State v. Binkley
Opinion
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
AUGLAIZE COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 2-23-04 v.
SUSAN ELAINE BINKLEY, OPINION DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeal from Auglaize County Municipal Court Trial Court No. 2022 TRC 4699
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: July 24, 2023
APPEARANCES:
Nick A. Catania for Appellant Joshua Muhlenkamp for Appellee
WALDICK, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Susan Elaine Binkley (“Binkley”), brings this appeal from the February 9, 2023, judgment of the Auglaize County Municipal Court sentencing her to community control after she pled no contest to, and was convicted of, OVI and Littering. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Background
{¶2} On July 22, 2022, Binkley was charged with OVI in violation of R.C.
4511.19(A)(1)(a), and Littering in violation of R.C. 4511.82. She originally pled not guilty to the charges.
{¶3} On September 6, 2022, Binkley filed a suppression motion arguing, inter alia, that the arresting officer lacked reasonable suspicion to expand the scope of the traffic stop to an OVI investigation. A hearing was held on Binkley’s motion on November 17, 2022. The trial court took the matter under advisement and then issued a written entry denying Binkley’s suppression motion on January 23, 2023.
{¶4} Following the denial of her suppression motion, Binkley withdrew her pleas of not guilty to the charges and entered pleas of no contest. The trial court then conducted a Crim.R. 11 hearing and determined that Binkley was entering knowing, voluntary, and intelligent pleas. The trial court accepted Binkley’s pleas and found
her guilty.1 Binkley was sentenced to community control, which included a 72-hour Driver’s Intervention Program.
{¶5} A judgment entry memorializing Binkley’s sentence was filed February 9, 2023. It is from this judgment that Binkley appeals, asserting the following assignment of error for our review.
First Assignment of Error
The trial court erred in admitting evidence obtained after the officer expanded the scope of the stop from a “Terry Stop” to an OVI investigation without reasonable suspicion to do so.
{¶6} In her assignment of error, Binkley argues that the trial court erred by determining that the arresting officer had a reasonable suspicion to expand the scope of the traffic stop to an OVI investigation.
Standard of Review
{¶7} “Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and fact.” State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 8. At a suppression hearing, the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact and, as such, is in the best position to evaluate the evidence and the credibility of witnesses. Id. When reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, “an appellate court must accept the trial court’s findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence.” Id., citing State v. Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d 19 (1982). With respect to the
1 At the change-of-plea hearing, the State indicated that a urine screen conducted as a result of Binkley’s arrest showed the presence of Gabapentin, Norfentanyl, THC, and Amphetamines.
trial court’s conclusions of law, however, our standard of review is de novo, and we must independently determine whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard. Id.
Relevant Authority
{¶8} Once a driver has been lawfully stopped, an officer may not administer field sobriety tests unless the invasion of privacy is separately justified by a reasonable suspicion based upon articulable facts that the motorist is impaired. See, e.g., State v. Schriml, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-12-32, 2013-Ohio-2845, ¶ 25. Importantly, reasonable suspicion does not require an officer to observe and relate overt signs of intoxication. State v. Carpenter, 3d Dist. Auglaize No. 2-22-20, 2023- Ohio-1702, ¶ 7. Rather, “[a] court will analyze the reasonableness of the request based on the totality of the circumstances, viewed through the eyes of a reasonable and prudent police officer on the scene who must react to events as they unfold.” Cleveland v. Maxwell, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104964, 2017-Ohio-4442, ¶ 20; Carpenter at ¶ 7.
{¶9} Circumstances from which an officer may derive a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the detained driver was operating the vehicle while under the influence include, but are not limited to:
(1) the time and day of the stop (Friday or Saturday night as opposed to, e.g., Tuesday morning); (2) the location of the stop (e.g., whether near establishments selling alcohol); (3) any indicia of erratic driving before the stop that may indicate a lack of
coordination (speeding, weaving, unusual braking, etc.); (4)
whether there is a cognizable report that the driver may be intoxicated; (5) the condition of the suspect’s eyes (bloodshot, glassy, glazed, etc.); (6) impairments of the suspect’s ability to speak (slurred speech, overly deliberate speech, etc.); (7) the odor of alcohol coming from the interior of the car, or, more significantly, on the suspect’s person or breath; (8) the intensity of that odor, as described by the officer (“very strong,” “strong,”
“moderate,” “slight,” etc.); (9) the suspect’s demeanor (belligerent, uncooperative, etc.); (10) any actions by the suspect after the stop that might indicate a lack of coordination (dropping keys, falling over, fumbling for a wallet, etc.); and (11) the suspect’s admission of alcohol consumption, the number of drinks had, and the amount of time in which they were consumed, if given.
State v. Schriml, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-12-32, ¶ 26. “We do not view any single factor in isolation.” State v. Null, 3d Dist. Logan No. 8-19-50, 2020-Ohio-3222, ¶ 19.
Evidence Presented at Suppression Hearing
{¶10} On July 27, 2022, Sergeant Brian Christopher of the St. Mary’s Police Department was off duty, beginning a workout at “Snap Fitness” in St. Mary’s when he observed Binkley walking strangely in the building. Sergeant Christopher testified that she was “flaring her arms to her side, she was staggering back and forth. It just didn’t seem right.” (Supp. Tr. at 4). Sergeant Christopher thought that either Binkley was “under the influence of something” or there was “some handicap.” (Id. at 8). Sergeant Christopher testified that other individuals present at
the gym noticed Binkley and indicated there might be something wrong or that she was “high.” (Id. at 6).
{¶11} Sergeant Christopher continued to observe Binkley as she nearly fell down while she was going into the parking lot, then he saw her “stagger[]” back to her car and sit in it for “some time.” (Id. at 5). As a result of his observations, Sergeant Christopher contacted Sergeant Lucas Turpin of the St. Mary’s Police Department, who was on duty at the time, to express concern about Binkley. Sergeant Christopher identified the vehicle Binkley was in, which was an older truck in “rough shape.” (Id. at 6).
{¶12} Sergeant Turpin received the message from Sergeant Christopher, which included a description of the truck and a license plate number. Sergeant Turpin responded to the area and eventually located the vehicle at a Shell gas station. He observed Binkley getting into the truck at that time.
{¶13} Sergeant Turpin followed Binkley’s vehicle and observed garbage fly out of the bed of her truck and onto the ground. Once he caught up to Binkley’s vehicle and confirmed the license plate, he activated his overhead lights and initiated a traffic stop.
{¶14} Sergeant Turpin testified that Binkley’s vehicle stopped “abruptly.”
(Tr. at 15). In fact, he testified that she stopped so quickly that he also had to stop abruptly to avoid a collision with her. Further, Sergeant Turpin testified that when
Binkley stopped, her right tires were just over the white fog line of the exit lane so she was stopped somewhat in the lane despite having plenty of room to get out of the lane on the right.
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