Case: 18-10474 Date Filed: 07/16/2020 Page: 1 of 33
[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 18-10474 ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 2:09-cv-01812-VEH
MYRA CORLEY, CHARLES CORLEY,
Plaintiffs-Appellants, versus
LONG-LEWIS, INC., individually and as successor to Burrell Corp., f.k.a. Lewis Hardware Co.; BIRMINGHAM RUBBER AND GASKET CO., et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama _______________________
(July 16, 2020)
Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, JILL PRYOR and LUCK, Circuit Judges.
WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge:
This appeal requires us to resolve three difficult questions of appellate
jurisdiction before deciding a single issue on the merits. The jurisdictional issues
are (1) whether an order granting a voluntary dismissal without prejudice, Fed. R. Case: 18-10474 Date Filed: 07/16/2020 Page: 2 of 33
Civ. P. 41(a)(2), is a “final decision[],” 28 U.S.C. § 1291; (2) whether we have
territorial jurisdiction, id. § 1294, to review an interlocutory decision by an out-of-
circuit district court that merged into the final judgment of a district court in this
Circuit; and (3) whether an appellant has standing to appeal from a final judgment
accompanying an order granting his motion for a voluntary dismissal. Charles
Corley and his wife, Myra Corley, filed this lawsuit against dozens of companies
that allegedly supplied products containing asbestos that caused Charles’s
malignant mesothelioma. Although the Corleys commenced their suit in an
Alabama court, the companies removed it to the Northern District of Alabama. The
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation then transferred the suit to the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania, which eventually returned it to the Northern District of
Alabama. After the Northern District of Alabama granted the Corleys’ motion to
voluntarily dismiss the last two companies in the suit, the Corleys sought our
review of an order entered by the Eastern District of Pennsylvania that denied their
motion to reconsider a partial summary judgment in favor of several companies. In
that motion, the Corleys had argued for the first time that the district court should
apply maritime law, not state law, to determine the merits of their claims. We
conclude that the order granting a voluntary dismissal without prejudice is a final
order, that we have territorial jurisdiction to hear this appeal, and that the Corleys
have standing to appeal. We also affirm the judgment against the Corleys.
2 Case: 18-10474 Date Filed: 07/16/2020 Page: 3 of 33
I. BACKGROUND Charles and Myra Corley sued dozens of companies that allegedly supplied
asbestos-laden products that Charles used when he served in the United States
Navy and later when he was a self-employed mechanic and repairman. The
Corleys alleged that these products caused Charles’s malignant mesothelioma and
sought damages under state law. After Charles’s death, his son, Oscar Corley,
joined the suit as the executor of Charles’s estate. Oscar and Myra amended their
complaint to add a claim under the Alabama Wrongful Death Act. The Corleys
originally filed their complaint in an Alabama court, and the companies removed
the suit to the Northern District of Alabama.
The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation transferred this action to the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, where several of the companies filed motions for
summary judgment. As relevant to this appeal, the Pennsylvania district court
granted summary judgment in favor of 17 companies that supplied products that
Charles used when he was in the Navy—a group we will call the “Navy suppliers.”
The district court determined that the statute of limitations had expired on the
claims against these companies. The Corleys filed a motion to reconsider, which
asked for “leave to elect the application of maritime law and, in so doing, the
[extended] statute of limitations recognized under maritime law.” After explaining
that the Corleys had not previously argued that maritime law applied, the district
3 Case: 18-10474 Date Filed: 07/16/2020 Page: 4 of 33
court denied the motion on the ground that a motion for reconsideration was far too
late in the litigation for the Corleys to change their theory of liability.
Over the next year, the Pennsylvania district court whittled the suit down to
what it thought were the final two companies in the suit—Honeywell International,
Inc., and Ford Motor Company. The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation then
remanded the suit to the Northern District of Alabama. The Alabama district court
later dismissed Honeywell and Ford from the suit with prejudice.
The Corleys filed an appeal to this Court that challenged the Pennsylvania
order denying their motion to reconsider the summary judgment in favor of the
Navy suppliers. Two defendants, Fairbanks Morse Pump Corporation and Garlock
Sealing Technologies, LLC, filed suggestions of bankruptcy in this Court. After
investigation, we discovered that the Corley’s claims against Fairbanks and
Garlock were still pending in the district court and dismissed the Corleys’ appeal.
On remand to the district court, the Corleys reported that Fairbanks and
Garlock had filed petitions for relief in a bankruptcy court in 2010, which had
stayed proceedings against them in this suit. Three months later, the bankruptcy
court confirmed a reorganization plan that prevented the Corleys from litigating
their claims against Fairbanks and Garlock in this suit. Because their claims against
the two companies had “already been eliminated as a matter of law” in the
bankruptcy court, the Corleys asked the district court to voluntarily dismiss those
4 Case: 18-10474 Date Filed: 07/16/2020 Page: 5 of 33
claims without prejudice. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2) (permitting the dismissal of
“an action . . . at the plaintiff’s request . . . by court order, on terms that the court
considers proper”); see also Plains Growers, Inc. ex rel. Florists’ Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Ickes-Braun Glasshouses, Inc., 474 F.2d 250, 253 (5th Cir. 1973) (holding that
plaintiffs can voluntarily dismiss individual parties from a suit). The district court
granted their motion and entered what it called a “final judgment with respect to all
claims asserted in this action.” The Corleys then filed this appeal, which again
challenges the denial of their motion to reconsider the summary judgment in favor
of the Navy suppliers.
II. JURISDICTION
We have a threshold obligation to ensure that we have jurisdiction to hear an
appeal, for “[w]ithout jurisdiction [we] cannot proceed at all in any cause.” Ex
parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1869); accord Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am.
Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 410 (11th Cir. 1999). Because we are a court of
limited jurisdiction, adjudicating an appeal without jurisdiction would “offend[]
fundamental principles of separation of powers.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better
Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998). In practical terms, our jurisdiction “must be both
(1) authorized by statute and (2) within constitutional limits.” OFS Fitel, LLC v.
Epstein, Becker & Green, P.C., 549 F.3d 1344, 1355 (11th Cir. 2008).
5 Case: 18-10474 Date Filed: 07/16/2020 Page: 6 of 33
To say that the odd procedural history of this appeal tests the boundaries of
our jurisdiction would be an understatement. The Corleys challenge an
interlocutory order from a district court in another circuit, and they do so by
appealing from an order granting their motion for a voluntary dismissal without
prejudice. But even so, we conclude that we have jurisdiction to address the merits.
We divide our discussion of the jurisdictional issues into three parts. First,
we address whether an order granting a motion to voluntarily dismiss an action
without prejudice is a “final decision[].” 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Second, we consider
whether we have territorial jurisdiction to hear an appeal challenging an
interlocutory order issued by a district court outside this Circuit that merged into
the final judgment of a district court in this Circuit. See id. § 1294. Finally, we
examine whether the Corleys have standing to appeal from an order that granted
their motion for a voluntary dismissal. See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.
A. The Corleys Appealed a Final Decision. The Corleys invoke our subject-matter jurisdiction over “appeals from all
final decisions of the district courts of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
Because the district court entered an order granting the Corleys’ motion to
voluntarily dismiss their only remaining claims, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2), the
Corleys contend that we can hear their appeal. The Navy suppliers respond that we
still lack jurisdiction. They argue that an order granting a plaintiff’s motion to
6 Case: 18-10474 Date Filed: 07/16/2020 Page: 7 of 33
voluntarily dismiss an action without prejudice under Rule 41(a)(2) is not a final
decision under section 1291.
Under section 1291, “[a] ‘final decision’ is one by which a district court
disassociates itself from a case.” Gelboim v. Bank of Am. Corp., 574 U.S. 405, 408
(2015) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 409 (“[T]he statute’s core
application is to rulings that terminate an action.”). The voluntary dismissal
underlying this appeal arguably fits that definition. It ended the involvement of the
district court, and the Corleys have conceded that the bankruptcy court
“eliminated” their claims against Fairbanks and Garlock “as a matter of law.”
“That the dismissal was without prejudice to filing another suit does not make the
cause unappealable, for denial of relief and dismissal of the case ended this suit so
far as the District Court was concerned.” United States v. Wallace & Tiernan Co.,
336 U.S. 793, 794 n.1 (1949).
But we do not write on a blank slate. Indeed, “the canvas looks like one that
Jackson Pollock got to first.” Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 258 (2013). Our
precedent splinters in multiple directions on whether voluntary dismissals without
prejudice are final. Compare, e.g., McGregor v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 956 F.2d 1017,
1020 (11th Cir. 1992) (“An order granting a plaintiff’s motion for voluntary
dismissal pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2) qualifies as a final judgment for purposes of
appeal.” (internal quotation marks omitted)), with, e.g., State Treasurer v. Barry,
7 Case: 18-10474 Date Filed: 07/16/2020 Page: 8 of 33
168 F.3d 8, 13 (11th Cir. 1999) (“[V]oluntary dismissals, granted without
prejudice, are not final decisions themselves . . . .”), with, e.g., CSX Transp., Inc. v.
City of Garden City, 235 F.3d 1325, 1328–29 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding that a
voluntary dismissal without prejudice was final when “there was no attempt to
manufacture jurisdiction”).
Our divergent decisions can be traced to two opinions of the former Fifth
Circuit: LeCompte v. Mr. Chip, Inc., 528 F.2d 601 (5th Cir. 1976), and Ryan v.
Occidental Petroleum Corp., 577 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1978). To “determine which
of our precedents binds us,” CSX Transp., Inc. v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 846 F.3d 1333,
1337 (11th Cir. 2017), we must begin with them.
LeCompte involved a plaintiff’s appeal from an order granting his motion
under Rule 41(a)(2) to dismiss his complaint without prejudice subject to certain
conditions. 528 F.2d at 602. Before reaching the merits, our predecessor court
considered whether the order was appealable. Id. It devoted most of its attention to
whether the plaintiff had standing to challenge the stringent conditions on refiling
that the district court attached to its dismissal order. See id. at 603–04. But before it
reached that issue, LeCompte addressed whether the order was final, see id. at 603,
which was also necessary to its holding that the order was appealable, see 28
U.S.C. § 1291. It concluded that “[w]here the trial court allows the plaintiff to
dismiss his action without prejudice, the judgment, of course, qualifies as a final
8 Case: 18-10474 Date Filed: 07/16/2020 Page: 9 of 33
judgment for purposes of appeal.” LeCompte, 528 F.2d at 603 (internal quotation
marks omitted). After concluding that the voluntary dismissal order was final and
that the plaintiff was adverse to that order, LeCompte vacated and remanded the
order on the merits. Id. at 603–05.
Ryan v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 577 F.2d 298, came two years later.
After the district court in Ryan had dismissed all but one of the plaintiff’s claims,
the plaintiff moved to voluntarily dismiss the paragraph of his complaint that
contained his remaining substantive allegation. Id. at 300. Although the district
court granted the plaintiff’s narrow motion, it “did not purport to dismiss the
jurisdictional allegations of [the] complaint . . . and it specifically noted that the
dismissal was without prejudice to [the plaintiff’s] right to file again.” Id. When
the plaintiff tried to appeal, the former Fifth Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction.
