[Cite as State v. Adams, 2024-Ohio-376.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT ADAMS COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, : : Case No. 22CA1158 Plaintiff-Appellee, : : v. : DECISION AND JUDGMENT : ENTRY JAMES ADAMS, JR., : : Defendant-Appellant. : RELEASED: 01/24/2024
APPEARANCES:
Brian T. Goldberg, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellant.
Aaron Haslam, Adams County Prosecuting Attorney, and Austin Ervin, Assistant Adams County Prosecuting Attorney, West Union, Ohio for Appellee.
Wilkin, J.
{¶1} This is an appeal from an Adams County Court of Common Pleas
judgment entry that convicted appellant, James Adams, Jr. (“Adams”), of fifth-
degree felony possession of drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A). On appeal
Adams maintains that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress,
permitted the state to amend the indictment because it changed the essential
element of the offense, and his conviction for possession of drugs was against
the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶2} After reviewing the parties’ arguments, the record, and the applicable
law, we find that the court did not err in denying Adam’s motion to suppress or
abuse its discretion in permitting the state to amend the indictment. We further
hold that Adams’ conviction for possession of drugs was not against the manifest Adams App. No. 22CA1158 2
weight of the evidence. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s judgment entry of
conviction.
BACKGROUND
{¶3} On November 9, 2018, Ohio State Highway Patrol Trooper Samie
Wedmore testified that she was dispatched to investigate a single-vehicle crash
involving a motorcycle, and the operator of the vehicle was Adams. Prior to her
arrival at the scene, Wedmore was advised by dispatch that Adams was not
injured but he was showing signs of impairment according to the EMTs and the
Adams County Sheriff’s Department. Wedmore spoke to Adams who described
the vehicle that he had been driving as a “mini dirt bike” and that he had been
using a flashlight as a headlight, which is why he crashed.
{¶4} Wedmore described Adams as being “restless,” his “pupils were
dilated[,]” and he had a “dry mouth,” which were signs of possible impairment.
Wedmore asked Adams if he had consumed any illegal drugs. Adams admitted
that two days prior to the accident he had used illegal drugs.
{¶5} Wedmore decided to have Adams take several field-sobriety tests.
She stated that field-sobriety tests can help determine if a person is impaired
because it divides the suspect’s attention making it more difficult for them to
successfully complete the tests. However, upon learning that Adams suffered an
injury in the crash, Wedmore did not have him take the walk-and-turn test or the
one-leg-stand test. Thus, the only field sobriety test that she administered to
Adams was the horizontal gaze nystagmus test (“HGN test”). Adams App. No. 22CA1158 3
{¶6} Wedmore stated that the HGN test, which looks for an “involuntary
jerking of the eyes[,]” may indicate the suspect is impaired. It can show
impairment if the person has consumed alcohol, but only shows impairment with
“certain drugs” “or depressants.” After administering the HGN test to Adams,
Wedmore did not see any clues of impairment.
{¶7} Wedmore also decided to have Adams take two “ARIDE” tests,
including the lack-of-convergence test and the modified Romberg test. She
administered the lack-of-convergence test, which similar to the HGN test may
show impairment for only certain drugs. A lack of convergence of a suspect’s
eyes is a sign of impairment. Wedmore testified that based on her training and
experience, marijuana use would show lack of convergence of the eyes, while
opiates would not. Wedmore did not observe any lack of convergence in Adams’
eyes.
{¶8} Finally, Wedmore administered the modified Romberg test, which
required Adams to close his eyes, tilt back his head, and hold that position for 30
seconds. Wedmore observed involuntary tremors in Adams’ legs, which was a
sign of impairment. Wedmore did not believe that Adams’ injury affected the
results of the modified Romberg test.
{¶9} Wedmore testified that based on her experience and training under
the totality of the circumstances, she believed that Adams was under the
influence of a controlled substance that night. Consequently, Wedmore arrested
Adams. During a search incident to the arrest, Wedmore discovered a brown Adams App. No. 22CA1158 4
plastic bag that contained a white powder in the pocket of Adams’ pants. Based
on her training and experience, Wedmore believed that the powder was heroin.
{¶10} On June 26, 2019, a grand jury charged Adams with possession of
a controlled substance (acetyl fentanyl/fentanyl) in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), a
fifth-degree felony, and operating a vehicle while under the influence of drugs or
alcohol, or both, in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a), a first-degree misdemeanor
(“OVI”).
