall make a written determination as to the child’s competency or incompetency based on a preponderance of the evidence within fifteen business days after completion of the hearing. The court, by journal entry, may extend the period for making the determination for not more than fifteen additional days. If the court extends the period for making the determination, it shall make the written determination within the period as extended.

R.C. 2152.58(A), (C) and (D)(1).

Upon review, I agree with the majority’s discussion of R.C. 2152.58,

and its determination that the juvenile court failed to complete the mandatory aspects of the statute. The juvenile court did not hold a hearing to determine D.T.’s

competency. Nor did the court issue a written determination as to the child’s

competency or incompetency. It is important to note, however, that once Dr. Ezzo’s

competency-assessment report was submitted for review under seal, counsel for

D.T. was provided ample opportunity to object to the juvenile court’s

noncompliance with R.C. 2152.58 prior to the bindover proceedings — but failed to

do so. In fact, defense counsel stipulated on the record that (1) D.T. was sent “for a

competency evaluation and he came back as competent,” and (2) “[D.T.]

understands the nature of the [bindover] proceedings.” (June 13, 2022, tr. 12.)

Under these circumstances, D.T.’s failure to raise the issue below waived all but plain

error.

Under Crim.R. 52(B), a plain error affecting a substantial right may

be noticed on appeal even though it was not brought to the trial court’s attention.

For the plain-error doctrine to apply, the party claiming error must establish (1) that

“‘an error, i.e., a deviation from a legal rule’” occurred; (2) that the error was “‘an

“obvious” defect in the trial proceedings’”; and (3) “that this obvious error affected

substantial rights.” State v. Rogers, 2015-Ohio-2459, ¶ 22, quoting State v. Barnes,

94 Ohio St.3d 21, 27 (2002). “The elements of the plain-error doctrine are

conjunctive: all three must apply to justify an appellate court’s intervention.” State

v. Bailey, 2022-Ohio-4407, ¶ 9.

To show that an error affected D.T.’s substantial rights, he must show

“a reasonable probability that the error resulted in prejudice — the same deferential standard for reviewing ineffective assistance of counsel claims.” Id. Therefore, D.T.

must establish “that the probability of a different result is ‘sufficient to undermine

confidence in the outcome’ of the proceeding.” United States v. Dominguez Benitez,

542 U.S. 74, 83 (2004), quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694,

(1984); Schade v. Carnegie Body Co., 70 Ohio St.2d 207, 209 (1982) (“A ‘plain error’

is obvious and prejudicial although neither objected to nor affirmatively waived

which, if permitted, would have a material adverse effect on the character and public

confidence in judicial proceedings.”).

Even when an appellant establishes all of the elements necessary to

demonstrate plain error, appellate courts are not required to correct the error.

Rogers at ¶ 23. Instead, appellate courts have discretion when deciding whether to

correct plain error. State v. Jones, 2020-Ohio-3051, ¶ 17. The Ohio Supreme Court

has “admonished [appellate] courts to notice plain error ‘with the utmost caution,

under exceptional circumstances and only to prevent a manifest miscarriage of

justice.’” Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d at 27, quoting State v. Long, 53 Ohio St.2d 91 (1978),

paragraph three of the syllabus.

After careful consideration, I do not believe the record contains

sufficient indicia of incompetency to suggest the juvenile court’s failure to strictly

adhere to the procedural requirements of R.C. 2152.58 rose to the level of plain

error. In this case, the issues of competency were carefully examined by trained

experts in their field. Specifically, Dr. Ezzo’s competency-assessment report

expressly indicates that D.T. (1) is of average intelligence for children of similar age, (2) had the mental capacity to understand the nature and objectives of the juvenile

court proceedings, (3) was able to appreciate and comprehend the potential

consequences of the juvenile proceedings, (4) understood the adversarial nature of

court and the roles of its participants, and (5) was able to effectively communicate

and assist in his own defense. Although the report acknowledged that D.T. had low

literacy scores and exhibited symptoms of an Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity

Disorder, Dr. Ezzo unambiguously opined that D.T. did not have the type of

diagnosed mental illness or developmental disability that would compromise his

competency or ability to participate in the proceedings.

