[Cite as In re O.J., 2026-Ohio-354.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
IN RE O.J. : : No. 115272 A Minor Child :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: February 5, 2026
Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Juvenile Division Case No. DL-25101451
Appearances:
Gregory T. Stralka, for appellant.
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and David Meredith, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
DEENA R. CALABRESE, J.:
Appellant O.J. (“appellant”) appeals the order of the Cuyahoga County
Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division (the “juvenile court”), adjudicating him
delinquent and committing him to the Ohio Department of Youth Services
(“ODYS”). Appellant contends the juvenile court erred by accepting his admission
to the allegations against him without further exploring his competency. For the
reasons that follow, we affirm the juvenile court’s judgment. I. Facts and Procedural History
A. The Complaint
In early 2025, appellant was 17 years old and had already been
committed to ODYS in connection with other proceedings. On February 2, 2025,
while awaiting transport to a different facility, appellant allegedly attacked a
detention officer in his housing unit, beating the officer to the point of
unconsciousness. On February 13, 2025, the Cuyahoga County Prosecutor’s Office
charged appellant with one count of felonious assault in violation of R.C.
2903.11(A)(1), a felony of the second degree if committed by an adult. On
February 18, 2025, the State, pursuant to R.C. 2152.10(B) and Juv.R. 30, sought
discretionary bindover to the general division, seeking to have appellant tried as an
adult.
B. Arraignment Hearing
Arraignment took place on March 12, 2025, with the trial court opening
proceedings by noting that it was responsible for appellant’s current ODYS
commitment and “had [appellant] in front of [it] on a couple of different occasions.”
(Mar. 12, 2025 tr. 4.) Appellant, through counsel, entered a denial to the complaint
and objected to the State’s bindover motion. The juvenile court addressed appellant
directly, explaining both his constitutional rights and the process involved in
discretionary bindovers, including a probable-cause hearing and an amenability
hearing. When asked (twice) if he understood his rights and the process, appellant twice responded in the affirmative. At no point during the arraignment did any
party, including appellant’s attorney, raise issues concerning competency.
C. Probable-Cause Hearing
On April 24, 2025, the juvenile court held a probable-cause hearing.
Appellant appeared with counsel, as well as his guardian ad litem (“GAL”). Counsel
informed the juvenile court that appellant was prepared to stipulate to probable
cause. The juvenile court again directly addressed appellant to inform him of his
rights, including the rights he would be waiving by stipulating to probable cause.
When asked if he understood, appellant replied, “Yes, Your Honor.” (Apr. 24, 2025
tr. 9.) The juvenile court next explained what would occur prior to and at an
amenability hearing, including a psychological evaluation that the juvenile court
would use to “guide [it] at the time of our amenability hearing” and a summary of
the hearing process. (Apr. 24, 2025 tr. 9-11.) Asked if he understood, appellant
again replied, “Yes, Your Honor.” (Apr. 24, 2025 tr. 11.)
The juvenile court next inquired whether appellant had “had enough
time to speak to [his] attorneys here today about [his] decision to agree that there’s
probable cause[.]” (Apr. 24, 2025 tr. 11.) Appellant responded in the affirmative.
He likewise confirmed that he was not under the influence of drugs, alcohol, or
medication that would prevent him from understanding that day’s proceedings and
that he had not been threatened or promised anything in exchange for stipulating to
probable cause. The juvenile court stated on the record that it found that appellant was “entering into a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary stipulation.” (Apr. 24, 2025
tr. 12.)
In a corresponding journal entry, the juvenile court ordered that the
matter be “continued for a full investigation into the child’s social history, education,
family situation, and any other factor on whether the child is amenable to juvenile
rehabilitation.” It further ordered “the Cuyahoga County Juvenile Court Clinic to
conduct a psychological evaluation of the child.” At no point during the probable-
cause hearing did any party, including appellant’s attorney or GAL, raise any issues
surrounding appellant’s competency.
D. The Amenability Hearing
The juvenile court held an amenability hearing on May 20, 2025, to
determine whether appellant was amenable to care and rehabilitation through the
juvenile court system or should be bound over to the general division. At the outset,
the juvenile court explained the hearing process, including the State’s burden of
proof and appellant’s right to refrain from testifying. Appellant indicated he
understood.
The State first called the detention officer to provide the court, as the
prosecution put it, with “a factual basis of what happened.” (May 20, 2025 tr. 11.)
