State v. Carpenter

2023 Ohio 1702

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: May 22, 2023
• Docket: 2-22-20
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Carpenter, 2023-Ohio-1702.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT AUGLAIZE COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 2-22-20

v.

LUCAS A. CARPENTER, OPINION

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

Appeal from Auglaize County Municipal Court Trial Court No. 2022 TRC 00612

Judgment Affirmed

Date of Decision: May 22, 2023

APPEARANCES:

Blaise Katter for Appellant

Reed D. Searcy for Appellee Case No. 2-22-20

WALDICK, J.

{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Lucas A. Carpenter (“Carpenter”), brings this

appeal from the August 16, 2022, judgment of the Auglaize County Municipal Court

sentencing him to community control after Carpenter pled no contest to, and was

convicted of, OVI in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(d). On appeal, Carpenter

argues that the trial court erred by overruling his suppression motion. For the

reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Background

{¶2} On February 13, 2022, Carpenter was charged with OVI in violation of

R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a), OVI in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(d) 1, and failing to

properly stop at a “stop bar” in violation of R.C. 4511.43. Carpenter originally pled

not guilty to the charges.

{¶3} On April 26, 2022, Carpenter filed a suppression motion arguing, inter

alia, that the officer who stopped him lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct a

traffic stop, and that the facts did not support the officer expanding the traffic stop

into an OVI investigation. A hearing was held on Carpenter’s suppression motion

on June 7, 2022. The trial court took the matter under advisement and issued a

written entry overruling Carpenter’s suppression motion on July 19, 2022.

1 The (A)(1)(d) charge alleges: “The person has a concentration of eight-hundredths of one gram or more but less than seventeen-hundredths of one gram by weight of alcohol per two hundred ten liters of the person's breath.” According to the traffic ticket in this case, Carpenter’s BAC was .161.

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{¶4} On August 16, 2022, Carpenter entered a no contest plea to OVI in

violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(d). The remaining charges against him were

dismissed. The trial court found Carpenter guilty of the OVI charge and sentenced

him to community control. Carpenter now brings the instant appeal, asserting the

following assignment of error for our review.

Assignment of Error

The trial court erred by overruling the motion to suppress.

{¶5} In his assignment of error, Carpenter argues that the trial court erred by

overruling his suppression motion. Specifically, he contends that the trial court erred

by determining that the officer in this case had reasonable suspicion to expand the

traffic stop into an OVI investigation.

Standard of Review

{¶6} “Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of

law and fact.” State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 8. At a

suppression hearing, the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact and, as such, is

in the best position to evaluate the evidence and the credibility of witnesses. Id.

When reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, “an appellate court must accept

the trial court’s findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible

evidence.” Id., citing State v. Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d 19 (1982). With respect to the

trial court’s conclusions of law, however, our standard of review is de novo, and we

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must independently determine whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal

standard. Id., citing State v. McNamara, 124 Ohio App.3d 706 (4th Dist.1997).

Relevant Authority

{¶7} Once a driver has been lawfully stopped, an officer may not administer

field sobriety tests unless the invasion of privacy is separately justified by a

reasonable suspicion based upon articulable facts that the motorist is impaired. See,

e.g., State v. Schriml, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-12-32, 2013-Ohio-2845, ¶ 25.

Importantly, reasonable suspicion does not require an officer to observe and relate

overt signs of intoxication. Cleveland v. Martin, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 105420,

2018-Ohio-740, ¶ 14. Rather, “[a] court will analyze the reasonableness of the

request based on the totality of the circumstances, viewed through the eyes of a

reasonable and prudent police officer on the scene who must react to events as they

unfold.” Cleveland v. Maxwell, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104964, 2017-Ohio-4442,

¶ 20, citing State v. Dye, 11th Dist. Portage No. 2001-P-0140, 2002-Ohio-7158, ¶

18; State v. Cromes, 3d Dist. Shelby No. 17-06-07, 2006-Ohio-6924, ¶ 38, citing

United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273, 122 S.Ct. 744 (2002).

