McCLENDON, J.
*41The State of Louisiana appeals a judgment that sustained peremptory exceptions raising the objections of no cause of action and no right of action in favor of a drug manufacturer, dismissing the State's claims against the manufacturer with prejudice. For the reasons that follow, we reverse.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The State of Louisiana, by and through its Attorney General, filed the instant suit against AstraZeneca AB, AstraZeneca LP, AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals LP, and Aktiebolaget Hassle (collectively "AstraZeneca") on March 18, 2015. The State alleges that AstraZeneca intentionally delayed approval of a generic equivalent to their brand pharmaceutical product Toprol-XL® in an effort to limit competition from generic pharmaceutical manufacturers and in violation of state law.1 As a result of a generic being delayed, the State alleges that it, through the Louisiana Medicaid program, paid more in reimbursement for Toprol-XL than it otherwise would have paid for the generic equivalent. The State also claims that it lost substantial amounts in reimbursements paid outside of the Medicaid program. In its lawsuit, the State asserts that its claims arise from antitrust violations under the Louisiana Monopolies Act ("Monopolies Act"), LSA-R.S. 51:121, et seq. , and from violations of the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Act ("LUTPA"), LSA-R.S. 51:1401, et seq. Alternatively, the State asserts that it has a claim for unjust enrichment. It seeks restitution, treble damages, attorney fees, and costs.
In response, AstraZeneca filed multiple exceptions, including the ones at issue herein-the peremptory exceptions raising the objections of no right of action and no cause of action. Following argument on AstraZeneca's exceptions, the trial court found that all claims were vested with the Department of Health and Hospitals (now Louisiana Department of Health or "LDH") rather than the State. No evidence was introduced at the hearing. Because the trial court found that all claims were vested with LDH, it sustained the exceptions of no right of action and no cause of action and dismissed the State's claims with prejudice.
The State has appealed, assigning the following as error:
1. The trial court erred in sustaining Defendants' Exceptions of No Right of Action and No Cause of Action in this suit, based upon its finding that the State of Louisiana is not the proper party in interest to bring the suit and/or that the Louisiana Department of Health has the sole right to assert these claims.
2. The Trial Court erred in sustaining Defendants' Exceptions of No Right of Action and No Cause of Action in this suit, based upon its finding that the State of Louisiana's role as an indirect purchaser of Toprol-XL bars the State from pursuing antitrust claims and LUTPA claims.
*423. The Trial Court erred in sustaining Defendants' Exceptions of No Right of Action and No Cause of Action in this suit by dismissing the State's claims that are not derived from Medicaid expenditures.
4. The Trial Court erred in sustaining Defendants' Exceptions of No Right of Action and No Cause of Action in this suit by dismissing the State's unjust enrichment claim.
DISCUSSION
At issue in this case are the exceptions of no right of action and no cause of action. Although these two exceptions are often confused, the peremptory exceptions of no right of action and no cause of action are separate and distinct. LSA-C.C.P. art. 927(A)(5) and (6) ; Badeaux v. Southwest Computer Bureau, Inc., 05-0612 (La. 3/17/06), 929 So.2d 1211, 1216. The Louisiana Supreme Court has recognized that one of the primary differences between the exception of no right of action and no cause of action lies in the fact that the focus in an exception of no right of action is on whether the particular plaintiff has a right to bring the suit, while the focus in an exception of no cause of action is on whether the law provides a remedy against the particular defendant. Badeaux, 929 So.2d at 1216-17.
An exception of no cause of action questions whether the law extends a remedy against the defendant to anyone under the factual allegations of the petition and is triable on the face of the petition. Badeaux, 929 So.2d at 1217. To determine the issues raised by the exception of no cause of action, each well-pleaded fact in the petition must be accepted as true. Id. In reviewing a district court's ruling sustaining an exception of no cause of action, appellate courts conduct a de novo review because the exception raises a question of law, and the district court's decision is based only on the sufficiency of the petition. Id. An exception of no cause of action should be granted only when it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of any claim that would entitle him to relief. Id. Every reasonable interpretation must be accorded the language used in the petition in favor of maintaining its sufficiency and affording the plaintiff the opportunity of presenting evidence at trial. Id. If the petition states a cause of action on any ground or portion of the demand, the exception should generally be overruled. Id.
Further, the Louisiana Supreme Court has held that the exception of no cause of action should not be maintained in part, so as to prevent a multiplicity of appeals thereby forcing an appellate court to consider the merits of the action in a piecemeal fashion. Everything on Wheels Subaru, Inc. v. Subaru South, Inc., 616 So.2d 1234, 1236 (La. 1993). If there are two or more items of damages or theories of recovery that arise out of the operative facts of a single transaction or occurrence, a partial judgment on an exception of no cause of action should not be rendered to dismiss an item of damages or theory of recovery. Id. at 1239.
