ROSE, Justice.
This petition for a writ of prohibition presents the issue of whether a Wyoming district court has subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate a claim arising out of a collision between a pickup truck and a horse on U. S. 287 within the Wind River Indian Reservation, Fremont County, Wyoming. The owners of the horse and truck were both enrolled members of the Shoshone Tribe. The truck owner’s subrogee, Mil-bank Mutual Insurance Company, sued the horse owner, Alice Peterson, who has filed this petition. We hold that the district court is without subject-matter jurisdiction to proceed in this case.
PROCEDURAL MATTERS
This matter was first before us late last year when Peterson appealed the district court’s denial of her motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and lack of personal jurisdiction. In an unpublished order, we dismissed the appeal on our own motion on December 14, 1979, because the denial of Peterson’s motion by the district court was not a final order pursuant to Rule 1.05, W.R.A.P., from which an appeal may be taken. Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 65 S.Ct. 631, 89 L.Ed. 911 (1945); and In re Greybull Valley Irrigation District, 52 Wyo. 168, 71 P.2d 801 (1937).
Currently, petitioner Peterson asks us to invoke our original jurisdiction under Article 5, Section 3, of the Wyoming Constitution and enter a writ of prohibition. The exercise of our original jurisdiction is discretionary. E. g., State ex rel. Pearson v. Hansen, Wyo., 409 P.2d 769, 770 (1966). However, the writ is most appropriately granted when the inferior court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. State ex rel. Bank of Chadron v. District Court of Weston County, 5 Wyo. 227, 39 P. 749, 751 (1895). The writ of prohibition is also particularly appropriate where the wrongful exercise of jurisdiction is contrary to the law of the land. Id. and State ex rel. Mau v. Ausherman, 11 Wyo. 410, 72 P. 200, 204 (1903). The writ of prohibition is ordinarily granted only where there is no adequate remedy at law, yet we granted the writ in State v. District Court, Wyo., 399 P.2d 583, 584 (1965) to protect petitioners from an improper jury trial and subsequent appeal. In the case at bar, a writ of prohibition is, indeed, appropriate to prevent the district court from exercising subject-matter jurisdiction forbidden to it by federal law and to prevent the petitioner from having to defend this action in the state court system, as well as in the tribal court system.
In response to the Petition for a Writ of Prohibition, we issued an Order to Show Cause on January 3, 1980, therein noting that the State of Wyoming likely had an interest in the case, and, therefore, we included the Attorney General in the Show-Cause Order. The Attorney General, Mil-bank Mutual, and the District Court haye all submitted briefs supporting the District Court’s position that it has jurisdiction in the premises.
THE FACTS
The jurisdictional facts are all stipulated. The horse owner, Alice Peterson, and the pickup truck owner and driver, Ross Duane Cady, are both enrolled members of the Shoshone Tribe of Indians of the Wind River Indian Reservation, and both reside within the reservation.1 Cady insured his truck [1058]*1058with Milbank Mutual through the latter’s Lander office, which is not within the reservation.2 In 1977, the truck was damaged and the horse killed when the two collided in the vicinity of Mile Post 83.8 of U. S. Highway 26 and 287. The accident site is a point on the highway within the boundaries of the Wind River Indian Reservation and also within Ms. Peterson’s Allotment # 871. Wyoming currently holds a right-of-way permit issued by the Bureau of Indian Affairs in 1938, to build and maintain U. S. Highway 26 and 287 across Allotment # 871.
There exists at Fort Washakie the Wind River Court of Indian Offenses, operated by the Bureau of Indian Affairs. The court is a court of general criminal and civil jurisdiction for the Shoshone and Arapahoe Tribes of the Wind River Indian Reservation and has jurisdiction to adjudicate the case at bar. It is stipulated that the judges of the Indian court have had legal training but are not lawyers or members of any bar association.
A PRELIMINARY ISSUE-MILBANK’S RIGHTS AS A SUBROGEE
All parties agree that Milbank Mutual is the real party in interest.3 The parties opposed to the writ of prohibition would prefer to characterize the dispute as one between Peterson, an Indian, and Milbank, a non-Indian, whereas petitioner urges that the case be viewed as one between Indians. The State would concede that if the case is viewed as one between Indians, then the district court lacks jurisdiction. But the State argues that a subrogation can alter the jurisdictional nature of a case and confer a jurisdictional option that was lacking absent the subrogation. In support of this argument, the State cites Lumbermen’s Mutual Casualty Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48, 75 S.Ct. 151, 99 L.Ed. 59 (1954). Although that case involved consideration of Louisiana’s direct-action statute allowing a tort plaintiff to sue the alleged tortfeasor’s insurer, the Supreme Court held that diversity jurisdiction existed where there was diversity between the plaintiff and the insurer, even if no diversity existed between the plaintiff and the alleged tortfeasor. Thus, by analogy to federal diversity jurisdiction, it would appear that the instant case is formally between a non-Indian and an Indian. Nonetheless, we consider it significant that trial of this case under Wyoming law4 (e. g., our comparative-negligence [1059]*1059statute, § 1-1-109, W.S.1977) would, of necessity, involve evaluation of the conduct (for purposes of ascertaining negligence) of two Reservation Indians on the Reservation.