Collectively, the factors discussed in Dr. Ezzo’s final competency-

assessment report went directly to the spirit of R.C. 2152.51 through 2152.59. The

concerns raised by defense counsel before the juvenile court and the adult court have

been carefully examined and considered by trained experts in their field. In each

instance, D.T. has been deemed competent, and defense counsel did not raise timely

objections or otherwise dispute the conclusions reached in the competency reports.

Under these circumstances, I am unable to conclude that the juvenile court

committed a manifest miscarriage of justice by accepting Dr. Ezzo’s expert report

without complying with the remaining requirements of R.C. 2152.58. The

information in this record demonstrates that D.T. was competent as defined by R.C.

2152.51(A)(1), and the court’s deviation from the statute did not influence the

outcome of the proceedings. Accordingly, I would find no plain error and overrule D.T.’s first

assignment of error.

B. Amenability Hearing

In the second assignment of error, D.T. argues the juvenile court

abused its discretion by transferring his case to the common pleas court without

sufficient evidence of nonamenability. D.T. contends that “there was competent and

compelling evidence that he was, in fact, amendable to the care of the juvenile

system — his young age, that he had not ever been to DYS or any lockup facility, his

good behavior and school progress at the juvenile detention center and his treatable

mental illnesses.”

As noted by the majority, in making the amenability determination,

the juvenile court must consider whether the applicable factors under R.C.

2152.12(D) indicating that the case should be transferred outweigh the applicable

factors under R.C. 2152.12(E) indicating that the case should not be transferred. R.C.

2152.12(B)(3). “The record shall indicate the specific factors that were applicable

and that the court weighed.” R.C. 2152.12(B)(3). Further, when the trial court

determines a transfer is proper, the juvenile court “shall state the reasons for the

transfer on the record.” R.C. 2152.12(I); see also Juv.R. 30(G).

The State bears the burden of persuasion when asking the juvenile

court to transfer the case to adult court, though “the state need not produce

affirmative evidence of nonamenability.” State v. Nicholas, 2022-Ohio-4276, ¶ 57.

“[A] juvenile court’s decision to exercise its discretion to transfer a juvenile to adult court must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. at ¶ 35. “An

appellate court reviews a juvenile court’s determination regarding a juvenile’s

amenability to rehabilitation or treatment in the juvenile system under and abuse-

of-discretion standard [of review].” Id. at ¶ 22. “If there is some competent, credible

evidence to support the trial court’s decision, there is no abuse of discretion.”

Middendorf v. Middendorf, 82 Ohio St.3d 397, 401 (1998).

The juvenile court’s wide latitude to determine whether to retain or

relinquish jurisdiction over a child’s case means that the court also has the discretion

to decide how much weight to give to each factor in R.C. 2152.12(D) and (E). In re

M.A., 2019-Ohio-829, ¶ 33 (12th Dist.), citing State v. Everhardt, 2018-Ohio-1252,

¶ 22 (3d Dist.); and State v. Marshall, 2016-Ohio-3184, ¶ 15 (1st Dist.). Moreover,

an appellant’s disagreement with the way the juvenile court weighed the factors is

not a reason to reverse the court’s decision. See State v. Ramsden, 2021-Ohio-3071,

¶ 23 (12th Dist.) (“[G]iven that it is the juvenile court, and not [the appellate] court,

that has the discretion to determine how much weight should be afforded to the

factors set forth in R.C. 2152.12(D) and (E), [D.T.’s] challenge to the weight that the

juvenile court ultimately decided to attribute to each [of] those factors lacks merit.”).

In this case, the juvenile court orally provided the reasons supporting

its bindover order at the conclusion of the amenability hearing, stating:

All right. Thank you. So for this hearing the Court is required to consider all the discretionary bind-over factors under ORC 2151[.12] (D) and (E), and the Court did consider all of those factors in addition to these that are listed, other information factors the Court had at its disposal. And based on the information that the Court has and considering all these factors the Court finds that [D.T.] is not amenable to our juvenile justice system. The factors in favor of transfer outweigh the factors that are against transfer. So with this finding, the Court transfers – this is a discretionary transfer, so the Court will transfer these cases to Adult Court.

