HULL, Circuit Judge:
Because the partial summary judgment order involved here was not a final decision, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. This Court’s prior precedent controls this case. Construction Aggregates, Ltd. v. Forest Commodities Corp., 147 F.3d 1334 (11th Cir.1998); Mesa v. United States, 61 F.3d 20 (11th Cir.1995).
I.- BACKGROUND
A. Cross-Motions for Partial. Summary Judgment
Plaintiff, Michigan’s State Treasurer, as Custodian for various State retirement funds, sued Defendants Harold Barry and a limited partnership (collectively, “Defendants”) after a real estate investment deal soured. Plaintiffs complaint contained: Count I for breach of contract, seeking specific performance of [9]*9an agreement to purchase an interest in a real estate partnership; Count II for the same breach of contract, but seeking damages; and Count III for expenses of litigation, including attorneys’ fees, as damages for “stubborn litigiousness” under O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11.
Defendants answered and asserted two compulsory counterclaims:1 Count,I for tor-tious interference with business relations, and Count II for breach of fiduciary duty.
On December 2, 1996, Plaintiff filed a motion for partial summary judgment on its claim for specific performance of the contract in Count I and on Defendants’ two counterclaims. On January 13, 1997, Defendants filed a cross-motion for partial summary judgment on Plaintiffs claim for specific performance of the contract in Count I.
In an order filed May 27, 1997, the district court granted Defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment on Plaintiffs claim for specific performance in Count I and denied Plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment on that specific performance claim. The court’s May 27 order also granted Plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment on Defendants’ counterclaim for tortious interference. That May 27 order left pending Plaintiffs damages claim for breach of contract in Count II, Plaintiffs claim for “stubborn litigiousness” in Count III, and Defendants’ counterclaim for breach of fiduciary duty.2
In granting Defendants partial summary judgment on Plaintiffs claim for specific performance of the contract in Count I, the district court made a finding that Defendants had not committed an anticipatory breach so as to relieve Plaintiff of its duty to perform. This finding necessarily dealt a fatal blow also to Plaintiffs claim in Count II for damages for breach of that same contract. In turn, resolution of those contract claims in Defendants’ favor would defeat Plaintiffs claim in Count III for stubborn litigiousness. However, despite this favorable finding in the May 27 order regarding the specific performance claim, there was no subsequent motion for partial summary judgment on, or motion for dismissal of, the claims in Counts II and III of Plaintiffs complaint based on that finding.
The parties also never requested that the district court issue a Rule 54(b) certificate regarding the May 27 partial summary judgment order. Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b). Upon a Rule 54(b) request, the district court may certify that no just reason exists for delay and expressly direct the entry of final judgment. If granted, this would have allowed the parties to appeal the May 27 partial summary judgment order.3
B. Pretrial Order
Instead of making a Rule 54(b) request, the parties proceeded with the case. They first obtained the district court’s consent to extend the due date for the pretrial order through June 23, 1997. The pretrial order was then filed on June 23,1997.
In the pretrial order, the parties agreed that the only remaining claim to be tried was Defendants’ counterclaim for breach of fiduciary duty.4 Because a pretrial order supersedes the pleadings, the pretrial order had [10]*10the effect-, of eliminating the remaining Counts II and III in Plaintiffs complaint.5 Accordingly, when the • district court approved and entered the pretrial order on July 14,1997, the only claim remaining in the case was Defendants’ counterclaim for breach of fiduciary duty.
C. Dismissal, Without Prejudice, of Fiduciary Duty Counterclaim
On August 20, 1997, the parties filed a joint stipulation entitled “Stipulation of Dismissal of Fiduciary Duty Claim.” The stipulation recited that it was filed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(l)(ii), and that the parties agreed to dismiss without prejudice Defendants” breach of fiduciary duty counterclaim, “with each party to bear its own costs.” The Clerk of Court stamped the voluntary dismissal without prejudice as follows: “Entered as dismissed pursuant to Rule 41 (a)(1)(i)(ii), F.R.C.P.”
