Callow, C.J.
The defendant, Larry Camarillo, was charged by information with indecent liberties with an 11-year-old boy. The charge was brought under former RCW 9A.44.100(1)(b).1 The 1-count information was based on conduct which occurred over a 1-year period between June 4, 1981, and July 10, 1982. The defendant was convicted.2
On appeal the defendant claimed he was denied a fair trial because the State failed to elect which act of three incidents it was relying upon. The 1-count information covered a period during which there was evidence of three distinct commissions of the offense. The defendant further argued that State v. Petrich, 101 Wn.2d 566, 683 P.2d 173 (1984)3 should be applied retroactively to provide for a jury instruction on jury unanimity when the State presents evidence of multiple acts but only one count is charged. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. State v. Camarillo, 54 Wn. App. 821, 776 P.2d 176 (1989). We granted review.
The boy testified that the defendant accomplished sexual contact on three separate occasions. The first time the boy was at the defendant's house for dinner with his mother. [63]*63The boy testified that he was in the defendant's bedroom watching television when the defendant came in and placed him on his lap. The defendant then rubbed the zipper area of the boy's pants for 5 to 10 minutes.
The second incident occurred at the defendant's house. This time the victim was spending the night at the defendant's house because he was babysitting for the boy's mother. On this occasion the boy was on the defendant's bed watching television. The boy testified that the defendant entered, lay beside him on the bed and placed his hand down the boy's pants and fondled him for 5 to 10 minutes.
The third incident occurred at the boy's house and was similar to the first. The boy testified that the defendant came into his bedroom and again sat him on his lap. The defendant then rubbed the zipper area of the boy's jeans.
About a year later the victim told a friend what had occurred because the friend's mother had discussed sharing a residence with the defendant. The victim then told his mother and she informed the police.
When the charge came to trial and the jury was instructed, defense counsel did not request that the State elect which act it relied upon for conviction, nor did the defense request a unanimity instruction.4
To convict a person of a criminal charge, the jury must be unanimous that the defendant committed the criminal act. State v. Stephens, 93 Wn.2d 186, 190, 607 P.2d 304 (1980); State v. Badda, 63 Wn.2d 176, 385 P.2d 859 (1963). In cases where there is evidence of multiple acts of like misconduct which relate to one charge against the defendant, the State is required to elect which act it is relying upon for a conviction. State v. Workman, 66 Wash. 292, 119 P. 751 (1911); State v. Sargent, 62 Wash. 692, 114 P. [64]*64868 (1911); State v. Osborne, 39 Wash. 548, 81 P. 1096 (1905). Workman states:
[W]hile evidence of separate commissions of the offense may be admitted as tending to prove the commission of the specific act relied upon, the proper course in such a case, after the evidence is in is to require the state to elect which of such acts is relied upon for a conviction.
Workman, 66 Wash. at 295.
State v. Petrich, supra, construed the rule in Workman to require the trial court to instruct the jury that all 12 members had to agree that the same underlying act has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt if the State neglects to elect which act constituted the crime. In effect, Petrich was a reiteration and clarification of Workman. The Workman-Petrich rule assures a unanimous verdict on one criminal act thereby protecting a criminal defendant's right to a unanimous verdict. Petrich, 101 Wn.2d at 572.
Failure of the court to follow the rule in Workman and Petrich is "violative of a defendant's state constitutional right to a unanimous jury verdict and United States constitutional right to a jury trial." State v. Kitchen, 110 Wn.2d 403, 409, 756 P.2d 105 (1988); State v. Badda, 63 Wn.2d 176, 385 P.2d 859 (1963); State v. Allen, 57 Wn. App. 134, 788 P.2d 1084 (1990); Const. art. 1, § 22 (amend. 10); U.S. Const. amend. 6. When error occurs during a trial the jury verdict will be affirmed only if that error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705, 87 S. Ct. 824, 24 A.L.R.3d 1065 (1967); State v. Kitchen, supra at 409.
We turn to whether the failure by the State to elect which of the multiple acts it would rely upon to prove the charge or to give a unanimity instruction was harmless error in this case. Kitchen stated the standard of review when there is an error in multiple acts cases which puts jury unanimity in question, as follows:
In reviewing a multiple acts case in which there has been no election by the State or unanimity instruction by the trial court, the proper standard for determining whether the error is harmless is . . .
[65]*65... if a rational trier of fact could have a reasonable doubt as to whether each incident established the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
[State v.] Loehner, 42 Wn. App. [408,] 411 [711 P.2d 377 (1985)] (Scholfield, A.C.J., concurring) . . . This approach presumes that the error was prejudicial and allows for the presumption to be overcome only if no rational juror could have a reasonable doubt as to any of the incidents alleged.