As to the exception of no right of action, the function of the exception is a determination of whether plaintiff belongs to the class of persons to whom the law grants the cause of action asserted in the petition. LSA-C.C.P. art. 927(A)(6) ; Badeaux, 929 So.2d at 1217. In examining an exception of no right of action, a court should focus on whether the particular plaintiff has a right to bring the suit, but assume that the petition states a valid cause of action for some person. Turner v. Busby, 03-3444 (La. 9/9/04), 883 So.2d 412, 415. Evidence supporting or controverting *43an exception of no right of action is admissible; however, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the averments of fact in the pleadings will be taken as true. See Eagle Pipe and Supply, Inc. v. Amerada Hess Corporation, 10-2267, 10-2272, 10-2275, 10-2279, 10-2289 (La. 10/25/11), 79 So.3d 246, 252-53 & 255. Determination of whether a plaintiff has a right of action is a question of law. 1900 Highway 190, L.L.C. v. City of Slidell, 15-1755 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/3/16), 196 So.3d 693, 698 (citing Horrell v. Horrell, 99-1093 (La.App. 1 Cir. 10/6/00), 808 So.2d 363, 368, writ denied, 01-2546 (La. 12/7/01), 803 So.2d 971 ).
Additionally, courts have treated a partial exception of no right of action no differently than a partial exception of no cause of action. This court has previously held that the Code of Civil Procedure does not provide for a partial peremptory exception raising the objection of no right of action, and, thus, if a plaintiff has a right of action as to any one of the theories or demands for relief set out in his petition, the objection of no right of action should be overruled. Talbot v. C&C Millworks, Inc., 97-1489 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/29/98), 715 So.2d 153, 156 (citing Clement v. McNabb, 580 So.2d 981, 983 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1991) and Cenac Towing Co. v. Cenac, 413 So.2d 1351, 1352 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1982) ). Where the plaintiff pleads multiple theories of recovery based on a single occurrence or set of operative facts, the partial grant of an exception of no right of action, which attacks only one theory of recovery and which does not dismiss a party, would be invalid as an impermissible partial judgment. Talbot, 715 So.2d at 156 (citing Shinew v. Luciano Refrigerated Transport, Inc., 96-2454 (La.App. 1 Cir. 11/19/97), 706 So.2d 140, 142 and Poy v. Twin Oaks Nursing Home, Inc., 95-889 (La.App. 5th Cir. 2/14/96), 671 So.2d 15, 18-19.
In light of these axioms, we first consider whether the Attorney General has a right of action to bring the proceeding at issue. In connection with its exception raising the objection of no right of action, AstraZeneca maintains that LDH, as opposed to the State, is the only party that has a right of action. AstraZeneca avers that the Louisiana Supreme Court has recognized: (1) state agencies with the power to "sue and be sued" as "the sole parties capable of bringing suit to enforce their rights" and (2) that lawsuits concerning the duties of such agencies should be instituted by the agency and not by the state. See State ex rel. Dep't of Highways v. City of Pineville, 403 So.2d 49, 52 (La. 1981). AstraZeneca notes that LDH is "a body corporate with the power to sue and be sued," and contends that LDH is statutorily vested with responsibility for Medicaid. LSA-R.S. 36:251A and 36:254D(1)(a)(i). Further, AstraZeneca asserts that LDH is the owner of the funds used to reimburse pharmacies for the purchase of Toprol-XL. See LSA-R.S. 46:153.3. Nevertheless, AstraZeneca maintains that even if the funds could be classified as belonging to the State, any action against it would belong to LDH under the rationale of City of Pineville.
On the other hand, while the State recognizes that LDH is a body corporate with the power to sue and be sued, the State maintains that it is not asserting any right that was ever solely possessed by LDH. The State avers that under the rationale of Pineville, the political subdivision becomes the sole party capable of asserting a claim only when the claim asserted derives from property owned (or a contract entered into) exclusively by that political subdivision or agency. The State argues that while LDH administers the Medicaid program, all Medicaid funds belong to the State. The State claims that all of the funds paid through the Medicaid *44program come from the State's general fund and from federal funds granted the State on which the State remains obligated-funds which were never a part of LDH's budget and never the distinct property of LDH. The State additionally alleges that there were non-Medicaid funds that were also paid out by the State. As such, the State maintains that it has a right to bring this action in its own name stemming from its ownership of those funds.