TRIBAL COURT JURISDICTION
The Code of Federal Regulations confers certain jurisdiction upon the Wind River Court of Indian Offenses. 25 C.F.R. § 11.-1(a) states:
“(a) Except as otherwise provided in this part, § 11.1-11.87H apply to the following Indian reservations:
* * * * * *
“(v) Wind River (Wyoming).”
25 C.F.R. § 11.22, under the heading “CIVIL ACTIONS (Jurisdiction),” provides:
“The Court of Indian Offenses shall have jurisdiction of all suits wherein the defendant is a member of the tribe or tribes within their jurisdiction, and of all other suits between members and nonmembers which are brought before the courts by stipulation of both parties. . . . ”
The portion of the regulations dealing with civil jurisdiction does not specify that the cause of action must arise on a reservation or in “Indian country.” However, even if, arguendo, we imply this condition, the condition is satisfied. The term “Indian country” is defined by 18 U.S.C.S. § 1151:
“Except as otherwise provided in sections 1154 and 1156 of this title [18 USCS §§ 1154 and 1156], the term ‘Indian country’, as used in this chapter [18 USCS §§ 1151 et seq.], means (a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-way running through the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian communities within the borders of the United States whether within the original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a state, and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, including rights-of-way running through the same.”
The United States Supreme Court has made the following comment on this definition:
“. . . While § 1151 is concerned, on its face, only with criminal jurisdiction, the Court has recognized that it generally applies as well to questions of civil jurisdiction. ...” DeCoteau v. District County Court for the Tenth Judicial District, 420 U.S. 425, 427, fn. 2, 95 S.Ct. 1082, 1084, fn. 2, 43 L.Ed.2d 300, reh. den. 421 U.S. 939, 95 S.Ct. 1667, 44 L.Ed.2d 95 (1975).
See, also, Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 504, 93 S.Ct. 2245, 2257, 37 L.Ed.2d 92 (1973).
A dissent to this opinion seeks to avoid the literal language of 18 U.S.C. § 1151, which defines Indian country to include rights-of-way through Indian country. The dissent argues that the state highway traversing the Wind River Indian Reservation in this case is not Indian country. In Seymour v. Superintendent of Washington State Penitentiary, 368 U.S. 351, 82 S.Ct. 424, 7 L.Ed.2d 346 (1962), the Supreme Court made it quite clear that 18 U.S.C. § 1151 means what it says. In that case, an Indian was convicted in state court of attempted burglary. He sought habeas-cor-pus relief on the grounds that the alleged crime had occurred in Indian country, that he was an enrolled unemancipated member of the Colville Indian Tribe and that, therefore, the United States had exclusive jurisdiction. A major issue in the United States Supreme Court was the definition of Indian country. As the Supreme Court viewed the facts, the site of the alleged crime was: (1) a plot of land held under a patent in fee by a non-Indian, (2) which lay within a governmental townsite, a plot of which was filed for record in the county courthouse, apparently with the usual dedication to the public interest, (3). which lay within an Indian Reservation. The Supreme Court rejected the dual contentions that sale of the land to a non-Indian in fee or dedication of the town to the public interest removed the [1060]*1060land from the status of “Indian country.” The Court said:
“. . . [A]n impractical pattern of checkerboard jurisdiction was avoided by the plain language of § 1151 and we see no justification for adopting an unwarranted construction of that language where the result would be merely to recreate confusion Congress specifically sought to avoid.” Id., 368 U.S. at 358, 82 S.Ct. at 428.
The dissent’s “highway exception” to the definition of Indian country is also undercut by another United States Supreme Court case involving Colville Indians. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville, - U.S. -, 100 S.Ct. 2069, 2086, 65 L.Ed.2d 10 (1980). That is an Indian tax case, but it is worth discussing in the context of the definition of Indian country. The United States Supreme Court held that the State of Washington could not impose a tax on the motor vehicles of reservation Indians, even though the state had argued that the tax was for the use of highways within the state. In dictum, the Supreme Court speculated that the state might be able to impose a tax “on the use outside the reservation of Indian-owned vehicles . . .." Id. The case does not tell us whether state highways traverse Indian reservations in that state. However, we take judicial notice of road atlases which show that in Washington, as well as in Wyoming and other states, state and/or federal highways traverse Indian Reservations. The Supreme Court’s statement indicating that at most the Reservation Indians could be taxed for the use of off-reservation highways is additional rebuttal of the dissent’s argument that state highways within a reservation have been severed from the reservation.
The above regulations, statute, and case law make it clear that the Wind River Court of Indian Offenses has jurisdiction to hear the negligence action at bar; however, the regulations do not state whether the jurisdiction conferred upon the tribal court is meant to be exclusive or merely concurrent with state or federal court jurisdiction.
