State v. Brillon

2010 VT 25, 995 A.2d 557, 187 Vt. 444, 2010 Vt. LEXIS 26

• Court: Supreme Court of Vermont
• Decided: March 19, 2010
• Docket: 2005-167
• Status: Published

Opinions

Skoglund, J.

¶ 1. This appeal is before us a second time following the United States Supreme Court’s reversal of our prior decision, wherein we concluded that defendant had been deprived of his right to a speedy trial in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. See Vermont v. Brillon, 556 U.S._, 129 S. Ct. 1283 (2009) (remanding case after rejecting this Court’s analysis of speedy-trial balancing test under the Federal Constitution). On remand, defendant urges us to consider the speedy trial issue under the Vermont Constitution. Defendant also reasserts the additional claims of error raised in his original appeal, including that the trial court erred in: (1) refusing to bifurcate the aggravating element based on violation of a condition-of-release order from the underlying offense of domestic assault, (2) declining to accept defendant’s stipulation to the existence and purpose of the order; (3) permitting the prosecutor to question defendant about whether he had committed perjury in a different case; and (4) denying defendant’s request to withdraw his waiver of a jury trial to the habitual offender charge. We do not reach the speedy trial issue under the Vermont Constitution because we conclude that defendant failed to adequately raise this ground in his original appeal. As to the additional claims of error, we conclude that the trial court erred in denying defendant’s request to bifurcate the aggravation element of the domestic assault charge. Thus, we reverse and remand for a new trial.

¶ 2. We briefly recount the facts, which are set forth in detail in our original decision, State v. Brillon, 2008 VT 35, 183 Vt. 475, 955 A.2d 1108 [hereinafter Brillon I]. The charges involve defendant’s girlfriend of several years with whom he had a child. In July 2001, after the two were no longer together, defendant was charged with felony domestic assault after allegedly striking his former girlfriend in an altercation. Because the assaultive behavior would also violate a court order previously imposed to protect the alleged victim, what would ordinarily constitute a misdemeanor domestic assault was elevated to a felony domestic assault. 13 V.S.A. § 1044(a)(1) (enhancing domestic assault to second-degree aggravated domestic assault if the person commits domestic assault that causes bodily injury to another person and, in doing so, “violates specific conditions of a criminal court order in effect at the time of the offense imposed to protect that other person”).¹ The criminal court order in effect at the time of the charged offense was a condition-of-release order imposed following an incident wherein defendant was charged with unlawful mischief for allegedly slashing the tires on his girlfriend’s car in June 2000. The condition-of-release order required that defendant not “harass” his girlfriend or cause her “to be harassed.” About three weeks after the imposition of the conditions of release, defendant’s now ex-girlfriend drove defendant to the local police station for a required check-in before they were to return to her home so that defendant could visit his daughter. The ex-girlfriend left after dropping off defendant because she apparently believed that he was going to be detained. Defendant was not detained by police, and eventually got a ride with his ex-girlfriend’s sister to his ex-girlfriend’s house. Defendant was angry about being left behind, and an argument ensued. At some point, his ex-girlfriend started to leave her home with their daughter, and defendant allegedly struck his ex-girlfriend in the face. The police were called, and defendant was arrested, charged with felony second-degree aggravated domestic assault and contempt of court based on a violation of a condition of release, 13 V.S.A. § 7559(e). The aggravated domestic assault felony was also charged as a predicate for habitual offender treatment, authorizing life imprisonment. See 13 V.S.A. § 11.

¶ 3. Following his arrest in July 2001, defendant was held on a no-bail order until his case was finally tried in June 2004. During the almost three years between his arrest and his trial, defendant was represented by assigned counsel through the Defender General’s office and had six attorneys. Following defendant’s eventual trial, the jury returned a guilty verdict on the domestic assault and contempt charges, and defendant was sentenced to twelve-to-twenty years in prison. Defendant appealed his conviction, asserting several claims of error, including that he was denied his right to a speedy trial. U.S. Const, amend. VI. This Court examined the delay under the balancing test articulated in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972), and concluded that all factors were in defendant’s favor. We held that the length of delay was extreme, and that almost two years of the delay was attributable to the state. Britton I, 2008 VT 35, ¶¶ 17, 32. We attributed this time period to the state judicial system as a whole, not the prosecution, because during that time defendant was either without counsel or his counsel did very little to move defendant’s case forward, and we held that “ultimately it is the court’s responsibility to assure that [the criminal justice system] prosecutes defendants in a timely manner.” Id. ¶ 35. We concluded that defendant had aggressively demanded to be tried and his lengthy pretrial incarceration resulted in prejudice. Id. ¶¶ 39, 49. Thus, we held that defendant was deprived of his right to a speedy trial and entitled to dismissal of the charges against him. Id. ¶ 50.

