State v. Henderson

2026 Ohio 380

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: February 6, 2026
• Docket: C-250243
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Henderson, 2026-Ohio-380.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NO. C-250243 TRIAL NO. B-2404211 Plaintiff-Appellant, :

vs. : JUDGMENT ENTRY LAWRENCE HENDERSON, :

Defendant-Appellee. :

This cause was heard upon the appeal, the record, and the briefs. For the reasons set forth in the Opinion filed this date, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and the cause is remanded. Further, the court holds that there were reasonable grounds for this appeal, allows no penalty, and orders that costs be taxed under App.R. 24. The court further orders that (1) a copy of this Judgment with a copy of the Opinion attached constitutes the mandate, and (2) the mandate be sent to the trial court for execution under App.R. 27.

To the clerk: Enter upon the journal of the court on 2/6/2026 per order of the court.

By:_______________________ Administrative Judge [Cite as State v. Henderson, 2026-Ohio-380.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NO. C-250243 TRIAL NO. B-2404211 Plaintiff-Appellant, :

vs. : OPINION LAWRENCE HENDERSON, :

Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas

Judgment Appealed From Is: Reversed and Cause Remanded

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: February 6, 2026

Connie Pillich, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and John D. Hill, Jr., Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellant,

Clyde Bennett, II, for Defendant-Appellee. OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

CROUSE, Judge.

{¶1} Police seized drugs during a traffic stop of defendant-appellee Lawrence

Henderson, which Henderson moved to suppress. Although Henderson’s motion and

witness examination centered on the propriety of the stop, the trial court ultimately

granted his motion to suppress based on the State’s failure to justify the officers’

subsequent search of the vehicle.

{¶2} The State then took this interlocutory appeal. It argues that the trial

court should have given it the chance to present further evidence before ruling on the

constitutionality of the search. Because we agree that the State did not have adequate

notice it needed to present evidence justifying the search at the suppression hearing,

we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND

{¶3} Henderson was a passenger in a vehicle that was stopped by police

officers after they observed a traffic infraction. Upon stopping the vehicle, officers

deployed “stop sticks,” which would puncture the vehicle’s tires if it tried to drive away.

The driver of the vehicle was removed when police noticed a gun in the car after he

had denied having a weapon. Eventually the officers searched the vehicle and found a

black bag containing a significant quantity of marijuana.

{¶4} Henderson was indicted for trafficking in and possession of between

200 and 1,000 grams of marijuana in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2) and

R.C. 2925.11(A), respectively. Henderson promptly filed a pro-forma motion to

suppress (1) “the seizure and arrest of the Defendant;” (2) “all statements, whether

oral or written, made by or elicited from Defendant;” and (3) “tangible evidence seized

from the Defendant.”

{¶5} A month later, the State filed its bill of particulars, which alleged that

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Henderson had “admitted to having an illegal amount of marijuana within the motor

vehicle” before officers searched it.

{¶6} Five months after that, the trial court permitted Henderson to file a

more robust “Supplemental Motion to Suppress Evidence.” In the first paragraph,

Henderson wrote as follows:

Defendant . . . respectfully requests this Court for an Order

excluding from the trial of this matter any and all items illegally and

unconditionally seized from the motor vehicle in which the Defendant

was an occupant. The Defendant also respectfully requests this Court

for an Order excluding from the trial of this matter any and all items

seized that were obtained as a result of illegal search and seizure that

occurred at the traffic stop and seizure of the vehicle. This includes, but

is not limited to any and all items found in the black bag that contained

marijuana attributed to the Defendant. The bag was improperly seized

and searched in connection with the unconstitutional traffic stop and/or

seizure.