The detention officer described the attack, which he characterized as unprovoked,
and indicated he lost consciousness and “woke up . . . seeing [his] manager’s face.”
(May 20, 2025 tr. 15.) The prosecution also walked the detention officer through
surveillance video of the incident and had him testify to his injuries, including surgical repair of his jaw. The detention officer indicated that at the time of his
testimony, he was still “not a hundred percent” recovered. (May 20, 2025 tr. 25.)
The State’s next witness was appellant’s juvenile probation officer, who
served as a “placement after care coordinator.” (May 20, 2025 tr. 31.) He testified
regarding his duties in that role:
So my specific duties are when kids get ordered to be placed at residential facilities, I will go out to visit them once a month in person, and then in the meantime, just oversee their progress through treatment, schedule team meetings, basically just — just monitor their progress in residential treatment.
And then once they complete that program, they come back to the community, and they are placed on community supervision with me.
(May 20, 2025 tr. 31-32.) Appellant had been assigned to the probation officer
during residential treatment at Summit Academy in Pennsylvania. The probation
officer testified that appellant completed the program in June 2023, and had done
“fairly well.” He elaborated:
The final report that I received from Summit Academy, if I remember correctly, he made the honor roll, so he did very well in school. He kept himself very active in a lot of what the program had to offer.
And overall, by the time that the six-month mark had been reached, his behaviors were mostly positive, and he definitely made some good progress in the program.
(May 20, 2025 tr. 34.)
The situation deteriorated, however, once appellant returned home.
Appellant stopped communicating, leading to a capias in August 2023. Cleveland
police later arrested appellant on an unrelated matter, and appellant “returned to
the attention of the court on October 31st of 2024.” (May 20, 2025 tr. 36.) Those proceedings ultimately concluded in a disposition committing appellant to ODYS on
January 21, 2025. The same trial court judge who presided over this matter also
presided over that case.1
The State next called Dr. Douglas Waltman, a Ph.D. psychologist and
licensed chemical dependency counselor who has worked with the juvenile court
system for approximately 30 years. Dr. Waltman testified that in that capacity he
had performed “a variety of evaluations for delinquent youth,” including
“[a]menability exams like the one we have here now, and also . . . competency to
stand trial.” (Emphasis added.) (May 20, 2025 tr. 48.)2 Testimony then turned to
his process in conducting amenability examinations.
Dr. Waltman identified State’s exhibit No. 3 as the report he prepared
pursuant to Juv.R. 30. His core testimony focused on appellant’s amenability to
treatment and rehabilitation within the juvenile justice system. Much of Dr.
Waltman’s testimony, therefore, is not pertinent to this appeal. Moreover, neither
the word “competency” nor any variant appears at any other point during Dr.
Waltman’s testimony, including cross-examination, and it is undisputed that no
party suggested appellant might not be competent to stand trial or moved for a
competency evaluation and hearing. We therefore focus only on those portions of
1 We note this only to clarify, for purposes of whether appellant ever displayed
indicia of incompetency, that the juvenile court judge’s direct interactions with appellant extended beyond the present matter.
2 Dr. Waltman’s reference to competency examinations can be read as distinguishing
that type of examination from the amenability examination he conducted in this case. Dr. Waltman’s testimony that might, at least according to appellant’s theory on
appeal, have relevance to appellant’s competency.
In that regard, Dr. Waltman testified, consistent with his report, that
appellant fell into the lower range of normal or average intelligence for his age
group. He specifically testified that appellant was “in the average range.” (May 20,
2025 tr. 52.) Reading from his own report, he further testified that “[f]rom strictly
an intellectual standpoint, [appellant] has the intelligence to identify risky
situations, rationally assess the consequences of his actions, and exercise good
judgment in his decision-making.” (May 20, 2025 tr. 53.)3 He further testified that
“[a]ny observed impairment in these abilities are due to factors other than to basic
intelligence[,]” for example “impulsivity” and “poor socialization.” (May 20, 2025
tr. 53.) He further testified that appellant expresses “an intellectual kind of remorse”
(in the sense of saying he felt bad about what happened) rather than displaying an
“affective expression of remorse.” (May 20, 2025 tr. 67-68.) Appellant, he testified,
“has the capacity to express empathy.” (May 20, 2025 tr. 67.) Providing another
example, Dr. Waltman testified that while appellant might struggle with identifying
alternative actions when presented with the opportunity to engage in criminal
conduct, “he has the cognitive capacity to realize, [w]ell, . . . it’s a wrong thing to
do[.]” (May 20, 2025 tr. 74.)4
3 The report further states that appellant “has the intelligence to identify high-risk
situations and determine probable outcome.”
