[Cite as State v. Adams, 2023-Ohio-4691.]
COURT OF APPEALS GUERNSEY COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO : JUDGES: : : Hon. William B. Hoffman, P.J. Plaintiff-Appellee : Hon. John W. Wise, J. : Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J. -vs- : : Case No. 22CA45 : MAGGIE ADAMS : : : Defendant-Appellant : OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Guernsey County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 21CR000396
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: December 21, 2023
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee: For Defendant-Appellant:
JASON R. FARLEY JACOB T. WILL ASST. PROSECUTOR 121 South Main St., Ste. 520 GUERNSEY COUNTY Akron, OH 44308 627 Wheeling Ave. Cambridge, OH 43725 [Cite as State v. Adams, 2023-Ohio-4691.]
Delaney, J.
{¶1} Appellant Maggie Adams appeals from the October 31, 2022 Judgment
Entry of Sentence of the Guernsey County Court of Common Pleas. Appellee is the state
of Ohio.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Trial evidence
{¶2} The following evidence is adduced from the record of appellant’s jury trial.
{¶3} This case arose around 10:45 p.m. on December 8, 2021, when Detective
May and Sergeant Leggett of the Central Ohio Drug Enforcement Task Force were
separately monitoring a Speedway gas station in Cambridge, Ohio. The station was
located in an area known for drug trafficking and May was undercover, in an unmarked
vehicle and plain clothes. May communicated with Leggett by cell phone.
{¶4} May observed a black four-door sedan with West Virginia plates parked at
a gas pump. He saw a woman identified as appellant exit the gas station store and get
into the car. He then noticed a passenger later identified as Deon Christian in the black
car. A silver SUV with North Carolina plates was parked on the other side of the gas-
pump island; May suspected the SUV was a rental car due to the age and condition. He
called Leggett and advised him to watch the SUV.
{¶5} Leggett was in a marked police cruiser and uniform, accompanied by K-9
Hoke. While May and Leggett spoke, May observed Christian get out of appellant’s car
and walk quickly to the silver SUV, which then pulled away. May advised Leggett he
suspected an illegal narcotics transaction had occurred. [Cite as State v. Adams, 2023-Ohio-4691.]
{¶6} Leggett watched the SUV pass him and caught up to it on the northbound
ramp to Interstate 77, where the vehicle took off at a high rate of speed. As the vehicle
merged onto 77, Christian failed to use a turn signal and sped up. Leggett traveled at
speeds in excess of 90 m.p.h. to keep up. He turned on lights and sirens and traffic-
stopped Christian, who stopped the SUV in the middle of a lane of traffic.
{¶7} Leggett approached the SUV and spoke to Christian and his passenger,
identified as Lee Gray. He first instructed Christian to pull to the side of the highway
because of the vehicle’s dangerous location. Leggett smelled a strong odor of marijuana
emanating from the vehicle and asked for consent to search. Christian agreed, and he
and Gray exited the SUV before the search. Both men were patted down and found to
have large amounts of currency on their persons; Christian had $2,674 and Gray had
$1,457.
{¶8} At that point Leggett advised May to call him immediately, suspecting this
was a narcotics delivery and the drugs might be at the Speedway location.
{¶9} In the meantime, Deputy Devon Ryan arrived at the Speedway and assisted
May in contacting appellant in the parking lot. May identified himself to appellant, showed
her his badge, and asked what brought her to Cambridge. Appellant responded that she
was here “to cheat on her husband.” May asked her about the man he observed jog from
her car to the SUV, and asked whether the two were involved in a drug transaction.
Appellant said she understood why he might think that. As May spoke to appellant,
Leggett called with news of the currency found on the occupants of the SUV. May asked
appellant for consent to search her car and she declined. [Cite as State v. Adams, 2023-Ohio-4691.]
{¶10} Leggett returned to the Speedway with K-9 Hoke and performed an open-
air sniff around the exterior of appellant’s vehicle. Hoke very quickly alerted on the
vehicle, indicating an odor of narcotics. Leggett asked appellant why Hoke would alert
on her car and appellant responded, “I don’t know; I can’t say anything because these
people will hurt me.”
{¶11} May and Leggett commenced a probable-cause search of appellant’s
vehicle and found a large Ziploc bag of suspected methamphetamine in the center
console. They also found additional baggies of suspected methamphetamine, brown
powder, two pipes, and white pills in appellant’s purse. Another bag containing a brown
substance was found in the center console. The suspected narcotics were collected,
bagged, photographed, weighed, and taken into evidence to be tested.
