OPINION
SHEA, Justice.
These matters are before the Supreme Court on two petitions, one a petition for the issuance of a writ of certiorari to review a decision of the Rhode Island State Board of Elections and the other on a petition for leave to file an information in the nature of quo warranto. The ultimate relief sought by both petitions is the preven[1195]*1195tion of Vincent A. Cianci, Jr., as mayor-elect, from assuming the office of mayor of the city of Providence. We deny both petitions.
The court heard oral argument on behalf of petitioners and respondent and carefully examined the briefs submitted by the parties and by amicus curiae. Following conference thereon, we issued an order on December 20, 1990, denying both petitions. 583 A.2d 880. That order was issued prior to the release of this opinion because of the obvious need of the city of Providence for a resolution of the issues before this court prior to the January 9, 1991 date on which the mayor-elect was scheduled to be inaugurated into office. Our opinion follows.
The events that gave rise to these petitions are well known to the people of this state. On April 23, 1984, Vincent A. Cian-ci, Jr. (Cianci), who was then the mayor of the city of Providence, entered a plea of nolo contendere in the Superior Court, County of Providence to the felony charge of assault with a dangerous weapon. He was adjudged guilty of the charge and a sentence of five years at the Adult Correctional Institutions was imposed. That sentence was suspended and defendant was placed on five years probation. That probationary period extended until on or about April 23, 1989. Two days after the imposition of sentence, Cianci resigned from the office of mayor because of disqualification provisions in the Home Rule Charter of the city of Providence. The office of mayor was declared vacant, and a special election was called to elect a mayor for the unexpired term.
Cianci declared his intention to become a candidate for election to that unexpired term. A timely challenge was filed to his eligibility to be elected to that unexpired term. That challenge ultimately came before this court. We ruled that Cianci was prohibited from seeking election to serve as mayor for the unexpired term created by his forfeiture of the office. Gelch v. State Board of Elections, 482 A.2d 1204 (R.I.1984). The ruling was based upon sections 202 and 206 of the Home Rule Charter of the city of Providence. In that opinion we noted that “[w]e need not decide whether state law (in particular G.L.1956 (1981 Reenactment) § 13-6-2) prohibits Cianci from holding public office. * * * State law concerning respondent’s right to be a candidate in a general election for a full new term is not at issue, and therefore we need not address it.” 482 A.2d at 1211 n. 6.
On June 27,1990, Cianci filed his declaration of candidacy for election as mayor of the city of Providence for the term beginning January 1991. On July 13,1990, Cian-ci filed his nomination papers with the Board of Canvassers of the city of Providence (Board of Canvassers). July 16, 1990 was the final date under G.L.1956 (1988 Reenactment) § 17-14-13 for the filing of objections to Cianci’s candidacy. No objections were filed.
Eventually three candidates qualified for a place on the ballot for the office of mayor of the city of Providence at the general election for state and local offices in November 1990. Cianci was declared to have received a plurality of the votes cast. On November 9, 1990, the State Board of Elections conducted a recount and determined that Cianci had in fact received a plurality of the votes cast. On that same day, an objection was filed with the Board of Canvassers to the certification of the vote. The Board of Canvassers held an emergency hearing on the objection on November 13, 1990. Sometime prior to the hearing on the objection, however, the original objectors withdrew their objection and were replaced by the Vileno petitioners in the matter before us, who filed their own objection. After a hearing on the objection, the certificate of election was issued to Cianci.
An appeal to the State Board of Elections was taken by objectors to the decision of the Board of Canvassers. The State Board of Elections allowed Cianci to intervene in the proceedings. It granted his motion to dismiss the appeal but retained jurisdiction over the matter in order to conduct an evidentiary hearing to create a record with respect to the newly adopted state constitutional provisions, which were expected to have bearing upon the issues that would be raised before this court.
[1196]*1196In due course the petition for an information in the nature of a quo warranto to challenge Cianci’s title to the office of may- or was filed in this court by Floyd Edmund Webb III (Webb). Later, the Yileno petitioners filed a petition for the issuance of a common-law writ of certiorari to review the decision of the State Board of Elections. These matters were consolidated for hearing before the court.