{¶11} On August 27, 2021, Adams filed a motion to suppress evidence or
in the alternative for an order in limine prohibiting admission of the evidence
obtained by law enforcement at the scene, as well as the observations and
opinions of the law enforcement officers present at the scene, including the
results of the field sobriety tests administered by Wedmore. On September 8,
2021, the state filed a memorandum contra to Adams’ motion to suppress. On
September 21, 2021, the court held a suppression hearing. Subsequently, the
court issued a judgment entry denying Adams’ motion to suppress.
{¶12} On September 8, 2022, Adams’ trial began. The state presented
several witnesses. Trooper Wedmore testified that based on the totality of the
circumstances she believed that Adams was intoxicated and arrested Adams for
OVI, and confiscated a substance from Adams that she believed was illegal
drugs. Heather Sheskey, supervisor of the Ohio State Highway Patrol crime lab
(“OSP lab”), testified that the substance confiscated from Adams contained
fentanyl, a schedule 2 controlled substance, which is an illegal drug unless taken
under the direction of a doctor. Adams App. No. 22CA1158 5
{¶13} The state then moved the trial court to amend count one of the
indictment to dismiss the allegation that Adams possessed acetyl fentanyl, which
would mean that Adams would be charged with possessing only fentanyl. Over
appellant’s objection, the trial court granted the motion dismissing acetyl fentanyl
from the indictment.
{¶14} In his defense, Adams called one witness, the Adams County
Sheriff’s Deputy Walters, who is dispatched to the scene of the accident. He
stated that the investigation was taken over by the Ohio Highway Patrol when he
arrived. Walters testified that “typically when he arrives at a scene and [he’s]
dealing with a suspect, it is very common to do a weapons pat[-down search.]”.
However, Walters testified that he did not recall searching Adams.
{¶15} The jury found Adams guilty of possessing fentanyl, but not guilty of
OVI. It is this judgment that Adams appeals.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED APPELLANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS FINDING THAT THERE WAS PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST APPELLANT FOR OPERATING A MOTOR VEHICLE UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF DRUGS OR ALCOHOL.
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT PERMITTED THE STATE OF OHIO TO AMEND THE INDICTMENT DURING TRIAL WHEN SUCH AMENDMENT CHANGED AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE.
III. THE CONVICTION FOR POSSESSION OF DRUGS WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE Adams App. No. 22CA1158 6
I. First Assignment of Error
{¶16} Adams asserts that the evidence presented at the motion to
suppress hearing did not establish probable cause for Wedmore to arrest
appellant for OVI. Adams alleges that neither the results from the various field
sobriety tests, nor Wedmore’s observations were sufficient to constitute probable
cause that he was operating a vehicle under the influence of drugs or alcohol.
Adams claims his use of a flashlight as a headlight for his motorcycle was the
cause of his crash.
{¶17} In response, the state asserts that based upon the totality of the
circumstances, Wedmore had probable cause to arrest Adams for operating a
vehicle under the influence of drugs or alcohol.
{¶18} Wedmore did not administer the walk-and-turn and one-leg field
sobriety tests because Adams told Wedmore that he had a leg injury, which
could invalidate the results. The state also acknowledges that the results of the
HGN test did not indicate impairment, but noted the HGN test is more focused on
determining impairment from alcohol. Finally, the state admits that Wedmore
observed no lack of convergence but further indicated this was normal because
the convergence test is best at detecting impairment from marijuana.
{¶19} However, the state maintains that the results of the modified
Romberg test should be afforded extra weight and indicated that Adams was
impaired. Further, Wedmore’s observations that Adams was talkative, restless,
had a dry mouth, and had dilated pupils were all signs of impairment.
Additionally, Adams admitted to using heroin two days prior to the accident, Adams App. No. 22CA1158 7
which would indicate that Adams was “an active drug user.” Finally, the state
maintains that the single-vehicle accident itself could be a sign of impairment.
Under the totality of these circumstances, the state alleges that Wedmore had
probable cause to arrest Adams for OVI.
{¶20} Thus, the state maintains that the trial court did not err in denying
Adams’s motion to suppress.
