State Ex Rel. Turnbladh v. DISTRICT COURT OF RAMSEY COUNTY

107 N.W.2d 307, 259 Minn. 228, 1960 Minn. LEXIS 677

• Court: Supreme Court of Minnesota
• Decided: December 23, 1960
• Docket: 38,237
• Status: Published

Opinions

Loevinger, Justice.

This case arises on an application by the commissioner of corrections for a writ of prohibition to prevent the respondent district court from enjoining an administrative action by relator. Because of the procedural posture of the case, we must take the facts from the complaint of the respondent Douglas C. Rigg in the court below, subject, however, to the rules of construction applicable to pleadings. There has been no evidence offered to the court below or in the record before this court from which any findings of fact can be made. It is important to emphasize, therefore, that any statement in this opinion is merely a reflection of the allegations of the pleadings and is not an indication that there has been any showing or finding as to the facts.

Respondent Rigg is and has been for some time the chief executive officer, or “warden,” of the Minnesota State Prison. Relator, Will C. Tumbladh, is the commissioner of corrections. The commissioner has general responsibility for and supervision of the Department of Corrections, which includes the prison. Minn. St. c. 243: On the night of August 25, 1960, the commissioner notified the warden to be present in the commissioner’s office the following day to discuss a matter of alleged excessive requisitioning of food from the prison commissary for the warden and three employees under his direction.

The warden appeared at the commissioner’s office on August 26, 1960, and talked in private to the commissioner during most of the day. This meeting is referred to in the complaint as a “hearing”; but from the facts alleged it appears that there was simply a private discussion between the commissioner and the warden which lasted from about 9 o’clock in the morning until after 4 o’clock in the afternoon. The commissioner and the warden then allegedly agreed informally that certain withdrawals of food from the prison commissary made and authorized by the warden were not illegal or dishonest but showed poor judgment, and that as discipline for said acts the warden should be suspended from his duties without pay for a period of 15 days and should repay to the state the amount of such withdrawals. This conclusion was apparently announced to various newspaper reporters and others at a news conference following the meeting between the commissioner and the warden.

' Thereafter, on September 2, 1960, the commissioner served upon the warden a formal written “Notice of Hearing and Order to Show Cause.” This notice stated that the warden was charged with misconduct as set out in an attached written “Statement of Charges,” and that a hearing would be held thereon, pursuant to Minn. St. 246.02, subd. 1, as amended by § 243.02.

Before the date set for the hearing, the warden filed suit in Ramsey County District Court against the commissioner, alleging that in the conference between the commissioner and the warden the parties had arrived at a “settlement and adjudication” of the charges against the warden, that the matter was therefore res judicata, and that the commissioner “has been divested of jurisdiction over the person of the Warden with relation to such subject matter and over the subject matter of the proceedings.” The complaint prayed for a.- temporary and permanent injunction restraining the commissioner from in any manner interfering with the warden’s enjoyment of his office. A temporary restraining order was issued by the district court to prevent the holding of the proposed hearing by the commissioner. Thereafter, the commissioner secured an alternative writ of prohibition from this court to prevent the district court from acting in the matter.

The pleadings of the warden herein and the material submitted in support of the pleadings, including affidavits and briefs, are exceedingly voluminous and contain many repetitious, hearsay, and irrelevant allegations, including insinuations and charges against officials not involved in this proceeding in any way. The pleadings also contain lengthy and repetitious assertions of the virtue and competence of the warden and of the propriety of his conduct. Since the only issue that is or could be presented either to the district court or to this court at this stage of the proceedings involves the jurisdiction of the commissioner to proceed, the merits of the controversy are not involved; and, therefore, these allegations are irrelevant to the present proceeding. Nothing that is said herein should be taken to suggest any view or conclusion as to the merits of the basic controversy.

The only question for the courts at this time is whether the commissioner has jurisdiction to determine that the warden shall or shall not be retained in the state service, or whether the commissioner has been deprived of such jurisdiction by the informal proceedings mentioned above. If the commissioner has jurisdiction, it is improper, under our decisions and under generally recognized principles of law, for the courts to interfere with the administrative proceeding prior to the making of ,such a determination.