We shall first address Webb’s request for leave to file an information in the nature of quo warranto (information). This common-law proceeding is used to challenge an individual’s title to public office and to oust the individual from the public office if the title is not well founded. Fargnoli v. Cianci, 121 R.I. 153, 162, 397 A.2d 68, 73 (1979); Andrews v. Stiles, 99 R.I. 546, 547-48, 209 A.2d 210, 211 (1965); State v. Ream, 17 R.I. 391, 396-97, 22 A. 1018, 1020 (1891); State v. Lane, 16 R.I. 620, 626, 18 A. 1035, 1037 (1889); see also State v. Brown, 5 R.I. 1, 11 (1857). The origins of the information are directly linked to the ancient writ of quo warranto. That was a high-prerogative civil writ of right in England, reserved for the use of the Crown to demand by what authority an individual presumed to hold public office. Annot. Right of private person not claiming office to maintain quo warran-to proceedings to test title to or existence of public office, 51 A.L.R.2d 1306, 1309 (1957); 65 Am.Jur.2d, Quo Warranto § 2 (1972); 74 C.J.S. Quo Warranto § 1 (1951). The writ became obsolete in England before the Revolutionary War. The obsolescence was said to have resulted in part from the cumbersome nature of the proceeding. Id. The writ was later supplanted by the “information in the nature of quo warranto,” which was criminal in nature. It was used not only to fine the usurper but also to remove the usurper from the public office in question. Id. These developments found legislative expression in the English Statute of Anne in 1711, 9 Anne, ch. 20, which, although not considered applicable to the United States, is viewed as the ancestral basis for the quo warranto statutes found in many American jurisdictions today. Annot. 51 A.L.R.2d at 1309.
That statute expressly recognized the preexistence of the information in the nature of quo warranto. Further, the statute conferred jurisdiction upon the courts to employ an information only with respect to the public and political offices that were specifically enumerated in the statute’s preamble. Brooks v. State, 26 Del. 1, 79 A. 790, 795 (1911). The information was used in all instances wherein the writ of quo warranto was previously maintained. In the absence of a statute, the information’s application in this country has been limited to instances in which the writ of quo warranto would have been granted at common law in England. High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies at 552 (3d ed. 1896). The information in the nature of quo war-ranto has been recognized in this jurisdiction to perform the same functions as the writ of quo warranto, see Brown, 5 R.I. at 7, and also to have lost all its character as a criminal proceeding in everything but form. See Ream, 17 R.I. at 401, 22 A. at 1020.
This court has entertained numerous petitions for leave to file an information in the nature of quo warranto. In Brown, the court exercised its discretion to allow the Attorney General to file an information in vindication of a public right to challenge the title of the acting major-general of the Division of the Rhode Island Militia. After reaching the merits of the petition and deciding that the major-general improperly held the public office, the court ousted him and imposed a nominal fine. Brown, 5 R.I. at 11. Later, in Attorney General v. McCaughey, 21 R.I. 341, 43 A. 646 (1899), this court again exercised its discretion to allow the Attorney General to file an information in vindication of a public right to challenge the title of several Pawtucket highway commissioners appointed by the local Board of Aldermen. In that case, however, the court ruled that the highway commissioners were not “public officers” and therefore declined to reach the merits of the petition because quo warranto was an improper method by which to seek the commissioners’ ouster. Id. at 348, 43 A. at 649.
[1197]*1197These early decisions demonstrate that we have continuously exercised our discretion to hold that an information in the nature of quo warranto that seeks to vindicate a public right cannot be brought in this jurisdiction without the intervention of the Attorney General.1 Violet v. Voccola, 497 A.2d 709, 710-11 (R.I.1985); Black v. Cummings, 62 R.I. 361, 367, 5 A.2d 858, 861 (1939); Ney v. Whiteley, 26 R.I. 464, 467, 59 A. 400, 401 (1904); see also O’Brien v. Board of Aldermen of Pawtucket, 18 R.I. 113, 116-17, 25 A. 914, 915 (1892). In complete agreement is Fargnoli, wherein we held that “title to public office should not be put in question any time an individual sees fit to cast a cloud. Proceedings by way of quo warranto or informations in the nature of quo warranto must be placed in public and responsible hands. The moving party on such occasions is the attorney general.” 121 R.I. at 164 n. 6, 397 A.2d at 74 n. 6. The purpose of this rule is to protect public officials from numerous private challenges to their titles as public officers. The rule is followed by numerous jurisdictions that have considered the issue. Newman v. United States ex rel. Frizzell, 238 U.S. 537, 35 S.Ct. 881, 59 L.Ed. 1446 (1915); Crouch v. City of Tucson, 145 Ariz. 65, 699 P.2d 1296 (1984); International Ass’n. of Firefighters v. City of Oakland, 174 Cal.App.3d 687, 220 Cal.Rptr. 256 (1985); Butterworth v. Espey, 523 So.2d 1278 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1988); State ex rel. Antrim v. Reardon, 161 Ind. 249, 68 N.E. 169 (1903); State of Maine v. Elwell, 156 Me. 193, 163 A.2d 342 (1960); State ex rel. Burk v. Thuet, 230 Minn. 365, 41 N.W.2d 585 (1950); Meehan v. Bachelder, 73 N.H. 113, 59 A. 620 (1904); State ex rel. Inman v. Brock, 622 S.W.2d 36 (Tenn.1981).