4 On cross-examination, Dr. Waltman testified that he asked how the victim in an
unrelated case might feel, “[a]nd [appellant] said, ‘Traumatized.’” (May 20, 2025 tr. 90.) Dr. Waltman testified that consistent with his observations of
appellant and his experience, he would expect such an individual to have academic
problems. He testified that appellant did have academic difficulties, particularly
related to math. (We note, in reviewing the report, that Dr. Waltman observed that
appellant performed significantly better with respect to verbal skills.) On cross-
examination, consistent with his report, Dr. Waltman testified that appellant’s
mental-health diagnoses included post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”).
(May 20, 2025 tr. 86.) He agreed with a PTSD diagnosis and found that appellant
frequently used marijuana as a coping mechanism. (May 20, 2025 tr. 94-95.) He
further agreed that appellant had a learning disability. Dr. Waltman testified to
having “some concern” regarding psychopathy, but indicated that while appellant
could “behave in a callous manner,” he also had “some remorse and regrets for what
he’s done” and scored low with respect to psychopathic features. (May 20, 2025 tr.
91.)
The juvenile court followed up with additional questions, which
appeared to be driven not only by testimony but by a review of Dr. Waltman’s report.
The court asked, for instance, whether “ADHD, PTSD, or conduct disorder” were all
considered mental illnesses. (May 20, 2025 tr. 103.) Dr. Waltman responded in the
affirmative. He also clarified the distinction he drew between intellectual remorse
and affective remorse.
Asked if this was a typical response for a youthful offender, Dr. Waltman stated, “Not really.” (May 20, 2025 tr. 90.) The State rested pending admission of its three exhibits (video of the
incident, the victim’s medical records, and Dr. Waltman’s report). All three exhibits
were admitted without objection. The State formally rested, and the defense rested
as well, indicating it did not intend to call witnesses.
The juvenile court heard closing arguments. In making its case for
bindover, the State conceded the R.C. 2152.12(E)(7) factor, i.e., that appellant did
have a mental illness or intellectual disability based on Dr. Waltman’s testimony
regarding “post traumatic stress disorder, ADHD, cannabis use, and conduct
disorder.” (May 20, 2025 tr. 119.) The defense argued against bindover but focused
its arguments principally on rehabilitative potential and the harm that could await
minors in the adult prison system. Again, no variant of the word “competency” was
mentioned.
The juvenile court went through the statutory factors meticulously,
indicating, inter alia, that while appellant was physically mature enough for transfer,
his level of emotional and psychological maturity factored against transfer pursuant
to R.C. 2152.12(E)(6). The juvenile court also found that appellant suffered from a
mental illness or intellectual disability, additional factors weighing against transfer
pursuant to R.C. 2152.12(E)(7). The court found that there was “sufficient time to
rehabilitate [appellant] within the Juvenile System and that the level of the security
available in the Juvenile System provides a reasonable assurance of public safety.”
(May 20, 2025 tr. 136.) The juvenile court also noted that appellant appeared to
display remorse while the prosecution played video of the attack. It stated that “while he is someone who normally is attentive and looking at the person that is
speaking to him, his head was down the entire time.” (May 20, 2025 tr. 137.) The
juvenile court denied the State’s request to transfer the case to the general division.
E. Adjudication and Disposition
Appellant appeared before the juvenile court on June 9, 2025, for
purposes of adjudication and disposition. Lead counsel for appellant indicated on
the record that he, his cocounsel, and appellant’s GAL had discussed with appellant
the possibility of admitting to the sole count in the State’s complaint, stating that
they “have all had occasion to discuss that possibility with him, and it’s my
understanding, having been advised of his Constitutional Rights and the possible
consequences, that he will enter that change in plea this morning.” (June 9, 2025
tr. 5.) Once again, neither the parties nor the juvenile court voiced any concerns
regarding appellant’s competency.