A. Law
1. Standard of Review
{¶21} This court’s “review of a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress
presents a ‘mixed question of law and fact.’ ” State v. Pine, 2023-Ohio-2191, 219
N.E.3d 423, ¶ 23 (4th Dist.), quoting State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152,
2003-Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8. “At a suppression hearing, the trial court
acts as the trier of fact and is in the best position to resolve factual questions and
evaluate witness credibility.” State v. Sheets, 4th Dist. Jackson No. 21CA6,
2023-Ohio-2591, ¶ 45, citing State v. Leonard, 2017-Ohio-1541, 89 N.E.3d 58, ¶
15 (4th Dist.). “Accordingly, we defer to the trial court's findings of fact if they are
supported by competent, credible evidence.” State v. Jones, 4th Dist.
Washington No. 11CA13, 2012-Ohio-1523, ¶ 6, citing State v. Landrum, 137
Ohio App.3d 718, 722, 739 N.E.2d 1159 (4th Dist. 2000). “However, ‘[a]ccepting
those facts as true, we must independently determine whether the trial court
reached the correct legal conclusion in analyzing the facts of the case.’ ” Sheets
at ¶ 45 quoting State v. Gurley, 2015-Ohio-5361, 54 N.E.3d 768, ¶ 16 (4th Dist.), Adams App. No. 22CA1158 8
citing State v. Roberts, 110 Ohio St.3d 71, 2006-Ohio-3665, 850 N.E.2d 1168, ¶
100.
2. Probable Cause
{¶22} “A law enforcement officer possesses probable cause to arrest an
individual for [OVI] when the totality of the circumstances gives rise to a
reasonable belief that the individual drove while under the influence of alcohol [or
drugs].” State v. Richards, 4th Dist. Athens No. 14CA1, 2015-Ohio-669, ¶ 26,
citing State v. Schmitt, 101 Ohio St.3d 79, 2004-Ohio-37, 801 N.E.2d 446, ¶ 8.
Law enforcement officers can utilize “field sobriety tests [to] evaluate one's
coordination and movements so as to indicate whether one's actions, reactions,
conduct, movement or mental processes are impaired to an appreciable degree
so as to demonstrate if one is ‘under the influence’ to a degree to impair one's
ability to drive a motor vehicle.” State v. Littleton, 5th Dist. Fairfield No. 01CA30,
2002-Ohio-2521, *2. Standard field sobriety tests include the HGN test, the walk-
and-turn test, and the one-legged-stand test. See State v. Rasheed, 6th Dist.
Lucas No. L-21-1065, 2021-Ohio-4509, ¶ 10.
{¶23} Law enforcement officers may also administer “advanced roadside
impaired driving enforcement (“ARIDE”) tests.” Id. at ¶ 12. The “ARIDE” tests,
which are “useful for detecting drivers impaired by drugs[,]” include the lack of
convergence and modified Romberg tests. Weiler, Weiler, and Katter, Baldwin's
Ohio Handbook Series Ohio Driving Under the Influence Law, Section 7:20
(2022). However,
[p]robable cause to arrest may exist in the absence of field sobriety tests results if there is evidence “that the defendant Adams App. No. 22CA1158 9
caused an automobile accident; a strong odor of alcohol emanating from the defendant; an admission by the defendant that he or she was recently drinking alcohol; and other indicia of intoxication, such as red eyes, slurred speech, and difficulty walking.”
State v. Martin, 5th Dist. Fairfield No. 2023 CA 00008, 2023-Ohio-2739, ¶ 9, quoting State v. Judy, 5th Dist. Delaware No. 2007-CAC-120069, 2008-Ohio- 4520, ¶ 27, citing Oregon v. Szakovits, 32 Ohio St.2d 271, 291 N.E.2d 742 (1972).
Being “talkative” has also been recognized as an indicia of impairment. See
Rockhill v. City of Dayton, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 1076, 1931 WL 2750, * 1.
See also State v. Campbell, 9th Dist. Medina No. 18CA0005-M, 2019-Ohio-583,
¶13. (“[T]alking fast” has been recognized as a sign of possible impairment.) A
single-vehicle accident with other observable indicia of impairment may also
support probable cause of OVI. See e.g. State v. Richards, 2016-Ohio-3518, 67
N.E.3d 147, ¶ 30 (1st Dist.) (The court of appeals found that the defendant’s
“single-car accident at 2:30 a.m.; red and watery eyes; odor of alcohol; slow and
deliberate speech; prior OVI; admission to consuming alcohol; and performance
on the field-sobriety tests” supported that he was “under the influence.”).
