State v. Caudill

2023 Ohio 3843

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: October 23, 2023
• Docket: 16-23-03
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Caudill, 2023-Ohio-3843.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT WYANDOT COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO, CASE NO. 16-23-03 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,

v.

RAY A. CAUDILL, JR., OPINION

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

Appeal from Wyandot County Common Pleas Court Trial Court No. 22 CR 0091

Judgment Affirmed

Date of Decision: October 23, 2023

APPEARANCES:

Howard A. Elliott for Appellant

Eric J. Figlewicz for Appellee Case No. 16-23-03

WILLAMOWSKI, J.

{¶1} Defendant-appellant Ray A. Caudill, Jr. (“Caudill”) appeals the

judgment of the Wyandot County Court of Common Pleas, arguing that the trial

court failed to comply with the requirements of Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(b). For the

reasons set forth below, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Facts and Procedural History

{¶2} On August 10, 2022, Caudill was indicted on one count of aggravated

trafficking in drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(1), a fourth-degree felony, and

on one count of having weapons while under disability in violation of R.C.

2923.13(A)(3), a third-degree felony. On February 23, 2023, Caudill pled guilty to

both of the charges in the indictment. On April 25, 2023, the trial court issued its

judgment entry of sentencing.

Assignment of Error

{¶3} Caudill filed his notice of appeal on May 17, 2023. On appeal, he raises

the following assignment of error:

The guilty plea herein was not properly taken and is invalid in that the trial court failed to substantially comply with its obligations to explain the non-constitutional rights, consequences, and implications of a plea of guilty.

Caudill asserts that the trial court failed to explain that it could proceed to judgment

and sentence upon accepting his pleas of guilty during the Crim.R. 11 colloquy.

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Legal Standard

{¶4} “When a defendant enters a plea in a criminal case, the plea must be

made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.” State v. Engle, 74 Ohio St.3d 525,

527, 1996-Ohio-179, 660 N.E.2d 450, 451 (1996). “Failure on any of those points

renders enforcement of the plea unconstitutional under both the United States

Constitution and the Ohio Constitution.” Id. “Crim.R. 11(C)(2) directs trial courts

to engage in a colloquy with a defendant before accepting a guilty or no contest plea

in a felony case.” State v. Wallace, 3d Dist. Henry No. 7-23-04, 2023-Ohio-3014,

¶ 6. This colloquy is designed to ensure that a plea is knowingly, intelligently, and

voluntarily made. State v. Phipps, 2021-Ohio-258, 167 N.E.3d 576, ¶ 6 (3d Dist.).

{¶5} Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a), requires a trial court, in addition to determining

that a plea is voluntarily made, to ensure that the defendant understands the nature

of the charges; the maximum penalty involved; and that probation or community

control is not available at sentencing if the defendant is not eligible for such

sanctions. Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(b) requires a trial court to inform the defendant of the

effects of a guilty or no contest plea and of the fact that it may proceed to judgment

and sentencing after accepting the plea. Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) requires a trial court to

inform a defendant of various constitutional rights that are waived when a guilty or

no contest plea is entered.

{¶6} In general, “a defendant is not entitled to have his plea vacated unless

he demonstrates he was prejudiced by a failure of the trial court to comply with the

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provisions of Crim.R. 11(C).” State v. Dangler, 162 Ohio St.3d 1, 2020-Ohio-2765,

164 N.E.3d 286, ¶ 16. “The test for prejudice is ‘whether the plea would have

otherwise been made.’” Id., quoting State v. Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d 106, 108, 564

N.E.2d 474, 476 (1990). However, the Ohio Supreme Court has delineated two

exceptions to this general rule. Dangler at ¶ 16.

{¶7} First, “a trial court’s complete failure to comply with a portion of

Crim.R. 11(C) eliminates the defendant’s burden to show prejudice.” Dangler at ¶

15. Second, “[w]hen a trial court fails to explain the constitutional rights that a

defendant waives by pleading guilty or no contest” as required by Crim.R.

11(C)(2)(c), the defendant’s plea is presumed to have been “entered involuntarily

and unknowingly, and no showing of prejudice is required.” Id. at ¶ 14.

{¶8} Thus, the Ohio Supreme Court has explained the analysis of an

appellate challenge based upon Crim.R. 11(C)(2) as involving three main questions:

“(1) has the trial court complied with the relevant provision of the rule? (2) if the

court has not complied fully with the rule, is the purported failure of a type that

excuses a defendant from the burden of demonstrating prejudice? and (3) if a

showing of prejudice is required, has the defendant met that burden?” Dangler,

supra, at ¶ 17.

Legal Analysis

{¶9} Caudill argues that the trial court failed to explain that, “upon

acceptance of the plea, may proceed with judgment and sentence” as was required

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by Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(b). However, during the Crim.R. 11 colloquy, the trial court

stated the following: “Your plea of guilty will allow the Court to proceed with

judgment on sentencing and you need to understand that the responsibility of

determining the appropriate sentence in your case rests solely with the judge.” (Tr.

10). Given this statement, we do not conclude that the trial court failed to comply

with the portion of Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(b) identified on appeal. See State v.

Reinthaler, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 16 MA 0170, 2017-Ohio-9374, ¶ 11. Even if

this portion of the colloquy was in some manner deficient, Caudill is still not

excused from the necessity of demonstrating prejudice.

{¶10} On appeal, Caudill has not raised an argument that he would not have

otherwise pled guilty had the trial court been more specific in the challenged portion

of the Crim.R. 11 colloquy. Initially, we note that, in addition to the Crim.R. 11

colloquy, Caudill was given the following notification in the guilty plea that he

signed: “I know the Judge may either sentence me today or refer my case for a pre-

sentence report.” (Doc. 25). Further, in this case, the trial court did not immediately

proceed to sentencing Caudill but delayed disposition and sentencing until it could

review a presentence investigation report. Courts have held that, “where a trial court

does not proceed immediately to sentencing upon accepting a guilty plea, the

defendant is not prejudiced by the court’s failure to warn that it could have done

so.” State v. Rogenski, 7th Dist. Columbiana No. 18 CO 0019, 2020-Ohio-1360, ¶

24. See also State v. White, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2014-CA-54, 2015-Ohio-28, ¶ 4;

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State v. Rider, 6th Dist. Ottawa No. OT-19-030, 2021-Ohio-1070, ¶ 7; State v.

Anthony, 2015-Ohio-2267, 37 N.E.3d 751, ¶ 11 (8th Dist.); State v. Brown, 11th

Dist. Geauga No. 2003-G-2504, 2004-Ohio-1843, ¶ 23.

{¶11} In conclusion, the trial court did not fail to comply with a portion of

Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(b) as alleged by Caudill on appeal. Further, even if the identified

portion of the Crim.R. 11 colloquy was in some manner deficient, Caudill has not

raised an argument to establish that he would not have otherwise pled guilty. Thus,

he has failed to demonstrate prejudice. Accordingly, his sole assignment of error is

overruled.

Conclusion

{¶12} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant in the particulars

assigned and argued, the judgment of Wyandot County Court of Common Pleas is

affirmed.

MILLER, P.J. and WALDICK, J., concur.

/hls

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