The second paragraph of the motion recited Fourth Amendment standards governing

the seizure of motor vehicles. The third described the seizure of the vehicle and the

officers’ use of stop sticks. This paragraph also noted that, after the driver was

removed, “police searched the car and located a black bag,” which “contained

marijuana attributed to the Defendant.” Finally, the fourth paragraph concluded the

motion as follows:

In light of the foregoing, it is crystal clear that any and all

evidence obtained from the Defendant during the unconstitutional stop

and search of his motor vehicle should be excluded from the trial of this

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matter as well as any other items or property seized in connection with

or as a result of the unconstitutional stop/seizure.

The State filed a memorandum in opposition, which addressed only the traffic-stop

issue.

{¶7} The trial court held a suppression hearing at which Officers Grant Perry

and Nick Dezarn, two of the officers involved in the stop, testified. The State’s opening

statement and the officers’ initial testimony focused exclusively on the events

preceding the stop, the stop itself, and the driver’s arrest. Henderson’s counsel made

no opening statement and did not ask the officers about their basis for searching the

vehicle or the black bag. In his closing argument, however, defense counsel argued

that, regardless of the legality of the stop, the court should suppress the drugs because

the “record [was] completely devoid of anything that would give the officers the right

to search the car and find the item, that black duffle bag that was found inside the car.”

{¶8} The State responded with surprise, representing that it had limited the

scope of its presentation “in reliance [on] Defendant’s supplemental motion that the

only basis to challenge this circumstance was the stop of the vehicle.” The State

acknowledged that perhaps it had misread that motion and requested that the trial

court reopen the hearing and allow the State to present further evidence before the

court ruled on the constitutionality of the search itself.

{¶9} The trial court acknowledged that it could “see how the State may have

thought this [motion] was limited,” but ultimately felt it sufficiently “clear” that the

supplemental motion to suppress had encompassed a challenge to the search of the

vehicle, and not just the traffic stop. Nevertheless, the court reopened the hearing and

permitted the State to recall Officers Perry and Dezarn to ask about the search.

{¶10} Neither witness proved very helpful. Officer Dezarn could recall nothing

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about the search, and Officer Perry testified that he had not been “involved in any way

with interactions that the officers had with Mr. Henderson,” because he had been

“dealing with the driver.” Officer Perry said he believed Officers Dezarn and Buck, and

perhaps a Sergeant Rock, had been involved with the search.

{¶11} Counsel for the State explained that, had he “been aware that the issue

of the search of the vehicle was in play,” he would have requested a hearing date on

which Officers Buck and Chitwood—the officers involved in the search—could have

attended. Counsel therefore asked the trial court for “a continuance in progress in

order to obtain testimony from Officers Buck and Chitwood.”

{¶12} The trial court denied the State’s motion for a continuance and granted

Henderson’s motion to suppress. In its written entry, the trial court explained that it

was granting the motion because the State had “failed to present any evidence

justifying the search of contents inside the vehicle.”

{¶13} After the hearing, the State proffered for the record “that the expected

testimony from the unavailable officers would establish that the Defendant admitted

to having an illegal amount of marijuana within the motor vehicle, which justified a

search of the vehicle at that point.” The State then filed this timely interlocutory appeal

pursuant to R.C. 2945.67 and Crim.R. 12(K).

II. ANALYSIS

{¶14} The State’s two assignments of error challenge the trial court’s decisions

(1) to grant Henderson’s motion to suppress and (2) to deny the State’s motion for a

continuance. Because these issues are intertwined, we address them together.

A.

{¶15} The State’s central argument is that Henderson’s motion to suppress

only challenged the validity of the traffic stop that ultimately led to the discovery of

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the marijuana and did not adequately raise the issue of the legality of the vehicle

search.

{¶16} The form and contents of “motions” are governed by Crim.R. 47. A

motion should (1) “state with particularity the ground upon which it is made” and (2)

“set forth the relief and order sought.” Crim.R. 47. This particularity requirement

ensures that both “the prosecutor and court are placed on notice of those issues to be

heard and decided by the court.” State v. Shindler, 70 Ohio St.3d 54, 58 (1994).