(Tr. 188.)

Within the corresponding journal entry, the juvenile court reiterated

the reasons supporting for the transfer, stating:

The court finds after a full investigation, including a mental evaluation of said child made by a duly qualified person, and after full consideration of the child’s prior juvenile record, family environment, school record, efforts previously made to treat and rehabilitate the child, including prior commitments to the Department of Youth Services, the nature and severity of the offenses herein, the age, physical, and mental condition of the victim as effected by the matter herein, and other matters of evidence, that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the child herein is not amendable to care or rehabilitation within the juvenile system.

In support of its conclusion, the juvenile court expressly identified

the factors it weighed in determining that the transfer was appropriate. Specifically,

the judgment entry reflects that the juvenile court relied extensively on the following

factors: (1) the victims suffered physical or psychological harm, or serious economic

harm; (2) the harm suffered by the victims was exacerbated because of the physical

or psychological vulnerability or age of the victims; (3) D.T. had a firearm on or

about his person or under his control at the time of the offenses; (4) D.T. was

awaiting adjudication or disposition and was under community control for a prior

delinquent child adjudication; (5) D.T. was emotionally, physically, or

psychologically mature enough for a transfer; (6) the results of D.T’s previous

juvenile sanctions and programs indicate that rehabilitation will not occur in the juvenile system; and (7) there would not be sufficient time to rehabilitate D.T. within

the juvenile system. See R.C. 2152.12(D)(1), (2), (5), (6), (7), (8), and (9). The court

found no R.C. 2152.12(E) factors applied.

Based on the court’s oral and written findings, I would conclude the

juvenile court complied with its obligations under the statute by providing reasons

for its judgment and expressly identifying the specific factors it considered under

R.C. 2152.12. The majority’s belief that something more was required of the juvenile

court promotes an analysis that is not supported by the language of the statute. In

fact, numerous districts in this state have rejected such a strict approach, reiterating

that “[a]s long as the court considers the appropriate statutory factors and there is

some rational basis in the record to support the court’s findings when applying those

factors,” the juvenile court does not abuse “its discretion in deciding whether to

transfer jurisdiction.” In re D.M., 2017-Ohio-8768, ¶ 47 (6th Dist.), quoting State

v. Blair, 2017-Ohio-5865, ¶ 39 (5th Dist.); see also State v. Reeder, 2016-Ohio-212,

¶ 18 (10th Dist.); State v. Marshall, 2016-Ohio-3184, ¶ 15 (1st Dist.); State v. Rice,

2016-Ohio-5372, ¶ 18, fn. 2 (12th Dist.); State v. Cunningham, 2022-Ohio-3497 (6th

Dist.). Nor is the juvenile court required to “‘individually analyze each and every

possible avenue for juvenile rehabilitation and decide that [the juvenile] was not

amenable to them.’” Id. at ¶ 50, quoting State v. Curtis, 2016-Ohio-6978, ¶ 50 (3d

Dist.).

Viewing the record and the court’s oral and written statements

together, I believe this court has sufficient information before it to conduct a meaningful review of the juvenile court’s amenability determination, including the

testimony of a juvenile-detention center employee, members of D.T.’s family, the

court psychiatric clinic doctor, the victims of each incident, and the investigating

officers. It is unclear what additional information is needed from the juvenile court

to assess the sufficiency of its conclusions under R.C. 2152.12. Accordingly, I

disagree with the majority’s determination that a limited remand is required to have

the juvenile court reconsider the evidence and explain the basis for its amenability

determination. The juvenile court has already done so.

Regarding the court’s analysis under R.C. 2152.12, I would further

conclude that there is some rational basis in the record to support the court’s

findings under R.C. 2151.12(D) and (E). In this case, the juvenile court heard ample

evidence at the amenability hearing that carefully outlined D.T.’s personal history

and his criminal activity in this matter.