{¶12} May returned to speak to appellant in the back of Leggett’s patrol car after
Mirandizing her. Appellant told May she “never knows” what all the drugs are when she’s
involved in deliveries. Appellant said someone puts the drugs in her car and she delivers
them to a certain address in Parkersburg. Appellant said she was just trying to make a
little money and the guy she was meeting is named Chris.
{¶13} Appellant was arrested and transported to the Guernsey County Jail where
May and Detective Carpenter interviewed her again. Appellant admitted she came to
Cambridge to meet “Chris” and this was not the first time they met; she knew “Chris”
through someone named “Q.” Appellant was supposed to meet Chris to obtain narcotics,
then deliver the narcotics to an address in Parkersburg. She would be paid upon delivery
and this wasn’t the first time she’s made this trip. May asked appellant if she “pinches a
little off the top,” meaning whether she takes a little of the narcotics for her own personal [Cite as State v. Adams, 2023-Ohio-4691.]
use, and she said no. She agreed with May that the amount of narcotics found was not
for personal use. In May’s estimation, the large amounts would be broken down into
smaller amounts for resale.
{¶14} At one point during the jail interview, appellant mentioned a “cartel,” which
indicated to May that appellant believed the large amount of narcotics might indicate
involvement of a cartel organization. Appellant also asked detectives whether she might
be able to “help herself out,” which they took to mean cooperate and provide information
in exchange for a reduced sentence.
{¶15} When asked what happened at the Speedway, appellant said she went into
the station, and when she came out Chris was in her car, as witnessed by May. She got
back in her car and didn’t know where he put the drugs, but he “usually” put them in the
console. She admitted she paid Chris for the drugs. She also admitted the
methamphetamine in her purse is hers and she uses methamphetamine.
{¶16} The substances found in appellant’s car were tested and determined to be
446.4 grams of methamphetamine in the Ziploc bag, and a grand total of 462.71 grams
of methamphetamine including the smaller bags in appellant’s purse. The other
substance found in the console was a combination of two drugs, fentanyl and tramadol,
in the amount of 14.141 grams.
{¶17} Appellant was charged by indictment as follows: Count I, aggravated drug
trafficking (methamphetamine) pursuant to R.C. 2925.03(A)(2) and (C)(1)(f), a felony of
the first degree; Count II, trafficking in a fentanyl-related compound pursuant to R.C.
2925.03(A)(2) and (C)(9)(e), a felony of the second degree; Count III, aggravated
possession of drugs (methamphetamine) pursuant to R.C. 2925.11(A) and (C)(1)(e), a [Cite as State v. Adams, 2023-Ohio-4691.]
felony of the first degree; and Count IV, possession of drugs pursuant to R.C. 2925.11(A),
(C)(10)(a) and (C)(2)(c), a misdemeanor of the first degree (as amended). Counts I and
III are accompanied by major-drug-offender specifications pursuant to R.C.
2941.1410(A).
{¶18} Appellant entered pleas of not guilty and filed a motion to suppress
evidence arising from her stop and arrest.
Suppression hearing
{¶19} The matter proceeded to an evidentiary hearing on October 17, 2022, and
the following evidence was adduced at the suppression hearing.
{¶20} On December 8, 2021, around 10:45 p.m., Detective Cory May of the
Guernsey County Sheriff’s Department was working as a narcotics detective with the
Central Ohio Drug Enforcement Task Force on patrol with Sgt. Leggett in the City of
Cambridge. May and Leggett communicated with each other via cell phones. May was
monitoring a Speedway gas station location known for drug activity; he has responded to
overdoses at that location and his training and experience led him to believe it was the
scene of drug activity.
{¶21} May noticed two vehicles parked on either side of a pump; one was a black
four-door sedan with a West Virginia registrations and the other was a silver SUV with a
North Carolina registration. Both vehicles had valid registrations.
{¶22} May was fueling his unmarked vehicle directly behind the sedan, later
identified as appellant’s car. He observed appellant come out of the gas station and sit
in her car for an unusually long period of time, which caught his attention and led him to
watch the vehicle. May wondered what appellant was doing because she wasn’t getting [Cite as State v. Adams, 2023-Ohio-4691.]
fuel and she wasn’t leaving. May also noticed the silhouette of someone’s head on the
passenger side of the vehicle.
