[Cite as State v. Bolen, 2025-Ohio-5104.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT HARDIN COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, CASE NO. 6-25-12
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
v.
DUSTIN RAY BOLEN, OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeal from Hardin County Common Pleas Court Trial Court No. CRI 20242166
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: November 10, 2025
APPEARANCES:
Michael B. Kelley for Appellant
Morgan S. Fish for Appellee Case No. 6-25-12
WILLAMOWSKI, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant Dustin Ray Bolen (“Bolen”) appeals the judgment
and sentence of the Hardin County Common Pleas Court, alleging that the trial court
erroneously imposed consecutive sentences; failed to merge allied offenses; and
accepted guilty pleas that were not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered.
For the reasons set forth below, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Facts and Procedural History
{¶2} On March 28, 2024, Bolen was with his father, Michael Bolen
(“Michael”), at his (Michael’s) house. At some point, they got into an altercation.
As a result, Michael left the house, went to his mother’s residence, and stayed there
the entire evening. The next day, Michael returned to his house because he had an
appointment with the plumber.
{¶3} After Michael arrived, he and Bolen got into a fight. Bolen affirmed
that he got mad at his father and then used physical force against him. Specifically,
Bolen choked his father and killed him. He then disposed of certain clothing items,
cleaned the bathroom, and left a misleading note on the kitchen table. Bolen tore
up the floor of the closet in one of Michael’s bedrooms and dug a hole. He wrapped
Michael’s body with some blankets and shower curtains before burying him face
down in a kneeling position.
{¶4} Michael’s family became concerned about where he was and called law
enforcement on March 31, 2024. Bolen eventually told law enforcement where his
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father’s body was buried. When law enforcement located Michael’s body, around
two-thirds of it was covered with dirt. Law enforcement discovered a place next to
a shed outside the house where some earth had been removed and came to believe
that this was the source of the dirt covering Michael’s remains.
{¶5} On November 7, 2024, Bolen was charged with (1) one count of murder
in violation of R.C. 2903.02(A), an unclassified felony; (2) one count of tampering
with evidence in violation of R.C. 2921.12(A)(1), a third-degree felony; (3) one
count of gross abuse of a corpse in violation of R.C. 2927.01(B), a fifth-degree
felony; (4) one count of having weapons while under disability in violation of R.C.
2923.13(A)(2), a third-degree felony; (5) one count of trafficking in a fentanyl-
related compound in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(1), a fourth-degree felony; (6)
one count of theft from a person in a protected class in violation R.C. 2913.02(A)(1),
fifth-degree felony; and (7) one count of possessing criminal tools in violation of
R.C. 2923.24(A), a fifth-degree felony.
{¶6} On March 5, 2025, Bolen pled guilty to three charges: (1) one count of
murder in violation of R.C. 2903.02(A), an unclassified felony; (2) one count of
tampering with evidence in violation of R.C. 2921.12(A)(1), a third-degree felony;
and (3) one count of gross abuse of a corpse in violation of R.C. 2927.01(B), a fifth-
degree felony. The remaining charges were dismissed by the trial court.
{¶7} On April 2, 2025, Bolen was sentenced to prison terms of fifteen years
to life for murder; thirty-six months for tampering with evidence; and twelve months
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for gross abuse of a corpse. While the parties jointly recommended that the prison
terms be served concurrently, the trial court imposed the prison terms consecutively.
On April 22, 2025, Bolen filed his notice of appeal, raising three assignments of
error:
First Assignment of Error
The trial court’s sentence is contrary to law and violates R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) as the Court erroneously imposed consecutive sentences, which is plain error.
Second Assignment of Error
The trial court erred when it failed to merge counts two (tampering) and three (gross abuse of corpse) for sentencing as the two counts are allied offenses with the same animus.
Third Assignment of Error
The trial court erred when it accepted the Appellant’s guilty pleas as the pleas were not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily given.
{¶8} Bolen argues that his sentence is contrary to the law because the trial
court imposed consecutive sentences without making the findings required by R.C.
2929.14(C)(4).
Legal Standard
{¶9} R.C. 2929.41(A) sets the general rule that prison terms “shall be served
concurrently” unless the trial court makes the requisite findings under R.C.
2929.14(C)(4). This provision reads as follows:
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(4) If multiple prison terms are imposed on an offender for convictions of multiple offenses, the court may require the offender to serve the prison terms consecutively if the court finds that the consecutive service is necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish the offender and that consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender’s conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the public, and if the court also finds any of the following:
(a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses while the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction imposed pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the Revised Code, or was under post-release control for a prior offense.