The stipulation also stated “that there are no claims remaining to be tried, since all claims in this action except the fiduciary duty claim were resolved in this Court’s Order of May 27,1997.” This summary of the district court’s order is technically inaccurate because the order repeatedly referred to only Plaintiffs claim for specific performance and nowhere discussed Plaintiffs claim for damages in Count II or claim based on stubborn litigiousness in Count III. Nonetheless, the pretrial order had the effect of removing Counts II and III from the pleadings in the case. Thus, the August 20 stipulation did resolve the only remaining claim, which was Defendants’ counterclaim for breach of fiduciary duty.
D. Judgment
On September 19, 1997, the Clerk of Court entered a judgment which stated, in full, as follows:
This action having come before the court [name of judge] for consideration of defendant’s [sic] motion for partial summary judgment, and the court having granted said motion, it is Ordered and Adjudged that the defendants [sic] motion for partial summary judgment be granted as to specific performance.
(Emphasis in original). The judgment covered only Plaintiffs specific performance claim in Count I. No judgment was entered on Defendants’ counterclaim for tortious interference, even though the partial summary judgment order clearly granted summary judgment against Defendants on that first counterclaim. No judgment was entered on Plaintiffs claims in Counts II and III, even though the effect of the pretrial order was to remove them from the case.
E. Notice of Appeal
On October 17, 1997, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal, which recited that Plaintiff was appealing from the district court’s order of May 27, 1997, and the final judgment entered on September 19,1997.
F. Appellate Jurisdiction Issue
A few weeks after the appeal was filed, this Court raised, sua sponte, the appellate jurisdiction issue. On November 10, 1997, this Court sent a letter requesting that the parties address the jurisdictional issue of “[w]hether the court’s orders granting partial summary judgment are final and appealable” under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Plaintiff filed a response to the Court’s jurisdiction question on November 24, 1997. Defendants filed a response on November 28, 1997, which concurred with the position taken in Plaintiffs response.
On February 24,1998, this Court issued an order carrying the jurisdictional issue with the case. The Court’s order stated, “The parties may, but are not required to, further address the jurisdictional issue in their briefs. Specifically, the parties may want to address whether the district court’s September 19, 1997, judgment is final and appeal-able in light of Mesa v. United States, 61 [11]*11F.3d 20 (11th Cir.1995).” Plaintiffs brief, filed April 21, 1998, addressed the jurisdiction issue.
Shortly before oral argument, this Court notified the parties, asking them to be familiar with the recent decision in Construction Aggregates, Ltd. v. Forest Commodities Corp., 147 F.3d 1334 (11th Cir.1998). Much of the oral argument, heard November 5, 1998, focused on the jurisdiction issue.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Question Presented
This case concerns whether the district court’s May 27 order granting partial summary judgment is a “final decision” appeal-able under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Section 1291 provides, in relevant part: “The courts of appeals ... shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States....” 28 U.S.C. § 1291. This section is the basis for the final judgment rule, which ordinarily requires that all claims and issues in a case be adjudicated before appeal.
The district court’s partial summary judgment order, by itself, was not a “final decision” under § 1291. That May 27 order left pending Plaintiffs claims for damages for breach of contract in Count II and for attorneys’ fees and costs for “stubborn' litigiousness” in Count III, as well as Defendants’ counterclaim for breach of fiduciary duty.
Subsequently, the June 23 pretrial order amended the pleadings and left pending only Defendants’ counterclaim for breach of fiduciary duty. Later, on August 20, the parties stipulated to a dismissal of that counterclaim without prejudice. The parties voluntarily agreed to dismissal of that counterclaim without prejudice in order to appeal the partial summary judgment order before having to try the counterclaim. After entry of the May 27 order, the parties could have asked the district court to issue a Rule 54(b) certificate, but they never did so. Instead, they prepared the pretrial order, as ordered by the district court, and only later dismissed the counterclaim without prejudice.