Kitchen, 110 Wn.2d at 411. Thus in multiple acts cases the standard of review for harmless error is whether a "rational trier of fact could find that each incident was proved beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Gitchel, 41 Wn. App. 820, 823, 706 P.2d 1091, review denied, 105 Wn.2d 1003 (1985). See also State v. Badda, 63 Wn.2d 176, 385 P.2d 859 (1963); State v. Allen, supra. Errors of constitutional proportions will not be held harmless unless the "appellate court is 'able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."' State v. Burri, 87 Wn.2d 175, 182, 550 P.2d 507 (1976) (quoting Chapman, 386 U.S.
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Callow, C.J.
The defendant, Larry Camarillo, was charged by information with indecent liberties with an 11-year-old boy. The charge was brought under former RCW 9A.44.100(1)(b).1 The 1-count information was based on conduct which occurred over a 1-year period between June 4, 1981, and July 10, 1982. The defendant was convicted.2
On appeal the defendant claimed he was denied a fair trial because the State failed to elect which act of three incidents it was relying upon. The 1-count information covered a period during which there was evidence of three distinct commissions of the offense. The defendant further argued that State v. Petrich, 101 Wn.2d 566, 683 P.2d 173 (1984)3 should be applied retroactively to provide for a jury instruction on jury unanimity when the State presents evidence of multiple acts but only one count is charged. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. State v. Camarillo, 54 Wn. App. 821, 776 P.2d 176 (1989). We granted review.
The boy testified that the defendant accomplished sexual contact on three separate occasions. The first time the boy was at the defendant's house for dinner with his mother. [63]*63The boy testified that he was in the defendant's bedroom watching television when the defendant came in and placed him on his lap. The defendant then rubbed the zipper area of the boy's pants for 5 to 10 minutes.
The second incident occurred at the defendant's house. This time the victim was spending the night at the defendant's house because he was babysitting for the boy's mother. On this occasion the boy was on the defendant's bed watching television. The boy testified that the defendant entered, lay beside him on the bed and placed his hand down the boy's pants and fondled him for 5 to 10 minutes.
The third incident occurred at the boy's house and was similar to the first. The boy testified that the defendant came into his bedroom and again sat him on his lap. The defendant then rubbed the zipper area of the boy's jeans.
About a year later the victim told a friend what had occurred because the friend's mother had discussed sharing a residence with the defendant. The victim then told his mother and she informed the police.
When the charge came to trial and the jury was instructed, defense counsel did not request that the State elect which act it relied upon for conviction, nor did the defense request a unanimity instruction.4
To convict a person of a criminal charge, the jury must be unanimous that the defendant committed the criminal act. State v. Stephens, 93 Wn.2d 186, 190, 607 P.2d 304 (1980); State v. Badda, 63 Wn.2d 176, 385 P.2d 859 (1963). In cases where there is evidence of multiple acts of like misconduct which relate to one charge against the defendant, the State is required to elect which act it is relying upon for a conviction. State v. Workman, 66 Wash. 292, 119 P. 751 (1911); State v. Sargent, 62 Wash. 692, 114 P. [64]*64868 (1911); State v. Osborne, 39 Wash. 548, 81 P. 1096 (1905). Workman states:
[W]hile evidence of separate commissions of the offense may be admitted as tending to prove the commission of the specific act relied upon, the proper course in such a case, after the evidence is in is to require the state to elect which of such acts is relied upon for a conviction.
Workman, 66 Wash. at 295.
State v. Petrich, supra, construed the rule in Workman to require the trial court to instruct the jury that all 12 members had to agree that the same underlying act has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt if the State neglects to elect which act constituted the crime. In effect, Petrich was a reiteration and clarification of Workman. The Workman-Petrich rule assures a unanimous verdict on one criminal act thereby protecting a criminal defendant's right to a unanimous verdict. Petrich, 101 Wn.2d at 572.
Failure of the court to follow the rule in Workman and Petrich is "violative of a defendant's state constitutional right to a unanimous jury verdict and United States constitutional right to a jury trial." State v. Kitchen, 110 Wn.2d 403, 409, 756 P.2d 105 (1988); State v. Badda, 63 Wn.2d 176, 385 P.2d 859 (1963); State v. Allen, 57 Wn. App. 134, 788 P.2d 1084 (1990); Const. art. 1, § 22 (amend. 10); U.S. Const. amend. 6. When error occurs during a trial the jury verdict will be affirmed only if that error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705, 87 S. Ct. 824, 24 A.L.R.3d 1065 (1967); State v. Kitchen, supra at 409.
