State v. Loehner

Court of Appeals of Washington

State v. Loehner

711 P.2d 377, 42 Wash. App. 408, 1985 Wash. App. LEXIS 3074

CourtCourt of Appeals of Washington

DecidedDecember 23, 1985

Docket15218-1-I

StatusPublished

Cited by26 cases

This text of 711 P.2d 377 (State v. Loehner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Washington primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

State v. Loehner, 711 P.2d 377, 42 Wash. App. 408, 1985 Wash. App. LEXIS 3074 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985).

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Opinions

Williams, J.

—Alfred Loehner was charged by information with one count of second degree statutory rape, which was alleged to have been committed between June 1, 1982, and February 1, 1984. Two trials were held. The first jury deadlocked and a mistrial was declared. The second jury returned a guilty verdict. The trial court denied Loehner's [409]*409motion for a new trial and judgment and sentence were entered on July 20, 1984. He appeals.

At trial, the complaining witness, K. B., then age 13, testified that Loehner sexually abused her on five or six different occasions over a 21-month period. She also testified about two incidents involving Loehner with other children. In one K. B. and her friend saw Loehner smelling their dirty laundry. In the other K. B. saw Loehner sexually abuse the 1-year-old baby of a family friend.

The first issue is whether the trial court erred by not requiring the State to elect the incident upon which it was relying to convict or to require that the jury be unanimous as to the incident on which they found Loehner guilty. The rule is that:

When the evidence indicates that several distinct criminal acts have been committed, but defendant is charged with only one count of criminal conduct, jury unanimity must be protected. . . . The State may, in its discretion, elect the act upon which it will rely for conviction. Alternatively, if the jury is instructed that all 12 jurors must agree that the same underlying criminal act has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, a unanimous verdict on one criminal act will be assured. When the State chooses not to elect, this jury instruction must be given to ensure the jury's understanding of the unanimity requirement.

State v. Petrich, 101 Wn.2d 566, 572, 683 P.2d 173 (1984); State v. Workman, 66 Wash. 292, 119 P. 751 (1911). Loeh-ner was charged with a single count of second degree statutory rape, but the testimony at trial described several instances of the crime. The trial court erred because it did not require the State to elect which incident it was relying on, and it did not instruct the jury that it had to be unanimous as to which incident was the basis for liability. Such error is harmless only if a rational trier of fact could have found each incident proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Petrich, at 573; State v. Gitchel, 41 Wn. App. 820, 823, 706 P.2d 1091 (1985). In this case the error was harmless because the victim described the first episode in detail, the [410]*410subsequent instances of rape being reported without objection as "he did the same thing" and "same stuff." Therefore, if the jury believed the evidence of the first rape, no rational trier of fact could have entertained a reasonable doubt as to the later ones because those were dependent upon the description of the first one. If the rational trier of fact entertained a reasonable doubt as to the episode described in detail, of necessity the rational trier of fact would have a reasonable doubt as to the subsequent ones, also.

The second issue is whether the trial court erred in admitting testimony by the victim concerning Loehner's alleged sexual abuse of other children. First, Loehner objects to the admission of evidence of the "laundry sniffing" incident. Although defense counsel brought a motion in limine to exclude this testimony, he did not give reasons in support. An objection which does not specify the particular ground upon which it is based is insufficient to preserve the question for appellate review. State v. Guloy, 104 Wn.2d 412, 422, 705 P.2d 1182 (1985). Second, Loehner argues that the trial court erred in admitting evidence concerning his alleged abuse of the 1-year-old baby. This argument was also not properly preserved for appeal. The evidence was not specified in the motion in limine, it was not objected to at trial, there was no motion to strike, and a curative instruction was not requested. See State v. Gallo, 20 Wn. App. 717, 728, 582 P.2d 558 (1978).

The judgment is affirmed.

Webster, J., concurs.

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Williams, J.

—Alfred Loehner was charged by information with one count of second degree statutory rape, which was alleged to have been committed between June 1, 1982, and February 1, 1984. Two trials were held. The first jury deadlocked and a mistrial was declared. The second jury returned a guilty verdict. The trial court denied Loehner's [409]*409motion for a new trial and judgment and sentence were entered on July 20, 1984. He appeals.

At trial, the complaining witness, K. B., then age 13, testified that Loehner sexually abused her on five or six different occasions over a 21-month period. She also testified about two incidents involving Loehner with other children. In one K. B. and her friend saw Loehner smelling their dirty laundry. In the other K. B. saw Loehner sexually abuse the 1-year-old baby of a family friend.

The first issue is whether the trial court erred by not requiring the State to elect the incident upon which it was relying to convict or to require that the jury be unanimous as to the incident on which they found Loehner guilty. The rule is that:

When the evidence indicates that several distinct criminal acts have been committed, but defendant is charged with only one count of criminal conduct, jury unanimity must be protected. . . . The State may, in its discretion, elect the act upon which it will rely for conviction. Alternatively, if the jury is instructed that all 12 jurors must agree that the same underlying criminal act has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, a unanimous verdict on one criminal act will be assured. When the State chooses not to elect, this jury instruction must be given to ensure the jury's understanding of the unanimity requirement.

State v. Petrich, 101 Wn.2d 566, 572, 683 P.2d 173 (1984); State v. Workman, 66 Wash. 292, 119 P. 751 (1911). Loeh-ner was charged with a single count of second degree statutory rape, but the testimony at trial described several instances of the crime. The trial court erred because it did not require the State to elect which incident it was relying on, and it did not instruct the jury that it had to be unanimous as to which incident was the basis for liability. Such error is harmless only if a rational trier of fact could have found each incident proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Petrich, at 573; State v. Gitchel, 41 Wn. App. 820, 823, 706 P.2d 1091 (1985). In this case the error was harmless because the victim described the first episode in detail, the [410]*410subsequent instances of rape being reported without objection as "he did the same thing" and "same stuff." Therefore, if the jury believed the evidence of the first rape, no rational trier of fact could have entertained a reasonable doubt as to the later ones because those were dependent upon the description of the first one. If the rational trier of fact entertained a reasonable doubt as to the episode described in detail, of necessity the rational trier of fact would have a reasonable doubt as to the subsequent ones, also.

The second issue is whether the trial court erred in admitting testimony by the victim concerning Loehner's alleged sexual abuse of other children. First, Loehner objects to the admission of evidence of the "laundry sniffing" incident. Although defense counsel brought a motion in limine to exclude this testimony, he did not give reasons in support. An objection which does not specify the particular ground upon which it is based is insufficient to preserve the question for appellate review. State v. Guloy, 104 Wn.2d 412, 422, 705 P.2d 1182 (1985). Second, Loehner argues that the trial court erred in admitting evidence concerning his alleged abuse of the 1-year-old baby. This argument was also not properly preserved for appeal. The evidence was not specified in the motion in limine, it was not objected to at trial, there was no motion to strike, and a curative instruction was not requested. See State v. Gallo, 20 Wn. App. 717, 728, 582 P.2d 558 (1978).

The judgment is affirmed.

Webster, J., concurs.

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711 P.2d 377, 42 Wash. App. 408, 1985 Wash. App. LEXIS 3074, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-loehner-washctapp-1985.

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