JURISDICTION OF THE DISTRICT COURT
Petitioner challenges both the district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction of the cause of action and its assertion of in per-sonam jurisdiction over herself. Because we conclude that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, we need not consider the issue of personal jurisdiction. The main concern of each of the five briefs filed in this case is the district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. (Petitioner has filed a brief and a reply brief; Milbank, the attorney general, and the district court have each filed one brief.) It would be unnecessarily tedious to cite the contentions of each of the four parties on the issue of subject-matter jurisdiction. A few introductory remarks, which we will justify in detail below, are appropriate.
The essential issue is whether the federal government has preempted the state jurisdiction which would ordinarily exist in this sort of case and replaced it with an exclusive tribal-court jurisdiction. Because we conclude that the federal government has, in fact, preempted state jurisdiction with respect to this cause of action, we consider it irrelevant to debate the wisdom of that preemption or the competence of the tribal court, issues raised by the district court and Milbank. We will treat separately the issue of whether our conclusion is objectionable under the federal or Wyoming constitutions. Because we construe the subject-matter jurisdiction issue as a question of federal law, we must, therefore, rely for guidance on United States Supreme Court opinions. Generally, we interpret these cases to mean that Wyoming is possessed of certain jurisdictional rights and prerogatives with respect to the Wind River Indian Reservation, but that the State’s jurisdiction does not exist in circumstances where it would interfere with tribal self-government.
Whether or not State action will or will not “interfere with tribal self-government” is the fulcrum about which the United States Supreme Court is, these days, decid-[1061]*1061jng the kind of cases with which we find ourselves concerned in this litigation. In discussing the relevant Supreme Court case law, our focus will, thus, be on the issue of whether the district court’s exercise of jurisdiction in the case at bar would interfere with tribal self-government.
THE SUPREME COURT CASE LAW
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 79 S.Ct. 269, 3 L.Ed.2d 251 (1959), is an appropriate place to begin our inquiry. Williams summarizes some relevant prior case law and is in turn commented upon frequently in subsequent cases. Williams is similar in many respects to the case at hand. Unless a controlling distinction between Williams and the instant matter were found to exist, it must be concluded that Williams is controlling for the proposition that the Wind River Court of Indian Offenses has exclusive jurisdiction of the matter to which we here address our concern.
In Williams, a non-Indian, operating a general store on a Navajo reservation in Arizona under federal license, brought suit in state court to collect for goods sold an Indian couple on credit. The Indian defendants moved unsuccessfully to dismiss the state court suit for lack of jurisdiction. The Indians maintained that exclusive jurisdiction lay in the tribal court and on appeal the United States Supreme Court upheld this contention.
After citing earlier case law, the Williams Court said:
"... Essentially, absent governing Acts of Congress, the question has always been whether the state action infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them. Cf. Utah & Northern Railway v. Fisher, 116 U.S. 28, 6 S.Ct. 246, 29 L.Ed. 542.” 358 U.S. at 220, 79 S.Ct. at 271.
The last above-cited case from Williams is, indeed, ancient (1885), but it illustrates a still valid instance of state jurisdiction on an Indian reservation, even absent federal delegation or permission to the state. Utah & Northern Railway Co., supra, concerned a dispute between Idaho Territory tax authorities and a railroad which ran through an Indian reservation; the issue was whether the track passing through the reservation was subject to state tax. The Indians sold land for the line to the United States, which then conveyed the land to the railroad. The Supreme Court said that by force of the cession thus made, the railroad land was withdrawn from the reservation. 6 S.Ct. at 247. Citing the railroad’s argument that the reservation is excluded from the general jurisdiction of the Territory of Idaho, the Court said:
“To uphold that jurisdiction in all cases and to the fullest extent would undoubtedly interfere with the enforcement of the treaty stipulations, and might thus defeat provisions designed for the security of the Indians. But it is not necessary to insist upon such general jurisdiction for the Indians to enjoy the full benefit of the stipulations for their protection. The authority of the territory may rightfully extend to all matters not interfering with that protection. ...” 6 S.Ct. at 247-248.
Notwithstanding this reference to an exception providing for state jurisdiction, the Williams Court continued:
“Congress has also acted consistently upon the assumption that the States have no power to regulate the affairs of Indians on a reservation. To assure adequate government of the Indian tribes it enacted comprehensive statutes in 1834 regulating trade with Indians and organizing a Department of Indian Affairs. 4 Stat. 729, 735. Not satisfied solely with centralized government of Indians, it encouraged tribal governments and courts to become stronger and more highly organized. See, e. g, the Wheeler-Howard Act, §§ 16, 17, 48 Stat. 987, 988, 25 U.S.C. §§ 476, 477. Congress has followed a policy calculated eventually to make all Indians full-fledged participants in American society. This policy contemplates criminal and civil jurisdiction over Indians by any State ready to assume the burdens that go with it as soon as the educational and economic status of the [1062]*1062Indians permits the change without disadvantage to them. See H.R.Rep. No. 848, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 3, 6, 7 (1953). Significantly, when Congress has wished the States to exercise this power it has expressly granted them the jurisdiction which Worcester v. Georgia [6 Pet. 515, 8 L.Ed. 483] had denied.” 358 U.S. at 220-221, 79 S.Ct. at 271.