The first issue that arises is whether the doctrine of res judicata is applicable in the present proceeding at all. Although there is some authority to the effect that this doctrine does not apply to administrative proceedings, the sounder view appears to be that stated in 2 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, § 18.02, as follows:

“As a matter of principle, it is completely clear that the reasons behind the doctrine of res judicata as developed in the court system are fully applicable to some administrative proceedings. * * * The sound view is therefore to use the doctrine of res judicata when the reasons for it are present in full force, to modify it when modification is needed, and to reject it when the reasons against it outweigh those in its favor.”

Rigg’s entire theory as to the application of res judicata to the present proceedings is constructed on the basis of a sentence appearing in Minn. St. 15.0418 relating to the hearing of contested cases in administrative proceedings. After stating the requirements for notice, specification of issues, opportunity to be heard, preparation of a record, and other matters, this section contains the following provision:

“* * * Informal disposition may also be made of any contested case by stipulation, agreed settlement, consent order or default.”

In any rational view of what actually occurred, it does gross violence to commonsense to assert that a private conference between a department head and a subordinate executive relating to the conduct of that department constitutes a “hearing” in the sense that this term is used in statutes or decisions by lawyers familiar with legal procedure. It further does gross violence to commonsense to assert that an announcement to newspaper reporters constitutes a “stipulation, agreed settlement, consent order or default.” There are numerous opinions and statements by lawyers and judges decrying “trial by newspaper.” It is significant in the present case that Rigg seeks to establish the alleged informal disposition of this matter by putting newspaper reports and the affidavit of a newspaper reporter before the court. It is no reflection on these publications or the reporters involved to say that it would be a travesty of legal process to accept newspaper reports of statements by public officials as the equivalent of a formal judgment or administrative adjudication.

However, even were the newspaper reports accepted as the equivalent of a formal administrative order, it is still clear that under the authorities this is not the kind of proceeding to which the doctrine of res judicata is properly applicable. As indicated in the quotation from Davis above, there is no authority anywhere to the effect that res ju-dicata is applicable to all administrative proceedings regardless of their nature. The only authority for the application of this doctrine in such proceedings goes no further than to assert that the doctrine should be applied to administrative proceedings which are essentially quasi-judicial in nature. It is clear, however, that this does not include proceedings relating to removal from employment of a public employee.

This precise question was presented in New York in the case of Matter of Evans v. Monaghan, 282 App. Div. 382, 123 N. Y. S. (2d) 662. In that case a New York policeman was accused of accepting bribes from a professional gambler and of protecting the gambler against arrest. A formal hearing on these charges was held before a judge specially authorized as a hearing commissioner. The principal witness refused to testify. Other evidence was taken, and a formal written finding was made that the policeman was not guilty of the charges. Four months later the same charges were again filed against the policeman. The principal witness by this time had changed his mind and agreed to testify. A hearing was held on the new charges, and the policeman was found guilty. An appeal was taken to the courts alleging that the second trial was a violation of the policeman’s rights, and that the first trial and formal findings constituted res judicata. In rejecting the plea of res judicata and sustaining the finding against the policeman and the order for discharge, the appellate division of the New York Supreme Court said (282 App. Div. 385, 389, 123 N. Y. S. [2d] 665, 668): that analogy in such a case rests very largely upon the fact that he conducts a hearing.

“The rule has never prevented the court itself from being moved to reopen the case and to reexamine the basis of its judgment for a cause which the court would regard as sufficient. While the judges developed a set of their own limitations on the sufficiency of the grounds which would move them to reopen, the rules related to the circumstances of exercise of power rather than to the power itself.

“A rule of law which would always treat as an analogue to the judgment of a court the determination of an administrative officer in the discipline of public employees would have to have a guarded acceptance and be taken with some considerable reservation. The theory of the enlargement of the court rule of finality to take in administrative determinations is that the administrator has acted ‘judicially’, but

“His determination of what to do about the charges, if he finds them sustained, is essentially an administrative function, for in that phase of his authority he carries out the duty to administer the public agency in the direction of the public service it performs.