{¶8} Circumstances from which an officer may derive a reasonable,

articulable suspicion that the detained driver was operating the vehicle while under

the influence include, but are not limited to:

(1) the time and day of the stop (Friday or Saturday night as opposed to, e.g., Tuesday morning); (2) the location of the stop

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(e.g., whether near establishments selling alcohol); (3) any indicia of erratic driving before the stop that may indicate a lack of coordination (speeding, weaving, unusual braking, etc.); (4) whether there is a cognizable report that the driver may be intoxicated; (5) the condition of the suspect’s eyes (bloodshot, glassy, glazed, etc.); (6) impairments of the suspect’s ability to speak (slurred speech, overly deliberate speech, etc.); (7) the odor of alcohol coming from the interior of the car, or, more significantly, on the suspect’s person or breath; (8) the intensity of that odor, as described by the officer (“very strong,” “strong,” “moderate,” “slight,” etc.); (9) the suspect’s demeanor (belligerent, uncooperative, etc.); (10) any actions by the suspect after the stop that might indicate a lack of coordination (dropping keys, falling over, fumbling for a wallet, etc.); and (11) the suspect’s admission of alcohol consumption, the number of drinks had, and the amount of time in which they were consumed, if given.

State v. Schriml, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-12-32, ¶ 26, citing State v. Evans, 127 Ohio

App.3d 56, 63, fn. 2 (11th Dist.1998). “We do not view any single factor in

isolation.” State v. Null, 3d Dist. Logan No. 8-19-50, 2020-Ohio-3222, ¶ 19, citing

State v. Macklin, 5th Dist. Fairfield No. 17-CA-39, 2018-Ohio-2975, ¶ 28.

Evidence Presented at Suppression Hearing

{¶9} Patrolman Adam Baker of the Wapakoneta Police Department testified

that on February 13, 2022, at approximately 3:09 a.m., he was on patrol when he

observed Carpenter commit a “stop bar violation.” (Tr. at 6). Patrolman Baker

elaborated, indicating that Carpenter’s vehicle was over the stop bar, which was

marked on the pavement. Patrolman Baker testified that he followed Carpenter, and

that he observed Carpenter commit another “stop bar violation” at a second stop

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sign. The second violation was captured on Patrolman Baker’s dash camera and the

recording from that incident was introduced into evidence.2 Based on his

observations of the two traffic infractions, Patrolman Baker conducted a traffic stop

of Carpenter’s vehicle.

{¶10} Patrolman Baker approached Carpenter’s vehicle from the passenger

side. Carpenter was in the driver’s seat and there was a passenger in the front of the

vehicle. Patrolman Baker explained the purpose of the stop then asked Carpenter

for his license and insurance. Carpenter promptly produced his license but he did

not have his insurance paperwork with him. Patrolman Baker then briefly went back

toward his vehicle and spoke with dispatch. After doing so, he returned to

Carpenter’s vehicle, this time approaching the driver’s side.

{¶11} Once Carpenter rolled down his window, Patrolman Baker asked who

had been drinking because he could smell a “strong” odor of alcohol from inside the

vehicle. (State’s Ex. 2b). Carpenter and the passenger both indicated that the

passenger had been drinking. The passenger claimed that Carpenter had just taken

him to Waffle House. Although Carpenter claimed he had not been drinking,

Patrolman Baker testified that Carpenter’s eyes were bloodshot and glassy.

2 The first violation was not on the recorded footage. As to the second violation, we note that the “stop bar” had faded over time but it was still visible, and the video corroborates Patrolman Baker’s testimony that Carpenter’s vehicle was over the “stop bar.”

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{¶12} After speaking with Carpenter and the passenger, Patrolman Baker

asked Carpenter to step out of the vehicle because he wanted to make sure Carpenter

was “good to drive.” Patrolman Baker testified that when he removed Carpenter

from the vehicle, he could smell the odor of an alcoholic beverage specifically

emitting from Carpenter’s breath. Patrolman Baker asked Carpenter if he had

consumed any alcoholic beverages and Carpenter stated that he had two beers,

though Carpenter claimed he had consumed them approximately four hours prior.

Based on all of his observations during the interaction, Patrolman Baker asked

Carpenter to perform field sobriety tests.

Analysis

{¶13} At the outset of our analysis, we note that while Carpenter challenged

the lawfulness of his traffic stop at the trial court level, he does not explicitly renew

that challenge on appeal. Nevertheless, even if he did, the traffic stop herein was

lawful based on Patrolman Baker’s observation of two separate “stop bar” violations

of R.C. 4511.43. State v. Harpel, 3d Dist. Hardin No. 6-20-03, 2020-Ohio-4513, ¶

18 (stating that observation of a violation of R.C. 4511.43 justifies a traffic stop).