Thus, the narrow question presented here is whether appellate jurisdiction over a non-final partial summary judgment order may be created by the parties’ agreeing to dismiss without prejudice the remaining counterclaim, so that the parties can appeal the partial summary judgment order before having to try the remaining counterclaim. In essence, the parties argue that the August 20 dismissal without prejudice of the remaining counterclaim transformed the district court’s May 27 ruling on the parties’ cross-motions for partial summary judgment into a final decision of the district court, thus permitting the parties an unfettered right to an immediate appeal of the partial summary judgment order.
This question is answered in Mesa v. United States, 61 F.3d 20 (11th Cir.1995), and Construction Aggregates, Ltd. v. Forest Commodities Corp., 147 F.3d 1334 (11th Cir.1998). In both cases, this Court recently dismissed similar appeals for lack of jurisdiction and held that appellate jurisdiction over a non-final order cannot be created by dismissing the remaining claims without prejudice. We examine each case in turn.
B. Mesa
In Mesa, the plaintiffs brought a multiple count claim. 61 F.3d at 21.6 The district court dismissed two of the counts. Id. The plaintiffs then moved to dismiss the remaining counts voluntarily so that they could appeal immediately. Id. The district court granted the plaintiffs’ motion and dismissed the remaining counts without prejudice. Id. However, this Court refused to hear the appeal, holding, “[B]ecause plaintiffs never sought or received a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) certification and, thus, never received a final decision, plaintiffs had nothing to appeal.” Id.
The Mesa decision concluded that the “[rjesolution of this appeal is controlled by Ryan v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 577 F.2d 298 (5th Cir.1978).” Mesa, 61 F.3d at [12]*1221.7 In Ryan, the district court dismissed parts of the plaintiffs complaint for failure to state a cause of action. The plaintiff sought a Rule 54(b) certification, which was granted but later vacated. The plaintiff then voluntarily dismissed his remaining claim under Rule 41(a). 577 F.2d at 300. The Court in Mesa agreed with the Fifth Circuit in Ryan that voluntary dismissal of the plaintiffs remaining claim could not be considered a “final decision” under § 1291 because a voluntary dismissal is without prejudice to the moving party filing those claims again. Mesa, 61 F.3d at 22.
The Mesa court also emphasized Ryan’s conclusion that “[i]n the absence of a rule 54(b) certification, the earlier dismissals were not appealable.” Mesa, 61 F.3d at 22 (citing Ryan, 577 F.2d at 303). In a footnote, the Mesa court observed that other interim Eleventh Circuit decisions failed to discuss Ryan and permitted appeal following voluntary dismissals; however, the Mesa court then acknowledged the necessity of adhering to the older Ryan precedent. Id. at 22 n. 5.
Here, as in Mesa, the parties failed to seek a Rule 54(b) certification prior to appealing an order which partially disposed of the case. The order in Mesa granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss two of the counts in the plaintiffs complaint. The order here granted a motion for partial summary judgment on Plaintiffs specific performance claim in Count I.
Similarly, the appeals in Mesa and in this case arrived in this Court after the dismissal without prejudice of any remaining claims. The Court in Mesa reasoned that no final decision had been entered, because the remaining claim, which was dismissed without prejudice, could be resurrected. See 61 F.3d at 22.
C. Construction Aggregates
This Court recently followed Mesa in Construction Aggregates, Ltd. v. Forest Commodities Corp., 147 F.3d 1334 (11th Cir.1998), where the plaintiff sued the defendant on several promissory notes. The defendant’s two counterclaims sought an offset of damages or recovery. 147 F.3d at 1335. A consent order dismissed without prejudice the defendant’s first counterclaim. Id. Both parties then sought partial summary judgment. Id. The district court ruled in the plaintiffs favor, holding unenforceable a provision upon which the defendant sought liquidated damages. Id.
A second consent order was subsequently entered, in which the parties agreed that the plaintiff would have a judgment against the defendant on the promissory notes. Id. The defendant then dismissed without prejudice its second counterclaim but expressly reserved its right to re-file. Id. The defendant then appealed the partial summary judgment in the plaintiffs favor on the issue of liquidated damages. Id.