Applying this rule to Webb’s petition, we find it clear that he is seeking to vindicate a public right on behalf of all the citizens of Providence without the intervention of the Attorney General by challenging Cianci’s title to the office of mayor. The petitioner’s brief, in fact, urges that he “be granted standing to assert the public’s right to an adjudication of the issues raised herein” and states that “[t]he [petitioner] * * * [is] prepared and qualified to adequately and fairly protect the interests of the public in this proceeding.” (Emphasis added.) Therefore, we conclude that we are constrained by precedent to deny petitioner leave to file an information in the nature of quo warranto. In doing so, we are following the long-established doctrine set forth in the earlier decisions of this court.
We acknowledge that this court has from time to time exercised its discretion to allow private citizens to challenge an individual’s title to public office without the intervention of the Attorney General. A review of these decisions reveals, however, that these private challenges have been allowed only in cases in which the proceedings were brought as petitions in equity in the nature of quo warranto (petition in equity). More importantly, in those cases the petitioners sought to place themselves in the public office in dispute. Andrews v. Stiles, 99 R.I. 546, 209 A.2d 210 (1965); Gorham v. Robinson, 57 R.I. 1, 186 A. 832 (1936); McGroarty v. Ferretti, 56 R.I. 152, 184 A. 508 (1936); Horton v. Sullivan, 35 R.I. 242, 86 A. 314 (1913); Hoxsie v. Edwards, 24 R.I. 338, 53 A. 128 (1902); see also Black, 62 R.I. at 364, 5 A.2d at 859.
In Black, we reasoned that a petition in equity could be brought only when it is claimed that the petitioner is entitled to the public office in dispute. In this regard the court stated:
“In a proper case there can also be no question of the jurisdiction of this court to entertain, in its discretion, a petition in equity in the nature of quo warran-to brought by a private person in his own name and without the intervention of the [1198]*1198attorney general.” (Emphasis added.) Black, 62 R.I. at 364, 5 A.2d at 859.
A petition in equity is a purely statutory proceeding that was first authorized in an 1891 statute.2 Fargnoli, 121 R.I. at 162, 397 A.2d at 73. Although the Superior Court has jurisdiction to hear any proceeding upon a writ of quo warranto or by way of an information in the nature of quo warranto by virtue of G.L.1956 (1985 Reenactment) § 8-2-16, the Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction under § 10-14-1 to entertain petitions in equity in the nature of quo warranto. Such a petition in equity rests on an entirely different basis from petitioner’s common-law petition for leave to file an information in the nature of quo warranto. And although the petition before us does not conform to the provisions of § 10-14-1, we shall nevertheless exercise our exclusive jurisdiction and examine the petition as if brought in equity to determine whether this is a proper case wherein this court could exercise its discretion to allow petitioner to challenge Cianci without the intervention of the Attorney General.
The petitioner argues that the matter before us constitutes a proper case because it raises important state constitutional issues and lacks any factual dispute. In doing so, he misinterprets the criteria we have used in prior decisions as a basis for determining what constitutes a proper case. In Hoxsie, this court exercised its discretion to allow a private citizen to petition in equity without the intervention of the Attorney General to challenge an individual’s title to the office of town clerk of the town of Exeter. The petitioner alleged that he was the duly elected town clerk pursuant to a valid election. The challenged individual was the prior town clerk, who defended his title on the grounds that the petitioner’s election was null and void and that he continued to hold the public office until his successor was duly elected and qualified. On the merits, the court concluded that the contested June 3, 1902 election was valid and therefore ousted the town clerk and replaced him with the petitioner. Hoxsie, 24 R.I. at 350, 53 A. at 132.
Similarly, in McGroarty, this court exercised its discretion to allow a private citizen to bring a petition in equity without the intervention of the Attorney General to challenge an individual’s title to the office of city auditor of the city of Warwick. The petitioner argued that the acting city auditor was not properly appointed and asked the court to confirm him, the petitioner, as city auditor by reason of his right to remain in the public office until a successor was properly chosen or appointed. The court expressly found that the petitioner had a sufficient personal interest in the public office in dispute to allow him to bring the petition in equity without the intervention of the Attorney General. Nevertheless, on reaching the merits, the court found that the acting city auditor was properly appointed and therefore denied and dismissed the petition. McGroarty, 56 R.I. at 162, 184 A. at 512.