{¶23} As May watched, a male exited appellant’s car and jogged over to the
passenger side of the SUV. May described the person as a middle-aged black male with
short hair who appeared to be in a hurry. May advised Leggett that something appeared
to be amiss and asked Leggett to watch the SUV after it pulled away from the gas station.
Appellant’s car remained at the gas station.
{¶24} May then saw appellant exit the gas station again with a coffee cup in her
hand and return to her car, although he hadn’t seen her re-enter the gas station. May
notified a patrol officer, Ptl. Ryan, that something was amiss and he wanted to contact
appellant. May believed he had just witnessed a drug transaction.
{¶25} May approached appellant, identified himself, and asked her what she was
doing. Appellant replied that she “traveled to the gas station to cheat on her husband.”
T. 20. While she spoke to May, appellant looked at the ground and wouldn’t meet his
eye; at one point she requested a cigarette. She appeared to be nervous.
{¶26} In the meantime, May learned Leggett had effectuated a traffic stop on the
silver SUV and discovered large amounts of currency on both occupants, increasing the
likelihood for May that he witnessed a drug transaction at Speedway. May requested that
Leggett come to his location with his K-9 trained in drug detection to perform a sniff around
appellant’s vehicle. May testified Leggett arrived in about 10 minutes with the K-9.
{¶27} May asked appellant for consent to search her car and she declined.
Leggett arrived and conducted an open-air sniff; the dog indicated a positive alert on the
driver’s side of the vehicle. The officers then conducted a probable-cause search of the [Cite as State v. Adams, 2023-Ohio-4691.]
vehicle and recovered a large amount of suspected methamphetamine and fentanyl from
the center console.
{¶28} May’s conversation with appellant occurred outside the vehicle and she had
no passengers at that time. She was not under arrest and made no attempt to walk away
from May; she freely answered his questions. May considered appellant to be detained
once he learned the SUV was traffic-stopped and a large amount of currency was
recovered. May advised appellant of her Miranda rights after the narcotics were found in
her vehicle.
{¶29} Upon cross-examination, May was asked what was unusual about
appellant’s vehicle at the gas station, other than the out-of-state registration. He replied
that his attention was caught by the time of night, coupled with being next to a rental car,
and that the passenger ran or jogged from her car to the passenger side of the rental SUV
and left. May acknowledged he didn’t see the black male carrying anything. Nor did he
know any of the individuals involved.
{¶30} May reiterated that his conversation with appellant occurred entirely in the
parking lot; he approached her, identified himself, and showed her his badge. She freely
answered his questions and was free to leave until he was notified the silver SUV had
been traffic-stopped.
{¶31} Appellant argued May lacked reasonable suspicion to detain her for the
purposes of a Terry stop of her person and lacked reasonable suspicion to extend the
detention to bring the K-9 to the scene. Appellee argued that May’s initial conversation
with appellant was a consensual encounter, the K-9 arrived within a reasonable time
frame of a few minutes, and the stop was not unduly prolonged. [Cite as State v. Adams, 2023-Ohio-4691.]
{¶32} The trial court ruled from the bench that May’s initial contact with appellant
was a consensual encounter which grew into an investigatory stop, then a sniff, then a
probable-cause search of the vehicle. On October 19, 2022, the trial court issued a
Findings of Fact/Conclusions of Law/Judgment Entry overruling appellant’s motion to
suppress.
Jury trial, conviction, and sentence
{¶33} The matter proceeded to trial by jury and appellant was found guilty as
charged.
{¶34} A sentencing hearing was held on October 28, 2022. The trial court found
that Counts I and III merged for purposes of sentencing, and that Counts II and IV merged.
Appellee elected to sentence upon Counts I and II. The trial court imposed a total
consecutive aggregate prison term of 18 to 23 and a half years.
{¶35} Appellant now appeals from the judgment entry of her convictions and
sentence.
{¶36} Appellant raises two assignments of error:
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
{¶37} “I. THE JURY’S FINDING OF GUILT AS TO THE TRAFFICKING
CHARGES AND THE ACCOMPANYING SPECIFICATIONS WAS AGAINST THE
MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.”
{¶38} “II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT-
APPELLANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS.” [Cite as State v. Adams, 2023-Ohio-4691.]
ANALYSIS
I.
{¶39} In her first assignment of error, appellant argues her trafficking convictions
in Counts I and II are against the manifest weight of the evidence. We disagree.