Dismissing the appeal in Construction Aggregates for lack of jurisdiction, this Court held that there was no final decision from which to appeal, in light of the defendant’s ability to re-file its second counterclaim, which had been dismissed without prejudice. Id. at 1336-37. The defendant argued that “it makes no sense to require the parties to continue litigating a claim (that is, the second counterclaim) they say they were not required to bring in the first place.” Id. at 1337. This Court rejected that argument, stating: “[W]e are not requiring the parties to continue litigation. All that [defendant] must do to appeal the partial summary judgment is have its remaining claims dismissed with prejudice.” Id. (citing Morewitz v. West of England Ship Owners Mut. Protection and Indem. Ass’n, 62 F.3d 1356, 1361 (11th Cir.1995)).
D. Jeteo’s Implied Final Decision Exception
The parties, and the concurrence here, advocate that a dismissal without prejudice is a “good pillar to support implied final judgment under Jeteo.” We disagree for the same reasons that this Court found the Jeteo [13]*13exception inapplicable in Construction Aggregates and Mesa.
“Jeteo allows an exception to the finality rule when ‘a series of court orders, considered together, terminate[d] the litigation as effectively as a formal order.’ ” Construction Aggregates, 147 F.3d at 1337 (quoting Mesa, 61 F.3d at 21); see Jetco Elec. Indus., Inc. v. Gardiner, 473 F.2d 1228 (5th Cir.1973). Jeteo involved two orders: (1) an order granting a motion to dismiss the plaintiff-appellant’s cause of action against one defendant for failure to state a cause of action and for failure to. comply with the Texas long arm statute; and (2) a subsequent “agreed judgment disposing of appellants’ . claims against the other two defendants.” Jetco, 473 F.2d at, 1230. The Jeteo Court concluded that the “two orders, considered together, terminated [the] litigation just as effectively as would have been the case had the district judge gone through the motions of entering a single order formally reciting the substance of the earlier two orders.” Id. at 1231. Importantly, in Jeteo, the two orders left nothing that could be refiled. See id.; Construction Aggregates, 147 F.3d at 1337.
In Construction Aggregates, this Court explained that Mesa and Ryan had rejected the use of the Jeteo exception because, in Jeteo, the plaintiff had no claims left if his appeal failed, whereas in Mesa and Ryan, the plaintiffs claims were dismissed without prejudice. Construction Aggregates, 147 F.3d at 1337. Thus, if the appeal failed in Mesa or Ryan, the plaintiff could re-file other claims. Id.
In this case, as in Mesa, Ryan, and Construction Aggregates, the Jeteo exception is inapplicable.
E. Plaintiffs Contention
Plaintiff attempts to distinguish Mesa and Construction Aggregates by arguing that here, unlike in those cases, the party seeking appeal was not the same party who sought dismissal of its remaining, claims below. Therefore, Plaintiff argues, it had no control of the manner in which the dismissal of the counterclaim took place, either with or without prejudice. This argument fails, however, because Plaintiff consented to the. dismissal without prejudice of Defendants’ counterclaims. Thus, this case presents' the same facts as Construction Aggregates, where both parties consented to a dismissal without prejudice of all remaining claims in an attempt to confer jurisdiction and create a right to immediate appeal of an otherwise non-final order. Id. at 1336.
In Construction Aggregates, as here, this Court noted the potential jurisdiction problem and offered the parties an opportunity to brief the issue. Id. at 1336. No Rule 54(b) certification is present in either case. Id. at 1336 n. 2. In 'both cases, the parties agreed to dismiss without prejudice potentially meritorious claims so that earlier non-final orders could be appealed.
Moreover, it is well settled in this Circuit that parties to a suit cannot agree to grant this Court appellate jurisdiction. Construction Aggregates, 147 F.3d at 1336 (citing Haney v. City of Cumming, 69 F.3d 1098, 1101 n. 4 (11th Cir.1995)). The teaching of Construction Aggregates, Mesa, and Ryan is that voluntary dismissals, granted without prejudice, are not final decisions themselves and also do not transform an earlier partial dismissal or partial summary judgment order into a final decision. Here, as .in Construction Aggregates, it is possible that the claim, dismissed without prejudice will be re-filed. Our precedent guides our conclusion that exercising jurisdiction here, “would undermine the policies of judicial efficiency, avoiding piecemeal litigation, and district court independence that are the basis of the final judgment rule.” Construction Aggregates, 147 F.3d at 1336.8
[14]*14F. Ryan’s Rule
The concurrence questions the wisdom of Ryan’s rule and invites en banc reconsideration of this Circuit’s longstanding precedent, which necessarily means overruling Mesa and Construction Aggregates. The invitation should be declined for several reasons.