Later, in Black, this court exercised its discretion to deny private citizens leave to file a petition in equity without the intervention of the Attorney General to challenge the election of several individuals in the town of North Providence. The petitioners sought a new election. In a well-reasoned decision the court examined prior cases and offered this summation in regard to when a private citizen may petition in [1199]*1199equity without the intervention of the Attorney General:
“Certainly the law in this state is clear that, where a petitioner seeks permission to file a petition in equity under the statute without the intervention of the attorney general, the primary issue must be the right of the petitioner to the office; and the petitioner in his petition must allege claim to it, and facts in support of his claim, or he will not be heard. In such a proceeding the petitioner can prevail only on the strength of his own title and not on the weakness of that of the respondent.” Black, 62 R.I. at 372-73, 5 A.2d at 863.
The court ruled that since the petitioners made no claim to the public offices held by the challenged individuals, it would deny the petition and decline to reach its merits. Id. at 375, 5 A.2d at 863-64.
These decisions demonstrate our well-established rule under which the justices of this court over the years have exercised their discretion to allow a private citizen to petition in equity without the intervention of the Attorney General only in instances wherein the petitioner seeks to vindicate a private right by claiming title to the public office in dispute. See Andrews v. Stiles, 99 R.I. 546, 209 A.2d 210 (1965); Gorham v. Robinson, 57 R.I. 1, 186 A. 832 (1936); McGroarty v. Ferretti, 56 R.I. 152, 184 A. 508 (1936); Horton v. Sullivan, 35 R.I. 242, 86 A. 314 (1913); Hoxsie v. Edwards, 24 R.I. 338, 53 A. 128 (1902). That rule has been consistently applied by this court since the enactment of the 1891 statute authorizing the use of petitions in equity.
We must reiterate that the petition in equity to challenge Cianci’s title to the office of mayor of the city of Providence without the intervention of the Attorney General seeks to vindicate a purely public right on behalf of the citizens of Providence. The petitioner makes no claim that he seeks to vindicate a private right on his own behalf by claiming title to the public office in dispute. Therefore, following long-established precedent, we conclude that this petition in equity must be denied.
We next address the Vileno petition for the issuance of a common-law-writ of certiorari that seeks our discretionary review of the State Board of Election’s decision to certify Cianci as mayor-elect of the city of Providence. The petitioners filed an objection to Cianci’s eligibility with the State Board of Elections after his apparent victory in the general election. The objection asserted Cianci was disqualified pursuant to article III, section 2, of the Rhode Island Constitution and G.L.1956 (1981 Reenactment) § 13-6-2. The Board of Canvassers held a hearing on petitioners’ objections. Thereafter, the Board of Canvassers certified Cianci as the mayor-elect, and petitioners appealed to the State Board of Elections. On appeal the State Board of Elections asserted that it was without authority to rule on petitioners’ objections to Cianci’s eligibility because of petitioners’ failure to file properly a timely objection in accordance with § 17-14-13. Thereafter, this petition for the issuance of a writ of certiorari was filed with this court to review the decision of the State Board of Elections.
The Vileno petitioners advance several reasons for us to exercise our discretion to issue a writ of certiorari. They advance as one reason the extreme public importance of their objections to Cianci’s eligibility in that they claim that art. Ill, sec. 2, disqualifies Cianci. They also claim that the time limitations for objections set forth in § 17-14-13 are unconstitutional. The petitioners also suggest that a hearing on the merits may help to decide similar election disputes that are likely to arise in the future. Finally petitioners urge that the matter be heard on its merits in order to achieve a finality to the general election, thus dispelling any doubt concerning the lawfulness of Cianei’s actions as mayor of the city of Providence.
In response Cianci claims that petitioners mistake the issue before us.. He asserts that the only issue before us is the legal sufficiency of the procedure petitioners have chosen to challenge his eligibility. He argues that their failure to make their constitutional and statutory objections to his eligibility in accordance with § 17-14-13 [1200]*1200requires that this court exercise its discretion to deny the petition for a writ of certiorari. We agree.
Section 17-14-13 provides in relevant part:
“Objections to eligibility of candidate or sufficiency of papers. — When nomination papers have been duly filed, and are in apparent conformity with § 17-14-11, they shall be conclusively presumed to be valid, unless written objections thereto are made as to the eligibility of the candidate or the sufficiency of the nomination papers or the signatures thereon. All objections shall be filed in the office of the secretary of state or of the local board, as the case may be, by four o’clock (4:00) p.m. on the next business day after the last day fixed for filing nomination papers in the appropriate office as heretofore provided.” (Emphasis added.)