We turn to whether the failure by the State to elect which of the multiple acts it would rely upon to prove the charge or to give a unanimity instruction was harmless error in this case. Kitchen stated the standard of review when there is an error in multiple acts cases which puts jury unanimity in question, as follows:
In reviewing a multiple acts case in which there has been no election by the State or unanimity instruction by the trial court, the proper standard for determining whether the error is harmless is . . .
[65]*65... if a rational trier of fact could have a reasonable doubt as to whether each incident established the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
[State v.] Loehner, 42 Wn. App. [408,] 411 [711 P.2d 377 (1985)] (Scholfield, A.C.J., concurring) . . . This approach presumes that the error was prejudicial and allows for the presumption to be overcome only if no rational juror could have a reasonable doubt as to any of the incidents alleged.
Kitchen, 110 Wn.2d at 411. Thus in multiple acts cases the standard of review for harmless error is whether a "rational trier of fact could find that each incident was proved beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Gitchel, 41 Wn. App. 820, 823, 706 P.2d 1091, review denied, 105 Wn.2d 1003 (1985). See also State v. Badda, 63 Wn.2d 176, 385 P.2d 859 (1963); State v. Allen, supra. Errors of constitutional proportions will not be held harmless unless the "appellate court is 'able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."' State v. Burri, 87 Wn.2d 175, 182, 550 P.2d 507 (1976) (quoting Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24).
In Kitchen, this court reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial because "[t]here was conflicting testimony as to each of those acts and a rational juror could have entertained reasonable doubt as to whether one or more of them actually occurred." Kitchen, 110 Wn.2d at 412. State v. Coburn, 110 Wn.2d 403, 409, 756 P.2d 105 (1988), a case consolidated with Kitchen, reversed Coburn's conviction because the testimony of the child victim was impeached and because the jury heard testimony pertaining to Cohurn's reputation in the community for truth, veracity and good morals. Furthermore, as in Kitchen's case, the jury heard conflicting testimony "as to each of those acts and a rational juror could have entertained reasonable doubt as to whether one or more of them actually occurred." Kitchen, 110 Wn.2d at 412.
In State v. Petrich, supra, the defendant's conviction was overturned because this court was not satisfied that the failure of the State to elect error was not harmless due to the child's testimony. The victim in Petrich was able to [66]*66describe with some detail and specificity the acts committed against her, but other details were acknowledged "with attendant confusion as to date and place, and uncertainty regarding the type of sexual contact that took place." Petrich, 101 Wn.2d at 573.
In the present case, the evidence admitted at trial came from the child victim, his mother, the defendant and an elderly woman who shared a residence with the defendant at all relevant times. As to the first incident the boy testified as to what the defendant had done and the attendant circumstances.5
The second incident occurred at the defendant's residence when the boy spent the night with the defendant because the defendant was babysitting for the boy's mother. Again, the boy's testimony was specific about what [67]*67had occurred.6 There was additional corroborative evidence which placed the child with the defendant that night from the boy's mother.7
[68]*68The third incident occurred while the defendant was at the boy's home. The boy's testimony is that the defendant rubbed the outside of the zipper area on his jeans.8
The defendant's testimony contained a general denial that he had ever touched the boy in the fashion described through the boy's testimony. The defendant also had the [69]*69elderly woman testify that she had never seen the defendant and the boy alone.
The defendant was charged under the former indecent liberties statute.9 Indecent liberties occurs when:
(1) A person . . . knowingly causes another person who is not his spouse to have sexual contact with him or another:
(b) When the other person is less than fourteen years of age
(2) For the purposes of this section, "sexual contact" means any touching of the sexual or other intimate parts of a person done for the purpose of gratifying sexual desire of either party.
Former RCW 9A.44.100. The sexual contact has not been limited to direct contact with the breasts or genital organs. Indecent sexual contact may take place through clothing. In re Adams, 24 Wn. App. 517, 519, 601 P.2d 995 (1979) (citing People v. Thomas, 91 Misc. 2d 724, 398 N.Y.S.2d 821 (1977); State v. Buller, 31 Or. App. 889, 571 P.2d 1263 (1977)). Therefore, not only did the second incident constitute indecent liberties, but the first and third incidents did as well. The question before the jury was whether the defendant knowingly committed acts which resulted in sexual contact with a person younger than 14 years of age. Nothing more was required. In re Shope, 23 Wn. App. 567, 568, 596 P.2d 1361 (1979).
The evidence related to the defendant's commission of the same acts, repeatedly, with the boy victim. Rule of Evidence 404(b) provides:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
The admissibility of the evidence must meet the standard in ER 403 which provides " [although relevant, [70]*70evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice . .
State v. Thorne, 43 Wn.2d 47, 60, 260 P.2d 331 (1953) held that it is proper for "[s]uch evidence [to be] admitted for the purpose of showing the lustful inclination of the defendant toward the offended female, which in turn makes it more probable that the defendant committed the offense charged." In numerous other cases this court has "invoked an exception in similar cases to permit evidence of collateral sexual misconduct when it shows a lustful disposition directed toward the offended [victim]." State v. Ferguson, 100 Wn.2d 131, 133-34, 667 P.2d 68 (1983); State v. Golladay, 78 Wn.2d 121, 470 P.2d 191 (1970), overruled on other grounds in State v. Arndt, 87 Wn.2d 374, 553 P.2d 1328 (1976); State v. Leohner, 69 Wn.2d 131, 417 P.2d 368 (1966); State v. Fischer, 57 Wn.2d 262, 356 P.2d 983 (1960); State v. Thorne, 43 Wn.2d 47, 260 P.2d 331 (1953).
The incidents testified to by the boy occurred between June 4, 1981, and July 10, 1982. The defendant was charged with one count of indecent liberties based on the three events testified to by the boy. Under the Rules of Evidence, the testimony was properly before the jury. The balancing of the relevancy and probity of the evidence against its harmful or prejudicial effects prior to its admission or exclusion is within the trial court's discretion. State v. Ferguson, supra at 135.
The uncontroverted evidence upon which the jury could reach its verdict reveals no factual difference between the incidents. As observed by the Court of Appeals:
Here, besides Camarillo's bare denial of the allegations, there is no direct, contravening evidence concerning the occurrence of the alleged incidents. The jury, in order to render the verdict it did, must have chosen to believe S. Because proof of the substantially similar incidents relied upon a single witness' detailed, uncontroverted testimony, and because Camarillo offered no evidence upon which the jury could discriminate between the incidents, a rational juror believing one of the incidents actually occurred would necessarily believe that the others occurred as well.
[71]*71State v. Camarillo, 54 Wn. App. 821, 828, 776 P.2d 176 (1989). The defendant has argued that the approach taken by the Court of Appeals conflicts with his right to remain silent and places upon him the burden to disprove his guilt. We disagree. We concur that the jury may consider the totality of the evidence of several incidents to ascertain whether there is proof beyond a reasonable doubt to substantiate guilt because of the acts constituting one incident and also to believe that if one happened, then all must have happened. The defendant testified on his own behalf and the elderly woman testified that she had never seen the defendant alone with the victim. The jury was free to believe the victim, disbelieve the defendant and give no weight whatsoever to the seemingly irrelevant testimony of the woman. Credibility determinations are for the trier of fact and cannot be reviewed on appeal. State v. Casbeer, 48 Wn. App. 539, 542, 740 P.2d 335, review denied, 109 Wn.2d 1008 (1987).
Our task is to determine whether a rational trier of fact could have a reasonable doubt as to whether any of the incidents did not establish the crime. In other words, whether the evidence of each incident established the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
In the case at bar, the child testified with specificity about the details of the defendant's actions. He recalled what the defendant did to him and the circumstances which led up to the defendant molesting him. There was no conflicting testimony which would have placed any reasonable doubt in the mind of a juror that the events did not happen as described by the boy.
In State v. Allen, 57 Wn. App. 134, 788 P.2d 1084 (1990), a multiple acts case, Allen was convicted of indecent liberties based on the testimony of the child victim. The same issue was present in Allen as is present in this case, to wit: failure of the State to elect which act it was relying upon and failure to instruct on jury unanimity. In Allen, as here, when the defendant testified he stated only a general denial that any improper physical contact occurred. This case and [72]*72the Allen case are distinguishable from State v. Kitchen, 110 Wn.2d 403, 756 P.2d 105 (1988), because the defendants in Kitchen introduced evidence controverting the different incidents of the alleged improper contact and the victims had made contradictory statements. In both this case and the Allen case, however, nothing save the defendant’s own testimony controverted or impeached the testimony of the victim. In Allen it was stated that:
In view of Dixson's[10] general denial of any improper physical contact and C.P.'s testimony that substantially the same contact occurred during each visit, we find no rational basis for jurors to distinguish among the acts charged in count 1. The jurors had either to believe Dixson and acquit or believe C.P. and convict.
Allen, 57 Wn. App. at 139. The same is true in the case before us.
There was no uncertainty on the part of the boy regarding the type of sexual contact; there was no conflicting testimony about what had occurred on the three occasions testified to by the boy; the boy's testimony was unimpeached; and there was no attendant confusion as to dates and places on the part of the victim. The error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
The conviction is affirmed.
Dolliver, Dore, Andersen, Durham, Smith, and Guy, JJ., concur.