¶ 4. On petition from the state’s attorney, the Supreme Court of the United States accepted certiorari on the question of whether delays caused by a public defender could be charged against the state. The Supreme Court held that this Court “erred in ranking assigned counsel essentially as state actors in the criminal justice system,” Vermont v. Brillon, 556 U.S. at_, 129 S. Ct. at 1287, and in mistakenly counting against the state periods of time when defendant’s public defender failed to move defendant’s case forward, id. at _, 129 S. Ct. at 1291-92. The Court further held that defendant’s “deliberate attempt to disrupt proceedings” by forcing the withdrawal of his first and third attorneys should be weighed heavily against defendant. Id. at_, 129 S. Ct. at 1292. Thus, the Court concluded that the record did not demonstrate that defendant was denied “his constitutional right to a speedy trial.” Id. at_, 129 S. Ct. at 1293. The case was remanded back to this Court.

I.

¶ 5. First, we address defendant’s argument that we should again examine his claim that his right to a speedy trial was violated, but this time under the protections of the Vermont Constitution. See Vt. Const, ch. I, art. 10 (affirming that persons have a right in criminal prosecutions to “a speedy public trial by an impartial jury”). Defendant claims that our original analysis was correct and that the holding of Britton I should be reinstated on state constitutional grounds. In deciding whether to engage in this analysis, we are mindful that we are “the final judicial interpreters of the Vermont Constitution,” and we encourage litigants to address claims under our state charter. Chittenden Town Sch. Dist. v. Dep’t of Educ., 169 Vt. 310, 319, 738 A.2d 539, 546 (1999). Nonetheless, we will not address state constitutional claims where they are insufficiently raised and inadequately briefed. On remand from the U.S. Supreme Court, we requested briefing from the parties on, among other things, “whether this Court should find a speedy-trial violation under the Vermont Constitution, given the current state of the record.” Despite our direction, the parties’ briefs were unresponsive to the issue of preservation. Having reviewed the record, we conclude that the state constitutional claim was not adequately raised or briefed, and therefore decline to analyze defendant’s speedy-trial argument under the Vermont Constitution.

¶ 6. Advocates have a “duty to diligently develop and plausibly maintain” state constitutional issues. State v. Gleason, 154 Vt. 205, 212, 576 A.2d 1246, 1250 (1990). Merely citing the Vermont Constitution, without providing any analysis of how the state constitutional provision compares with its federal analog, does not adequately present the issue for our review, especially where the argument was not presented in the trial court. See State v. Maguire, 146 Vt. 49, 54, 498 A.2d 1028, 1031 (1985) (declining to address state constitutional argument where it was insufficiently raised and inadequately briefed). Although defendant cited the Vermont Constitution in his pleadings to the trial court and his original brief on appeal, he did not provide any “substantive analysis of the Vermont Constitution, nor d[id] he set forth any rationale as to how our analysis of this constitutional claim should differ under the Vermont Constitution in comparison with the federal constitution.” State v. Raymond, 148 Vt. 617, 619 n.1, 538 A.2d 164, 165 n.1 (1987); see State v. Chapman, 643 A.2d 1213, 1219 (Conn. 1994) (concluding that the defendant’s state constitutional claim was not adequately raised where the defendant’s brief included no “reference to the language or history of [the relevant constitutional provision], no reference to prior constitutional decisions of this or other states, and no reference to policy considerations”).