That statute is one of the many statutes enacted by the Legislature to establish and regulate an orderly electoral process in Rhode Island. Section 17-14-13 establishes the time and the place for the filing of all objections to the eligibility of candidates and the sufficiency of their nomination papers. The plain language of the statute mandates that all objections must be filed in either the office of the Secretary of State or the local board of canvassers by four o’clock in the afternoon on the next business day following the last day fixed for filing nomination papers. The obvious purpose of the statute is to ensure that objections to the eligibility of a candidate will be resolved before a candidate enters into a formal campaign.
The petitioners did not file their objections to Cianci’s eligibility within the period established by the General Laws. The fact is that petitioners waited until after the general election and Cianci’s apparent victory to file their objections. By the time the objections were filed, all the candidates had expended considerable effort, time, and resources in their quest for office, and the community had gone through an entire election process without challenge, all contrary to the intent and purpose of § 17-14-13. The petitioners’ failure to comply with § 17-14-13 is not excused by the candidate’s filing his nomination papers almost at the last possible moment. It cannot be persuasively argued, as petitioners attempt, that the three-day span they had in which to file their objections renders § 17-14-13 unconstitutional because the statute fails to allow the public adequate time to object to the eligibility of a candidate. In this case all material facts relevant to the application of art. Ill, sec. 2, of the Rhode Island Constitution and § 13-6-2 to Cianci’s eligibility were well known by petitioners and by the general public long before Cianci filed his nomination papers.
The substantive issues presented by petitioners are not dissimilar to those presented in Gelch, wherein we issued a writ of certiorari to hear a challenge to Cianci’s eligibility to run in the 1984 special election in advance of the election date. In that case even though the challenge was timely filed, the time required for hearing the challenge by the State Board of Elections and the appeals process to this court necessitated our ordering a delay of the special election itself. Nevertheless, a decision on the challenge was possible before the election was held. Thus, while Gelch challenged Cianci’s right to run under sections 202 and 206 of the Home Rule Charter of the city of Providence, the petitioner in that case, motivated by the same substantive issue as in this case, filed a timely petition for relief in accordance with § 17-16-16.3
We are also not persuaded by petitioners’ argument that we should exercise our discretion to issue a writ of certiorari in order to achieve a finality to the general election, thus dispelling any doubt concerning the lawfulness of Cianci’s actions as the mayor of the city of Providence. The principle in favor of finality of elections actually works against petitioners. In fact, the public policy supporting the finality of [1201]*1201elections is entitled to very serious consideration when we are called upon to exercise our discretion to issue a writ of certiorari in election-related disputes. We elaborated on that public policy in Van Daam v. DiPrete, 560 A.2d 953, 954 (R.I.1989), wherein we stated:
“The public policy of this state requires that challenges to qualification of candidates for public office be resolved as quickly as possible in order that an election may take place upon the dates previously ordained by the General Assembly. The state has a compelling interest in the validity and finality of the election of candidates to all public offices, but particularly to the office of chief executive. Only prompt challenges presented in accordance with statutory and case law may be considered.” (Emphasis added.)
It is ironic that petitioners present the finality of elections as a basis for their petition for relief when they could have raised the question of Cianci’s eligibility well in advance of the general election by filing a timely objection in accordance with § 17-14-13.
The Vileno petitioners also assert as a reason for our issuing a writ of certiorari the absence of any other available remedy to review the decision of the State Board of Elections. In support, petitioners refer to G.L.1956 (1988 Reenactment) § 42-35-18, which specifically excludes a statutory appeal from decisions of the State Board of Elections, and our decision in Van Daam, wherein we stated that decisions of the State Board of Elections are “final and subject to review only by a petition for certiorari filed in this court.” 560 A.2d at 954.
We acknowledge that petitioners’ only remedy at this point is to petition for a writ of certiorari to this court. However, we cannot overlook the important fact that it was their own failure to make a timely challenge to Cianci’s eligibility in accordance with the provisions of § 17-14-13 that put them in this predicament. It was that fact that led the State Board of Elections to decline to rule on their challenge to Cianci.
Although we have concluded that both the Webb and the Vileno petitions must be denied on procedural grounds, the issue concerning art. Ill, sec. 2, will probably arise in future elections. We believe, therefore, that its resolution now would be in the public interest.
Article III, section 2, provides:
“An elector shall be disqualified as a candidate for elective or appointive state or local office or from holding such office if such elector has been convicted of or plead nolo contendere to a felony or if such elector has been convicted or plead nolo contendere to a misdemeanor resulting in a jail sentence of six months or more, either suspended or to be served. Such elector shall not, once so convicted, attain or return to any office until three years after the date of completion of such sentence and of probation or parole.”