Id. It concluded that no final judgment existed because “the torso of the plaintiff’s
complaint—including the identification of the parties and the jurisdictional
allegations—remain[ed] before the district court.” Id. at 301. Ryan later explained
that the “chief problem” with finality in the appeal was that the plaintiff’s dismissal
motion was “more appropriately considered to be an amendment to the complaint
under Rule 15” and that an order granting leave to amend “lacks finality” when it
“permits judicial proceedings to continue.” Id. at 302 n.2. Ryan separately
concluded that the plaintiff could not take advantage of the Jetco exception to
9 Case: 18-10474 Date Filed: 07/16/2020 Page: 10 of 33
finality, which allows parties to appeal interlocutory decisions that were part of a
series of orders that “effectively terminated the entire litigation.” Id. at 301–02; see
also Jetco Elec. Indus., Inc. v. Gardiner, 473 F.2d 1228, 1231 (5th Cir. 1973).
Because the “language of the district court’s order, along with its retention of the
jurisdictional allegations of the complaint, appeared to contemplate that [the
plaintiff] would pursue this same action in the same court,” the voluntary dismissal
did “not amount to a termination of the litigation between the parties.” Ryan, 577
F.2d at 302. And because the order “neither amount[ed] to an appealable final
decision nor [met] the requirements of any exception to the finality rule,” Ryan
dismissed the appeal. Id. at 303.
LeCompte and Ryan are not in conflict. We can read LeCompte to establish
that a voluntary dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2) is a final decision for the purposes
of appeal at least when the court places stringent conditions on refiling. See 528
F.2d at 603. Ryan qualifies that voluntary dismissals are deprived of finality when
part of the complaint remains before the district court, which occurs when a
plaintiff moves to voluntarily dismiss only part of his remaining complaint without
prejudice, the district court grants the motion without purporting to dismiss the
remainder of the complaint, and the dismissal order contemplates future filings in
the court. See 577 F.2d at 300–02 & n.2. Under these circumstances, the dismissal
10 Case: 18-10474 Date Filed: 07/16/2020 Page: 11 of 33
is akin to an order granting leave to amend, which is not final when it “permits
judicial proceedings to continue.” See id. at 302 n.2.
Perhaps because no conflict existed, both the former Fifth Circuit and, at
least initially, this Court held that voluntary dismissals without prejudice were final
in a variety of circumstances. Shortly after Ryan, our predecessor court explained
that LeCompte “stated the usual rule governing the appealability of orders granting
motions for voluntary dismissal” and reiterated that voluntary dismissals under
Rule 41(a)(2) are final decisions. Yoffe v. Keller Indus., Inc., 580 F.2d 126, 129
(5th Cir. 1978). This Circuit initially allowed appeals from voluntary dismissals
without prejudice without addressing whether a voluntary dismissal was final. See,
e.g., Black v. Broward Emp’t & Training Admin., 846 F.2d 1311, 1312 & n.3 (11th
Cir. 1988); Studstill v. Borg Warner Leasing, 806 F.2d 1005, 1007 (11th Cir.
1986); McCants v. Ford Motor Co., Inc., 781 F.2d 855, 856 (11th Cir. 1986). But
we later cited LeCompte and held that an “order granting voluntary dismissal
without prejudice under Rule 41(a)(2) is final and appealable” by a defendant who
had opposed the plaintiff’s motion for voluntary dismissal. Kirkland v. Nat’l
Mortg. Network, Inc., 884 F.2d 1367, 1369–70 (11th Cir. 1989). Because the
voluntary dismissal was a final judgment, we explained, “it incorporate[d] and
[brought] up for review the preceding nonfinal order” that the defendant
challenged. Id. at 1370. Finally, in McGregor v. Board of Commissioners, which
11 Case: 18-10474 Date Filed: 07/16/2020 Page: 12 of 33
involved a plaintiff’s challenge to several claims that the district court had
dismissed on the merits before granting the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss his
remaining claims, we quoted LeCompte and Yoffe and held that “[a]n order
granting a plaintiff’s motion for voluntary dismissal pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2)
qualifies as a final judgment for purposes of appeal.” 956 F.2d at 1020 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
The conflict came in Mesa v. United States, which also involved an order
granting a motion to voluntarily dismiss a suit without prejudice. See 61 F.3d 20,
21 (11th Cir. 1995). Mesa held that the order of dismissal before it was not final.
See id. It interpreted Ryan to hold that “the voluntary dismissal of [a] plaintiff’s
remaining claim could not be considered final because a voluntary dismissal is
without prejudice to the moving party to file those claims again.” Id. at 22. This
understanding of finality became the standard in this Circuit for addressing
voluntary dismissals without prejudice. See State Treasurer, 168 F.3d at 13;
Constr. Aggregates, Ltd. v. Forest Commodities Corp., 147 F.3d 1334, 1335–37
(11th Cir. 1998) (extending Mesa to stipulated dismissals under Rule 41(a)(1)).
We first spotted the tension in our precedent in State Treasurer v. Barry, 168
F.3d 8. After the district court in State Treasurer granted a partial summary
judgment in favor of the defendants, the parties filed a joint stipulation to dismiss
the remaining claim in the suit. Id. at 9–10; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(ii)
12 Case: 18-10474 Date Filed: 07/16/2020 Page: 13 of 33
(allowing the plaintiff to dismiss an action without a court order if all parties sign a
stipulation of dismissal). We dismissed the plaintiff’s appeal because we concluded
that Mesa and its reading of Ryan controlled. See State Treasurer, 168 F.3d at 16.
Although we failed to mention McGregor, we acknowledged that LeCompte and
Kirkland had allowed appeals from voluntary dismissals without prejudice. Id. at
14. But we concluded that the reasoning of these two decisions did not extend to
stipulated dismissals. Id. at 15. LeCompte and Kirkland, we explained, involved
court orders of dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2), not stipulated dismissals under Rule
41(a)(1). Id.; see also Kirkland, 884 F.2d at 1369–70 (concluding that a voluntary
dismissal without prejudice “under Rule 41(a)(2) is final”); LeCompte, 528 F.2d at
603 (concluding that a voluntary dismissal without prejudice is final “[w]here the
trial court allows the plaintiff to dismiss his action without prejudice” (emphasis
added) (internal quotation marks omitted)). We added, in dicta, that LeCompte “is
limited to a subset of Rule 41(a)(2) dismissals”: dismissals in which the court
“placed stringent conditions on the plaintiff’s ability to re-file its dismissed
claims.” State Treasurer, 168 F.3d at 15.