¶ 7. Likely for this reason, the trial court did not address defendant’s state constitutional claim. Having failed to raise the issue adequately in the trial court and in his original appeal, we conclude that defendant has waived consideration of this issue on remand. Compare State v. Tripp, 2004 VT 26, ¶ 2, 176 Vt. 604, 848 A.2d 343 (mem.) (holding that the defendant whose federal constitutional claims were rejected in an interlocutory appeal from a motion to suppress “waived his Article 11 claim [in direct appeal] by not presenting it adequately in his original motion to suppress or in his brief in the interlocutory appeal”), and State v. Montoya, 861 P.2d 978, 982 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993) (concluding that the defendant failed to preserve argument that state constitution provided adequate and independent ground for reversal where the defendant “failed to discuss or argue that any different protection is offered” by the state constitution), with First Covenant Church of Seattle v. City of Seattle, 840 P.2d 174, 186 (Wash. 1992) (addressing state constitutional claim on remand where initial briefing sufficiently raised state constitution as an adequate and independent ground). Thus, we turn to defendant’s additional claims of error.

II.

¶ 8. Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his request to bifurcate the aggravated portion of his domestic assault charge. Some additional facts are necessary to understand the context of this argument. Defendant was charged with aggravated domestic assault, which requires factors from two separate statutory provisions.' Misdemeanor domestic assault is defined in 13 V.S.A. § 1042 as actions causing “bodily injury to a family or household member,” and carries a penalty of not more than eighteen months in prison or a fine of not more than $5000. Domestic assault may be enhanced to second degree aggravated domestic assault, a felony, if, among other things, the person committing the assault also violates “specific conditions of a criminal court order in effect at the time of the offense imposed to protect [the victim of the assault].” 13 V.S.A. § 1044(a)(1).² As noted, defendant was under a condition-of-release order to not harass his former girlfriend when the charged incident occurred.

¶ 9. In May 2004, defendant filed a motion to bifurcate the substantive domestic assault offense from the aggravated enhancement for violating the condition-of-release order and to sever the contempt charge based on violation of the conditions of release.³ Defendant argued that if the enhancement was not bifurcated and the contempt not severed there was great potential for unfair prejudice because the jury would hear about the no-harassment condition, as well as the unlawful mischief charge stemming from his then-girlfriend’s allegation that defendant had slashed her tires. Defendant proffered that the jury could infer from this information that defendant had previously harmed his ex-girlfriend and was therefore likely to do so again. See V.R.E. 404(b) (evidence of past wrongs may not be introduced to demonstrate defendant’s character and propensity to commit crime). Defendant claimed that the risk of prejudice was particularly great in his case because, although the unlawful mischief charge had not yet been proven, the judicial condition-of-release order made it appear that defendant was guilty of the conduct. Defendant additionally argued that the condition-of-release order was not relevant to the underlying charge and therefore its existence had no probative value. For all these reasons defendant argued that the proceeding should be bifurcated so that the existence and content of the condition-of-release order could be excluded from the initial phase of the trial.

¶ 10. The State opposed defendant’s request. The State argued that bifurcation was reserved for enhanced penalties depending on proof of prior convictions, conceding that if the aggravating element was a prior conviction for domestic assault, then bifurcation would be warranted. See 13 V.S.A. § 1043(a)(3) (enhancement based on prior conviction). The State further argued that the existence of the court order of protection was an element of the charge, not an enhancement, and therefore there were no grounds to bifurcate it.

¶ 11. In an oral ruling, the court denied defendant’s request. The court concluded that existence of the condition-of-release order was an element of the offense and that there was no legal basis to bifurcate an element which did not involve a prior conviction.⁴ The court further likened the situation to those “where prior other conduct, bad or otherwise, is permitted in the trial for certain purposes under Rule 404,” but then never explained how that rule applied.

¶ 12. On appeal, defendant reasserts the arguments made in the trial court, arguing that the aggravation element should be bifurcated because the substantial risk of prejudice outweighs any probative value. We agree. Bifurcation is appropriate when the prejudice from introducing the bifurcated factor outweighs any relevance or factual connection the factor holds to the rest of the charge. Given the limited probative value of the condition-of-release order to the elements of the domestic assault charge and the substantial risk of prejudice from introducing it, we conclude that it should have been bifurcated in this case. The trial court erred in not applying this balancing test and in denying defendant’s request. To more fully explain our decision we begin by discussing the history of bifurcation and then explain in more detail when it is required.