Article III, section 2, of the amended Constitution clearly restores full civil rights to felons after the passage of three years following the completion of their sentence or period of probation. However, the effective-date provision of the article is ambiguous because it does not resolve the question before the court. That question is whether the article applies, as Cianci claims, only to convictions that occurred after the November 5, 1986 date on which ratification occurred. Or whether it applies, as petitioners assert, to all convictions and pleas, as long as the election itself takes place after November 5, 1986.
In construing constitutions, our task is to give effect to the intent of the framers. See In re Opinion to the House of Representatives, 45 R.I. 289, 120 A. 868 (1923). In doing so, it is appropriate for us to consult what extrinsic sources are available: not only the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention itself but also legislation relating to the constitutional provision in question adopted at the same time as the constitutional amendment or subsequently. In re Opinion to the Governor, 35 R.I. 166, 85 A. 1056 (1913); see also [1202]*1202Gorham v. Robinson, 57 R.I. 1, 186 A. 832 (1936).
When more than one construction of a constitutional provision is possible, “one of which would diminish or restrict a fundamental right of the people and the other of which would not do so, the latter must be adopted.” In re the Constitutional Convention, 55 R.I. 56, 73, 178 A. 433, 441-42 (1935). Also it is well established that a constitutional provision is presumed to apply prospectively only, unless the intent to give it retroactive effect is clear either through explicit language or by necessary implication. Nelson v. Ada, 878 F.2d 277, 280 (9th Cir.1989); see also Lawrence v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 523 A.2d 864, 869 (R.I.1987).
In the transcript and exhibits compiled during the evidentiary hearing conducted by the State Board of Elections, we have been able to review parts of the journal of the Convention. We have also reviewed the testimony of the chairman and the eight members of the Committee on Ethics of the Constitutional Convention given during that evidentiary hearing.
All those witnesses were unanimous in their assertion that their intent was to draft a disqualification article that would have prospective application only. During committee meetings, on more than one occasion, reference was made to the status of Cianci and the status of another individual who had served a sentence in a federal prison during his term in office as a councilman in another community. Each time assurance was given that the proposed amendment would not disqualify the individuals from seeking office after its adoption.
The proposed resolution that later became art. Ill, sec. 2, was adopted by the Convention on March 18, 1985. On April 1, 1985, the Committee on Ethics again discussed the disqualification article. In order to make its intent about prospective application more specific, the Committee on Ethics adopted new wording for the effective-date provision of the resolution. The new language was as follows: “This resolution [art. Ill, sec. 2] shall take effect upon voter approval and shall apply to all persons convicted of crimes after such approval.” That amendment to the resolution already passed by the Convention was placed on its calendar for consideration at its April 3, 1985 meeting. We understand that owing to procedural problems, the proposed amendment was never explained or debated by the full Convention. Testimony of the Committee on Ethics members indicated, however, that the failure to consider the amendment to the resolution in no way changed the fact that the Committee unanimously understood art. Ill, sec. 2, to be prospective in effect.
The petitioners argued that the failure of the Convention on April 3, 1985, to adopt the amendment to the proposed art. Ill, sec. 2, indicates a repudiation of the intent of the Committee on Ethics which authored the original resolution. We must reject that argument. There is no question that the amendment to the article already passed on by the Convention was offered only to make the Committee on Ethics’s original intention concerning its application more specific. We believe it would be wrong to read anything into the failure to adopt the amendment because that amendment was never explained to or debated by the full Convention. The Convention’s adoption of art. Ill, sec. 2, as originally proposed by the Committee on Ethics would indicate to us that the Convention never harbored any intent contrary to that of the Committee on Ethics when it first drafted and proposed art. Ill, sec. 2.
After the new Constitution was ratified by the voters, the General Assembly passed Public Law 1987, chapter 293, which, among other things, repealed § 13-6-2. That was the section of the General Laws that permanently barred from voting and from election to public office all persons on whom prison sentences of more than one year had been imposed. Under that section the only way such an individual could regain the right to vote or to run for elective office was by an act of the General Assembly. Section 13-6-2 provided:
[1203]*1203“Every person who shall be sentenced to imprisonment in the adult correctional institutions for a term of more than one year, for any one (1) offense, shall forever thereafter be incapable of being elected to any office of honor, trust, or profit in this state and of acting as an elector therein, unless such person be expressly restored to such privilege by act of the general assembly.”