{¶17} We review de novo whether a motion to suppress comports with

Crim.R. 47. See State v. Codeluppi, 2014-Ohio-1574, ¶ 8-9; State v. Clark,

2024-Ohio-1869, ¶ 9 (10th Dist.); State v. Moore, 2017-Ohio-7024, ¶ 36 (11th Dist.).

{¶18} When officers execute a search without a warrant, the State must

shoulder the burden of explaining why the search was nevertheless “reasonable” under

the Fourth Amendment. Xenia v. Wallace, 37 Ohio St.3d 217, 218 (1988). A defendant

triggers this obligation by filing a motion to suppress that is sufficient, under Crim.R.

47, to “put the State on notice that it [must] prove the constitutionality of the

warrantless search with an exception to the warrant requirement.” State v. Curry,

2025-Ohio-2083, ¶ 41 (1st Dist.); see Codeluppi at ¶ 13; see also Wallace at paragraphs

one and two of the syllabus.

{¶19} Fair notice is the goal and the lodestar of the Crim.R. 47 analysis.

Because the defendant’s motion to suppress “is merely a procedural vehicle to ‘put the

ball into play,’” Crim.R. 47 does not demand “excruciating detail.” Codeluppi at ¶ 13;

accord Curry at ¶ 37, 40; State v. Mishler, 2024-Ohio-1085, ¶ 13 (9th Dist.). When a

defendant’s motion to suppress identifies (1) the particular actions alleged to have

constituted an unlawful search or seizure, (2) the factual and legal basis on which the

movant asserts those actions were not “reasonable” under the Fourth Amendment,

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and (3) the relief sought (i.e., the evidence to be suppressed), the motion will generally

provide the State with adequate notice as to the burden it must meet. See, e.g.,

Codeluppi at ¶ 13 (motion to suppress results of field-sobriety tests was sufficient

where it alleged that officer “had not conducted [them] in substantial compliance

with” applicable law); Curry at ¶ 40-41; Wallace at paragraph one of the syllabus

(motion to suppress must “demonstrate the lack of a warrant” and “raise the grounds

upon which the validity of the search or seizure is challenged in such a manner as to

give the prosecutor notice of the basis for the challenge”); Shindler, 70 Ohio St.3d at

56-57.

{¶20} Henderson’s first motion to suppress did not comply with Crim.R. 47.

His supplemental motion to suppress did give the State adequate notice that he was

challenging the reasonableness of the seizure and detention of the vehicle, but was

ambiguous as to whether it was also challenging the search of the vehicle. While

Crim.R. 47 does not require “highly detailed pleading of the facts and law,” Codeluppi,

2014-Ohio-1574, at ¶ 15, it does require that the State have notice of what it will need

to show at a hearing, id. at ¶ 13. The ambiguity here deprived it of that notice.

{¶21} Henderson’s supplemental motion provided no legal theory as to why

the search itself was not “reasonable” for Fourth Amendment purposes. It did not even

allege, for example, that the search of the vehicle or bag had been warrantless.

Compare Wallace, 37 Ohio St.3d 216, at paragraph one of the syllabus (defendant

must allege the lack of a warrant in motion to suppress); Curry, 2025-Ohio-2083, at

¶ 41 (1st Dist.) (motion sufficient where it put the State on notice of the need to show

an exception to the warrant requirement).

{¶22} Instead, the supplemental motion focused on the legality of the traffic

stop, the officers’ use of “stop sticks,” and the duration of Henderson’s detention. True,

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the motion made a handful of passing references to the “unconstitutional stop and

search of [Henderson’s] motor vehicle” and to the “illegal search and seizure that

occurred at the traffic stop and seizure of the vehicle.” But these statements, without

even an assertion that the officers had lacked a search warrant, were inadequate to put

the State on notice that it would need to defend the warrantless search at the hearing.