First, Ryan’s rule is sound, consistent with § 1291, which provides for appellate jurisdiction over only a “final decision,” and is followed by two other circuits. Chappelle v. Beacon Communications Corp., 84 F.3d 652 (2d Cir.1996); Cook v. Rocky Mountain Bank Note Co., 974 F.2d 147 (10th Cir.1992).
Second, repealing Ryan’s rule significantly erodes Rule 54(b). The district court, sua sponte or on motion, could have certified that there was no reason for delay and directed the entry of final judgment on Plaintiffs complaint and Defendants’ counterclaim for tortious interference. Although another counterclaim remained pending, the parties then would be able to appeal immediately the district court’s partial summary judgment order. Rule 54(b) allows the district court to control its docket and to make an independent determination whether an exception to the final decision rule is warranted in an individual case under appropriate circumstances.
The parties never requested a Rule 54(b) certificate so the concurrence can only speculate that, it would not have been granted. But what is not conjecture is that abrogation of Ryan’s rule will subvert Rule 54(b) and result in the parties’, not the trial court’s, controlling what interim orders are appealed and when.9 For example, as the concurrence acknowledges, one countervailing concern is “the specter of repeated appeals by litigants who dismiss claims in order to appeal and then resurrect them on remand in another action.” The concurrence argues that litigants will not necessarily take that path, that Ryan’s rule sweeps too broadly, and that Ryan’s rule is bad policy. These arguments are similar to the policy arguments that have already been made, considered, and rejected in the enactment of § 1291 and Rule 54(b), which represent policy determinations that appellate jurisdiction shall be over only a final decision and that whether to allow an interim appeal is best decided by the trial court.
Third, Ryan’s rule is not based on a mistake of law but on a proper interpretation of § 1291. The concurrence states that a final decision is one that “ends the litigation on the merits” and “leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.” Although the court may have nothing further to do when a stipulation of dismissal without prejudice is filed, the litigation has not been terminated on the merits because the stipulation is not an adverse final ruling to either party. Instead, a stipulation of dismissal without prejudice filed by the parties does just the opposite — it leaves the dismissed claim for another day.
The two cases cited by the concurrence for the proposition that Ryan rests on a mistake of law, Kirkland v. National Mortgage Network, Inc., 884 F.2d 1367 (11th Cir.1989), and LeCompte v. Mr. Chip, Inc., 528 F.2d 601 (5th Cir.1976), involved dismissals without prejudice granted by the court upon motion of the plaintiffs under Rule 41(a)(2). In contrast, this case addresses a stipulation of dismissal without prejudice by the parties under Rule 41(a)(1). In Kirkland, the defendant did not consent to the plaintiffs motion for dismissal without prejudice, and in fact moved for reconsideration and for dismissal with prejudice. 884 F.2d at 1369. The Kirkland Court’s statement that a “voluntary dismissal without prejudice under Rule 41(a)(2) is final and appealable by [the defendant],” relied entirely on LeCompte. 884 F.2d at 1369-70. Specifically, the LeCompte Court reasoned that ordinarily a plaintiff cannot appeal from a Rule 41(a)(2) dismissal, be[15]*15cause dismissal on its own motion “does not qualify as an involuntary adverse judgment so far as the plaintiff is concerned.” 528 F.2d at 603. Nevertheless, according to Le-Compte, and as applied by Kirkland, a defendant who opposes the dismissal has suffered an adverse final judgment and may appeal. The reasoning of Kirkland and LeCompte does not extend to a stipulation of dismissal without prejudice under Rule 41(a)(1), where all parties have consented. In such a dismissal, there has been no involuntary adverse judgment against any party, and therefore there has been no final appealable order. Indeed, unlike Rule 41(a)(2) which requires an order of court, Rule 41(a)(1) states that upon filing of a stipulation signed by all parties, no order of court is necessary. Fed. R.Civ.P. 41.