“We would hesitate, too, to apply to this kind of a determination, involving discipline of public employees, the full effect of court judgments between litigating parties. The general rule has been stated that while the doctrine of res judicata applies to a judicial determination of a board or officer, it does not apply ‘to a decision made while acting ministerially or administratively.’ Such a determination, if ‘not recognized by the law of the forum as a judgment,’ is ‘no bar to further proceedings in relation to the same matter.’ ”

On appeal this decision was affirmed, Matter of Evans v. Monaghan, 306 N. Y. 312, 324, 118 N. E. (2d) 452, 458, with the court of appeals saying:

“* * * it would be beyond the spirit as well as beyond the letter of the doctrine of res judicata, as that doctrine is applied in court procedure, to bar the second departmental trial of petitioners.”

The rationale of the Monaghan cases is not challenged by the dissenting opinions. Further, there is a long line of cases in this court which expressly approves that rationale by holding that the decision of an administrative body in determining whether or not to discharge an employee is an administrative function. State ex rel. McGinnis v. Police Civil Service Comm. 253 Minn. 62, 91 N. W. (2d) 154; Sellin v. City of Duluth, 248 Minn. 333, 80 N. W. (2d) 67; State ex rel. Ging v. Board of Education, 213 Minn. 550, 7 N. W. (2d) 544. These decisions go so far as to hold that, in view of the constitutional division of the powers of government, jurisdiction cannot be conferred upon the courts, either directly or indirectly, to pass upon or interfere with this administrative function; and, therefore, that any judicial review of such a matter must be a limited review. Thus, the holdings of this court are that in exercising the function at issue here an administrator is acting in an executive or administrative capacity, and the basis for the application of the doctrine of res judicata does not, therefore, exist.

The reason for this conclusion is pointed out in the analogous case of Jason v. Summerfield, 94 App. D. C. 197, 214 F. (2d) 273, certiorari denied, 348 U. S. 840, 75 S. Ct. 48, 99 L. ed. 662. In that case a Federal government employee previously had a full hearing before the loyalty review board which found that reasonable grounds did not exist to believe the employee disloyal. Later another hearing was held on the same evidence to determine whether there was reasonable doubt as to the loyalty of the employee. In an action for declaratory judgment and an injunction, the employee contended that the prior hearing and finding of the loyalty review board precluded reexamination of the same charges in a later hearing. The court said that it would refuse to extend the principles of res judicata and equitable estoppel to such administrative proceedings. The court went on to say that there is no basis for holding that an executive department should retain in its service any whose loyalty is reasonably doubtful. Accordingly, it held that such an inquiry should not be precluded by an extension of the doctrine of res judicata to the prior finding involving this employee.

The cases cited above have all involved employees who were below the rank of policy-making executives. A fortiori the vice of requiring government to retain in its employment an employee who may, for any reason, be unqualified is greater in the case of a policy-making executive such as the warden.

Thus, accepting all the well-pleaded facts of Rigg’s complaint and affidavits and giving him the benefit of all reasonable inferences therefrom, it is clear that the doctrine of res judicata does not prevent a prospective determination now by the commissioner as to whether Rigg should be retained as warden. Therefore it is improper to grant Rigg any of the relief prayed for in the court below on the face of his pleadings. As we have previously held, “when it appears that no case can be made under the pleadings for any injunctive relief, it should be considered an abuse of discretion to grant a temporary injunction pending litigation.” Safro v. Lakofsky, 184 Minn. 336, 337, 238 N. W. 641, 642. Since any action by the district court to prevent the administrative proceedings proposed by the commissioner would thus be improper, under the rule of State ex rel. Sheehan v. District Court, cited and analyzed infra, this court should issue the writ to prohibit action by the district court at this stage of the matter.