{¶23} The State’s reading of the scope of Henderson’s motion—i.e., as

challenging only the seizure—is not inconsistent with Henderson’s request to suppress

items found during the search. If Henderson had shown that the seizure of the vehicle

was unconstitutional, then the items found and statements made during the

subsequent search would be suppressed as fruits of that unconstitutional seizure.

{¶24} Further, the motion must be read in its procedural context. Five months

earlier, the State had filed a bill of particulars that alleged that Henderson had

admitted to possessing an illegal quantity of marijuana prior to the search. After the

suppression hearing, the State proffered that Officers Buck and Chitwood would have

testified to that effect. In light of the allegation in the State’s bill and the focus of

Henderson’s motion, the State could reasonably have concluded that Henderson was

turning his energies away from the search of the vehicle and toward the stop of the

vehicle.

{¶25} We hold that Henderson’s supplemental motion was at least ambiguous

as to whether it went beyond the validity of the traffic stop to challenge the

reasonableness of the vehicle search. And because that motion was ambiguous, it could

not provide the State with adequate notice that Henderson sought to challenge the

lawfulness of the search itself. The trial court therefore had no obligation under

Crim.R. 47 to address the search’s constitutionality when it ruled on the supplemental

motion to suppress.

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B.

{¶26} But just because the trial court did not have to address the search issue

does not mean the trial court was categorically prohibited from doing so. Generally, “a

trial court is free to expand the scope of a suppression hearing beyond the issues

specified in the motion to suppress [1] so long as the matters within the expanded

scope were material to the suppression sought, and [2] so long as the State had a

reasonable opportunity to prepare itself for the hearing.” (Cleaned up.) State v.

Byrnes, 2014-Ohio-1274, ¶ 12 (2d Dist.); accord State v. Tyson, 2015-Ohio-3530, ¶ 35

(3d Dist.).

{¶27} Henderson’s motion sought suppression of the bag’s contents. Though

it was ambiguous whether the motion based this request on the alleged

unreasonableness of the vehicle search itself, Henderson clearly raised this issue in his

closing argument at the suppression hearing. The law did not prohibit the trial court

from considering the search’s constitutionality as an issue “material to the

suppression” Henderson sought.

{¶28} But in expanding the scope of a suppression hearing, fair notice is, once

again, the touchstone. A trial court abuses its discretion to manage proceedings when

it chooses to rule on an issue beyond the scope of the motion to suppress without first

providing the parties with adequate notice and an opportunity to make their cases. See

Tyson at ¶ 28 (reviewing a trial court’s decision to “raise and consider suppression

issues outside of the scope of Crim.R. 47” under “an abuse-of-discretion standard”);

State v. Pilot, 2004-Ohio-3669, ¶ 42-43 (12th Dist.) (trial court abused its discretion

by not reopening suppression hearing for State to litigate issues beyond the

suppression motion). So, if the court below wished to address the issues Henderson

raised in his closing arguments, it had to give the State adequate notice and an

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opportunity to gather the necessary witnesses. For the reasons we have already set

forth, Henderson’s motion did not provide such notice. Indeed, the State had agreed

to hold a suppression hearing on a date when Officers Buck and Chitwood would not

be available in reliance on the apparent limits of that motion.

{¶29} We therefore hold that the trial court abused its discretion by ruling on

the constitutionality of the search without first ensuring the State received adequate

notice and a meaningful opportunity to present its arguments and evidence. Compare

Tyson, 2015-Ohio-3530, at ¶ 32 (3d Dist.); Pilot at ¶ 43.

III. CONCLUSION

{¶30} For the foregoing reasons, we sustain the State’s first assignment of

error and reverse the trial court’s April 17, 2025 order granting Henderson’s motion

to suppress. And because this disposition effectively vacates the trial court’s order

denying the motion for a continuance, we hold that the State’s second assignment of

error is moot, and we decline to address it.

{¶31} The cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings

consistent with the law and this opinion.

Judgment reversed and cause remanded.

ZAYAS, P.J., and BOCK, J., concur.