(b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of the multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no single prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the courses of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender’s conduct.
(c) The offender’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime by the offender.
R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). Thus, when imposing consecutive sentences, “R.C.
2929.14(C)(4) requires the trial court to make specific findings on the record.” State
v. Gallant, 2025-Ohio-3182, at ¶ 10 (3d Dist.); State v. Hites, 2012-Ohio-1892, ¶ 11
(3d Dist.). The trial court must find that:
(1) . . . consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public or punish the offender (‘the necessity finding’); (2) . . . consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offense (‘the proportionality finding’); and (3) . . . one of the three factors listed in R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(a-c) is applicable.
State v. Sims, 2025-Ohio-2488, ¶ 7 (3d Dist.).
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{¶10} Further, “the trial court must state the required findings at the
sentencing hearing . . . and incorporate those findings into its sentencing entry.”
Gallant at ¶ 11; State v. Runyon, 2024-Ohio-5039, at ¶ 24 (3d Dist.). The trial court
“has no obligation to state reasons to support its findings and . . . to give a talismanic
incantation of the words of the statute, provided that the necessary findings can be
found in the record and are incorporated into the sentencing entry.” Gallant at ¶ 11,
quoting State v. Bonnell, 2014-Ohio-3177, ¶ 37.
Standard of Review
{¶11} “Under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), an appellate court may reverse a sentence
only [upon finding], by clear and convincing evidence, that the record does not
support the trial court’s findings under the relevant statutes or that the sentence is
otherwise contrary to law.” (Emphasis added.) State v. Lawrence, 2025-Ohio-3023,
¶ 17 (3d Dist.); State v. Marcum, 2016-Ohio-1002, ¶ 1.
{¶12} The standard of “clear and convincing evidence” is a highly
deferential one, it is evidence that “will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a
firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.” Gallant, 2025-
Ohio-3182, at ¶ 8 (3d Dist.), quoting Marcum at ¶ 22.
Legal Analysis
{¶13} On appeal, Bolen asserts that the language used by the trial court at
sentencing was not adequate to make the necessity finding, the proportionality
finding, and one of the required R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(a)-(c) factors. The State
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responds that the trial court made findings that satisfy the three prongs. It expressly
made the necessity finding, stating that consecutive sentences were necessary to
protect the public and punish the offender. The trial judge then described this
offense as “heinous.” (Tr. 17). He also said, “I still can’t imagine sitting there and
looking into my father’s eyes and choking the life out of him and continuing to do
that.” (Tr. 18). In context, the trial court was addressing the proportionality of the
punishment in relation to the seriousness of the offense. The trial judge also stated
that the harm caused was so great or unusual that a single term would be insufficient,
which satisfies R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(b).
{¶14} The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that the trial court is not required
to use exact statutory language so long as the substance of the findings are made
clear and separate on the record. Bonnell, 2014-Ohio-3177, at ¶ 29; Gallant, 2025-
Ohio-3182, at ¶ 11 (3d Dist.). Here, the trial court’s statements, while not formulaic,
were functionally equivalent to the required statutory findings. The record indicates
that the trial court made the required R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) findings at sentencing even
if not in the exact statutory language. Thus, Bolen has failed to demonstrate that the
imposition of consecutive sentences is contrary to law. We overrule his first
assignment of error.
{¶15} Bolen argues that his conviction for tampering with evidence and
gross abuse of a corpse are allied offenses that should have merged at sentencing.
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{¶16} Because R.C. 2941.25 focuses on the defendant’s conduct, the allied-
offense analysis is dependent upon the facts of a case. State v. Ruff, 2015-Ohio-
995, at ¶ 26; Lawrence, 2025-Ohio-3023, at ¶ 19 (3d Dist.). “[T]wo or more
offenses of dissimilar import exist within the meaning of R.C. 2941.25(B) when the
defendant’s conduct constitutes offenses involving separate victims or if the harm
that results from each offense is separate and identifiable.” Lawrence at ¶ 19,
quoting Ruff at ¶ 23. R.C. 2941.25, Ohio’s multiple-count statute, provides:
(A) Where the same conduct by defendant can be construed to constitute two or more allied offenses of similar import, the indictment or information may contain counts for all such offenses, but the defendant may be convicted of only one.