B. Analysis
{¶24} Trooper Wedmore testified that she had been trained on how to
administer field sobriety tests, which can assist in determining a driver’s
impairment. She also received additional training to recognize drug impairment.
Wedmore testified that prior to Adams’ incident, she had been the investigating
officer for 75 to 80 OVI cases. Consequently, we find Wedmore had the training
and experience to investigate Adams’ case. Adams App. No. 22CA1158 10
{¶25} While the HGN and convergence tests did not give any indications
that Adams was impaired, Wedmore testified that the HGN test is not typically
used to determine impairment from drugs, and the convergence test is primarily
helpful in determining only marijuana use.
{¶26} However, the modified Romberg test conducted on Adams
demonstrated leg tremors, which can be indicative of impairment. Further,
Wedmore observed that Adams was “very restless, um, very talkative. His
mouth was dry, pupils were dilated. Um, these are all signs of impairment based
on my training and experience.” Wedmore testified that Adams’ pupils “had little
to no reaction[,]” to her flashlight, which is another sign of impairment. Adams
was involved in a single-vehicle accident while purportedly attempting to use a
flashlight instead of a headlight. Finally, the emergency medical technicians and
sheriff’s deputy who responded to the accident suspected that Adams was
impaired.
{¶27} Based on our independent review of the evidence, we find that
under the totality of the aforementioned circumstances, Trooper Wedmore had
probable cause to arrest Adams for operating a vehicle while under the influence
of drugs or alcohol. Therefore, we find that the trial court did not err in denying
Adams’ motion to suppress. Accordingly, we overrule Adams’ first assignment of
error.
II. Second Assignment of Error
{¶28} In his second assignment of error, Adams maintains that when a
single count of the indictment alleges two separate offenses, it is improper to Adams App. No. 22CA1158 11
allow an amendment of the indictment when the amendment changes an
essential element of the offense. Adams claims that count one of the indictment
charged him with possessing acetyl fentanyl/fentanyl, i.e., two different
substances. The trial court permitted the state to amend the indictment by
removing the acetyl fentanyl charge and proceeding solely on the fentanyl
charge. Adams alleges that removal of acetyl fentanyl from the indictment
violated Crim.R. 7, which allows an amendment to an indictment provided it does
not change the name or identity of the crime.
{¶29} Adams cites State v. Headley, 6 Ohio St.3d 475, 453 N.E.2d 716
(1983) in support of his argument. Adams claims that in Headley the Court found
that in an indictment charging a drug offense, the name of the controlled
substance is an essential element of the offense. Adams claims the dismissal of
acetyl fentanyl from the indictment changed the essential element of the drug
possession offense alleged against him. Therefore, Adams claims that the
amendment was “unlawful and prejudicial” to him.
{¶30} In response, the state maintains that Headley is distinguishable
because it determined that the “omission” of the type of controlled substance
from the indictment cannot be cured by an amendment because it would change
the very identity of the offense charged. In the case at hand, the indictment
charged Adams with possession of acetyl fentanyl and fentanyl, only fentanyl
was a controlled substance at that time. Therefore, the state maintains that
dismissing acetyl fentanyl from the indictment “did not alter in any form the
essential element under Headley.” In other words, dismissing acetyl fentanyl Adams App. No. 22CA1158 12
from the indictment did not change the essential element of Adams’ offense,
which was possession of fentanyl.
{¶31} Accordingly, the state claims that we should overrule Adams’
second assignment of error.
{¶32} We review a trial court’s decision to amend an indictment for an
abuse of discretion. State v. Hannah, 4th Dist. Highland No. 16CA17
2017-Ohio-1239, ¶ 16. “The term ‘abuse of discretion’ implies that a court's
attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.” Sites v. Sites, 2023-Ohio-
1278, 215 N.E.3d 573, ¶ 14 (4th Dist.), citing Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio
St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983).
{¶33} “ ‘The primary purpose of an indictment is to inform a defendant of
the offense with which he is charged to enable his preparation for trial.’ ” State v.
Butler, 4th Dist. Lawrence No. 10CA36, 2011-Ohio-1652, ¶ 8, quoting State v.
Evans, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 08CA3268, 2010-Ohio-2554, ¶ 19. In part, Crim R.
7(D) states: “The court may at any time before, during, or after a trial amend the
indictment, information, complaint, or bill of particulars, in respect to any defect,
imperfection, or omission in form or substance, or of any variance with the
evidence, provided no change is made in the name or identity of the crime
charged[.]”