The juvenile court then conducted an extensive colloquy with
appellant. It once again explained his constitutional rights, including the right to go
to trial and hold the State to its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the right
to cross-examine the State’s witnesses, the right to call his own witnesses, and his
right to remain silent if he chose not to testify. Asked if he understood his rights and
that he would be giving them up by entering an admission, appellant twice
responded, “Yes, Your Honor.” (June 9, 2025 tr. 7.) The colloquy continued with
the juvenile court’s recitation of possible sanctions. At every turn, appellant
indicated he understood the juvenile court’s statements. The juvenile court asked appellant if he had any questions and whether his admission was the result of threats
or promises. To each question, appellant replied “No, Your Honor.” (June 9, 2025
tr. 9.) The juvenile court then stated:
Let the record reflect the Court [is] satisfied that [appellant] has been informed of his Constitutional Rights. He understands the nature of the charges, the effect of an admission, and the penalties or consequences which may be imposed.
I further find that he’s about to enter into a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary admission here today.
(June 9, 2025 tr. 9-10.)
The juvenile court then asked appellant: “[W]ith respect to the sole
count in the complaint, Count 1, felonious assault, a felony of the second degree, do
you admit or deny[?]” (June 9, 2025 tr. 10.) Appellant responded, “I admit.”
(June 9, 2025 tr. 10.) The trial court accepted the admission and adjudicated
appellant delinquent.
The juvenile court then proceeded to disposition. The State argued
for a term of ODYS commitment consecutive to appellant’s current term of two
years. Appellant understandably sought leniency, with counsel arguing that his
behavior had improved.
In allocution, when asked by the juvenile court why he assaulted the
detention officer, appellant immediately requested clarification regarding the
court’s expectations: “You want me to speak?“ (June 9, 2025 tr. 14.) The juvenile
court indicated it did. Appellant then responded in detail:
Well, like for the past time, like for me being in the house pod, I had problems with that staff. Like he didn’t say, but I had problems with him. Like, we really didn’t have no like weird connection with each other. But like he was like a picky staff towards me, like as far as like he used to check my room, throw my letters away. Like but at the same time, I know he was doing his job, like he had to do certain things. But it was like he was just always picky, pick like picky, like picking at me towards him. And I got fed up with it, and that’s — led to my actions, that I’m sorry about doing.
(June 9, 2025 tr. 14-15.) The juvenile court asked appellant how he now felt about
the incident. He responded: “I’m disappointed. I know I’m wrong, and I feel bad
for what I did to him.” (June 9, 2025 tr. 15.)
The juvenile court asked appellant if he understood that it had been
lenient with him in the past, and also that if he had been bound over to the general
division he faced the potential of a significant prison term. Appellant indicated he
understood. The juvenile court also further emphasized its past interactions with
appellant:
[O]bviously, we have gotten to know each other a little bit over the past how many years since you’ve been coming in front of me. I, obviously, have learned a lot about you, and I know a lot about you from all of those prior cases and all of the reports that’s been provided to the Court.
(June 9, 2025 tr. 17-18.) Appellant thanked the court for its leniency in the past:
Well, honestly, like I thank you for giving me chances. Like you give me — you gave me chances to do better and step myself up, but I’m still working on it to this day[.]
(June 9, 2025 tr. 18.) The court explained to appellant that he would “still have that
option, because [it] found [him] amenable,” which would allow appellant to
“continue to work on [himself]” and “to continue to learn and to grow and to
mature,” and that he “wouldn’t have those same opportunities had [he] been bound over and gone to prison.” (June 9, 2025 tr. 18.) Appellant replied, “I understand,
your Honor.” (June 9, 2025 tr. 18.) The juvenile court then noted appellant’s
improved performance at school, urging him to continue his studies “so that you can
graduate.” (June 9, 2025 tr. 19.)
The juvenile court committed appellant to ODYS custody for a
minimum term of one year, consecutive to his two-year commitment in Cuyahoga
J.C. No. DL23108243. It explained: “[T]hat means once you’re done with serving
that two-year commitment, you will then start serving the one year on this.” (June
9, 2025 tr. 20.) Appellant indicated he understood.
This timely appeal followed.
II. Assignment of Error
Appellant presents a single assignment of error for our review:
The trial court erred when it accepted the Appellant’s admission without first determining the extent of his mental health disorder and the effect it had on his ability to understand the consequences of his plea.
Finding no merit to the appeal, we affirm.
III. Analysis
Appellant does not employ the word “competency” in framing his
assignment of error. He tips his hand, however, in his App.R. 16(A)(4) statement of
the issue presented for review:
The issue presented on appeal involves whether the trial court should have accepted Appellant’s admission when considerable evidence and testimony was presented regarding the Appellant’s mental health issues and whether he was competent to enter a change of plea. (Emphasis added.)