The record reflects that D.T. has a lengthy history with the juvenile

court, including (1) delinquency adjudications for burglary and theft in Cuyahoga

J.C. No. DL-19-110590, (2) delinquency adjudications for attempted breaking and

entering, theft, theft, criminal damaging, obstructing official business, and

unauthorized use of a vehicle in Cuyahoga J.C. No. DL-20-109270, and (3)

delinquency adjudications for theft in Cuyahoga J.C. No. DL-20-106080. During

the bindover proceedings, D.T. also had a pending case before the juvenile court that

stemmed from an incident occurring just days before D.T. committed the spree of

carjackings in this case. While on probation, D.T. committed a number of home- detention violations: “leaving home without permission, being suspended from

school for inappropriately touching [a] school staff member. More recently, a [D.T.]

was suspended from his new school for creating unsafe conditions.”

The diagnostic evaluation further established that D.T.’s “current

criminal behavior is significant” and that he presents a high risk for future violence

towards community members based on various historical, contextual, and

individual factors. In addition, forensic psychologist, Dr. Lynn Williams, opined

that D.T. demonstrated a level of emotional, physical, and psychological maturity

during the pendency of this matter. As noted by Dr. Williams, D.T. “is displaying a

higher level of sophistication and maturity and using these emerging skills in a

criminogenic manner.” Relatedly, the evaluation revealed “that [D.T.] is not

intellectually disabled and does not suffer a severe psychiatric disturbance that

would impair” his ability to perceive reality. Dr. Williams further noted that D.T.

received “mixed” scores for treatment amenability, indicating that “[he] has some

characteristics that are difficult to treat.” Dr. Williams expounded on her discussion

of D.T.’s amenability to treatment as follows:

[D.T.] has had several attempted treatment interventions (MST, mentoring, Tapestry) which were unsuccessful, and no positive improvements were noted. As discussed in the SAVRY results, he displays a negative attitude towards authority and is unable to adhere to the rules and expectations while being monitored by probation, on home detention and even within the structured setting of the [juvenile detention center.] He has demonstrated inconsistencies in his desire to improve his behavior by following all rules and regulations. In the [juvenile detention center], he has displayed a number of both positive and negative behaviors. His poor compliance with the court system and the current significant charges for his relatively young age are concerning. Previous interventions have been unsuccessful primarily due to [D.T.]’s poor motivation coupled with a lack of consistent family involvement that did not produce sustainable gains.

Collectively, Dr. Williams expert testimony directly addressed D.T.’s maturity, risk

of future violence, mental illnesses and disabilities, and amenability to care. In my

view, this evidence constituted competent, credible evidence supporting the juvenile

court’s substantial reliance on the factors outlined under R.C. 2152.12(D)(6)-(9).

With respect to the court’s reliance on R.C. 2152.12(D)(1)-(2) and (5),

it is well settled the seriousness of the alleged act is relevant to “the assessment of

the probability of rehabilitating the child within the juvenile justice system” because

the more serious the offense, the less amenable the juvenile will be to rehabilitation

in the juvenile system. State v. Watson, 47 Ohio St.3d 93, 95 (1989). See also State

v. Hennings, 2019-Ohio-4675, ¶ 25 (8th Dist.) (“The severity of a crime can be a

strong indicator that there remains insufficient time to rehabilitate a child offender

in the juvenile justice system.”), citing State v. Johnson, 2015-Ohio-96, ¶ 43 (8th

Dist.), and State v. Amos, 2016-Ohio-1319, ¶ 43 (1st Dist.) (a juvenile court can

consider the number and nature of the committed offenses when determining if the

child is amenable to the juvenile justice system).

In this case, the seriousness of D.T.’s conduct and his complete

disregard of the associated consequences cannot be understated. D.T. was the

principal offender in a systematic crime spree that threatened the lives of

unsuspecting victims. During this crime spree, D.T. brandished a firearm on each

occasion and deprived four of the five unsuspecting victims of their personal property. Ultimately, D.T.’s increasingly reckless conduct resulted in the inevitable

shooting of a young woman that remarkably did not result in the loss of life in our

community. His conduct was unprovoked and resulted in physical, emotional, and

psychological harm that continues to affect the daily lives of those harmed.