{¶34} In Headley, the state charged the defendant with one count of
aggravated trafficking in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(8), but failed to name any
controlled substance that he purportedly possessed. Headley, 6 Ohio St.3d at Adams App. No. 22CA1158 13
475, 453 N.E.2d 716. The defendant moved to dismiss the indictment on the
grounds that it failed to allege an essential element of the crime. Id. The trial
court denied the defendant’s motion and permitted the state to amend the
indictment by adding the word “to-wit-cocaine.” Id. The court of appeals
reversed finding “that the indictment was defective due to the failure to name the
controlled substance involved.” Id. at 476.
{¶35} On appeal, the Supreme Court found Section 10 of Article I of the
Ohio Constitution required that a criminal indictment must notify the accused of
“the essential facts constituting the offense[,]” which in a drug case includes “the
type controlled substance involved.” Id. at 478-479. Thus, the Court in Headley
found that the indictment’s failure to name the drug involved in the appellant’s
trafficking charge was fatal to the state’s case and affirmed the court of appeals
reversal of appellant’s conviction.
{¶36} The holding in Headley that the indictment was improper was
predicated on the indictment’s failure to name any controlled substance. The
instant case is distinguishable from Headley because the indictment charged
Adams with possessing both acetyl fentanyl and fentanyl.
{¶37} However, the parties agree that at the time of Adams’ arrest, acetyl
fentanyl was not a controlled substance. See R.C. 3719.41 Schedule I,
Schedule II (B)(9). Therefore, as charged in the original indictment, and after the
amendment dismissing acetyl fentanyl, the state charged Adams with possession
of only one controlled substance, fentanyl. Thus, the amendment “[did] not Adams App. No. 22CA1158 14
charge a new or different offense, nor * * * change the substance of the offense.’
” State v. Evans, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 08CA3268, 2010-Ohio-2554, ¶ 35. Adams
knew that he was being charged with possession of fentanyl before and after the
amendment, which is the purpose of having to name the controlled substance in
the indictment.
{¶38} Dismissing the alleged possession of acetyl fentanyl did not change
an essential element of the offense. Accordingly, we find that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in permitting the state to amend the indictment herein by
removing acetyl fentanyl from Adams’s indictment. We, therefore, overrule
Adams’ second assignment of error.
III. Third Assignment of Error
{¶39} In his third assignment of error Adams alleges that his conviction for
possession of fentanyl is against the manifest weight of the evidence because
the state cannot prove a chain of custody of the substance that Wedmore
confiscated from him. The substance was initially delivered to the OSP lab in
November of 2018, but subsequently transferred to the National Medical Lab
(“NML”) in Pennsylvania for testing. However, it was not tested at NML and it
was eventually transported back to the OSP lab. There it eventually tested
positive for fentanyl.
{¶40} Adams maintains that there is no evidence showing how the drugs
were transported to NML. Nor was there evidence to show a chain of custody of
the drugs for the time they were at NML, until they were transported back to the
OSP lab in July 2019. Adams also questions why the substance was transported Adams App. No. 22CA1158 15
from NML back to the OSP lab and kept there for 2 ½ years before it was tested.
Adams claims that these deficiencies in the chain of custody of the drugs causes
his conviction for possession of fentanyl to be against the weight of the evidence.
{¶41} In response, the state argues that it presented sufficient evidence to
establish a chain of custody of the drugs confiscated from Adams. The state
claims that it is not required to “prove a perfect, unbroken chain of custody.” The
state only needs to establish that “it is reasonably certain that substitution,
alteration, or tampering [of the evidence] did not occur.” Breaks in the chain of
custody do not go to the admission of the evidence, but to the weight afforded
that evidence.
{¶42} Heather Sheskey, supervisor of the OSP lab, testified that the
“lieutenant in charge” would have transported the drugs from the OSP lab to
NML. She stated that the OSP lab had contracts to outsource drug testing,
including one with NML. Sheskey testified that the OSP lab picked up the drugs
from NML on July 31, 2019. The only location where the drugs were not
explicitly tracked was while they were at NML. However, the drugs arrived to and
from the NHL by way of the Ohio State Highway Patrol personnel.