“‘As the United States Supreme Court has long held, due process
protections must be afforded to children.’” In re J.D., 2025-Ohio-746, ¶ 67 (8th
Dist.), quoting State v. D.T., 2024-Ohio-4482, ¶ 64 (8th Dist.). This includes the
fundamental “‘due process right of a criminal defendant who is legally incompetent
not to be subjected to trial.’” In re J.D. at ¶ 67, quoting State v. Were, 94 Ohio St.3d
173, 174 (2002). Ohio courts, therefore have consistently held that “‘the right not to
be tried or convicted while incompetent is as fundamental in juvenile proceedings
as it is in criminal trials of adults.’” In re J.D. at ¶ 67, quoting In re Bailey, 2002-
Ohio-6792, ¶ 10 (2d Dist.). See also In re K.A., 2017-Ohio-6979, ¶ 10 (8th Dist.).
In juvenile proceedings, as in adult proceedings, “[t]he competency
standard for pleading guilty is the same as competency to stand trial.” Id. at ¶ 11.
“A defendant who is not competent to stand trial is not competent to enter a
negotiated plea.” State v. Cruz, 2010-Ohio-3717, ¶ 17 (8th Dist.); In re K.A. at ¶ 11.
When the issue of competency is raised prior to a plea, the plea itself does not waive
a challenge regarding failure to conduct a competency hearing. “[A] challenge based
on a lower court’s failure to hold a competency hearing or make a competency
determination ‘goes directly’ to whether a defendant’s plea was voluntary, knowing,
and intelligent.” D.T. at ¶ 75, quoting In re K.A. at ¶ 19, fn. 2.
In the context of juvenile proceedings, this court very recently
explained: The Ohio Supreme Court has held that a “defendant is rebuttably presumed to be competent to stand trial.” State v. Lawson, 165 Ohio St.3d 445, 2021-Ohio-3566, ¶ 48, 179 N.E.3d 1216. A “competency determination is necessary only when a court has reason to doubt the defendant’s competence.” Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 401, fn. 13, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 125 L.Ed.2d 321 (1993).
Juvenile competency determinations are governed by R.C. 2152.51 through R.C. 2152.59. Competency concerns “a child’s ability to understand the nature and objectives of a proceeding against the child and to assist in the child’s defense.” R.C. 2152.51(A)(1). “A child is incompetent if, due to mental illness, . . . developmental disability, or . . . lack of mental capacity, the child is presently incapable of understanding the nature and objective of proceedings against the child or of assisting in the child’s defense.” Id.
(Emphasis added.) In re J.D. at ¶ 68-69.
R.C. 2152.52(A)(1) provides that “[i]n any proceeding under this
chapter . . . any party or the court may move for a determination regarding the child’s
competency to participate in the proceeding.” Such a motion then triggers certain
statutory obligations on the part of the trial court regarding inquiries into a child’s
competency, including specific timing parameters and a requirement that the trial
court declare the child incompetent, determine that there is a reasonable basis to
order a competency evaluation, or hold a hearing to determine if there is a
reasonable basis for a competency evaluation. See In re J.D., 2025-Ohio-746, at ¶ 70
(8th Dist.), citing R.C. 2152.52(A) and 2152.53(B). See also D.T., 2024-Ohio-4482,
at ¶ 84 (8th Dist.).
In the present case, appellant’s trial counsel never raised the issue of
competency before the trial court and therefore never triggered any statutory
requirements. Where the issue was never raised below, we review appellant’s competency argument for plain error. In re J.D. at ¶ 95. “Under the plain-error
standard, we will not reverse unless there was an error that was so plain that it
created an ‘obvious defect in the . . . proceedings,’ and the error” affected the
outcome of the proceedings. In re R.H., 2013-Ohio-1030, ¶ 8 (8th Dist.), quoting
State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 27 (2002). See also In re J.D. at ¶ 95; State v.
Ford, 2004-Ohio-5610, ¶ 22-23 (8th Dist.). In this context, “[t]he right to a hearing
on the issue of competency rises to the level of a constitutional guarantee where the
record contains ‘sufficient indicia of incompetence,’ such that an inquiry into the
defendant’s competency is necessary to ensure the defendant’s right to a fair trial.”
State v. Berry, 72 Ohio St.3d 354, 359 (1995), quoting Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S.