The Williams Court then discussed the 1868 treaty between the Navajos and the United States, 15 Stat. 667 (1868), and noted that the treaty promise of a reservation included the promise that no one except United States Government personnel (and the Navajos) were to enter the reserved area. 358 U.S. at 221, 79 S.Ct. at 271. The Court said:
“. . . Implicit in these treaty terms, as it was in the treaties with the Cherokees involved in Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, [8 L.Ed. 483] was the understanding that the internal affairs of the Indians remained exclusively within the jurisdiction of whatever tribal government existed. ... ” Id. at 221-222, 79 S.Ct. at 271.
The Wind River Indian Reservation was established pursuant to a treaty between the United States and the Eastern Band of Shoshonee Indians and the Bannack Tribe of Indians. 15 Stat. 673 (1868). This treaty, which is found in the United States Statutes at Large, back to back with the Navajo treaty, considered by the Supreme Court in Williams, contains a reservation promise virtually identical to the one in the Navajo treaty, which restricts access to the reservation to Indians and United States employees. The “implicit” understanding found by the Williams Court in the Navajo treaty must, therefore, be found in the treaty which established the Wind River Indian Reservation if we are to pay the Williams opinion its due.
The Williams Court also said that although Congress may deny the states the power to regulate Indian affairs, Congress may also delegate that power to the states in order to further Congressional goals. Williams, supra, at 358 U.S. 220-221, 79 S.Ct. at 270-271. Examples of such delegations are discussed at 358 U.S. 221-223, 79 S.Ct. at 270-272. At 358 U.S. 222-223 and 222, fn. 10, 79 S.Ct. at 271-273 and 271, fn. 10, the Court expressly referred to the Act of August 15, 1953, c. 505, §§ 6, 7, 67 Stat. 5905, in which “Congress did express its willingness to have any State assume jurisdiction over reservation Indians if the State Legislature or the people vote affirmatively to accept such responsibility.” Sections 6 and 7 are reproduced in footnote 4, supra. These sections imposed upon the states certain requirements to establish state jurisdiction on the reservation. Article 21, Section 26, of our Constitution provides, inter alia, that “said Indian lands shall remain under the absolute jurisdiction and control of the congress of the United States; ...” 6 This [1063]*1063constitutional provision was not changed and we are aware of no Wyoming legislation to accept this Congressional offer of delegation. In 1968, Congress very substantially altered its offer to the states by repealing § 7, supra, in Section 403(b) of Public Law 90-284, Title IV, April 11,1968, 82 Stat. 79.
The Williams Court also addressed the fact that the store owner seeking to collect his debt was a non-Indian:
“.. . It is immaterial that' respondent is not an Indian. He was on the Reservation and the transaction with an Indian took place there . . . The cases in this Court have consistently guarded the authority of Indian governments over their reservations. Congress recognized this authority in the Navajos in the Treaty of 1868, and has done so ever since. If this power is to be taken away from them, it is for Congress to do it. ... ” 358 U.S. at 223, 79 S.Ct. at 272.
Thus, after discussing the traditional independence of reservation Indians from state intrusion into tribal affairs, the treaty guarantees of the Navajos, the Congressional efforts to establish tribal courts on reservations and the failure of Arizona to accept a Congressional offer of delegated federal jurisdiction, the Williams Court concluded that concurrent state jurisdiction in the Williams case was impermissible.
We now turn our attention to later decisions which give flesh to the Williams skeleton.