{¶43} “In a manifest-weight-of-the-evidence review, we ‘will not reverse a
conviction where there is substantial evidence upon which the [trier of fact] could
reasonably conclude that all the elements of an offense have been proven
beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (Brackets sic.) State v. Jenkins, 4th Dist.
Highland No. 12CA10, 2013-Ohio-595, ¶ 9, quoting State v. Eskridge, 38 Ohio Adams App. No. 22CA1158 16
St.3d 56, 526 N.E.2d 304 (1988), paragraph two of the syllabus. In making such
an analysis, we must “review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all
reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses, and determine
whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way
and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be
reversed.” State v. Wade, 4th Dist. Ross No. 14CA3435, 2015-Ohio-997, ¶ 29,
citing State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997).
However, “ ‘the weight to be given the evidence and the credibility of the
witnesses are primarily for the trier of the facts.’ ” Jenkins at ¶ 9, quoting State v.
DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 227 N.E.2d 212 (1967), paragraph one of the
syllabus.
{¶44} “The purpose of requiring a chain of custody is to ensure that the
substance offered into evidence is in substantially the same condition as when
seized.” State v. Kiel, 9th Dist. Wayne No. C.A. 1480, 1977 WL 199005, *3
(Sept. 8, 1977), citing United States v. Santiago, 534 F. 2d 768 (7th Cir. 1976).
“Items such as blood samples or drugs generally require some showing of a
chain of custody to establish identity because visual identification of the
substance itself is difficult, if not impossible: the substance has no unique, readily
identifiable characteristics.” Id., citing State v. Conley, 32 Ohio App.2d 54, 59,
288 N.E.2d 296 (3rd Dist. 1971). However, “ ‘[a]ny breaks in the chain of custody
go to the weight afforded to the evidence, not to its admissibility.’ ” Jenkins, 4th
Dist. Highland No. 12CA10, 2013-Ohio-595, ¶ 10, quoting State v. Smith, 8th
Dist. Cuyahoga No. 96348, 2011-Ohio-6466, ¶ 37. Adams App. No. 22CA1158 17
{¶45} Sheskey, of the OSP lab, testified that the drugs recovered from
Adams were received by the OSP lab on November 21, 2018. The sample was
outsourced to NML because of a backlog at the OSP lab.
{¶46} Referencing an “internal chain of custody report[,]” Sheskey testified
that the fentanyl recovered from Adams would have been flown or driven to NML
on April 20, 2019 by whoever the lieutenant was overseeing the property section
at the time. It was delivered to NML on April 22, 2019. Sheskey explained that it
was unnecessary to have a witness from NML to come and testify about the
fentanyl while it was at NML because the OSP lab has records of “who had the
evidence when they had it, what was done with it.”
{¶47} On July 31, 2019, NML returned the drugs to Ohio where it was
stored in the Ohio State Patrol’s long-term storage near the OSP lab. Sheskey
testified that the drugs were transported from NML back to Ohio by the lieutenant
who was overseeing the property section at that time. Sheskey testified the
drugs were tested by OSP lab on February 17, 2022.
{¶48} We find that the state has presented substantial evidence from
which a jury could infer that the state demonstrated a chain of custody of the
drugs recovered from Adams in this case. Therefore, we overrule Adams’ third
assignment of error. Adams App. No. 22CA1158 18
CONCLUSION
{¶49} Having overruled Adams’ three assignments of error, we affirm
Adams’ conviction for possession of fentanyl.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED. Adams App. No. 22CA1158 19
JUDGMENT ENTRY
It is ordered that the JUDGMENT IS AFFIRMED and appellant shall pay the costs.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Adams County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution.
IF A STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE AND RELEASE UPON BAIL HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY GRANTED BY THE TRIAL COURT OR THIS COURT, it is temporarily continued for a period not to exceed 60 days upon the bail previously posted. The purpose of a continued stay is to allow Appellant to file with the Supreme Court of Ohio an application for a stay during the pendency of proceedings in that court. If a stay is continued by this entry, it will terminate at the earlier of the expiration of the 60-day period, or the failure of the Appellant to file a notice of appeal with the Supreme Court of Ohio in the 45-day appeal period pursuant to Rule II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court of Ohio. Additionally, if the Supreme Court of Ohio dismisses the appeal prior to expiration of 60 days, the stay will terminate as of the date of such dismissal. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Smith, P.J. and Abele, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.
For the Court,
BY: ____________________________ Kristy S. Wilkin, Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with the clerk.