162, 175 (1975). See also Ford at ¶ 34; State v. Moore, 2020-Ohio-3459, ¶ 34 (8th
Dist.); State v. Finley, 2024-Ohio-1058, ¶ 35 (8th Dist.); State v. Elliott, 2015-Ohio-
3766, ¶ 21 (8th Dist.).
In re K.A., 2017-Ohio-6979 (8th Dist.), like the present case, involved
an admission by a juvenile. In that case, the issue of competency had been raised,
the juvenile court ordered a competency evaluation, and the evaluator deemed K.A.
competent. The defense, however, did not stipulate to a finding of competency, and
the juvenile court failed to follow its statutory obligations regarding a competency
hearing and written determination. The State argued that this was harmless error
because the record did not “reveal sufficient indicia of incompetency.” In re K.A. at
¶ 13. This court rejected the State’s argument that the record was devoid of sufficient
indicia of incompetence. While the most recent competency evaluation (never stipulated to) deemed K.A. competent, it also noted that K.A. had been found
incompetent in earlier cases, that K.A. “functions in the borderline to extremely low
range of intellectual capabilities,” and that he did not appear to understand “the
concepts of confidentiality, nonconfidentiality, the role of the prosecutor, the
process by which decisions are made, and his right not to be compelled to testify
against himself.” Id. at ¶ 17.
The present case is distinguishable from In re K.A., and not merely
because in that action, unlike this one, the issue of competency had been raised. In
the present action, nothing in the record suggests appellant had ever been found
incompetent during any previous involvement with the juvenile justice system. The
psychologist evaluating appellant found that he was of average (albeit low-average)
intelligence rather than the “borderline to extremely low range of intellectual
capabilities” evidenced by K.A. Id. at ¶ 17. Furthermore, appellant appeared to
grasp the court process at every turn, including his right not to be compelled to
testify against himself. After confirming multiple times, on multiple occasions, that
he understood that right, he arguably displayed that understanding after the
juvenile court accepted his admission and turned to allocution prior to disposition.
The juvenile court asked him why he assaulted the detention officer, and he
immediately sought clarification, asking the juvenile court: “You want me to speak?”
(June 9, 2025 tr. 15.) This suggests that he had understood his right to remain silent
and that he was able to ask for clarification of the juvenile court’s expectations at
this phase of the proceedings. Moreover, while appellant’s statements in allocution consisted
principally of excuses, his remarks were articulate and rational. Unlike the facts of
In re K.A., this does not suggest the inability to understand the court process or to
aid in his own defense.
Appellant’s answers to the court’s inquiries during the admission
colloquy, and in earlier proceedings, likewise reflect his understanding of the court
process. For example, he repeatedly answered “yes” when asked whether he
understood his rights and consistently answered “no” when asked if he had been
threatened or promised anything in exchange for his admission or was under the
influence of drugs or alcohol. His responses betrayed no evidence of confusion.
In that regard, and in other respects, this case is distinguishable from
In re J.D., 2025-Ohio-746 (8th Dist.), which also involved a juvenile’s admission.5
In that case, this court highlighted the following exchange between the juvenile court
and J.D. during the hearing in which he admitted to the offense:
THE COURT: Okay. And so you’re making a knowing decision? You understand what you’re doing, correct?
J.D.: Yes, your Honor.
THE COURT: Intelligent decision; is that correct? Are you making an intelligent decision?
J.D.: No, your Honor.
THE COURT: A smart — intelligent — A smart decision?
5 In re J.D. involved a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to raise the
issue of competency prior to his admission and failing to move to withdraw the admission. This court’s substantive focus, however, was on indicia of incompetence. J.D.: No, your Honor.
THE COURT: You’re not making a smart decision? Let me — Are you making an intelligent decision?
J.D.: What did you say?
THE COURT: Are you making an intelligent decision?
THE COURT: Okay. And it’s voluntary. No one is making you make this decision; is that correct?
J.D.: No, your — Yes, your Honor.
Id. at ¶ 76.
J.D.’s confusion during this exchange is immediately evident. This
court further wrote that “[a] cursory look at J.D.’s history with the juvenile justice
system show[ed] that he had been found incompetent in three previous cases” and
was even found incompetent again after his admission in the case under review. In
re J.D. at ¶ 82. On the record before it, this court found that “there was more than
sufficient indicia of incompetency to require an inquiry into J.D.’s competence” and
that there was therefore a “realistic possibility that J.D. was incompetent when he
entered” his admission. Id. at ¶ 83.