In keeping with the amended constitutional provisions, § 13-6-2 was repealed as part of a package of remedial legislation enacted to bring the General Laws in to conformity with the revised Constitution. This package of bills was part of an overall scheme to reinstate the franchise to all felons at the expiration of a period of three years after their punishment was served.
The 1987 Act repealing § 13-6-2 also amended §§ 17-9-6, 17-14-1, and 8-15-8. In each instance the prior statutory provision had disqualified exfelons. The amendment in each instance provided for disqualification of persons convicted of a felony committed after November 5, 1986, only and whose sentence, including probation or parole, had not been completed at least three years before the person sought to vote or to declare candidacy for public office.
Each amendment brought the particular section of the General Laws in to conformity with art. Ill, sec. 2, in the revised Constitution. The explanation attached to the bill, prepared by the office of the Legislative Council for the information of the legislators who acted on Public Laws 1987, chapter 293, read:
“This act conforms election laws with respect to the registration and candidacies of convicted felons who have successfully completed their sentence, probation, etc., as required by the constitutional amendment adopted in 1986.”
It is a well-settled principle of statutory construction that statutes relating to the same subject matter should be considered together so that they will harmonize with each other and be consistent. Such statutes are considered to be in pari materia even when they contain no reference to one another and even though they are passed at different times. State v. Ahmadjian, 438 A.2d 1070 (R.I.1981); see also Herald Press, Inc. v. Norberg, 122 R.I. 264, 405 A.2d 1171 (1979). There can be no question, then, that § 13-6-2 was repealed as part of a broad legislative effort to liberalize and extend voting rights and qualification for candidacy for elective office to convicted felons who had successfully served their sentences and completed their probations.
Nevertheless, petitioners take the position that § 13-6-2 remains in force and effect in regard to individuals who were convicted before that section was repealed. We cannot agree. To carry that argument to its logical conclusion would mean that a person convicted of a relatively minor felony before November 5, 1986, for which a very minor sentence was imposed, would remain permanently disenfranchised. And at the same time a person convicted of a more serious felony committed after November 5, 1986, would have his or her right to vote and to run for office reinstated automatically three years after completion of his or her sentence. Such a result would be unreasonable.
Even without the benefit of the Convention proceedings- and deliberations we would reach the same conclusion about the applicability of art. Ill, sec. 2, by applying the usual rules for the interpretation of statutes and constitutions generally. All constitutional provisions are presumed to apply prospectively. They should be given retroactive effect only if such an intent is clear or if the subject matter permits no other construction. Nelson v. Ada, 878 F.2d 277 (9th Cir.1989). “If [a] statute [or constitutional provision] is remedial or procedural, that is, if it ‘neither enlarges nor impairs substantive rights but prescribes the methods and procedures for enforcing such rights’ * * * it may be construed to apply retroactively.” Lawrence, 523 A.2d at 869 (quoting Norton v. Paolino, 113 R.I. 728, 733, 327 A.2d 275, 278 (1974)). “If [a statute or constitutional provision] creates, defines, or regulates substantive legal rights, it must be construed to operate [1204]*1204prospectively.” Lawrence, 523 A.2d at 869; Narragansett Electric Co. v. Burke, 122 R.I. 13, 25, 404 A.2d 821, 828 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1079, 100 S.Ct. 1031, 62 L.Ed.2d 763 (1980).
The petitioners Webb and Yileno argue that the application of art. Ill, sec. 2, to disqualify Cianci based on what occurred before it was adopted would not be a retroactive application because they view it as a prospective application of art. Ill, sec. 2, to “elections which occur after adoption of the article not to persons in Mr. Cianci’s situation.” We must reject that argument primarily because of the language used in the article, “an elector shall be disqualified * * *.” The article very specifically disqualifies “persons” who have committed felonies. Since the disqualification occurs as a result of acts committed before the effective date of art. Ill, sec. 2, there can be no question that its application to Cianci would be a retroactive application.
It is a basic tenet of statutory construction that the Legislature will not be presumed to have intended to enact laws that are absurd, unjust, or unreasonable. Coletta v. State, 106 R.I. 764, 263 A.2d 681 (1970); Wilkinson v. Harrington, 104 R.I. 224, 243 A.2d 745 (1968); Deignan v. Cowan Plastic Products Corp., 99 R.I. 193, 206 A.2d 534, (1965). To continue to disenfranchise a person who has been a law-abiding citizen for many years while extending the right to vote and to hold office to persons whose criminal offenses are more recent and more serious would in our opinion be absurd, unjust, and unreasonable. We must reject petitioners’ argument on this issue and we hold that the repeal of § 13-6-2 applies equally to all former criminal offenders.