{¶40} Appellant was convicted of two counts of drug trafficking pursuant to R.C.
2925.03(A)(2), which states:
No person shall knowingly do any of the following:
* * * *.
Prepare for shipment, ship, transport, deliver, prepare for
distribution, or distribute a controlled substance or a controlled
substance analog, when the offender knows or has reasonable
cause to believe that the controlled substance or a controlled
substance analog is intended for sale or resale by the offender or
another person.
{¶41} Appellant asserts her trafficking convictions are against the manifest weight
of the evidence because her vehicle remained stationary throughout the incident and
there is no evidence she “set into motion” the steps described in the statute to “prepare
for shipment, ship, transport, deliver, prepare for distribution, or distribute a controlled
substance.” We find appellant’s arguments unavailing and contrary to the evidence
presented at trial.
{¶42} The controlled substances involved were methamphetamine (Count I) and
a fentanyl-related compound (Count II). The methamphetamine in the Ziploc bag pulled
from the console of appellant’s vehicle weighed 446.4 grams, prompting Leggett to [Cite as State v. Adams, 2023-Ohio-4691.]
exclaim “Woo hoo! Oh boy! That’s his biggest one!” referring to K-9 Hoke’s indication on
appellant’s vehicle. The total weight of the fentanyl mixture was 14.141 grams. We note
the extraordinary weight of the narcotics because appellant’s claims of total naivete as to
the substances involved and their ultimate purpose are belied by the quantities involved.
Appellant is an admitted meth user. When asked by May if she “pinches a little off the
top” of her deliveries, she said no and agreed with May that these amounts were much
more than for personal use. The jury could reasonably find appellant knew exactly what
the narcotics were and knew the end result of her pickup and delivery was drug sales.
{¶43} The evidence established appellant is familiar with the business of drug
trafficking. When Hoke indicated on her vehicle, appellant told officers she was scared
because the people involved might kill her, she doesn’t really know them, and mentioned
a “cartel.” As the investigation progressed, by the end of the jail interview, appellant asked
if she could do something to “help” herself in terms of cooperation, admitted she knew
“Chris” for at least a month, and had done this before. She admitted throughout her
conversations that “Chris” would place narcotics in her vehicle which she delivered to a
residence in Parkersburg, that she did this because she wanted to make a little money,
and she would be paid upon delivery. The sequence and timing of events strongly
suggest “Chris” deposited narcotics in appellant’s vehicle in return for the currency he
and his passenger were immediately caught with; in other words, appellant bought the
narcotics from “Chris” to deliver to another location in an amount to be broken down and
sold. In short, the record is replete with evidence upon which the jury could have based
its findings of guilt. [Cite as State v. Adams, 2023-Ohio-4691.]
{¶44} Upon a challenge to the weight of the evidence, the issue is whether the
jury created a manifest miscarriage of justice in resolving conflicting evidence, even
though the evidence of guilt was legally sufficient. State v. Ashcraft, 5th Dist. Richland
No. 2021-CA-0024, 2023-Ohio-2378, ¶ 14, citing State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380,
386–387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). In the instant case, we find no such manifest
miscarriage of justice.
{¶45} “Weight of the evidence” addresses the evidence's effect of inducing belief.
State v. Thompkins, supra, 78 Ohio St.3d at 386-387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997), State v.
Williams, 99 Ohio St.3d 493, 2003-Ohio-4396, 794 N.E.2d 27, ¶ 83. When a court of
appeals reverses a judgment of a trial court on the basis that the verdict is against the
weight of the evidence, the appellate court sits as a “thirteenth juror” and disagrees with
the fact finder's resolution of the conflicting testimony. Thompkins at 387, 678 N.E.2d 541,
citing Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 42, 102 S.Ct. 2211, 72 L.Ed.2d 652 (1982) (quotation
marks omitted); State v. Wilson, 113 Ohio St.3d 382, 2007-Ohio-2202, 865 N.E.2d 1244,
¶ 25, citing Thompkins. The uncontroverted evidence in the instant case established
appellant had a prearranged meeting with “Chris,” paid him for a large amount of narcotics
which he placed inside her vehicle, and which she intended to deliver to Parkersburg,
where she would be paid.