We have already noted that the record contains nothing to indicate
appellant was ever found to be incompetent or that the issue of competence had ever
been raised during his time in the juvenile justice system. Unlike In re J.D., the
transcripts do not suggest appellant was confused by the juvenile court process, that
he was otherwise unable to understand the nature and objective of the proceedings, or that he could not assist in his own defense. As noted above, the only point at
which he arguably displayed confusion was during allocution when the trial court
asked him to speak openly about the assault. Earlier that day and in previous
proceedings, the trial court had appropriately informed appellant that he had the
right to remain silent. Appellant’s momentary confusion during allocution was
understandable, and his question to the juvenile court appeared to be a logical and
thoughtful request for clarification. If anything, this reflects appellant’s grasp of the
process as a whole and his ability to aid in his own defense.
The various diagnoses highlighted by the testifying psychologist do
not alter the outcome. In State v. Pubill, 2023-Ohio-3875 (8th Dist.), a case
involving “outrageous courtroom behavior” by the defendant, this court noted that
“‘[i]ncompetency must not be equated with mere mental or emotional instability or
even outright insanity. A defendant may be emotionally disturbed or even psychotic
and still be capable of understanding the charges against him and of assisting his
counsel.’” Id. at ¶ 22, quoting State v. Bock, 28 Ohio St.3d 108, 110 (1986). A trial
court “‘may not find a defendant incompetent to stand trial or plead guilty solely
because he suffers from a mental illness or intellectual disability.’” Pubill at ¶ 22,
quoting State v. McMillan, 2017-Ohio-8872, ¶ 29 (8th Dist.). “‘[A] defendant’s
emotional or mental instability does not establish incompetence for the purpose of
negating a plea, which was otherwise voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently
made.’” State v. Hawkins, 2019-Ohio-4162, ¶ 17 (8th Dist.), quoting State v. Prettyman, 2002-Ohio-1096 (8th Dist.). See also Finley, 2024-Ohio-1058, at ¶ 37
(8th Dist.).
In Finley, the defendant suffered from schizophrenia and had a
history of substance abuse. This court nevertheless observed:
But Finley answered the trial court’s questions during the colloquy appropriately and without any signs of confusion or misunderstanding. Nothing in the record demonstrates that he was struggling to understand what was occurring at the plea hearing so as to put the trial court on notice that a competency evaluation was warranted. The record does not reflect anything out of the ordinary in Finley’s behavior and demeanor in the courtroom, and his counsel at no point suggested that he was unable to assist in his defense.
Id. at ¶ 38. In the present case, appellant likewise answered the juvenile court’s
questions appropriately, with no signs of misunderstanding or confusion, and his
attorneys never suggested he might be incompetent. Furthermore, nothing in the
transcripts suggested that appellant struggled to understand the proceedings or
otherwise behaved in a manner suggesting incompetence. See Elliott, 2015-Ohio-
3766, at ¶ 23 (8th Dist.) (trial court did not err in not sua sponte conducting
competency hearing; while defendant was schizophrenic and had not been taking
his medication, “the record [did] not reflect anything out of the ordinary in Elliott’s
behavior and demeanor in the courtroom,” and his attorney did not suggest he was
incompetent); State v. McCoy, 2009-Ohio-4284 (5th Dist.) (diagnosis of mild
developmental disability did not warrant a sua sponte competency hearing where
nothing in the record suggested defendant did not understand the nature and
objective of the proceedings or that he was unable to assist in his own defense). In Moore, 2020-Ohio-3459 (8th Dist.), the defendant argued that a
mitigation-of-penalty report prepared for purposes of sentencing “revealed ‘mental
health issues’ that should have been reviewed by a mental health professional to
determine his competency and that [he] ‘was also possibly denied necessary
medications which could have assisted him in aiding in his own defense and making
proper legal decisions.’” Id. at ¶ 39. The report detailed Moore’s placement in
special education and learning disability classes while in middle school and high
school, as well as his extensive history of substance abuse. Id. at ¶ 40. This echoes
appellant’s claim in this appeal, where he appears to contend that Dr. Waltman’s
report somehow triggered the juvenile court’s obligation to inquire further into his
competency.
This court rejected Moore’s arguments. Consistent with the case law
above, this court wrote that “simply because Moore may have suffered from a mental
disorder or a learning disability and may have benefited from medication to treat his
condition, does not mean he was not competent to enter a guilty plea.” Id. at ¶ 40.