Recently, this court addressed a similar issue in State v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc., 15-1854, 15-1626 (La.App. 1 Cir. 10/21/16), 208 So.3d 384, writs denied, 17-0125, 17-0149 (La. 3/13/17), 216 So.3d 802, 808, wherein the State sued pharmaceutical manufacturers alleging that the manufacturers "engaged in an unlawful and deceptive scheme to receive Medicaid payments for drugs that were not eligible for Medicaid payments." The State raised claims under LUTPA and the Louisiana Medical Assistance Programs Integrity Law (MAPIL), LSA-R.S. 46:437.1, et seq. , along with claims for fraud, negligent misrepresentation, redhibition, and unjust enrichment. Id. at 386-87. In response, the manufacturers filed an exception of no right of action, asserting that the right of action belonged to the Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals (now LDH). The trial court sustained the manufacturers' exception of no right of action and dismissed the suit. The State then appealed. Id. at 387.
On appeal, this court noted that LDH was a political subdivision that had the right to sue and be sued, and that the LDH was statutorily authorized to file suit on behalf of Medicaid. LSA-R.S. 36:254D(2)(H). Abbott, 208 So.3d at 388. Nonetheless, this court recognized the extensive powers granted the Attorney General on behalf of the State to "institute and prosecute any and all suits he may deem necessary for the protection of the interests and rights of the state." See LSA-R.S. 13:5036. We also recognized the specific powers granted the Attorney General in the area of consumer protection under LUTPA. See LSA-R.S. 51:1404.2
*45Abbott, 208 So.3d at 388-89. With regard to the LUTPA claim, this court cited the following provisions of the act: Louisiana Revised Statutes 51:1405 provides, in part:
A. Unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby declared unlawful.
Louisiana Revised Statutes 51:1407 provides, in part:
A. Whenever the attorney general has reason to believe that any person is using, has used, or is about to use any method, act, or practice declared by R.S. 51:1405 to be unlawful, he may bring an action for injunctive relief in the name of the state against such person to restrain and enjoin the use of such method, act, or practice....
B. In addition to the remedies provided herein, the attorney general may request and the court may impose a civil penalty against any person found by the court to have engaged in any method, act, or practice in Louisiana declared to be unlawful under this Chapter. In the event the court finds the method, act, or practice to have been entered into with the intent to defraud, the court has the authority to impose a penalty not to exceed five thousand dollars for each violation.
Louisiana Revised Statutes 51:1408 provides, in part:
A. The court may issue such additional orders or render judgments against any party, as may be necessary to compensate any aggrieved person for any property, movable or immovable, corporeal or incorporeal, which may have been acquired from such person by means of any method, act, or practice declared unlawful by R.S. 51:1405, whichever may be applicable to that party under R.S. 51:1418. Such orders shall include but not be limited to the following:
(1) Revocation, forfeiture, or suspension of any license, charter, franchise, certificate, or other evidence of authority of any person to do business in the state.
(2) Appointment of a receiver.
(3) Dissolution of domestic corporations or associations.
(4) Suspension or termination of the right of foreign corporations or associations to do business in this state.
(5) Restitution.
B. Unless otherwise expressly provided, the remedies or penalties provided by this Chapter are cumulative to each other and to the remedies or penalties available under all other laws of this state.
Louisiana Revised Statutes 51:1416 provides:
In addition to remedies for contempt of court otherwise provided by law, any person who violates the terms of an injunction issued under R.S. 51:1407 or 1408, or an assurance of voluntary compliance as authorized under R.S. 51:1410, may be required to pay to the state treasurer a civil penalty of not more than five thousand dollars per violation. For the purposes of this Section, the district court issuing an injunction shall retain jurisdiction and the attorney general acting in the name of the state may petition for recovery of civil penalties provided in this Section.
Considering the foregoing statutory authority, this court concluded that "LUTPA
*46expressly gives the Attorney General the right to bring an action for injunctive relief (La. R.S. 51:1407A) and request civil penalties (La. R.S. 51:1407B) and restitution ( La. R.S. 51:1408(5) )." Id. at 389. Accordingly, this court reversed the trial court ruling sustaining the objection of no right of action under LUTPA.
Here, AstraZeneca asserts that the Abbott decision is not controlling because the State, through the Attorney General, has not asserted a claim under MAPIL. However, in Abbott, this court held that the Attorney General has a right of action to maintain a LUTPA claim on behalf of the State for specific purposes, which it has done here. Therefore, the non-existence of a MAPIL claim in this matter does not control our decision.3 Accordingly, we conclude that the State has a right of action under LUTPA.
Having concluded that the State has a right of action under LUTPA, and given that the claims under LUPTA and the Monopolies Act arise from the same set of operative facts, the exception of no right of action should be overruled. To the extent that Abbott recognizes a partial grant of no right of action when the claims arise from the same set of operative facts, it is overruled. Moreover, given that the State has a specific right under LUTPA, we need not delineate between Medicaid and non-Medicaid expenditures at this time.