Three years later, after Williams, in Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 82 S.Ct. 562, 7 L.Ed.2d 573 (1962), the Court was presented with a question of whether the State of Alaska could exercise jurisdiction over off-reservation Indian fishing activity. The Court examined the Alaska Statehood Act, 72 Stat. 339 (1958). Section 4 of that act provides that Indian “property (including fishing rights)” shall “be and remain under the absolute jurisdiction and control of the United States.” The litigants had proceeded on the assumption that if the Indians had such fishing rights within the meaning of the above language, then the State of Alaska was without power to apply its laws to regulate those rights. The Kake Court rejected this reasoning, 369 U.S. at 67, 82 S.Ct. at 567, and, in so doing, noted that the language about “absolute jurisdiction and control” of the United States is an adoption of “the formula of nine prior statehood Acts” (including Wyoming’s, 26 Stat. 222). 369 U.S. at 67, 82 S.Ct. at 567. Referring back to Williams, the Kake Court observed that Indian lands in Arizona remain under the absolute jurisdiction and control of the United States, “yet in Williams v. Lee [supra], we declared that the test of whether a state law could be applied on Indian reservations there was whether the application of that law would interfere with reservation self-government.” Id. at 67-68, 82 S.Ct. at 567. The Court then cited past case law allowing the exercise of state jurisdiction within a reservation: Utah & Northern Railway, supra; Langford v. Monteith, 102 U.S. 145, 26 L.Ed. 53 (1880)-process may be served within a reservation for a suit in territorial court between two non-Indians; United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621, 26 L.Ed. 869 (1881) and Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 240, 17 S.Ct. 107, 41 L.Ed. 419 (1896)-murder of one non-Indian by another on a reservation is a matter of state law; Mari-[1064]*1064copa & Phoenix Railroad Co. v. Arizona Territory, 156 U.S. 347, 15 S.Ct. 391, 39 L.Ed. 447 (1895)-a railway right-of-way through a reservation could be taxed since it had been withdrawn from the reservation; and Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264, 18 S.Ct. 340, 42 L.Ed. 740 (1898)-Oklahoma territorial tax on the cattle of non-Indian lessees of reservation land upheld.7 The Court also cited New York ex rel. Ray v. Martin, 326 U.S. 496, 499, 66 S.Ct. 307, 308, 90 L.Ed. 261 (1946), for the proposition that “in the absence of a limiting treaty obligation or Congressional enactment, each state has a right to exercise jurisdiction over Indian reservations within its boundaries.” (This quotation is particularly appropriate to the Kake case-as opposed to the Williams case or the case at bar-because Kake involved off-reservation fishing rights unprotected by federal law.) The Kake Court referred to Williams as its latest decision and characterized it as a
“civil action brought by a non-Indian against an Indian for the price of goods sold the latter on the Navajo Reservation. The applicability of state law, we there said, depends upon ‘whether the state action infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them, ... ’ ” Kake, supra, 369 U.S. at 74-75, 82 S.Ct. at 570.
The Kake Court then concluded that regulation of off-reservation fishing rights would not impair reservation self-government.
The United States Supreme Court had occasion to revisit Williams in 1971. Kennerly v. District Court of Montana, 400 U.S. 423, 91 S.Ct. 480, 27 L.Ed.2d 507 (1971). The per curiam opinion, with a two-justice dissent, split over the issue of “ ‘whether the state action infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them.’ ” Kennerly, 400 U.S. at 427, 91 S.Ct. at 482, citing Williams, supra, 358 U.S. at 220, 79 S.Ct. at 270.
The Kennerly petitioners to the United States Supreme Court were members of the Blackfeet Indian Tribe, residing on the Blackfeet Indian Reservation in Montana. They had bought food on credit from a grocery store located within the town limits of Browning, a town incorporated under the laws of Montana but located within the boundaries of the Blackfeet Reservation. We are not told whether the grocer was also Indian. At any rate, the grocer commenced suit in the Montana state courts to collect the debts. The petitioners unsuccessfully moved the lower court to dismiss the suit on the grounds that they were Indians and the transactions took place on an Indian reservation. The Montana Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction of the jurisdictional dispute on a “writ of supervisory control” and, in so doing, affirmed and distinguished Williams, supra. The United States Supreme Court found the distinction unconvincing and vacated the judgment of the Montana Supreme Court. Although the attempted distinction in Kennerly is not on all fours with the case at bar, it is worthwhile to consider the Kennerly opinion in detail since it illustrates how stringently the United States Supreme Court protects reservation Indians from the exercise of state court jurisdiction when the cause of action arises on a reservation and involves Indian defendants.
[1065]*1065As mentioned in' the discussion of Williams, supra, in 1968 Congress altered its 1953 offer to the states to assume jurisdiction of Indian affairs under certain conditions. 25 U.S.C.S. § 1322 (April 11, 1968, P.L. 90-284, Title IV, § 402, 82 Stat. 79) now provides:
“(a) Consent of United States-Force and effect of civil laws. The consent of the United States is hereby given to any State not having jurisdiction over civil causes of action between Indians or to which Indians are parties which arise in the areas of Indian country situated within such State to assume, with the consent of the tribe occupying the particular Indian country or part thereof which would be affected by such assumption, such measure of jurisdiction over any or all such civil causes of action arising within such Indian country or any part thereof as may be determined by such State to the same extent that such State has jurisdiction over other civil causes of action, and those civil laws of such State that are of general application to private persons or private property shall have the same force and effect within such Indian country or' part thereof as they have elsewhere within that State.
“(b) Alienation, encumbrance, taxation, use, and probate of property. Nothing in this section shall authorize the alienation, encumbrance, or taxation of any real or personal property, including water rights, belonging to any Indian or any Indian tribe, band, or community that is held in trust by the United States or is subject to a restriction against alienation imposed by the United States; or shall authorize regulation of the use of such property in a manner inconsistent with any Federal treaty, agreement, or statute, or with any regulation made pursuant thereto; or shall confer jurisdiction upon the State to adjudicate, in probate proceedings or otherwise, the ownership or right to possession of such property or any interest therein.