A second, equally important, point is that in such a situation as presented here an administrative agency has a well-established right to reopen, rehear, and redetermine the matter even after a determination has been made. This is a rule of general application. Thus the United States Supreme Court has held that the Interstate Commerce Commission has the power to change a certificate of authority to engage in transportation services to add restrictions that were improperly omitted. American Trucking Assns. Inc. v. Frisco Transp. Co. 358 U. S. 133, 79 S. Ct. 170, 3 L. ed. (2d) 172. Similarly, it has been held that a state rent commission is not bound by its own error but can correct its own determination, at least in so far as this relates to prospective events and effect. Matter of Alamac Estates v. Abrams, 4 App. Div. (2d) 146, 163 N. Y. S. (2d) 242.

This court has recently reached the same conclusion in Anchor Cas. Co. v. Bongards Co-op. Creamery Assn. 253 Minn. 101, 106, 91 N. W. (2d) 122, 126, 73 A. L. R. (2d) 933, 938, where we said:

“* * * It is generally recognized that one of the powers proper to an efficient and just administration of the right to adjudicate is the power to reverse adjudications which appear to be erroneous * * *. This power lasts until jurisdiction is lost by appeal or certiorari or until a reasonable time has run, which would be at least coextensive with the time required by statute for review.

“Where through fraud, mistake, or misconception of facts the commissioner enters an order which he promptly recognizes may be in error, there is no good reason why, on discovering the error, he should not, after due and prompt notice to the interested parties, correct it.”

What the commissioner of corrections will or may do with respect to the present situation is not before us and is not now our concern. The commissioner has the continuing responsibility for administration of the state prison, as well as other institutions. By a formal notice, the sufficiency of which is not challenged, he has proposed to hold a hearing upon specified charges, as well as upon any other charges that may properly be filed, on Rigg’s qualifications to continue to hold the office of warden. The administrative action with which we are concerned here relates to prospective matters. Neither this court nor the district court can, constitutionally, be entrusted with the responsibility for determining or controlling those administrative matters. State ex rel. McGinnis v. Police Civil Service Comm. supra; Sellin v. City of Duluth, supra. There is certainly no logical basis for the court’s undertaking to prevent the administrator who has this responsibility from exercising his judgment with respect to it. It requires emphatic repetition that the matter before us does not involve any question of penalty or civil liability, but only the future continuance in a responsible public position of an employee whose qualifications are formally challenged by his superior — regardless of the basis or merits of that challenge, which we are not in a position to pass upon.

In the third place, regardless of the applicability of the doctrine of res judicata, and regardless of the power of the administrator to reopen and rehear this matter, it should be clear that on any view the plea of res judicata does not, as Rigg asserts, operate to divest the administrative agency of jurisdiction. The statutory authority of the commissioner with respect to Rigg cannot, on the facts pleaded, be “exceeded or exhausted,” as suggested in the dissenting opinions. Since there are no facts pleaded which would, if true, divest the commissioner of either jurisdiction or responsibility to make the determination proposed to be made, there is no “fact issue” for determination by the lower court. All that is required for determination of the instant case is a careful application of well-established principles of law.

Under the strictest common-law view, the plea of res judicata is a plea in bar of a second proceeding which operates as an estoppel and not as a deprivation of jurisdiction of the tribunal. Bowe v. Minnesota Milk Co. 44 Minn. 460, 47 N. W. 151; Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U. S. 351, 24 L. ed. 195. Counsel has cited and diligent search has disclosed no case so much as suggesting that res judicata operates to deprive a tribunal of jurisdiction. On the contrary, a plea of res judicata is inconsistent with a denial of jurisdiction, since it presupposes a former valid adjudication of the same subject matter by the same tribunal and involving the same parties.

This court has held that the only exceptions to the long-settled rule that no one is entitled to an injunction against the actual or threatened acts of an administrative agency until the administrative remedies and the remedies by direct review have been exhausted are in case of a showing of the imminence of actual irreparable harm from action beyond the agency’s jurisdiction or contrary to constitutional principles. Thomas v. Ramberg, 240 Minn. 1, 60 N. W. (2d) 18.