{¶46} Once the reviewing court finishes its examination, an appellate court may
not merely substitute its view for that of the jury, but must find that “ ‘the jury clearly lost
its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be
reversed and a new trial ordered.’ ” State v. Thompkins, supra, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387,
quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717, 720–721(1st Dist. [Cite as State v. Adams, 2023-Ohio-4691.]
1983). The Ohio Supreme Court has emphasized: “ ‘[I]n determining whether the
judgment below is manifestly against the weight of the evidence, every reasonable
intendment and every reasonable presumption must be made in favor of the judgment
and the finding of facts. * * *.’ ” Eastley v. Volkman, 132 Ohio St.3d 328, 334, 972 N.E.2d
517, 2012-Ohio-2179, quoting Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80,
461 N.E.2d 1273 (1984), fn. 3, quoting 5 Ohio Jurisprudence 3d, Appellate Review,
Section 603, at 191–192 (1978).
{¶47} We find that this is not an “ ‘exceptional case in which the evidence weighs
heavily against the conviction.’ ” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386–387, 678
N.E.2d 541 (1997), quoting Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d at 175, 485 N.E.2d 717. Based upon
the entire record in this matter we find appellant’s trafficking convictions are not against
the manifest weight of the evidence. To the contrary, the jury appears to have fairly and
impartially decided the matters before them. The jury heard the witnesses, evaluated the
evidence, and was convinced of appellant’s guilt.
{¶48} Appellant’s first assignment of error is overruled.
II.
{¶49} In her second assignment of error, appellant argues the trial court should
have granted her motion to suppress. We disagree.
{¶50} Appellate review of a trial court’s decision to deny a motion to suppress
involves a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Long, 127 Ohio App.3d 328, 332, 713
N.E.2d 1 (4th Dist.1998). During a suppression hearing, the trial court assumes the role
of trier of fact and, as such, is in the best position to resolve questions of fact and to
evaluate witness credibility. State v. Brooks, 75 Ohio St.3d 148, 154, 661 N.E.2d 1030 [Cite as State v. Adams, 2023-Ohio-4691.]
(1996). A reviewing court is bound to accept the trial court’s findings of fact if they are
supported by competent, credible evidence. State v. Medcalf, 111 Ohio App.3d 142, 145,
675 N.E.2d 1268 (4th Dist.1996). Accepting these facts as true, the appellate court must
independently determine as a matter of law, without deference to the trial court’s
conclusion, whether the trial court’s decision meets the applicable legal standard. State
v. Williams, 86 Ohio App.3d 37, 42, 619 N.E.2d 1141 (4th Dist.1993), overruled on other
grounds.
{¶51} There are three methods of challenging a trial court’s ruling on a motion to
suppress on appeal. First, an appellant may challenge the trial court’s finding of fact. In
reviewing a challenge of this nature, an appellate court must determine whether the trial
court’s findings of fact are against the manifest weight of the evidence. See, State v.
Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d 19, 437 N.E.2d 583 (1982); State v. Klein, 73 Ohio App.3d 486,
597 N.E.2d 1141 (4th Dist.1991). Second, an appellant may argue the trial court failed
to apply the appropriate test or correct law to the findings of fact. In that case, an appellate
court can reverse the trial court for committing an error of law. See, Williams, supra.
Finally, an appellant may argue the trial court has incorrectly decided the ultimate or final
issues raised in a motion to suppress. When reviewing this type of claim, an appellate
court must independently determine, without deference to the trial court’s conclusion,
whether the facts meet the appropriate legal standard in any given case. State v. Curry,
95 Ohio App.3d 93, 96,620 N.E.2d 906 (8th Dist.1994).
{¶52} In the instant case, appellant argues May did not have reasonable suspicion
to Terry stop her in the Speedway parking lot, and the stop was unreasonably prolonged
for Leggett to bring K-9 Hoke to the scene for a sniff. [Cite as State v. Adams, 2023-Ohio-4691.]
{¶53} We will first address May’s initial encounter with appellant in the gas station
parking lot, which appellant seeks to classify as a Terry stop. See, State v. Crouse, 5th
Dist. Licking No. 16 CA 37, 2017-Ohio-1097, ¶ 17. Instead, we find May’s initial
conversation with appellant to have been a consensual encounter.
{¶54} The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 14,
Article I, Ohio Constitution, prohibit the government from conducting unreasonable
searches and seizures of persons or their property. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct.