This appeal picks up where State Treasurer left off. To be sure, we have
revisited whether stipulated or noticed dismissals under Rule 41(a)(1) are final.
See, e.g., Equity Inv. Partners, LP v. Lenz, 594 F.3d 1338, 1341–42 n.2 (11th Cir.
2010); Schoenfeld v. Babbitt, 168 F.3d 1257, 1265–66 (11th Cir. 1999); Univ. of S.
13 Case: 18-10474 Date Filed: 07/16/2020 Page: 14 of 33
Ala., 168 F.3d at 408 n.1. But we have not addressed the tension between our
earliest precedents and Mesa as applied to voluntary dismissals under Rule
41(a)(2). Cf. Hood v. Plantation Gen. Med. Ctr., Ltd., 251 F.3d 932, 933–34 (11th
Cir. 2001) (holding that an order granting a motion for voluntary dismissal was not
final when a claim remained pending in the district court and that voluntarily
dismissing the remaining claim did not trigger the Jetco exception). That tension is
squarely presented in this appeal.
Two principles govern our approach to resolving conflicts in our precedent.
First, we are “obligated, if at all possible, to distill from apparently conflicting
prior panel decisions a basis of reconciliation and to apply that reconciled rule.”
United States v. Hogan, 986 F.2d 1364, 1369 (11th Cir. 1993). And second, if we
cannot reconcile our precedent, we must follow the oldest decision that governs the
issue. See Gen. Mills, 846 F.3d at 1338; accord Bryan A. Garner et al., The Law of
Judicial Precedent § 36, at 303–04 (2016).
We see no way to give force to Mesa in the light of our earlier precedents.
Even if State Treasurer is correct that we can limit LeCompte to situations in
which the district court attached “stringent conditions” to the voluntary-dismissal
order, 168 F.3d at 15, we must still reconcile Mesa with our other earlier decisions,
at least one of which is materially identical to it. In both McGregor and Mesa, the
plaintiff suffered an adverse decision on some of his claims and voluntarily
14 Case: 18-10474 Date Filed: 07/16/2020 Page: 15 of 33
dismissed his remaining claims without prejudice to challenge the earlier decision
on appeal. See Mesa, 61 F.3d at 21; McGregor, 956 F.2d at 1018–20. McGregor
concluded that “an order granting a plaintiff’s motion for voluntary dismissal
pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2) ‘qualifies as a final judgment for purposes of appeal.’”
956 F.2d at 1020 (quoting Yoffe, 580 F.2d at 129, and LeCompte, 528 F.2d at 603).
Conversely, Mesa later concluded that these orders were not final. 61 F.3d at 21–
22. Because Mesa did not even mention McGregor, it provided no reason to
distinguish that decision. And we cannot find one.
Because we cannot harmonize our decisions, the earliest-precedent rule
applies. See Gen. Mills, 846 F.3d at 1340. And under that rule, we must follow
McGregor, which both predates Mesa and is consistent with our earlier decisions.
So we hold that an order granting a motion to voluntarily dismiss the remainder of
a complaint under Rule 41(a)(2) “qualifies as a final judgment for purposes of
appeal.” McGregor, 956 F.2d at 1020 (quoting Yoffe, 580 F.2d at 129, and
LeCompte, 528 F.2d at 603). And because the Corleys appealed from such an
order, we have jurisdiction under section 1291.
B. We Have Territorial Jurisdiction to Hear This Appeal.
The next issue concerns our territorial jurisdiction under section 1294, which
mandates that “appeals from reviewable decisions of the district . . . courts shall be
taken . . . to the court of appeals for the circuit embracing the district.” 28 U.S.C.
15 Case: 18-10474 Date Filed: 07/16/2020 Page: 16 of 33
§ 1294. The Corleys urge us to hold that “reviewable decisions” in section 1294
refers to appealable decisions—that is, decisions that federal laws grant circuit
courts jurisdiction to review. Here, that decision is the voluntary-dismissal order.
See id. § 1291. Because the Northern District of Alabama issued that order, we
would have jurisdiction to review the order as “the court of appeals for the circuit
embracing [that] district.” Id. § 1294; see also id. § 41. The Navy suppliers counter
that the reviewable decision is the order that the Corleys challenge—that is, the
denial of their motion for reconsideration by the Eastern District of Pennsylvania—
which would deprive us of jurisdiction. See id. § 41.
The parties’ disagreement tracks a circuit split over the application of section
1294 to interlocutory orders that precede an inter-circuit transfer. Most circuits to
reach the question have concluded that they can review an out-of-circuit
interlocutory decision so long as they have jurisdiction over the district court that
issued the appealable decision. See Kalama v. Matson Navigation Co., 875 F.3d
297, 305 (6th Cir. 2017); In re Briscoe, 448 F.3d 201, 213–14 (3d Cir. 2006);
Jones v. InfoCure Corp., 310 F.3d 529, 532–34 (7th Cir. 2002); Hill v. Henderson,
195 F.3d 671, 674–75 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Chaiken v. VV Publ’g Corp., 119 F.3d
1018, 1025 n.2 (2d Cir. 1997); Tel-Phonic Servs., Inc. v. TBS Int’l, Inc., 975 F.2d
1134, 1138 (5th Cir. 1992). Conversely, the Tenth Circuit has held that it lacks
jurisdiction to review interlocutory orders issued by an out-of-circuit district court,
16 Case: 18-10474 Date Filed: 07/16/2020 Page: 17 of 33
even when the appealable decision comes from within its boundaries. See
McGeorge v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 871 F.2d 952, 954 (10th Cir. 1989). In its view,
jurisdiction under section 1294 depends on whether the district court that issued
the interlocutory order under review lies within its territorial boundaries. See id.