This court has most recently applied that rule in the case of State ex rel. Sheehan v. District Court, 253 Minn. 462, 93 N. W. (2d) 1, certiorari denied, 359 U. S. 909, 79 S. Ct. 585, 3 L. ed. (2d) 573. In that case the commissioner of insurance proposed to hold a hearing to determine whether an insurance company was engaging in unfair competition or deceptive practices. The insurance company sought and secured from the district court a restraining order preventing the holding of the hearing by the commissioner on the grounds that he was proposing to act beyond his statutory jurisdiction and in such a manner as to deprive the insurance company of due process of law. This court issued a writ of prohibition to the district court directing it to refrain from further proceedings in that matter. The court said, inter alia (253 Minn. 464, 467, 93 N. W. [2d] 3, 5):

“* * * The writ may issue to restrain an inferior court from exceeding its legitimate powers in a matter over which it has jurisdiction as well as to restrain it from proceeding in a matter over which it has no jurisdiction, and it may also issue to prevent an abuse of discretion where there is no other adequate remedy at law. * * *

“* * * Where a court threatens to proceed in a matter over which, it has no jurisdiction at a time when it is the duty of the administrative tribunal to proceed and act, a writ of prohibition will not be denied merely because there may be a remedy by appeal from the judgment.”

As this court has previously observed in State ex rel. Nelson v. Board of Public Welfare, 149 Minn. 322, 328, 183 N. W. 521, 524:

“* * * It is well settled that the power to discharge an employe rests in the officer or board that appointed him, unless that power has been taken away by some express statute. [Citations.] It is also well settled that where an officer or employe is entitled to a hearing before he can be removed or discharged, such hearing is to be held by the officer or board possessing the power of removal in the absence of a statute providing otherwise.”

In the situation presented here, the commissioner has the power of appointment, of removal, and of hearing and determining charges upon which removal may be based. Minn. St. 246.02, 243.02. The commissioner is charged with the responsibility for the control and supervision of the institution and the department within which the warden is employed. Minn. St. 243.01. It has been repeatedly held by this court, in cases cited above, that such administrative responsibility for the effective functioning of departments and institutions cannot be transferred from the administrator to the courts. Cf. Public Service Comm. v. Wycoff Co. Inc. 344 U. S. 237, 73 S. Ct. 236, 97 L. ed. 291.

This court cannot, therefore, consistently with its own prior decisions, and particularly with the decision in the Sheehan case, permit the district court to interfere with the administrative process prior to a final determination by the commissioner as to the fitness of the warden to continue in the position he holds in the public service. Indeed, the Sheehan case presented a much stronger case for judicial interference with the administrative process than is presented here. There it was alleged that the administrative agency was proposing to act beyond its statutory authority and in violation of constitutional rights. Here it is alleged merely that the commissioner will, or may, disregard a very tenuous plea of res judicata. This court cannot deny the writ here without overruling the Sheehan case, as well as disregarding the several cases, cited above, holding that the retention or discharge of a public employee is an administrative function, and that an administrative agency has a right to reopen, rehear, and reconsider its own determinations until jurisdiction is lost by appeal or lapse of time.

Thus, confining our decision to the legal issues necessarily presented by this proceeding, as we must, it is clear that the writ of prohibition should issue to prevent judicial interference with administrative responsibility for determination of the continuing qualifications of the executives in the public service. The doctrine of res judicata is not applicable here because the confidential conference between the commissioner and the warden cannot in any realistic sense be called a hearing, nor can a newspaper report of a public statement be called an adjudication. By both reason and precedent the doctrine of res judicata is not applicable to proceedings involving the continuance in office of public employees. The commissioner, as any other administrator, clearly has the right to reopen, rehear, and redetermine a matter involving prospective action, regardless of the character of a previous determination, at least within the very short time interval involved here. In any event, res judicata is only a plea in bar and does not operate to deprive a tribunal of jurisdiction. Finally, under the clear decision of this court in the Sheehan case, the district court has no right to interfere with an administrative agency which is proposing to act in a matter properly within the scope of its general responsibility until final action has been taken by the administrative agency.

The writ is made absolute.