Nevertheless, AstraZeneca urges that if the cause of action is vested with LDH, then the Attorney General has no right to pursue the agency's cause of action even if the Attorney General otherwise has a general grant of authority permitting it to do so. We note that substantially similar arguments were asserted by the defendant manufacturers in Abbott, wherein the defendants urged that "the district court correctly recognized that the State cannot pursue claims that, by law, belong to a state agency .... The defendants assert that the State, represented by the Attorney General, purported to bring the action in its own name in order to circumvent the prescriptive periods that would apply if DHH were the plaintiff." Id. at 387. Even so, the Abbott court recognized that the State, by virtue of its statutory authority expressly granted it under LUTPA, has a right to bring claims under LUTPA and to seek limited specified relief, regardless of any right that LDH may possess.
In light of our holding in Abbott, we recognize that the State has a right of action to proceed under the express provisions of LUTPA. In so holding, however, we do not address whether the Medicaid funds belong to LDH or to the State, whether some of the claims belong solely to LDH, what specific relief is available to the State, or whether any claims are prescribed.4
*47AstraZeneca further contends that even if the State has a right of action, it cannot maintain a cause of action as an indirect purchaser5 of the prescription drug at issue. Although AstraZeneca couches this argument in terms of "no cause," the argument in essence is one of no right. In other words, AstraZeneca asserts that because the State is an indirect purchaser, it has no right to assert claims under LUTPA or the Monopolies Act.
In Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 728-29, 97 S.Ct. 2061, 2066, 52 L.Ed.2d 707 (1977), the United States Supreme Court held that only a direct purchaser may bring an action under § 4 of the Clayton Act, or the federal antitrust provision (akin to the Louisiana Monopolies Act). Citing a number of policy concerns, the Supreme Court held that indirect purchasers were not entitled to recover. 431 U.S. at 730-35, 97 S.Ct. at 2067-69. In support of its holding, the Supreme Court cited the unique nature of antitrust litigation, issues of multiple recovery, and the problem of allocating damages if indirect purchasers were allowed to bring suit. Id. at 737-38, 97 S.Ct. at 2070-71. Later, the court held that federal antitrust laws do not, however, preempt states from enacting statutes that allow indirect purchasers to recover damages for their injuries. See California v. ARC America Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 101-02, 109 S.Ct. 1661, 1665-66, 104 L.Ed.2d 86 (1989) (rejecting the argument that California's antitrust law, which specifically allows indirect purchaser actions, was preempted by federal law).
Louisiana has no statute that specifically provides a right of action to an indirect purchaser; nor has a Louisiana state court addressed this specific issue.6 Nonetheless, *48we need not make a determination of whether we would follow Illinois Brick. Regardless of whether the State is an indirect purchaser or if Louisiana courts would follow the Illinois Brick rationale, the State itself has a right of action under LUTPA, including a specific right of action to seek civil penalties and restitution. On this limited record based solely on the exceptions, we make no determination of whether Louisiana would follow Illinois Brick with regard to the indirect purchaser rule, as we need not decide this issue to determine whether the State has any right of action.
AstraZeneca also maintains that the State has no cause of action as to antitrust claims under the Louisiana Monopolies Act, because the petition alleges activity occurring in interstate commerce. Additionally, AstraZeneca asserts that reading the Monopolies Act claims and LUTPA claims in pari materia, the LUTPA claims sounding in antitrust should likewise be barred where the conduct at issue lacks a specific nexus to Louisiana.7 However, having found that LUTPA, by its terms, gives the State a cause of action, as well as a right of action, and based on decisions of both the Louisiana Supreme Court and this court that do not recognize partial exceptions of no cause of action, the exception of no cause of action must be overruled.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court's judgment sustaining the exceptions of no right of action and no cause of action, and dismissing the State's claims with prejudice, is reversed. We overrule AstraZeneca's exceptions raising the objections of no right of action and no cause of action. Costs of this appeal are assessed to appellees, AstraZeneca AB, AstraZeneca LP, AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals LP, and Aktiebolaget Hassle.
REVERSED; EXCEPTIONS OVERRULED.
Welch J. concurs in part and dissents in part with reasons assigned
McDonald, J. concurs for the reasons assigned by Judge Pettigrew
Guidry, J. Concurs in the result.
Pettigrew, J. Concurs with the Results and Assigns Reasons
Holdridge J. concurs of results & assigns reasons.
Chutz, J. Concurs for Reasons assigned by J. Pettigrew
PETTIGREW, J., CONCURS WITH THE RESULTS, AND ASSIGNS REASONS.
*49I concur with the results reached by the majority, however, I am of the opinion it was not necessary, nor is there any reason, to overrule State v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc., 15-1854, 15-1626 (La.App. 1 Cir. 10/21/16), 208 So.3d 384, writs denied, 17-0125, 17-0149 (La. 3/13/17), 216 So.3d 802, 808. Under the unique facts of Abbott, I am of the opinion it was legally correct.