We agree with the majority interpretation and hold that the phrase
“reviewable decisions” in section 1294 refers to appealable decisions. Congress
has not given us the power to review interlocutory orders at will. Outside of narrow
circumstances not relevant here, we can review those orders only when they
“merge into a final judgment of the district court.” Akin v. PAFEC Ltd., 991 F.2d
1550, 1563 (11th Cir. 1993). So even when we consider the merits of an
interlocutory order, we still “review” the final decision into which the earlier order
merged. See Kalama, 875 F.3d at 305 (“A partial dismissal is not ‘reviewable’
until it can be appealed—generally, when it ‘merges’ into a final, appealable
judgment.”). That final decision is necessarily the reviewable decision.
The rest of section 1294 dispels any lingering ambiguity about the meaning
of “reviewable decision.” See Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 56 (1995) (“[I]t is a
fundamental principle of statutory construction . . . that the meaning of a word
cannot be determined in isolation, but must be drawn from the context in which it
is used.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Section 1294 concerns “appeals from
reviewable decisions.” 28 U.S.C. § 1294 (emphasis added). This language, of
17 Case: 18-10474 Date Filed: 07/16/2020 Page: 18 of 33
course, presumes that the “reviewable decision[]” is an appealable decision. After
all, there can be no “appeal[] from” a non-appealable decision. Cf. Cox v. Adm’r
U.S. Steel & Carnegie, 17 F.3d 1386, 1413 n.4 (11th Cir. 1994) (“When reviewing
an appeal from a final judgment, this court can review rulings on previous
interlocutory orders.” (alteration adopted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). See
generally 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (giving courts of appeals jurisdiction over “appeals
from all final decisions” of district courts). Adopting the minority interpretation
would require us to ignore this context, which we cannot do.
The Navy suppliers argue that our decision in Roofing and Sheet Metal
Services, Inc. v. La Quinta Motor Inns, Inc., 689 F.2d 982, 986 (11th Cir. 1982),
requires a different interpretation of section 1294. In Roofing, the Western District
of Arkansas transferred the underlying suit to the Southern District of Alabama,
and the appellant sought to challenge that transfer order on appeal to this Court.
See id. at 984–85. We held that section 1294 prevented us from reviewing the
transfer order. Id. at 986–87; see also Murray v. Scott, 253 F.3d 1308, 1314 (11th
Cir. 2001) (holding the same); cf. In re Corrugated Container Anti-Trust Litig.,
620 F.2d 1086, 1090–91 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that section 1294 required
dismissing an appeal from a final order of contempt issued by the Southern District
of New York against a third-party witness). The Navy suppliers argue that Roofing
demands that we dismiss the Corleys’ appeal.
18 Case: 18-10474 Date Filed: 07/16/2020 Page: 19 of 33
We disagree. The holding of Roofing does not extend beyond transfer orders.
Roofing reached its decision in the shadow of what it called the “well established”
rule that “a transferee court cannot directly review the transfer order itself.” 689
F.2d at 986 (quoting Starnes v. McGuire, 512 F.2d 918, 924 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (en
banc)); see also id. at 987 (“[W]e know of no case in which [any] circuit . . . has in
fact reviewed a transfer order issued by a district court in another circuit.”). When
Roofing held that it could not review the transfer order before it, it joined the
uniform consensus of our sister circuits that an out-of-circuit transfer order is not
reviewable on appeal in the transferee circuit. See Posnanski v. Gibney, 421 F.3d
977, 980 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Copley, 25 F.3d 660, 662 (8th Cir.
1994); Lewelling v. Farmers Ins. of Columbus, Inc., 879 F.2d 212, 218 (6th Cir.
1989); McGeorge, 871 F.2d at 953–54; Reyes v. Supervisor of the Drug Enf’t
Admin., 834 F.2d 1093, 1095 (1st Cir. 1987); Linnell v. Sloan, 636 F.2d 65, 67 (4th
Cir. 1980); Starnes, 512 F.2d at 924; Purex Corp. v. St. Louis Nat’l Stockyards
Co., 374 F.2d 998, 1000 (7th Cir. 1967); see also Songbyrd, Inc. v. Estate of
Grossman, 206 F.3d 172, 178 (2d Cir. 2000) (requiring a party to file a retransfer
motion in the transferee court to appeal a transfer order). But see Nascone v.
Spudnuts, Inc., 735 F.2d 763, 772 n.9 (3d Cir. 1984) (suggesting in dicta that a
transferee circuit could review a transfer order). This bar does not encompass other
out-of-circuit interlocutory decisions. See Hill, 195 F.3d at 677 (concluding that
19 Case: 18-10474 Date Filed: 07/16/2020 Page: 20 of 33
the “complex and somewhat conflicting pattern of reviewability” of transfer orders
does not affect the reviewability of other pretransfer orders).
In sum, we have territorial jurisdiction. The term “reviewable decisions” in
section 1294 refers to appealable decisions. The Northern District of Alabama
issued the final, appealable decision in this suit. And, of course, we can hear
appeals from that court.
C. The Corleys Have Standing to Appeal. The final jurisdictional issue concerns our jurisdiction under Article III of
the Constitution, which limits our authority to “Cases” and “Controversies.” U.S.
Const. art. III, § 2. Although the parties do not dispute this issue, “[l]ongstanding
principles of federal law oblige us to inquire sua sponte whenever a doubt arises as
to the existence of federal jurisdiction.” Green v. Graham, 906 F.3d 955, 961 (11th
Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because our precedent leaves doubt
about whether we have Article III jurisdiction to hear the Corleys’ appeal from
their own voluntary dismissal, we address the issue.