¶ 13. The issue of bifurcating penalty enhancements from the liability portion of an offense was first addressed in State v. Cameron, 126 Vt. 244, 227 A.2d 276 (1967). In that case, the defendant was charged with driving with license suspended (DLS), and the State sought an enhanced sentence based on the defendant’s prior DLS convictions. However, the State failed to notify the defendant of its intent to seek enhancement in the criminal information. This Court held that if the State intends to seek greater punishment based on a prior conviction then the State must charge the principal offense and the prior conviction in two parts in the complaint. Id. at 249-50, 227 A.2d at 279. In addressing the proper procedure for trying the case, this Court endorsed the following two-step process. First, the State should prove the facts of the principal offense, and second, in a separate proceeding, it should “determine the liability of an accused to punishment as a subsequent offender.” Id. at 249, 227 A.2d at 280. We explained that this process appropriately balances the probative versus prejudicial effect of the evidence in that prior convictions are not relevant to the defendant’s liability to the substantive offense, but are highly prejudicial to a defendant. “To project the issue of the accused’s former conviction(s) into the trial for a subsequent offense, before verdict, practically deprives the respondent of the legal presumption of innocence, [and] inevitably prejudices the jury against him ...” Id. at 250, 227 A.2d at 280; see also State v. Ferrone, 113 A. 452, 457 (Conn. 1921) (“It cannot be believed that an accused man would ever have a fair trial, resulting in a verdict not affected by prejudice or by considerations by which the jury should not be influenced, if during that trial allegations that he has twice before been convicted . . . has been placed before them.”).

¶ 14. Since Cameron, we have endorsed the use of bifurcated proceedings in trials involving increased penalties for subsequent DUIs and based on habitual offender status. See State v. Baril, 155 Vt. 344, 348, 583 A.2d 621, 624 (1990) (affirming use of Cameron bifurcated proceeding in second-offense DUI); State v. Angelucci, 137 Vt. 272, 281, 405 A.2d 33, 37 (1979) (noting use of bifurcated trial to determine habitual offender enhancement). The main reasons given in these cases for bifurcation are the enhancement’s lack of relevance to the underlying charge and the great amount of prejudice this type of evidence can cause to a defendant.⁵ As we stated in Baril, it is necessary “to protect an accused from the prejudice that would likely result from the introduction of the accused’s former conviction into the trial for the substantive offense.” 155 Vt. at 348, 583 A.2d at 624. Thus, the general rule is that, in deciding whether to bifurcate, the trial court should balance the probative value of the facts giving rise to the enhancement against the danger of prejudice from the same.

¶ 15. With this background in mind, we turn to defendant’s request in this case. The aggravating circumstance defendant sought to bifurcate was whether the conduct charged violated “specific conditions of a criminal court order in effect at the time of the offense imposed to protect [the victim of the assault].” 13 V.S.A. § 1044(a)(1). The facts supporting the no-harassment court-ordered condition, issued a year before the charged offense, held little probative value or factual connection to the incident that formed the basis of the domestic assault charge presented to the jury. The claims that generated the condition-of-release order were quite separate in time (one year) and nature from those related to the domestic assault charge. The order arose from an unlawful mischief charge, based on the then-girlfriend’s allegation that defendant had slashed her tires — a charge that had not been resolved at the time of defendant’s trial for domestic assault. As with prior convictions, this condition-of-release order did “not become material until after the conviction of the accused on the substantive offense on trial [was] established.” Cameron, 126 Vt. at 249, 227 A.2d at 280. There is no bright-line rule, however. A court order of protection may be highly probative in an aggravated domestic assault case, but in the situation presented, had an evaluation occurred, the probative value, if any, would have been minimal indeed.

¶ 16. Balanced against any tenuous relevance to the underlying charge is the possible prejudicial impact of introducing the condition-of-release order. Evidence is unfairly prejudicial to defendant when the primary purpose of the evidence is “to appeal to a jury’s sympathies, arouse its sense of horror, provoke its instinct to punish, or trigger other mainsprings of human action that may cause a jury to base its decision on something other than the established propositions in the case.” State v. Bruyette, 158 Vt. 21, 31, 604 A.2d 1270, 1274 (1992) (quotation and alterations omitted). And, it is highly prejudicial to a defendant to introduce prior bad acts to suggest propensity for criminal acts. See State v. Moran, 141 Vt. 10, 19, 444 A.2d 879, 883 (1982).