1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); State v. Andrews, 57 Ohio St.3d 86, 87, 565 N.E.2d 1271
(1991). “However, not every contact between police officer and citizen implicates the
Fourth Amendment. ‘Only when the officer, by means of physical force or show of
authority, has in some way restricted the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a
“seizure” has occurred.’ ” State v. Lopez, 2nd Dist. Greene No. 94 CA 21, 1994 WL
527670, quoting Terry, supra, at 19, fn. 16. A Terry stop is an investigatory detention,
more intrusive than a consensual encounter, but less intrusive than a formal custodial
arrest, and such a stop is valid if the officer had a reasonable and articulable suspicion of
criminal activity. See State v. Stonier, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2012 CA 00179, 2013–Ohio–
2188, ¶ 43.
{¶55} Ohio law accordingly recognizes a distinction between a Terry stop and a
consensual encounter; the latter occurs “* * * when the police merely approach a person
in a public place, engage the person in conversation, request information, and the person
is free not to answer and walk away.” State v. Daniels, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2002CA00290,
2003–Ohio–2492, ¶ 12, quoting State v. Taylor, 106 Ohio App.3d 741, 747, 667 N.E.2d
60 (1995). Thus, police officers are permitted to engage in “consensual encounters” with [Cite as State v. Adams, 2023-Ohio-4691.]
citizens without running afoul of Fourth Amendment prohibitions on searches and
seizures. See United States v. Hinojosa, 534 Fed.Appx. 468, 470 (6th Cir. 2013), citing
Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991); United
States v. Waldon, 206 F.3d 597, 602–03 (6th Cir. 2000). Furthermore, a police officer's
request to examine a person's identification does not render an encounter
nonconsensual. See Florida v. Bostick, supra, citing Immigration & Naturalization Serv.
v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216, 104 S.Ct. 1758, 80 L.Ed.2d 247 (1984). Accord State v.
Miller, 5th Dist. Licking No. 01 CA 79, 2002–Ohio–2465. The relevant inquiry is whether
a reasonable person would feel free to disregard the officer's request and leave the scene.
See State v. Miller, 148 Ohio App.3d 103, 107–108, 2002–Ohio–2389, 772 N.E.2d 175.
{¶56} We review the issue of the existence of a consensual encounter by
examining the totality of the circumstances. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 506–507,
103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983).
{¶57} May’s initial approach to appellant in the parking lot and their ensuing
conversation was entirely voluntary and appellant was free to leave. May’s attention was
drawn to appellant’s car because it had West Virginia plates, was parked at an island by
an apparent rental SUV with North Carolina plates, and was parked at the pump for an
unusually long period of time. As May watched the vehicles, Deon Christopher exited
appellant’s car and “jogged” to the SUV before it pulled away. This occurred at a gas
station known for drug activity. The totality of the circumstances led May to question
whether he observed a drug transaction and he called Leggett to tell him to watch the
SUV. When appellant came out of the gas station for the second time, May wanted to
contact her and did so once a uniformed officer was present. May was in plain clothes. [Cite as State v. Adams, 2023-Ohio-4691.]
He approached appellant, identified himself, showed his badge, and asked what brought
her to Cambridge.
{¶58} Appellant argues May’s approach and the ensuing conversation resulted in
an unlawful police detention under the Fourth Amendment. However, we find the initial
encounter between appellant and May to be consensual for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment because May had no reason or intent to detain appellant at that point.
Crouse, supra, 5th Dist. Licking No. 16 CA 37, 2017-Ohio-1097, ¶ 21, citing Brendlin v.
California, 551 U.S. 249, 255, 127 S.Ct. 2400, 168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007) (indicating that a
seizure occurs “[w]hen the actions of the police *** show an unambiguous intent to
restrain”). See, also, United States v. Hinojosa, supra, at 470 (finding that officers had left
the defendant with “a reasonable means of egress such that [he] was physically capable
of terminating the encounter and leaving the area at any time.”)
{¶59} May's interaction with appellant began as a consensual encounter which
then progressed to an investigative or Terry stop such that the Fourth Amendment was
not implicated. State v. Shrimplin, 5th Dist. Coshocton No. 2021CA0006, 2021-Ohio-
3720, ¶ 38, citing United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d
497 (1980). Appellant next argues even if the Court finds the initial “detention” of her was
proper and/or that it was a consensual encounter, the subsequent actions of the officers
resulted in the incident turning into an improper detainment or custodial arrest prior to the
K–9 drug sniff of the vehicle.