(B) Where the defendant’s conduct constitutes two or more offenses of dissimilar import, or where his conduct results in two or more offenses of the same or similar kind committed separately or with a separate animus as to each, the indictment or information may contain counts for all such offenses, and the defendant may be convicted of all of them.
{¶17} The Supreme Court of Ohio has directed the use of a three-part test to
determine whether a defendant can be convicted of multiple offenses:
As a practical matter, when determining whether offenses are allied offenses of similar import within the meaning of R.C. 2941.25, courts must ask three questions when the defendant’s conduct supports multiple offenses: (1) Were the offenses dissimilar in import or significance? (2) Were they committed separately? and (3) Were they committed with separate animus or motivation? An affirmative answer to any of the above will permit separate convictions. The conduct, the animus, and the import must all be considered.
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Ruff at ¶ 31.
{¶18} “We review de novo whether offenses are allied offenses of similar
import.” Lawrence, 2025-Ohio-3023, at ¶ 17 (3d Dist.); State v. Tall, 2023-Ohio-
1853, ¶ 7 (3d Dist.). “De novo review is independent, without deference to the
lower court’s decision.” Lawrence, 2025-Ohio-3023, at ¶ 17 (3d Dist.); State v.
Hudson, 2013-Ohio-647, ¶ 27 (3d Dist.).
{¶19} Bolen contends that tampering with evidence and gross abuse of
corpse are allied offenses because they were committed with the same conduct.
Under R.C. 2921.12(A)(1), a tampering with evidence conviction requires that:
(A) No person, knowing that an official proceeding or investigation is in progress, or is about to be or likely to be instituted, shall do any of the following:
(1) Alter, destroy, conceal, or remove any record, document, or thing, with purpose to impair its value or availability as evidence in such proceeding or investigation.
Under R.C. 2927.01(B), a gross abuse of a corpse conviction requires that “no
person, except as authorized by law, shall treat a human corpse in a way that would
outrage reasonable community sensibilities.” Bolen argues that the burial of his
father in a hole beneath the closet floor of a residence was a singular act that both
destroyed evidence, fulfilling the requirements of the tampering charge, and
dishonored the body, fulfilling the requirements of the abuse of a corpse charge.
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Therefore, he maintains the offenses were committed simultaneously and should
merge.
{¶20} However, the State argues in its brief that it is possible to commit both
offenses with the same conduct but such did not occur here under the facts
presented. Rather, the two charges stemmed from separate and distinguishable
actions by Bolen. The tampering with evidence charge was supported by Bolen’s
acts of cleaning the bathroom where the killing occurred; disposing of incriminating
clothing; and creating false evidence by writing a misleading note. These actions
were directed at concealing the fact of the murder and misleading law enforcement.
{¶21} In contrast, the gross abuse of a corpse charge arose from a separate
set of acts that included tearing up the floor of the closet in a bedroom, digging a
hole in which to place the body; wrapping the corpse in blankets and shower
curtains; positioning the body face down in a kneeling posture; and partially burying
it.
{¶22} The record clearly establishes that the tampering offense and the gross
abuse of a corpse offense were committed at different times and with distinct sets
of actions. Since these offenses were committed with separate conduct, they are not
subject to merger. We thus find this first argument without merit.
{¶23} While our analysis of Bolen’s first argument is dispositive of this
issue, Bolen also argues that the tampering with evidence and gross abuse of a
corpse charges involved the same harm: interfering with the ability of law
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enforcement to recover and examine the victim’s body. He contends that the
charges must merge because the acts affected the same victim and resulted in a
single form of harm.
{¶24} The State asserts that the harm from tampering with evidence is to the
justice system. It obstructs truth-finding, delays or frustrates investigations, and
renders key evidence unavailable. Moreover, the harm from gross abuse of a corpse
is a violation of societal norms, human dignity, and the emotional sensibilities of
the community and family of the deceased.
{¶25} The State also argues that, even if a common victim is involved,
offenses may be of dissimilar import if they cause separate identifiable harms. In
State v. Revere, 2022-Ohio-551, ¶ 39-40 (2nd Dist.), the Second District considered
a case in which the defendant hid the victim’s body in the woods and covered it with
a tarp. The court found that these acts
prevented law enforcement from finding [the body] and using it as evidence. The blatant disregard for the dignity of the . . . [victim’s] body, who Revere admittedly had a relationship with, was an outrage to community sensibilities. [Therefore, t]he crimes had separate, identifiable harm, were offenses of dissimilar import, and were not subject to merger.