¶ 17. Though no prior bad act had ever been established, in citing Rule 404(b), the trial court seems to have considered the tire-slashing incident to be one. Our cases and our rules recognize that so-called prior bad act evidence may be allowed “ ‘for any purpose other than proving the defendant’s bad character.’ ” State v. Lipka, 174 Vt. 377, 391, 817 A.2d 27, 38 (2002) (quoting State v. Forbes, 161 Vt. 327, 332, 640 A.2d 13, 16 (1993)); see V.R.E. 404(b) (explaining that evidence of past wrongs is “not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith”). It is the State’s burden to show precisely how the proffered evidence is relevant to the theory advanced, how the issue to which it is addressed is related to the disputed elements in the case and how the probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. Lipka, 174 Vt. at 391, 817 A.2d at 39. Here, the trial court failed to engage in this analysis, though it cited Rule 404 in its decision denying bifurcation.

¶ 18. In this case, admission of the condition-of-release order was highly prejudicial in that it established for the jury that a court had found it necessary to issue a protective order on behalf of the putative victim against defendant. It had the potential to evoke the jury’s sympathy and allow it to base its decision on something other than the established propositions in the case. See Bruyette, 158 Vt. at 31, 604 A.2d at 1274. While few courts have addressed bifurcation in factually similar situations, our holding is the same as that reached by the Superior Court of New Jersey in State v. Lozada, in which the court considered whether the trial court erred in failing to sever charges of stalking and violation of a domestic violence restraining order. 815 A.2d 1002, 1003 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003). The court acknowledged that existence of the restraining order was an element of the charge because it enhanced the crime of stalking from a fourth- to a third-degree offense. Nonetheless, the court concluded that it should be bifurcated because the existence of the restraining order was highly prejudicial to the defendant and “the jury’s knowledge that there has been a restraining order is likely to prejudice defendant’s right to a fair trial of the issue of whether he is guilty of conduct constituting stalking.” Id. at 1004. Thus, the court endorsed the use of a bifurcated trial to remedy the situation and reversed Lozada’s conviction. Id. We similarly conclude that given the danger of unfair prejudice and the limited relevance of the evidence, bifurcation was warranted in this case.

¶ 19. We further conclude that the error was not harmless. Error is harmless if we can say beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have convicted absent the error. Lipka, 174 Vt. at 384, 817 A.2d at 34. ‘When conducting a harmless-error analysis to determine whether the jury would have convicted without the offending evidence, we consider the extent to which the offending evidence was inculpatory, whether it was cumulative or duplicative of other evidence, and how prominent it was at trial.” State v. Mumley, 2009 VT 48, ¶ 20, 186 Vt. 52, 978 A.2d 6. In this case, given the strong prejudicial nature of the condition-of-release order, its multiple references at trial, and the noncumulative nature of the evidence, we conclude that its inclusion was not harmless.

¶ 20. Both the content of the condition-of-release order and the facts supporting unlawful mischief allegation were introduced and mentioned several times during the trial. In opening statements, the State explained that as a result of problems in the relationship between defendant and his ex-girlfriend, defendant was under “conditions of release which indicate[d] that he cannot harass [his ex-girlfriend].” The ex-girlfriend testified that in June 2000 defendant had been angry and upset with her on a certain day and that later that night she had discovered her tires were cut. The ex-girlfriend stated that as a result of this incident defendant had to check in at the police station. In closing, the State mentioned that defendant had been charged with slashing his ex-girlfriend’s tires and “as a result of that incident, the court issued out conditions of release, and one of those conditions was that he not harass [the ex-girlfriend].” The State further stated that “the only legal reason . . . that that court order was in place was to prevent [defendant] from harassing and threatening [his ex-girlfriend].” Therefore, the jury was presented with evidence that defendant had been charged with a crime involving this alleged victim — a charge not yet proven — and that the court deemed defendant was enough of a threat to his ex-girlfriend to issue an order against defendant for her protection. This information could certainly create an inference that defendant had a propensity to engage in harm against this victim, and the substance of the order implied that defendant was a danger to this victim, notwithstanding the fact that the malicious mischief occurred a year prior with no relevant court action since.⁶ Despite the generalized instruction at the end of trial, the court did not instruct the jury on how to view the prior incident between defendant and his ex-girlfriend. See Moran, 141 Vt. at 20, 444 A.2d at 884 (holding that trial court’s “perfunctory cautionary instruction” that did not specifically address improperly admitted statements did not eliminate prejudice to the defendant).