“To have a case or controversy, a litigant must establish that he has standing,
which must exist ‘throughout all stages of litigation,’” including on appeal. United
States v. Amodeo, 916 F.3d 967, 971 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting Hollingsworth v.
Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 705 (2013)). Standing is an “irreducible constitutional
minimum,” and a “court is powerless to continue” in its absence. CAMP Legal Def.
20 Case: 18-10474 Date Filed: 07/16/2020 Page: 21 of 33
Fund, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 451 F.3d 1257, 1269 (11th Cir. 2006) (internal
quotation marks omitted). To establish standing, a litigant must prove that “he has
suffered a concrete and particularized injury.” Amodeo, 916 F.3d at 971 (quoting
Hollingsworth, 570 U.S. at 704). In the appellate context, “the primary meaning of
the injury requirement is adverseness.” Id. Specifically, the litigant “must be
adverse as to the final judgment” to appeal from that judgment. OFS Fitel, 549
F.3d at 1356 (internal quotation marks omitted).
As a general rule, a plaintiff is not adverse to a voluntary dismissal that he
requested. See, e.g., Druhan v. Am. Mut. Life, 166 F.3d 1324, 1326 (11th Cir.
1999). This rule “can easily be understood,” the former Fifth Circuit explained,
because “the plaintiff has acquired that which he sought,” so the order cannot be
adverse. LeCompte, 528 F.2d at 603.
Appellate standing is murkier when a plaintiff appeals from a voluntary
dismissal to challenge an adverse interlocutory order. On the one hand, we have
held that plaintiffs have standing to appeal from a voluntary dismissal if the
adverse interlocutory order is effectively “case-dispositive” and “the district court
bases its dismissal with prejudice on the fact that its interlocutory decision
disposed of the entire case.” OFS Fitel, 549 F.3d at 1359 (order excluding expert
testimony that was legally necessary to prevail). On the other hand, interlocutory
orders that do not address the merits of a plaintiff’s claim cannot establish
21 Case: 18-10474 Date Filed: 07/16/2020 Page: 22 of 33
appellate standing. See Druhan, 166 F.3d at 1326 (order denying the plaintiff’s
motion to remand her suit to state court); accord Woodard v. STP Corp., 170 F.3d
1043, 1044 (11th Cir. 1999). The second class of appeals lacks adverseness
because there is “no contested court ruling, either interlocutory or final, as to the
merits of the plaintiff’s claims” and so “the dismissal on the merits derives only
from the plaintiff’s own written request.” OFS Fitel, 549 F.3d at 1356.
This appeal does not fit neatly within our precedents on voluntary
dismissals. Unlike the plaintiff in OFS Fitel, the Corleys did not voluntarily
dismiss their claims to contest a “case-dispositive” order. They instead challenge a
years-old order denying their motion to reconsider a summary judgment in favor of
some defendants. But unlike the plaintiffs in Druhan and Woodard, the Corleys
contest an order that completely resolved their claims against certain defendants on
the merits and merged into the final judgment. See Akin, 991 F.2d at 1563 (“When
a district court enters a final judgment, all prior non-final orders and rulings which
produced the judgment are merged into the judgment and subject to review on
appeal.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Because the Corleys never consented
to that order, the final judgment contains an adverse decision on the merits that
does not “derive[] only from the plaintiff’s own written request.” OFS Fitel, 549
F.3d at 1356.
22 Case: 18-10474 Date Filed: 07/16/2020 Page: 23 of 33
Although our precedent on voluntary dismissals does not resolve this appeal,
a broader principle of appellate standing establishes that the Corleys are adverse to
the final judgment: “a party is ‘aggrieved’ and ordinarily can appeal a decision
‘granting in part and denying in part the remedy requested.’” Forney v. Apfel, 524
U.S. 266, 271 (1998) (quoting United States v. Jose, 519 U.S. 54, 56 (1996)). Even
though the Corleys are not adverse to the order of voluntary dismissal, which
granted their requested remedy for Fairbanks and Garlock, they are adverse to the
order that denied their motion to reconsider the summary judgment in favor of the
Navy suppliers. And the latter order is just as much a part of the final judgment as
the voluntary-dismissal order. So, notwithstanding their voluntary dismissal, the
Corleys are adverse to part of the final judgment, which is enough to establish
appellate standing. See Aaro, Inc. v. Daewoo Int’l (Am.) Corp., 755 F.2d 1398,
1400–01 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding that plaintiffs who prevailed at trial on some of
their claims and consented to a remittitur order could still appeal because they
challenged an adverse partial summary judgment that had merged into the final
judgment); see also Forney, 524 U.S. at 271; OFS Fitel, 549 F.3d at 1359
(“[W]hen the appeal is from a final judgment, the fact that the appeal substantively
concerns an interlocutory ruling is no bar to jurisdiction.”).
23 Case: 18-10474 Date Filed: 07/16/2020 Page: 24 of 33
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review the denial of a motion for reconsideration for an abuse of
discretion. See Richardson v. Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 740 (11th Cir. 2010).
IV. DISCUSSION
The merits of this appeal are straightforward. The Corleys contend that the
district court abused its discretion when it denied their motion for reconsideration,
which argued that they had a valid claim against the Navy suppliers under
maritime law. The Corleys argue that they had a right to “make an election
between civil and admiralty law,” even after the district court entered a summary
judgment. We disagree.
When the district court denied the Corleys’ motion, it explained that the
Corleys had “never argued previously that maritime law should apply.” In their
complaint, the Corleys instead alleged that “no claim of admiralty or maritime law
is raised.” They maintained this position in their response to the Navy suppliers’
motion for summary judgment, which discussed only Alabama law. The Corleys
waited until after the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Navy
suppliers to argue, in a motion for reconsideration, that they had a valid claim
under maritime law against the Navy suppliers. The district court ruled that the
Corleys could not argue that a different substantive law governed their complaint
at that late stage in the litigation.