Id.
{¶26} Following the logic in Revere, we conclude that the State correctly
notes that these two charges address distinct societal interests. Like in Revere, the
State here argues that dual harms support dual punishments. Revere at ¶ 39. The
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harms caused by the two offenses are distinct and separately punishable. See Ruff,
2015-Ohio-995, at ¶ 26 (the Ohio Supreme Court held that “two or more offenses
of dissimilar import exist within the meaning of R.C. 2941.25(B) if the harm that
results from each offense is separate and identifiable.”). Therefore, the offenses are
of dissimilar import and are not subject to merger. This second argument is without
merit.
{¶27} In summary, Bolen failed to establish that these two convictions are
allied offenses of similar import. The trial court properly concluded that his
convictions for tampering with evidence and gross abuse of a corpse did not merge
at sentencing. We thus overrule his second assignment of error.
{¶28} Bolen argues that his guilty plea was not entered knowingly,
voluntarily, and intelligently.
{¶29} “When a defendant enters a plea in a criminal case, the plea must be
made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.” State v. Carpenter, 2025-Ohio-
2561, ¶ 8 (3d Dist.), quoting State v. Engle, 74 Ohio St.3d 525, 527 (1996). The
enforcement of the plea is unconstitutional if a guilty plea was not a knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary one. State v. Dangler, 2020-Ohio-2765, ¶ 10; Carpenter
at ¶ 8. “A guilty plea that is coerced or induced by promises or threats renders the
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plea involuntary.” Carpenter at ¶ 8; State v. Lawson, 2018-Ohio-4922, ¶ 20 (3d
Dist.).
{¶30} “[C]rim.R. 11 sets forth the procedures to be followed by a trial court
when accepting a guilty plea and ‘ensures an adequate record on review by requiring
the trial court to personally inform the defendant of his rights and the consequences
of his plea and determine if the plea is understandingly and voluntarily made.’”
Carpenter at ¶ 9, quoting Dangler at ¶ 11, quoting State v. Stone, 43 Ohio St.2d 163,
168 (1975). An appellate court considers the dialogue between the trial court and
the defendant and whether it shows that the defendant understood the consequences
of the plea. Carpenter at ¶ 9; Dangler at ¶ 12.
{¶31} Crim.R. 11(C) applies specifically to a trial court’s acceptance of
guilty pleas in felony cases and provides in relevant part as follows:
(2) In felony cases the court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or a plea of no contest, and shall not accept a plea of guilty or no contest without first addressing the defendant personally * * * and doing all of the following:
(a) Determining that the defendant is making the plea voluntarily, with understanding of the nature of the charges and of the maximum penalty involved, and if applicable, that the defendant is not eligible for probation or for the imposition of community control sanctions at the sentencing hearing.
(b) Informing the defendant of and determining that the defendant understands the effect of the plea of guilty or no contest, and that the court, upon acceptance of the plea, may proceed with judgment and sentence.
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(c) Informing the defendant and determining that the defendant understands that by the plea the defendant is waiving the rights to jury trial, to confront witnesses against him or her, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in the defendant’s favor, and to require the state to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which the defendant cannot be compelled to testify against himself or herself.
{¶32} “[A] defendant is not entitled to have his plea vacated unless he
demonstrates he was prejudiced by a failure of the trial court to comply with the
provisions of Crim.R.11(C).” State v. Sessom, 2024-Ohio-130, ¶ 25 (3d Dist.),
quoting Dangler, 2020-Ohio-2765, at ¶ 16. “The test for prejudice is ‘whether the
plea would have otherwise been made.’” Sessom at ¶ 25. Dangler, however, set
the exceptions to this rule:
First, ‘a trial court’s complete failure to comply with a portion of Crim.R. 11(C) eliminates the defendant’s burden to show prejudice.’ Second, ‘[w]hen a trial court fails to explain the constitutional rights that a defendant waives by pleading guilty or no contest' as required by Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c), the defendant’s plea is presumed to have been ‘entered involuntarily and unknowingly, and no showing of prejudice is required.’
State v. Caudill, 2023-Ohio-3843, ¶ 25 (3d Dist.), quoting Dangler, 2020-Ohio-
2765, at ¶ 14-15.