“(c) Force and effect of tribal ordinances or customs. Any tribal ordinance or custom heretofore or hereafter adopted by an Indian tribe, band, or community in the exercise of any authority which it may possess shall, if not inconsistent with any applicable civil law of the State, be given full force and effect in the determination of civil causes of action pursuant to this section.”,
and is qualified by 25 U.S.C.S. § 1326 (§ 406, 82 Stat. 80):
“Special election
“State jurisdiction acquired pursuant to this title [25 USCS §§ 1321-1326] with respect to criminal offenses or civil causes of action, or with respect to both, shall be applicable in Indian country only where the enrolled Indians within the affected area of such Indian country accept such jurisdiction by a majority vote of the adult Indians voting at a special election held for that purpose. The Secretary of the Interior shall call such special election under such rules and regulations as he may prescribe, when requested to do so by the tribal council or other governing body, or by 20 per centum of such enrolled adults.”
In Kennerly, there was some effort by both Montana and the Blackfeet to provide for state jurisdiction concurrent with the jurisdiction of the Tribal Court. In 1963, Montana, in response to the 1953 offer, extended criminal but not civil jurisdiction over an Indian reservation in the state different than the Blackfeet Reservation. In 1967, the Blackfeet Tribal Council legislated that “ ‘The Tribal Court and the State shall have concurrent and not exclusive jurisdiction of all suits wherein the defendant is a member of the Tribe which is brought before the Courts. ... ”’ 400 U.S. at 425, 91 S.Ct. at 481.
The Montana Supreme Court construed the action of the Blackfeet Tribal Council as sufficient to establish concurrent state jurisdiction. The United States Supreme Court disagreed and held that the absence of affirmative legislative action on the part of Montana prevented Montana from asserting jurisdiction in the Blackfeet Reservation under the 1953 Act and the absence [1066]*1066of a general election within the Blackfeet Reservation prevented Montana from asserting jurisdiction under the 1968 Act.
The Kennerly dissent argued that the ruling of the Montana Supreme Court did not infringe the right of the Indians to make their own laws since the Indians themselves had legislated that the Montana state courts would share concurrent jurisdiction. Whatever the relative merits of the Kennerly dissenting and majority opinions, we view the Kennerly majority as emphasizing a very vivid federal policy mandating the exclusive jurisdiction of tribal courts in cases involving internal tribal affairs or tribal self-government unless there has been an express delegation by Congress allowing the state to assume jurisdiction. None of the parties to this lawsuit contend that the State and the Wind River Indian Reservation Indians have arranged for state jurisdiction in the manner provided by the Congress.
Furthermore, Kennerly rebuts any sort of argument that might be made to the effect that in using the highway Ms. Peterson impliedly consents to state jurisdiction. (The highway was fenced and Ms. Peterson is accused of leaving a gate in the fence open; presumably the gate is for her convenience in using the highway.) Kennerly makes clear that consent by Indians to state jurisdiction-if the state does not already possess jurisdiction-must be given according to Congressional procedures.
A little more than a decade after Williams, the Arizona courts were again reversed by the United States Supreme Court. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission, 411 U.S. 164, 93 S.Ct. 1257, 36 L.Ed.2d 129 (1973). Arizona insisted, and the Arizona courts agreed (relying on Kake, supra), that the state could tax the income of an Indian earned on the reservation. In reversing, a unanimous Court reviewed Supreme Court decisions on state jurisdiction within an Indian reservation. The Court discussed the concept of- tribal sovereignty and concluded that the state tax was impermissible. The Court said:
“Finally, the trend has been away from the idea of inherent Indian sovereignty as a bar to state jurisdiction and toward reliance on federal pre-emption. [Footnote and citation omitted.] The modern cases thus tend to avoid reliance on platonic notions of Indian sovereignty and to look instead to the applicable treaties and statutes which define the limits of state power. [Citations and footnote omitted.] “The Indian sovereignty doctrine is relevant, then, not because it provides a definitive resolution of the issues in this suit, but because it provides a backdrop against which the applicable treaties and federal statutes must be read. ...” 411 U.S. at 172, 93 S.Ct. at 1262.8
The McClanahan Court then proceeded to examine the relevant treaty and statutes. [1067]*1067We have already discussed the Navajo treaty of 1868, along with the 1868 treaty establishing the Wind River Indian Reservation; both limit reservation access to Indians and federal employees. The Court recognized that that portion of the Navajo treaty did not explicitly state that the “Navajos were to be free from state law or exempt from state taxes.” 411 U.S. at 174, 93 S.Ct. at 1263. Nonetheless, the Court concluded that the Navajo treaty precludes “extension of state law-including state tax law-to Indians on the Navajo Reservation.” Id. at 175, 93 S.Ct. at 1264.