¶ 21. Balanced against this strong indication of prejudice is the strength of the prosecution’s case overall. See Lipka, 174 Vt. at 385, 817 A.2d at 34 (explaining that harmless error hinges on “the strength of the prosecution’s case without the offending evidence and the strength of the offending evidence”). We have cautioned that it is not this Court’s role to determine if defendant is guilty on the facts, but to determine “what the jury might have done without the offending evidence.” Id. Chief Justice Reiber’s dissenting claim that “[t]he evidence of guilt was not close,” post, ¶ 64, is not supported by the record. Defendant did not dispute that there was a scuffle and that as a result his ex-girlfriend was injured. He did dispute, however, that he intentionally punched her in the face. Although other witnesses testified to events that occurred before and after the actual altercation, only defendant and his ex-girlfriend testified as to what occurred at the side of the car. Thus, the case ultimately came down to a credibility determination between defendant and his ex-girlfriend. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the prosecution’s case was so strong that the prejudice caused by introducing the condition-of-release order can be ignored. Thus, the error was not harmless because we are not assured beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have convicted defendant if it had not been presented with the information. See Lipka, 174 Vt. at 384, 817 A.2d at 33-34.

¶ 22. Finally, it is appropriate to respond to the trial court’s rationale for denying defendant’s request so as to provide direction for future cases. While generally the trial court has broad discretion in balancing the prejudicial impact of evidence, it is error if “the court either completely withheld its discretion or exercised it on grounds clearly untenable or unreasonable.” State v. Shippee, 2003 VT 106, ¶ 13, 176 Vt. 542, 839 A.2d 566 (mem.). As noted, in this case the court did not balance the prejudicial and probative impact of the evidence. Instead, the trial court primarily denied defendant’s request because the court held the aggravating factor defendant sought to bifurcate was an element of the offense and not a prior conviction. This approach was too simplistic. As explained above, the purpose of bifurcation is to prevent undue prejudice to a defendant due to introduction of facts not relevant to the basic elements of the crime. The trial court’s reasoning is based on distinctions that have little to do with the court order’s potential prejudice to defendant or its connection to the rest of the charge. This was error.

¶ 23. Even accepting the trial court’s characterization of the protection order as an element of aggravated domestic assault, this choice in labeling does not end the inquiry. The difference between an element of a crime and an enhanced penalty provision is sometimes viewed as merely the result of the legislature’s choice in labeling. See United States v. Michael, 10 F.3d 838, 841 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (considering statutory language, legislative history and character of the factor to determine if factor is a sentence enhancement or an element). We have distinguished enhancements as “part of a statutory structure that, on proof of certain defined facts, enlarges the range of punishments available for certain criminal activity.” State v. Thompson, 150 Vt. 640, 644, 556 A.2d 95, 98 (1989). This distinction previously held significant import to a defendant because sentence enhancement classification meant “shifting the issue from jury to court and denying the defendant the benefit of the reasonable doubt standard.” Michael, 10 F.3d at 842. In Apprendi v. New Jersey, the U.S. Supreme Court held that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). The Court explained that this requirement is not dependent on how the legislature chooses to label the factor, id., explaining that “[a]ny possible distinction between an ‘element’ of a felony offense and a ‘sentencing factor’ was unknown to the practice of criminal indictment, trial by jury, and judgment by court as it existed during the years surrounding our Nation’s founding.” Id. at 478 (footnote omitted). Thus, following Apprendi, the Supreme Court treats “sentencing factors, like elements, as facts that have to be tried to the jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212, 220 (2006). Given the need to prove both elements and enhancements to a jury, there is little reason to deny or grant bifurcation based solely on how the factor a defendant seeks to bifurcate is labeled. The critical reasons for bifurcation — lack of relevance to the crux of the charge and substantial risk of prejudice to the defendant — are not reflected by the labeling of the factor as an element or an enhancement.