The Ohio Supreme Court has explained the analysis of an appellate challenge based upon Crim.R. 11(C)(2) as involving three main questions: “(1) has the trial court complied with the relevant provision of the rule? (2) if the court has not complied fully with the rule, is the purported failure of a type that excuses a defendant from the burden of demonstrating prejudice? and (3) if a showing of prejudice is required, has the defendant met that burden?”
Sessom at ¶ 25, quoting Dangler, 2020-Ohio-2765, at ¶ 17.
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{¶33} “‘[A] trial court must advis[e] a defendant of all five constitutional
rights listed’ in Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) during a plea colloquy.” Sessom at ¶ 26,
quoting State v. Veney, 2008-Ohio-5200, ¶ 22. The five constitutional rights
include:
(1) the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, (2) the right to a trial by jury, (3) the right to confront one’s accusers, (4) the right to the compulsory process of witnesses, and (5) the right to be proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
State v. Howard, 2017-Ohio-8020, ¶ 20 (3d Dist.).
{¶34} “[T]he language of Crim.R.11(C)(2)(c) ‘supports the conclusion that
the list of cited rights was intended to be exclusive’ and does not ‘indicat[e] that the
trial court is obligated to inform the defendant of other constitutional rights.’”
Sessom, 2024-Ohio-130, at ¶ 26 (3d Dist.), quoting State v. Phillips, 2020-Ohio-
2785, ¶ 12 (3d Dist.), quoting State v. Stewart, 2011-Ohio-2582, ¶ 20 (11th Dist.).
{¶35} Bolen raises two main sets of arguments. He first argues that the trial
court failed to substantially comply with Crim. R. 11(C) by not explaining in detail
the constitutional rights he was waiving by entering a guilty plea. Specifically, he
argues that the trial court’s mention of a bench trial while explaining his right to a
jury trial created confusion, leading him to believe that he could still go to trial after
pleading guilty. However, the record reflects that the trial court clearly explained
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that the right to a bench trial and the right to a jury trial were distinct and that he
would waive both by entering a guilty plea.
{¶36} Bolen further contends that the trial court initially failed to inform him
that the State could not comment on his choice to exercise his constitutional right to
remain silent at trial. But the record reflects that the trial court eventually informed
him of this right at the hearing even if not initially. Having examined the record,
we conclude that the first set of arguments does not identify a deficiency in the trial
court’s explanation of the constitutional rights that Bolen was waiving.
{¶37} In his second set of arguments, Bolen asserts that the trial court did not
make the charges or potential penalties clear. He argues that the original plea form
inaccurately listed murder as a third-degree felony, creating confusion. Yet, the
State correctly points out that the trial court promptly identified and corrected this
typographical error. In response, Bolen affirmatively stated he understood the
corrections.
{¶38} Bolen also argues that the written joint sentencing recommendation
created confusion because it stated that the prison terms should run concurrently.
However, the trial court clearly stated that it was not bound by the joint sentencing
recommendation and that it could still impose the prison terms consecutively if
Bolen pled guilty.
{¶39} Lastly, Bolen insists that the trial court’s comment that sentencing
“will not happen” was misleading or confusing. (Tr. 15). However, in context, the
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trial court was clearly explaining that a sentence would not be imposed immediately
after Bolen’s guilty plea was entered but that a sentence would be imposed at a
separate hearing after the pre-sentence investigation was written. Thus, we find this
last set of arguments fails to establish that the charges or potential penalties were
not fully explained and are without merit.
{¶40} After reviewing the record, we conclude that Bolen failed to identify
a deficiency in the Crim.R. 11 colloquy. Thus, he has failed to demonstrate that his
pleas were not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered. We thus overrule
his third assignment of error.
Conclusion
{¶41} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant in the particulars
assigned and argued, the judgment of the Hardin County Court of Common Pleas is
affirmed.
WALDICK, P.J. and ZIMMERMAN, J., concur.
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JUDGMENT ENTRY
For the reasons stated in the opinion of this Court, the assignments of error
are overruled and it is the judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of the
trial court is affirmed with costs assessed to Appellant for which judgment is hereby
rendered. The cause is hereby remanded to the trial court for execution of the
judgment for costs.
It is further ordered that the Clerk of this Court certify a copy of this Court’s
judgment entry and opinion to the trial court as the mandate prescribed by App.R.
27; and serve a copy of this Court’s judgment entry and opinion on each party to the
proceedings and note the date of service in the docket. See App.R. 30.
John R. Willamowski, Judge
Juergen A. Waldick, Judge
William R. Zimmerman, Judge
DATED: /hls
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