Furthermore it is highly doubtful that § 13-6-2 applied to Cianci at all. Although we have not had occasion to address directly the issue of whether § 13-6-2 applied to persons on whom suspended sentences were imposed, we have in other contexts ruled that § 13-6-2 required actual imprisonment to be applicable. In State v. Rezendes, 105 R.I. 483, 488, 253 A.2d 233, 235 (1969), we held that § 13-6-2 provides “that any person who is imprisoned for more than a year at the Adult Correctional Institutions for any offense shall be incapable of being elected to any office of honor, trust and profit and shall be unable to vote unless these privileges are expressly restored to him by act of the general assembly.” (Emphasis added.) In Bogosian v. Vaccaro, 422 A.2d 1253, 1254 n. 1 (R.I.1980), we noted that we interpreted § 13-6-2 as applying to “any felon who is imprisoned at the Adult Correctional Institutions.” In Bailey v. Baronian, 120 R.I. 389, 394 A.2d 1338 (1978), this court, after a thorough examination of our recent and earlier constitutional provisions and those of sister states, said the following:
“Thus, we hold that persons otherwise qualified to vote who are convicted of felonies and have served time in prison in this or any jurisdiction (federal or state) are disqualified from voting by reason of Amendment XXXVIII of the Rhode Island Constitution, unless and until the General Assembly restores that right.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 401, 394 A.2d at 1344.
In his brief Cianci points out that these interpretations of § 13-6-2 are consistent with a ruling by the United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, which had occasion to construe identical language in a deportation statute in connection with an alien who had received a suspended sentence. Judge Learned Hand, writing for the court, stated:
“We are therefore * * * considering whether the relator was ‘sentenced to imprisonment for a term of one year or more.’
Formally indeed he was; the sentence so read. Actually he never was, because he was not to be imprisoned unless he defaulted in the [conditions of his suspended sentence]. The sentence was absolute; the imprisonment was conditional.
Therefore, unless we are to close our eyes to the substance and go merely on form, a sentence whose execution is conditionally suspended is not a sentence to imprisonment at all; it is no more than a [1205]*1205device to compel the offender to a course of conduct deemed desirable.” United States ex rel. Robinson v. Day, 51 F.2d 1022, 1023 (2nd Cir.1931).
We conclude that even without the adoption of art. Ill, sec. 2, it would be our opinion that Cianci was not barred by the provisions of § 13-6-2 from running for election to the office of mayor of the city of Providence in November 1990.
In light of the Chief Justice’s dissenting opinion, we believe it would be well to remind ourselves of the thoughts expressed by the great jurist Oliver Wendell Holmes in his dissenting opinion in Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400-01, 24 S.Ct. 436, 468, 48 L.Ed. 679, 726 (1904).
“Great cases like hard cases make bad law. For great cases are called great, not by reason of their real importance in shaping the law of the future, but because of some accident of immediate overwhelming interest which appeals to the feelings and distorts the judgment. These immediate interests exercise a kind of hydraulic pressure which makes what previously was clear seem doubtful, and before which even well settled principles of law will bend.”
The “great case” now before the court should not be allowed to persuade us to abandon the well-established principle that has guided our discretion that the Attorney General — and only the Attorney General— is empowered to file an information in the nature of quo warranto. The language quoted in the dissenting opinion from Black v. Cummings, ignores the holding in that case. The holding was:
“It is indisputable, therefore, that a proceeding in the nature of quo warranto to enforce a public right cannot be brought in this state without the intervention of the attorney general.” 62 R.I. at 367, 5 A.2d at 861.
We also feel that the attempt in the dissent to distinguish several of the cases we have cited as authority does not survive analysis.4 We continue to believe the holdings in those eases support the conclusions of the majority.
Furthermore, it is unfortunate that the dissenting opinion ignores the repeated holdings of this court that § 13-6-2 was applicable only to persons actually imprisoned. Bogosian v. Vaccaro, 422 A.2d 1253 (R.I.1980); Bailey v. Baronian, 120 R.I. 389, 394 A.2d 1338 (1978); State v. Rezendes, 105 R.I. 483, 253 A.2d 233 (1969). The majority feels strongly that the court must not depart from settled principles of statutory and constitutional construction in order to achieve the disqualification from public office of a particular person, no matter how much notoriety may surround that person or the litigation involving him.
For these reasons the petition for leave to file an information in the nature of quo warranto is denied, the petition for certio-rari is denied, the writ previously issued is quashed, the decision of the State Board of Elections is affirmed, and the papers of the case are remanded to the State Board of Elections with our decision endorsed thereon.