¶ 24. In this case, defendant was charged with aggravated domestic assault based on the fact that a criminal court order was in effect at the time of the offense that was imposed to protect the alleged victim of the assault. 13 V.S.A. § 1044(a)(1). That is, the fact of a court order of protection, while an element of the aggravated crime, also elevated the crime of domestic assault to a felony so that the punishment if convicted is accordingly enhanced. Most of our cases involving aggravating factors similar to the one at issue here have concluded that those factors are enhancements, rather than necessary elements of the crime. In State v. Ritter, we described the separate subsections of § 1044(a) — the statutory provisions increasing the penalty for domestic assault if the assault violates an order of protection or if the perpetrator has a prior conviction — as defining different aggravating circumstances of domestic assault, not as each creating a separate offense. 167 Vt. 632, 633, 714 A.2d 624, 626 (1998) (mem.) (“Because defendant’s unitary act occurred under aggravating circumstances, it is punishable as second-degree aggravated domestic assault rather than domestic assault.”).⁷ Similarly, in State v. Dunbar, we construed the felony for violating an abuse-prevention order based on second offense, 13 V.S.A. § 1030(b), as an enhanced penalty provision, and endorsed use of a bifurcated trial to determine the validity of the enhancement. 172 Vt. 557, 557-58, 772 A.2d 533, 534-35 (2001) (mem.); see also State v. Crepeault, 167 Vt. 209, 212, 704 A.2d 778, 781 (1997) (describing aggravated sexual assault charge based on serious bodily injury as an enhancement). Along those same lines, in State v. Galvin, the defendant was charged with assault on a police officer, and we held that the elements of the crime were wholly defined by the simple assault statute, 13 V.S.A. § 1023(a)(1), and that § 1028, setting a higher penalty if the crime was against a law enforcement officer, served “simply as an enhanced penalty provision.” 147 Vt. 215, 217, 514 A.2d 705, 707 (1986).

¶ 25. The State agrees that if defendant had a prior conviction for domestic assault and consequently had been charged with aggravated domestic assault under 13 V.S.A. § 1044(a)(2), then he would have been entitled to a bifurcated trial. There is nothing structurally different, however, between the manner in which the Legislature has written the aggravated domestic assault charge based on a prior conviction, and the aggravated domestic assault charge brought in this case based on violation of a protection order. It is illogical to presumptively allow bifurcation for the former and flatly deny it for the latter.

¶ 26. Furthermore, the labeling of element versus enhancement is not a determinative distinction because the connection of a bifurcated factor to the underlying offense and its prejudicial effect to defendant do not change depending on how the factor is labeled. These points are best illustrated by example. Some aggravating factors are factually intertwined with the underlying offense, including where the aggravation is based on characteristics of the crime itself such as the type of harm caused, the identity of the victim, or the use of a weapon. See, e.g., 13 V.S.A. § 1043(a)(2) (defining first degree aggravated domestic assault to include cases involving use of a deadly weapon); id. § 1063(a)(4)-(5) (including in definition for aggravated stalking circumstances where victim is under sixteen or where actor possesses a deadly weapon); id. § 3253 (defining aggravated sexual assault based on various aggravating factors including causing serious bodily injury, using a deadly weapon, or perpetrating a crime against a victim under thirteen). In those cases, the aggravating factor’s close relationship to the main offense may increase its probative value and weigh against bifurcation. Similarly, some factors may not carry a high risk of prejudice, and this consideration would also weigh against bifurcation. See, e.g., Michael, 10 F.3d at 842 (considering statutory provision increasing penalty for drug possession if the drug is cocaine and noting that character of drug not highly prejudicial to defendant).