24 Case: 18-10474 Date Filed: 07/16/2020 Page: 25 of 33
We have long held that district courts act well within their discretion when
they refuse to consider arguments that a party made for the first time in a motion
for reconsideration. See, e.g., Bost v. Fed. Express Corp., 372 F.3d 1233, 1242–43
(11th Cir. 2004); Hashwani v. Barbar, 822 F.2d 1038, 1041 (11th Cir. 1987). As
we have explained, “[t]here is a significant difference between pointing out errors
in a court’s decision on grounds that have already been urged before the court and
raising altogether new arguments on a motion to amend; if accepted, the latter
essentially affords a litigant two bites at the apple.” Am. Home Assur. Co. v. Glenn
Estess & Assocs., Inc., 763 F.2d 1237, 1239 (11th Cir. 1985) (internal quotation
marks omitted). This principle extends to plaintiffs’ motions for reconsideration
that urge district courts to apply a different law to govern their claims for relief.
See id. (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it rejected a
choice-of-law argument that a party raised for the first time in a motion for
reconsideration).
The Corleys contend that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(h) gave them
the right to invoke maritime law at any time, but they misread that rule. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 9(h)(1) (“If a claim for relief is within the admiralty or maritime
jurisdiction and also within the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction on some other
ground, the pleading may designate the claim as an admiralty or maritime claim
. . . .”). Rule 9(h)(1) “serves only as a device by which the pleader may claim the
25 Case: 18-10474 Date Filed: 07/16/2020 Page: 26 of 33
special benefits of admiralty procedures and remedies, including a nonjury trial,
when the pleadings show that both admiralty and some other basis of federal
jurisdiction exist.” Romero v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 515 F.2d 1249, 1252 (5th Cir.
1975). It does not determine whether maritime law governs a claim. See Powell v.
Offshore Nav., Inc., 644 F.2d 1063, 1065 & n.5 (5th Cir. Unit A May 1981).
The Corleys are not entitled to a second bite at the apple. They argued that
Alabama law applied until the district court granted summary judgment in favor of
the Navy suppliers. Their motion for reconsideration was the first time they even
suggested that maritime law applied. And they do not offer a compelling
explanation to justify their delay. For example, the Corleys’ main argument is that
the intervening decision of a district court in an unrelated suit, Conner v. Alfa
Laval, Inc., 799 F. Supp. 2d 455 (E.D. Pa. 2011), changed the law and allowed
them to bring a maritime claim. But, of course, decisions of district courts “have no
binding precedential authority beyond the case in which they are entered,” Dow
Jones & Co. v. Kaye, 256 F.3d 1251, 1258 n.10 (11th Cir. 2001); accord Garner et
al., The Law of Judicial Precedent § 29, at 255, so Conner could not have affected
their ability to bring a claim under maritime law. At bottom, the district court did
not abuse its discretion when it concluded that this motion was an incorrect vehicle
to change the substantive law governing the suit.
26 Case: 18-10474 Date Filed: 07/16/2020 Page: 27 of 33
V. CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
27 Case: 18-10474 Date Filed: 07/16/2020 Page: 28 of 33
WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, joined by LUCK, Circuit Judge, concurring:
Although this Court has jurisdiction to hear the Corleys’ appeal from their
voluntary dismissal, I write separately both to underscore the widespread problems
that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a) creates in finality doctrine and to
highlight better ways for many litigants to secure appellate review of decisions that
resolve only some of their claims.
Rule 41(a) is a poor mechanism to accelerate appellate review. The rule
contemplates the voluntary dismissal of “an action,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a), which,
we have explained, refers to “the whole case” instead of particular claims, Perry v.
Schumacher Grp. of La., 891 F.3d 954, 958 (11th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation
marks omitted). But see Plains Growers, Inc. ex rel. Florists’ Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Ickes-Braun Glasshouses, Inc., 474 F.2d 250, 253 (5th Cir. 1973) (“[W]e hold that
plaintiff is entitled to a dismissal against one defendant under Rule 41(a), even
though the action against another defendant would remain pending.”). The rule
also presumes that a plaintiff will want to refile the “action” later. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 41(a) (mandating that unless the notice, stipulation, or order of dismissal “states
otherwise, the dismissal is without prejudice”). Perhaps unsurprisingly, litigants’
attempts to hijack this rule as a means to “home-brew their own approach to
obtaining appellate review” of particular claims, First Health Grp. Corp. v. BCE
Emergis Corp., 269 F.3d 800, 801 (7th Cir. 2001), have not always been smooth.
28 Case: 18-10474 Date Filed: 07/16/2020 Page: 29 of 33
Nearly every circuit has encountered similar issues to those we considered in
this appeal. We are not the first court to face an intracircuit split in our precedent.
See Robinson-Reeder v. Am. Council on Educ., 571 F.3d 1333, 1338–39 & n.6
(D.C. Cir. 2009) (explaining that several inter- and intra- circuit splits exist on the
question); Chappelle v. Beacon Commc’ns Corp., 84 F.3d 652, 654 (2d Cir. 1996)
(listing intracircuit splits); see also Terry W. Schackmann & Barry L. Pickens, The
Finality Trap: Accidentally Losing Your Right to Appeal (Part I), 58 J. Mo. Bar 78,
84 (2002) (cautioning litigants that judicial decisions in this area are not “assured
of adherence in the future” and are sometimes “ignore[d]”). And although the
panel opinion compares this Circuit’s finality doctrine on Rule 41(a) to a Jackson
Pollock painting, we might have also called it an “egregious mess,” Williams v.
Seidenbach, 958 F.3d 341, 355 (5th Cir. 2020) (en banc) (Willett, J., concurring in
the judgment) (internal quotation marks omitted), or lamented that “[i]t would be
an understatement to say that our precedents . . . are difficult to harmonize,” West
v. Macht, 197 F.3d 1185, 1188 (7th Cir. 1999).