It further held that “[a] trial court may not find a defendant incompetent to stand
trial or plead guilty solely because he suffers from a mental illness or a learning or
intellectual disability[,]” and that “[a] defendant suffering from an emotional or
mental disability or a learning disability may still possess the ability to understand
the charges and proceedings against him or her and be able to assist in his or her
defense.” Id. at ¶ 41. This court further explained: The test for competency focuses entirely on the defendant’s ability to understand the meaning of the proceedings against him and his ability to assist in his own defense, which can be satisfied regardless of the defendant’s mental status or IQ.
Id. at ¶ 41.
This court then found that the record contained no indicia of
incompetence where there was “nothing to suggest that any mental condition or
learning disability Moore may have had (or the consequences of any prior drug use
or abuse) precluded him from understanding the nature and objective of the
proceedings against him, in assisting in his defense or in otherwise entering
knowing, intelligent and voluntary guilty pleas.” Id. at ¶ 42. This court found
“nothing in the transcript that suggest[ed] Moore was experiencing any cognitive
difficulties that impacted his understanding of the nature and objective of the
proceedings against him or that inhibited his ability to assist in his defense at the
time he entered his guilty pleas” and nothing to indicate he was under the influence
of drugs, alcohol, or medication “that would adversely affect his ability to enter into
a plea[.]” Id. at ¶ 44. Moore interacted with the trial court over the course of several
months. The trial court therefore had ample opportunity to observe him and to
interact with him. Id. at ¶ 43. During that time, Moore “exhibited [his]
understanding of the legal process, the charges against him and the consequences
of his guilty pleas.” Id. at ¶ 43. This court cited its earlier opinion in State v.
Almashni, 2010-Ohio-898 (8th Dist.), in which it held that even if the trial court
erred by failing to hold a competency hearing after a competency evaluation had been ordered, the error was harmless where the record did not contain sufficient
indicia of incompetence. Id. at ¶ 11-14.
Moore is remarkably similar to this case. The record reflects that the
juvenile court had the opportunity to observe and interact with appellant extensively
over the course of several hearings. We find nothing in the transcripts or anywhere
else in the record suggesting any indicia of incompetence, much less indicia
sufficient to require the juvenile court to order a competency evaluation sua sponte.
The juvenile court trial judge was familiar with appellant from previous proceedings,
and this case alone involved four separate in-person appearances on four separate
dates. At no point during those hearings did appellant’s behavior, including his
exchanges with the court, suggest he was experiencing cognitive difficulties affecting
his understanding of the nature of the proceedings or his ability to assist in his
defense. Furthermore, at the beginning of the adjudication hearing, appellant’s lead
counsel indicated that appellant had consulted with two attorneys and his GAL
before deciding to admit to the complaint. These same professionals raised no
competency concerns.
The psychologist who evaluated appellant in connection with possible
bindover, and who filed a 14-page report, noted appellant’s mental-health diagnoses
but never raised any competency concerns either in the report or during his
extensive testimony. Dr. Waltman wrote in his report that while appellant was
“diagnosed with an unspecified learning disability,” he “does not have an Intellectual
Developmental Disorder.” Dr. Waltman described appellant as having “adequate reading skills” and “the intellectual ability to recognize high-risk situations and
address potential outcomes.” Indeed, Dr. Waltman wrote that appellant “has the
intelligence to identify risky situations, rationally assess the consequences of his
actions, and exercise good judgment in his decision-making.” Dr. Waltman further
reported that appellant told him he had “been employed three times” and wanted
“to finish his education to improve his life.” Appellant’s “thinking was logical and
reality oriented,” and he “displayed adequate insight.” “Mental health records,” Dr.
Waltman wrote, “[did] not indicate a history for psychoticism.”
We have independently reviewed the record. Appellant’s counsel
never requested a competency evaluation, and the record is devoid of any indicia of
incompetence that would require sua sponte inquiry into appellant’s competency.
Nothing suggests that appellant’s decision to admit to the sole count in the
complaint was anything other than voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made.
Appellant’s assignment of error is overruled, and the juvenile court’s judgment is
affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
common pleas court, juvenile division, to carry this judgment into execution. The
finding of delinquency having been affirmed, any bail or stay of execution pending
appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the juvenile court for execution of
commitment. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
DEENA R. CALABRESE, JUDGE
LISA B. FORBES, P.J., and KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J., CONCUR