¶ 27. This approach also rejects the trial court’s reasoning that bifurcation was not appropriate because the bifurcated element was not a prior conviction. The trial court noted that our past cases involving bifurcation all involved recidivist statutes, and extrapolated that bifurcation is limited to prior convictions. We do not draw the same conclusion. While our previous bifurcation cases have all involved prior convictions, this can be attributed to the fact that most enhancement statutes are based on commission of a prior offense, not because there is something talismanic about a prior conviction. The critical factors are whether the bifurcated enhancement is relevant and factually related to the predicate offense and the level of prejudice involved in introducing it. Introduction of prior bad acts — such as the existence of a condition-of-release order barring defendant from harassing the victim — should result in a similar balancing as introduction of a prior conviction. As we have previously explained, “the potential unfair prejudice to the defendant is great from evidence of a past unpunished crime that is similar to that for which he is charged.” State v. Winter, 162 Vt. 388, 399, 648 A.2d 624, 631 (1994). Indeed, some commentators have suggested that uncharged crimes are even more prejudicial to a defendant than a prior conviction because the jury may be tempted to punish the accused for other crimes. E. Imwinkelried, The Use of Evidence of an Accused’s Uncharged Misconduct to Prove Mens Rea: The Doctrines that Threaten to Engulf the Character Evidence Prohibition, 130 Mil. L. Rev. 41, 48 (1990). In addition, prior acts are just as likely as prior convictions to hold little to no probative value in proving the principal offense.

¶ 28. While it is illogical to categorically reject bifurcation simply because the factor at issue is not a prior conviction, there may also be valid reasons to deny bifurcation even for a prior conviction. For example, several state and federal courts have denied requests to bifurcate the prior-conviction element of a felon-in-possession charge because of the possibility of creating jury confusion. See, e.g., State v. Brown, 853 A.2d 260, 264-66 (N.J. 2004) (citing cases). If a felon-in-possession charge is bifurcated into the possession and the convicted felon status elements, the jurors in the first phase of the trial solely involving possession may question the criminality of the offense because possession for most people is not a crime. Id. at 266. Without a complete crime to present to the jury, bifurcation may result in confusion for jurors and may influence the results of the initial phase of trial. See id. (“Doubt as to the criminality of [the defendant’s] conduct may influence the jury when it considers the possession element.” (quotation omitted) (alteration in original)).

¶ 29. This concern is not present in the current case. Bifurcating the existence of the condition-of-release order would not result in an incomplete crime. The jury would be required to first determine whether defendant committed domestic assault, a complete crime, and then subsequently consider whether a court order protecting the victim existed at the time. For this reason, we are not concerned with the State’s prediction that if we allow bifurcation in this case, it will open the door to requiring bifurcation for all prosecutions for violations of condition-of-release orders and violations of protective orders. In these cases, the existence of the condition is a necessary element of the offense; in other words, there is no crime without a prior order.

¶ 30. In sum, we hold that the best method for determining whether a particular portion of the charge should be bifurcated from the main crime is by balancing the element’s probative value against the risk of undue prejudice to defendant. We conclude that the balance weighs in favor of bifurcation in this case. Because of the required severance, the contempt conviction as well as the domestic assault conviction must be reversed. The contempt conviction was based on the domestic assault, and defendant did not receive a fair trial on that charge because it was tainted by the evidence of the condition-of-release order. If the conviction of the underlying crime must be reversed, then so must the conviction of contempt because the criminal conduct supporting each conviction was identical. Because we reverse and remand for a new trial on the bifurcation issue, we do not reach defendant’s additional claims of error.

Reversed and remanded for a new trial.

1 This statute was amended generally in 2008, and the section under consideration now appears as 13 V.S.A. § 1044(a)(1)(A). We refer throughout this opinion to the section number as it was at the time of the trial.

2 The penalty for violation of this section is imprisonment up to five years and a fine of not more than $10,000.

3 As already noted, the felony aggravated domestic assault charge provided the basis for a habitual offender enhancement, which made defendant eligible for a sentence of life imprisonment. Defendant also requested that the habitual offender charge be bifurcated. The State agreed, and the court granted this request.

4 Defendant renewed his objection in a post-trial motion for a new trial. The court also denied this request.

5 This is analogous to the balancing test in Rule of Evidence 408, which provides that evidence, although relevant, may be excluded if its probative value is “substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.”

6 In dissent, Chief Justice Reiber posits that the prosecutor’s statement in his closing cured any risk the jury would improperly consider the condition-of-release order as evidence that defendant had a history of abuse against his ex-girlfriend and had a propensity to engage in this behavior. In effect, the dissent implies that the prosecutor’s statement is equivalent to a curative statement from the court. This is simply not the case.

7 No issue of bifurcation was raised in Bitter.