Nor are we the only circuit to riddle our doctrine with exceptions to the
purported nonfinality of voluntary dismissals without prejudice. Many circuits, for
example, assess the likelihood that the plaintiff will relitigate dismissed claims.
See, e.g., Spring Creek Expl. & Prod. Co., LLC v. Hess Bakken Inv., II, LLC, 887
F.3d 1003, 1015–16 (10th Cir. 2018). In other circuits, this plaintiff can secure
29 Case: 18-10474 Date Filed: 07/16/2020 Page: 30 of 33
appellate jurisdiction by recanting before the appellate panel any intention of
pursuing the voluntarily dismissed claims. See, e.g., Jewish People for the
Betterment of Westhampton Beach v. Vill. of Westhampton Beach, 778 F.3d 390,
394 (2d Cir. 2015). The plaintiff will receive a particularly good deal in the Third
Circuit, which requires him to renounce pursuing the dismissed claims only in the
same district court. See Doe v. Hesketh, 828 F.3d 159, 165 (3d Cir. 2016). The
First Circuit will hear an appeal if he “unequivocally” reserved the right to appeal
in the district court, see Scanlon v. M.V. SUPER SERVANT 3, 429 F.3d 6, 8 (1st
Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted), while the Federal and Ninth Circuits
will reach the merits if he persuades them that he acted in good faith and did not
intend to manufacture appellate jurisdiction with the voluntary dismissal, see Doe
v. United States, 513 F.3d 1348, 1353–54 (Fed. Cir. 2008); James v. Price Stern
Sloan, Inc., 283 F.3d 1064, 1070 (9th Cir. 2002). But the plaintiff should take the
opposite approach if he finds himself in the Eighth Circuit, which has held that
finality exists when the plaintiff tries to manufacture jurisdiction—that is, if the
plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his claims without prejudice to “expedite appellate
review” of other issues. Helm Fin. Corp. v. MNVA R.R., Inc., 212 F.3d 1076, 1080
(8th Cir. 2000).
In the light of the volatility Rule 41(a) brings to appellate jurisdiction,
district courts faced with voluntary-dismissal motions would act well within their
30 Case: 18-10474 Date Filed: 07/16/2020 Page: 31 of 33
discretion to redirect litigants to other avenues to appeal. See McCants v. Ford
Motor Co., Inc., 781 F.2d 855, 857 (11th Cir. 1986) (“Dismissal on motion of the
plaintiff pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2) is within the sound discretion of the district
court, and its order may be reviewed only for an abuse of discretion.”). The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure provide litigants with better options to secure an appeal.
For example, district courts can designate decisions on the merits as final
under Rule 54(b). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) (allowing district courts to “direct entry
of a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties” if they
find that “there is no just reason for delay”). In this appeal, such a designation
would have obviated any question about whether we could reach the merits. See,
e.g., Perry, 891 F.3d at 958 (“[I]t is likely that a plaintiff would have little trouble
[satisfying Rule 54(b)] where . . . the nucleus of her multi-claim and multi-party
suit has been destroyed and she is now faced with committing the time and
expense of trying only one claim against only one defendant.”).
Alternatively, district courts may sever a party’s remaining claims. See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 21 (“The court may . . . sever any claim against a party.”). The severed
claims would “proceed[] as a discrete suit and result[] in [their] own final judgment
from which an appeal may be taken.” Hofmann v. De Marchena Kaluche &
Asociados, 642 F.3d 995, 998 (11th Cir. 2011). As with Rule 54(b), Rule 21 can
form the basis of an appeal. See, e.g., Estate of Amergi ex rel. Amergi v.
31 Case: 18-10474 Date Filed: 07/16/2020 Page: 32 of 33
Palestinian Auth., 611 F.3d 1350, 1367 (11th Cir. 2010) (“[I]t was no abuse of
discretion to sever the claims so that Saperstein could proceed to trial on his FTA
claim and that the Amergis could take an immediate appeal for the dismissal of
their claims.”). Here, the Corleys moved to sever their claims before they sought a
voluntary dismissal without prejudice, but the district court denied their motion
without explanation.
Still other possibilities remain open to explore. For example, a district court
could grant leave to amend a complaint to drop lingering claims. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 15(a)(2) (empowering district courts to “freely give leave [to amend] when
justice so requires”); see also Nat’l Broiler Mktg. Ass’n v. United States, 436 U.S.
816, 819 n.5 (1978); Klay v. United Healthgroup, Inc., 376 F.3d 1092, 1106 (11th
Cir. 2004). Or, if needed, a district court could drop parties. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 21
(“On motion . . . the court may at any time, on just terms, add or drop a party.”);
see also Lampliter Dinner Theater, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 792 F.2d 1036,
1045–46 (11th Cir. 1986) (stressing the “great discretion” district courts have when
using Rule 21 to drop a party).
District courts should consider the availability of these options when
deciding whether to grant a voluntary dismissal without prejudice under Rule
41(a)(2). To be sure, the panel opinion paves the way for litigants to continue using
Rule 41(a) to secure appellate review, but this result may not be permanent. Our
32 Case: 18-10474 Date Filed: 07/16/2020 Page: 33 of 33
decision is largely grounded on the force of precedent, and an en banc court would
have colorable arguments to reconsider our approach. See, e.g., Williams, 958 F.3d
at 362 (Oldham, J., dissenting) (arguing that litigants lack standing to appeal from
a voluntary dismissal without prejudice because “a Rule 41(a) dismissal represents
a voluntary abandonment of the entire action”). And in the light of the chaos both
within and among the circuits, the Supreme Court might also intervene.
I express no opinion on the need for such a shift, much less on the merits of
any future dispute over our appellate jurisdiction. Regardless of these issues,
litigants have a number of more reliable tools to use when seeking appeals. They
should look first to them before resorting to Rule 41(a).