Reasonable suspicion is present to justify a traffic stop when a defendant’s tires are

stopped on a stop bar or “stop line,” thus we find no error with the trial court’s

determination that reasonable suspicion existed here. Findlay v. Frenzel, 3d Dist.

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Hancock Nos. 5-20-01, 5-20-02, 2020-Ohio-4621, ¶ 11; see also State v. Miller, 3d

Dist. Marion No. 9-14-50, 2015-Ohio-2529.

{¶14} Carpenter now contends that while there may have been some

evidence of alcohol consumption, Patrolman Baker did not have evidence that

would lead to a reasonable suspicion that Carpenter was impaired prior to asking

Carpenter to perform field sobriety tests. More specifically, Carpenter argues that

the odor of alcohol is evidence of consumption rather than impairment. Further, he

argues that bloodshot/glassy eyes is not necessarily evidence of impairment.

Carpenter also contends that Patrolman Baker had already determined that he was

going to have Carpenter perform field sobriety tests when he asked Carpenter to get

out of the vehicle, which was prior to Carpenter’s admission that he had consumed

any alcoholic beverages, thus Patrolman Baker had even less information to base

his reasonable suspicion on.

{¶15} In reviewing his arguments, we emphasize that Carpenter seeks to

have us view each factor in complete isolation, but our review concerns the totality

of the circumstances. See State v. Null, 3d Dist. Logan No. 8-19-50, 2020-Ohio-

3222, ¶ 19. Here, Patrolman Baker stopped a vehicle that had committed two traffic

violations at approximately 3:09 a.m. After speaking with Carpenter and the driver,

Patrolman Baker noted a “strong” odor of an alcoholic beverage from within the

vehicle. He also noted that Carpenter’s eyes were bloodshot and glassy.

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{¶16} In order to determine whether the odor of an alcoholic beverage was

emanating from the passenger, as Carpenter claimed, Patrolman Baker removed

Carpenter from the vehicle. Once he did, he noticed that the odor of an alcoholic

beverage was emitting specifically from Carpenter’s breath. Patrolman Baker then

asked Carpenter if he had consumed alcoholic beverages that evening, and

Carpenter admitted that he had, albeit several hours prior. It was only at this point

that Patrolman Baker requested that Carpenter perform field sobriety tests.3

{¶17} The record thus reflects that each step in the investigative process led

to the next until the totality of the circumstances prompted Patrolman Baker to

request that Carpenter perform field sobriety tests. See Null, supra; see also State v.

Lewis, 3d Dist. Auglaize No. 2-16-13, 2017-Ohio-996 (determining that under the

totality of the circumstances, conducting field sobriety tests was reasonable). While

Carpenter argues that there were numerous indicators of impairment that were not

present here, such as erratic driving, slurred speech, and loss of motor control, we

emphasize that not every OVI investigation is going to have the same indicators of

impairment, which is why the totality of the circumstances must be considered.

Here, the totality of the circumstances supported the trial court’s determination to

3 Carpenter contends that since Patrolman Baker radioed dispatch and said that he was getting Carpenter out of the vehicle to perform field sobriety tests before Carpenter was out of the car, we effectively cannot consider the information learned after Carpenter was removed from the car when evaluating the totality of the circumstances. However, Patrolman Baker clarified that when he was having Carpenter step out of the vehicle, he had to notify dispatch. Patrolman Baker testified that at the time he got Carpenter out of the vehicle, he may or may not have had Carpenter perform field sobriety tests.

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overrule Carpenter’s suppression motion. Compare State v. Angers, 3d Dist.

Auglaize No. 2-21-04, 2021-Ohio-3640 (wherein we determined the totality of the

circumstances did not support conducting field sobriety tests because, inter alia,

officers merely opined that they were not smelling the odor of alcohol on a driver

because of the strong smell of tobacco in the car, and other noted factors the officers

noted were not specifically indicative of impairment).

{¶18} In sum, the totality of the circumstances observed by Patrolman Baker

supported his determination to expand the scope of the stop into an OVI

investigation and to request that Carpenter perform field sobriety tests. Based on the

specific facts and circumstances of this case, we do not find that the trial court erred

by overruling Carpenter’s suppression motion. Therefore, Carpenter’s assignment

of error is overruled.

Conclusion

{¶19} Having found no error prejudicial to Carpenter in the particulars

assigned, his assignment of error is overruled and the judgment of the Auglaize

County Municipal Court is affirmed.

WILLAMOWSKI and ZIMMERMAN, J.J., concur.

/jlr

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