In addressing the seriousness of the offenses and the nature of the

harm caused, the majority suggests that the victims inherently lacked vulnerability

in this case because they were in their mid-to-late 20s, while D.T. was a 14-year-old,

12o pound juvenile. With respect, I believe it is improper to suggest the harm

suffered by each victim was not exacerbated by the time, location, and nature of the

incidents, including the inherently vulnerable position the victims were in when they

were suddenly approached by an armed male while approaching the safety of their

own vehicles. Three of the victims, for example, each described how D.T.’s conduct

has impaired their ability to feel safe in their communities and in their private

vehicles. Likewise, D.T.’s age and apparent lack of size was immaterial to the

defenseless victims who had a gun pointing at them. The factors corresponding to

D.T.’s personal circumstances are critical to the analysis under R.C. 2152.12.

However, this court must be careful to not unintentionally diminish or otherwise

minimize the factors outlined in R.C. 2152.12(D)(1), (2), and (5). The factors relating

to the seriousness of the offenses and the harm caused to the victims are of equal

importance under the controlling statute.

Nevertheless, contrary to D.T.’s suggestion on appeal, the juvenile

court’s analysis under R.C. 2151.12 did not rely exclusively on the seriousness of the offenses or the harm caused to the victims. Rather, the juvenile court’s judgment

also relied extensively on D.T.’s prior history of juvenile adjudications, his repeated

probation violations, and his conduct in the juvenile detention center, including his

participation in a physical altercation and his act of exposing his private parts to a

female employee. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the court also relied

extensively on the expert testimony of Dr. Williams, who specifically addressed the

relevant recidivism and amenability factors in her evaluation and report.

Though D.T., and perhaps the majority of this panel, may disagree

with the weight afforded to the relevant statutory factors, this is insufficient to show

that the juvenile court’s findings were based on erroneous facts or an unreasonable,

arbitrary, or unconscionable application of R.C. 2152.12. See In re M.A., 2019-Ohio-

829, ¶ 33 (12th Dist.); State v. Walker, 2024-Ohio-729, ¶ 29-31 (8th Dist.); State v.

Cunningham, 2022-Ohio-3497, ¶ 100-101 (6th Dist.).

I am further cognizant of the statistical information referenced by the

majority and the rising number of juvenile bindovers in Cuyahoga County.

Unfortunately, these numbers directly correlate to a troubling trend of gun violence

amongst the youth in our community and not, in my opinion, an unjustified use of

the bindover procedure by the state or an unsatisfactory application of R.C. 2151.12

by juvenile court judges in this county. While the statistical trends warrant prompt

attention and consideration, these matters are best addressed by the General

Assembly which has carefully developed the bindover procedure and the factors to

be considered. As it relates the juvenile court, the majority correctly states that an amenability determination is “inherently individualized and fact based,” and cannot

rely exclusively on broadly complied statistics. In re M.P., 2010-Ohio-599, at ¶ 14;

State v. Gregory, 2020-Ohio-5207, ¶ 32 (2d Dist.). Thus, the juvenile courts’

considerations are narrowly limited to the evidence before it, including the

testimony of experts who have specialized training and experience in assessing a

juvenile’s rate of recidivism and amenability to rehabilitation in the juvenile system.

In turn, this court is solely responsible for ensuring that the juvenile court complied

with the requirements of the statute and, if so, whether the court’s judgment is

supported by the record. Although we cannot substitute our judgment for that of

the juvenile court, such considerations do not amount to merely rubber stamping a

juvenile court’s judgment.

Based on the foregoing, I would find no abuse of discretion in the

juvenile court’s determination that D.T. was not amenable to rehabilitation in the

juvenile system. The record clearly reflects that the juvenile court weighed the

appropriate statutory factors listed in R.C. 2152.12(D) and (E) and there is

competent, credible evidence in the record to support the court’s findings under the

statute. Accordingly, I would overrule the assigned errors and affirm the lower

courts’ judgments.