The McCIanahan Court continued:
“Moreover, since thé signing of the Navajo treaty, Congress has consistently acted upon the assumption that the States lacked jurisdiction over Navajos living on the reservation. [Footnote omitted.] Thus, when Arizona entered the Union, its entry was expressly conditioned on the promise that the State would ‘forever disclaim all right and title to ... all lands lying within said boundaries owned or held by any Indian or Indian tribes, the right or title to which shall have been acquired through or from the United States or any prior sovereignty, and that until the title of such Indian or Indian tribes shall have been extinguished the same shall be and remain subject to the disposition and under the absolute jurisdiction and control of the Congress of the United States.’ Arizona Enabling Act, 36 Stat. 569.” Id. at 175, 93 S.Ct. at 1264.
The language quoted from the Arizona Enabling Act by the McCIanahan Court is virtually identical to that found in Article 21, Section 26, of the Wyoming Constitution, reproduced in fn. 6, supra. The Wyoming Act of Admission, 26 Stat. 222-226 (1890), does not repeat the relevant language from Article 21, Section 26, of the Wyoming Constitution. However, because the Act of Admission recites acceptance, ratification and affirmance of the Wyoming Constitution, we held in a previous case that the “provisions of the act of admission had the same effect ... as an independent act of Congress enacting the provisions of our constitution . . ..” Merrill v. Bishop, 74 Wyo. 298, 311, 287 P.2d 620, 624 (1955). McCIanahan thus suggests that interpretation of Article 21, Section 26, of the Wyoming Constitution is largely a question of federal law. McCIanahan also broadly affirms the principles of Williams and Kennedy, supra.
The Court again discussed the current offer of Congress to delegate general jurisdiction over Indian reservations (conditioned upon Indian consent) to the states. The Court said:
“. . . But we cannot believe that Congress would have required the consent of the Indians affected and the amendment of those state constitutions which prohibit the assumption of jurisdiction if the States were free to accomplish the same goal unilaterally by simple legislative enactment. See Kennedy v. District Court [supra].” 411 U.S. at 178, 93 S.Ct. at 1265.
We interpret this language as indicating that the limited state jurisdiction over Indians discussed in Kake, supra, is to be narrowly defined. Moreover, Kake dealt with state jurisdiction off the reservation, whereas McCIanahan, Williams, and Kennedy, supra, show that specific treaty provisions may limit a state’s limited jurisdiction on a reservation.
Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 93 S.Ct. 1267, 36 L.Ed.2d 114 (1973), is a companion case of McCIanahan and dealt with state taxation with respect to off-reservation activities. Although the resolution of two tax issues in Mescalero is not relevant to our case, the following language is helpful:
“At the outset, we reject-as did the state court-the broad assertion that the Federal Government has exclusive jurisdiction over the Tribe for all purposes . . . The conceptual clarity of Mr. Chief Justice Marshall’s view in Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, 556-561 [8 L.Ed. 483] (1832), has given way to more individualized treatment of particular treaties and specific federal statutes, including state[1068]*1068hood enabling legislation, as they, taken together, affect the respective rights of States, Indians, and the Federal Government. ...” 411 U.S. at 147-148, 93 S.Ct. at 1270.
We have previously discussed the treaty which established the Wind River Indian Reservation and the federal and state law concerning Wyoming’s admission to the Union; Mescalero Apache Tribe further emphasizes the importance of that history.9
Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 96 S.Ct. 943, 47 L.Ed.2d 106, reh. den. 425 U.S. 926, 96 S.Ct. 1524, 47 L.Ed.2d 772 (1976), is a case which we consider very important in interpreting the Williams test of whether state jurisdiction would interfere with tribal government. Fisher involved the issue of whether the state of Montana had jurisdiction to resolve a child-custody dispute between reservation Indians and the Court held that exclusive jurisdiction lay with the Tribal Court.
Unlike the case at bar, Fisher did not involve any non-Indian parties. However, the Fisher Court indicated that it was applying the Williams test of whether the state jurisdiction would interfere with tribal self-government, and in so indicating the Court observed that Williams involved a non-Indian party. Fisher, supra, 424 U.S. at 386, 96 S.Ct. at 946. The Court said:
“State-court jurisdiction plainly would interfere with the powers of self-government conferred upon the Northern Cheyenne Tribe and exercised through the Tribal- Court. It would subject a dispute arising on the reservation among reservation Indians to a forum other than the one they have established for themselves. ...” 424 U.S. at 387-388, 96 S.Ct. at 947.
The Fisher Court referred to § 16 of the Indian Reorganization Act, 48 Stat. 987, 25 U.S.C. § 476, which authorizes tribal courts, as “a statute specifically intended to encourage Indian tribes to revitalize their self-government.” Id. at 387, 96 S.Ct. at 946. Again referring to the Indian Reorganization Act, the Court said:
“'. . . [I]t implements an overriding federal policy which is clearly adequate to defeat state jurisdiction over litigation involving reservation Indians. Accordingly, even if we assume that the Montana courts properly exercised adoption jurisdiction prior to the organization of the Tribe, a question we do not decide, the jurisdiction has now been pre-empt-ed.” Id. at 390, 96 S.Ct. at 948.