{¶60} “An officer may not expand the investigative scope of the detention beyond
that which is reasonably necessary to effectuate the purposes of the initial stop unless
any new or expanded investigation is supported by a reasonable, articulable suspicion [Cite as State v. Adams, 2023-Ohio-4691.]
that some further criminal activity is afoot.” Ashland v. Zehner, 5th Dist. Ashland No. 2012-
CA-25, 2012-Ohio-5545, ¶ 14, citing State v. Batchili, 113 Ohio St.3d 403, 2007–Ohio–
2204, 865 N.E.2d 1282, ¶ 34; United States v. Brignoni–Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881–882,
95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607(1975). “In determining whether a detention is reasonable,
the court must look at the totality of the circumstances.” State v. Bobo, 37 Ohio St.3d 177,
178, 524 N.E.2d 489(1988).
{¶61} As May spoke to appellant, she was visibly nervous and claimed she came
to Cambridge to cheat on her husband. May had observed Christopher jog from
appellant’s vehicle to the SUV. His training and experience, together with the location
and the actions he observed in the parking lot, led him to believe a drug transaction
occurred between the occupants of the vehicles. As he spoke to appellant, Leggett called
to say he traffic-stopped the SUV and found large amounts of currency on the occupants,
confirming May’s suspicion that a drug transaction took place and the narcotics were likely
with appellant. The consensual encounter was thus elevated into a Terry stop while May
investigated further.
{¶62} “Under Terry, police officers may briefly stop and/or temporarily detain
individuals in order to investigate possible criminal activity if the officers have a
reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity may be afoot * * *.” State v. Swift,
2nd Dist. Montgomery No. 27036, 2016–Ohio–8191, ¶ 10. May testified that appellant
was not free to leave once Leggett advised him of the traffic stop of the SUV. At that
point, May had increasing evidence supporting his reasonable, articulable suspicion that
he witnessed a drug transaction because the occupants of the SUV were flush with cash. [Cite as State v. Adams, 2023-Ohio-4691.]
{¶63} May had reasonable, articulable suspicion to temporarily detain appellant
and question her further. In the meantime, he told Leggett to return with Hoke, and Hoke
was at Speedway in about 10 minutes. The use of a drug detection dog does not
constitute a “search” and an officer is not required, prior to a dog sniff, to establish either
probable cause or a reasonable suspicion that drugs are concealed in a vehicle. State v.
Camp, 5th Dist. No. 14CA42, 2014-Ohio-329, 24 N.E.3d 601, ¶ 30, citing Illinois v.
Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409, 125 S.Ct. 834, 838, 160 L.Ed.2d 842 (2005); United States
v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 2645, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983); State v.
Carlson, 102 Ohio App.3d 585, 594, 657 N.E.2d 591 (9th Dist.1995); United States v.
Seals, 987 F.2d 1102, 1106 (5th Cir.1993). Further, if a trained narcotics dog alerts to the
odor of drugs from a lawfully detained vehicle, an officer has probable cause to search
the vehicle for contraband. United States v. Reed, 141 F.3d 644 (6th Cir.1998) (quoting
United States v. Berry, 90 F.3d 148, 153 (6th Cir.1996), cert. denied 519 U.S. 999, 117
S.Ct. 497, 136 L.Ed.2d 389 (1996)); accord, United States v. Hill, 195 F.3d 258, 273 (6th
Cir.1999); United States v. Diaz, 25 F.3d 392, 394 (6th Cir.1994); State v. French, 104
Ohio App.3d 740, 663 N.E.2d 367 (12th Dist.1995), abrogated on different grounds, City
of Dayton v. Erickson, 76 Ohio St.3d 3, 665 N.E.2d 1091 (1996).
{¶64} May had a reasonable suspicion of illegal drug activity. He could lawfully
call for a police dog and wait for it to arrive to check for drugs based on this suspicion.
Camp, supra, 2014-Ohio-329, ¶ 31. Once Hoke alerted to appellant’s car, the officers
had probable cause to search that vehicle for contraband. Id. No violation of appellant's
Fourth Amendment rights has been demonstrated. Id. [Cite as State v. Adams, 2023-Ohio-4691.]
{¶65} The trial court did not err in overruling appellant’s motion to suppress, and
the second assignment of error is overruled.
CONCLUSION
{¶66} Appellant’s two assignments of error are overruled and the judgment of the
Guernsey County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
By: Delaney, J.,
Hoffman, P.J. and
Wise, J., concur.