LeCompte itself, while permitting a plaintiff to appeal from its own motion to dismiss under Rule 41(a)(2), is limited to a subset of Rule 41(a)(2) dismissals. Where the district court placed stringent conditions on the plaintiffs ability to re-file its dismissed claims, the Court in LeCompte reasoned the dismissals were better treated as dismissals with prejudice for purposes of determining appealability. 528 F.2d at 603. The dismissal without prejudice here under Rule 41(a)(1), on consent and without condition, clearly is beyond the scope of LeCompte. This is not a case where the party seeking appeal opposed a dismissal without prejudice under Rule 41(a)(2). Thus, we need not decide the wisdom of Ryan’s, rule in those circumstances.10
As the concurrence astutely points out, “part of the conceptual difficulty here and elsewhere may arise from the fact that Rule 41 is not meant for the use the parties in this ease and others like it have put it: the rule speaks of voluntary dismissal of ‘an action,’ not a claim. Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(1).” This reinforces our view that the proper way to seek appeal here was to obtain a Rule 54(b) certificate and not to craft appellate jurisdiction through a Rule 41(a)(1) dismissal without prejudice.
Fourth, we disagree with the concurrence’s contention that Ryan’s rule encourages pointless district court litigation. Instead, if a Rule 54(b) certificate is denied, Ryan’s rule forces litigants to make hard choices and seriously evaluate their cases. The parties must assess the likelihood of a reversal of the adjudicated claims on appeal versus the likelihood of success on the remaining claims at trial. While some claims in lawsuits axe close, many are not. Litigants often have to make much more difficult choices in the course of complex litigation. In order to appeal a court’s rulings on some claims, a party may settle the remaining claims in some fashion and dismiss them with prejudice.11 Such a settlement might even incorporate a high or low amount on the remaining claims dismissed with prejudice, contingent upon the outcome of the appeal. As the concurrence notes, perhaps the remaining claims are not winners on their merits, but only offered other tactical advantages. A party seeking an appeal either has to give up that tactical advantage to gain the benefit of finality or has to convince the other party to do so. In fact, the options of resolving the dilemma faced by the parties are endless and only limited by the settlement creativity of the parties.
Fifth, Ryan’s rule does not permanently deny an appeal, as the concurrence asserts, [16]*16in circumstances like this case. Instead, what denies a party an appeal is the strategic choice an appellant makes in attempting to craft appellate jurisdiction by dismissing, or agreeing to the opposing party’s dismissing, a remaining claim without prejudice in order to appeal an adverse non-final decision over other claims. When such an attempt to craft jurisdiction fails, the case is returned to the district court and the parties may seek to reopen the case and to reinstate the claim dismissed without prejudice. The district court may deny such a request to reopen. However, the parties may account for that risk before attempting to craft appellate jurisdiction. In this ease, the parties’ attempt was made in the face of Mesa and simply represents one of many strategic and calculated decisions in litigation. As the concurrence concedes, “this circuit’s bright-line rule fosters predictability.”
Lastly, this Circuit has followed Ryan’s rale for almost twenty-five years. Any procedural rule will engender policy arguments and the final decision rule is no exception. The final decision rule is well known and longstanding. It is clear, easy to follow, and promotes judicial efficiency, avoiding piecemeal appeals. Most importantly, the rule as it stands today is consistent with Rule 54(b), is faithful to the statutory language and policies underlying § 1291, and allows the district courts to retain control of their dockets. It is unwise to expand the Jeteo “implied final judgment rale,” as the concurrence styles it, or the Jeteo exception, as Construction Aggregates calls it, to a stipulation of dismissal without prejudice under Rule 41(a)(1) filed by all parties after the entry of a pretrial order.
III. CONCLUSION
This case is controlled by Construction Aggregates, Mesa, and Ryan. Thus, we DISMISS this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.