The Fisher Court went on to observe that Montana had not accepted jurisdiction over Indian affairs pursuant to either of the two Congressional offers discussed above.
We view Fisher as indicating that where a tribal court is established to handle a dispute involving reservation Indians, concurrent state jurisdiction is an interference with tribal self-government. Fisher is applicable to the case at bar because, as discussed in the section of this opinion titled, “A PRELIMINARY ISSUE — MILBANK’S RIGHTS AS A SUBROGEE,” trial of the case in a Wyoming court would necessarily involve evaluation of the conduct of two Indians arising out of activities taking place on the reservation.
In Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 98 S.Ct. 1011, 55 L.Ed.2d 209 (1978), the Court held that an Indian tribal court lacks jurisdiction to try a non-Indian defendant for a crime committed on the reservation. In explaining its decision, the Court relied, inter alia, on the plight of the non-Indian criminal defendant in a strange court system. Id. at 435 U.S. 210-211, 98 S.Ct. at 1021-1022.10 We are urged to con[1069]*1069sider the plight of the non-Indian plaintiff in the instant case and to ignore the distinction between a criminal and a civil action. However, in the case at bar, a federal regulation, supra, provides for tribal court jurisdiction when the defendant in a civil action is an Indian; in Oliphant there was no federal law providing for tribal court jurisdiction over the non-Indian criminal defendant.
In Washington v. Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 99 S.Ct. 740, 58 L.Ed.2d 740 (1979), reh. den. 440 U.S. 940, 99 S.Ct. 1290, 59 L.Ed.2d 500, the Court upheld the State of Washington’s assertion of partial jurisdiction over Indian reservations and affairs. Washington had legislated, pursuant to 67 Stat. 588-590, supra, that it would assert jurisdiction with respect to certain Indian matters but not with respect to others. The district court correctly points out that in this case the federal supreme court held that Washington’s partial assertion of jurisdiction was lawful even though Washington had not amended its constitution which contains a disclaimer of authority over Indian country. Nonetheless, Washington did clearly take advantage of 67 Stat. 588-590 by legislative action and Wyoming has not.
We are persuaded by the above review of United States Supreme Court cases that exclusive jurisdiction of the case at bar lies with the Wind River Court of Indian Offenses. In reaching this conclusion, we have also reviewed two state-supreme court decisions cited by the district court. In Vermillion v. Spotted Elk, N.D., 85 N.W.2d 432 (1957), a case very similar to the case at bar, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that the state court system had jurisdiction of the cause of action. That case was decided before Williams and we do not consider that the rationale of the Vermillion decision survived Williams.11 In State ex rel. Iron Bear v. District Court, Mont., 512 P.2d 1292 (1973), the Montana Supreme Court applied the test of Williams, supra, and concluded that state jurisdiction of a divorce action between two reservation Indians would not interfere with tribal self-government. However, the reversal of the Montana Supreme Court three years later, when it held that the state courts had jurisdiction of a child-custody dispute involving only reservation Indians, undercuts the force of the Iron Bear rationale. Fisher, supra. At any rate, we are unpersuaded that the rationale of either Vermillion or Iron Bear reveals error in our above analysis of the governing United States Supreme Court cases.
We are also cited to our own case of Torrey v. Baldwin, 3 Wyo. 430, 26 P. 908 (1891). Torrey, a non-Indian, moved his livestock onto the Wind River Indian Reservation (called the Shoshone Reservation in Torrey) and maintained that his livestock was exempt from county taxation and that county or state officials could not properly enter the reservation to seize his cattle if the taxes were not paid. Citing recent changes in United States Supreme Court case law, we declined to follow an earlier territorial precedent, Moore v. Board of County Commissioners, 2 Wyo. 8 (1878), and held against Torrey on both contentions.
We see nothing in this result which supports the contention that the state may assume jurisdiction of a cause of action involving the behavior of reservation Indians on the reservation. Torrey is merely consistent with the concept, discussed above, that Wyoming may assert a limited jurisdiction within the Wind River Indian Reservation. The limited jurisdiction was sufficient to tax or seize cattle of a non-Indian. Torrey was not concerned with Indian litigants.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS
It is urged that the conclusion of exclusive jurisdiction in the tribal court in the case at bar would be a denial of equal protection. Similar equal-protection arguments concerning tribal or federal jurisdiction have been summarily dismissed by the United States Supreme Court on numerous
[1070]*1070occasions. E. g., Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 94 S.Ct. 2474, 41 L.Ed.2d 290 (1974); United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 97 S.Ct. 1395, 51 L.Ed.2d 701 (1977); Fisher; Moe; and DeConteau, supra. The United States Supreme Court has held conclusively that exclusive jurisdiction in a tribal or federal court in the circumstances discussed in this opinion is not a denial of equal protection under the federal constitur tion. We consider it a moot point whether such exclusive jurisdiction violates Wyoming constitutional guarantees, e. g., the Article 1, Section 8, guarantee of access to the Wyoming courts, because we are dealing with an area of federal law which preempts our own state law.
The writ is granted.