OPALA, J.
¶ 1 In this disciplinary proceeding against a lawyer, the issues to be decided are: [1] Does .the record
submitted for our examination provide sufficient evidence for a meaningful
de novo
consideration of the complaint and of its disposition? and [2] Is a license suspension for thirty (30) days an appropriate disciplinary sanction for respondent’s breach of professional ethics? We answer both questions in the affirmative.
I
INTRODUCTION TO THE RECORD
¶ 2 On 26 January 2001 the Oklahoma Bar Association [Bar] commenced this disciplinary proceeding against Fred M. Schraeder [Schraeder or respondent], a licensed lawyer, by filing a formal complaint in accordance with the provisions of Rule 6 of the Rules Governing Disciplinary Proceedings [RGDP].
The complaint alleges in four counts multiple violations of the Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct [ORPC]
and of the RGDP. The charges include two grievances advanced by separate clients and respondent’s failure to respond to the Bar’s investigative inquiries in both matters. The Bar has since
withdrawn its reliance
on ORPC Rules 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 3.2 and 8.4(c) in Count I (the
McMinn
grievance); ORPC Rules 1.1, 1.3, 1.5, 1.16(b)(2), (d), 3.2 and 8.4(c) in Count II (the
Parsons
grievance); and on ORPC Rule 8.4(c) in Counts II and IV (for respondent’s failure timely to respond to the Bar’s inquiries).
The Bar now rests the four counts solely on:
(1) ORPC Rules 1.4,1.5,1.15(b), 1.16(b)2, (d), 3.2, 8.4(a) and RGDP Rule 1.3 in Count I; (2) ORPC Rules 1.4, 1.15(b), 8.4(a) and RGDP Rule 1.3 in Count III; and (3) ORPC Rules 8.1(b), 8.4(a) and RGDP Rules 1.3 and 5.2 in Counts II and IV.
¶ 3 At the commencement of its hearing on 16 May 2001 a trial panel of the Professional Responsibility Tribunal [panel or PRT] recognized for the record the admission of the parties’ stipulations of fact, conclusions of law and an agreed disciplinary recommendation. As for mitigation, the parties agreed that respondent had never before been disciplined (by the Professional Responsibility Commission or by this court) or been the subject of a formal investigation by the Bar’s counsel. The parties submit
professional burnout syndrome
as a factor to be considered in mitigation of respondent’s culpability.
.¶4 Upon completion of the hearing and consideration of the stipulations and testimony on file, the trial panel issued its report (which incorporates the parties’ stipulations). The panel recommended that respondent receive a private reprimand and be directed to pay the costs of this proceeding.
II
THE RECORD BEFORE THE COURT PROVIDES SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE FOR A MEANINGFUL
DE NOVO
CONSIDERATION OF ALL FACTS RELEVANT TO THIS PROCEEDING
¶ 5 In a bar disciplinary proceeding the court functions as an adjudicative licensing authority that exercises exclusive original cognizance.
The court’s jurisdiction rests
on the eourt’s constitutionally vested, nondel-egable power to regulate the practice of law, including the licensure, ethics, and discipline of this State’s legal practitioners.
In deciding whether discipline is warranted and what sanction, if any, is to be imposed for the misconduct charged, the court conducts a full-scale, nondeferential,
de novo
examination of all relevant facts,
in which the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the trial panel are neither binding nor persuasive.
In its task, the court is not guided by the scope-of-review rules that govern corrective relief on appeal or in certiorari proceedings in which another tribunal’s findings of fact may have to be left undisturbed by adherence to some law-imposed standards of deference.
¶ 6 The court’s duty can be discharged only if the trial panel submits a complete record of the proceedings.
Our initial task is to ascertain whether the tendered record is sufficient to permit (a) an independent on-the-record determination of the critical facts and (b) the crafting of an appropriate discipline.
The latter is that which (1) is consistent with the discipline imposed upon other lawyers who have committed similar acts of professional misconduct and (2) avoids the vice of visiting disparate treatment of an offending lawyer.
¶ 7 Having carefully scrutinized the record submitted, we conclude that it is adequate for
de novo
consideration of the respondent’s alleged professional misconduct and of the discipline to be imposed.
Ill
FACTS ADMITTED BY STIPULATION
¶ 8 The parties have tendered their stipulations by which respondent admits the facts which serve as the basis of the charges against him. A stipulation of fact is an agreement by the parties that a particular fact (or facts) in controversy stands admitted. It serves as an evidentiary substitute that dispenses with a need for proof of facts that are conceded by the parties’ agreement. Stipulations are subject to the approval of the court in which they are entered.
Re
spondent’s stipulations of facts (a) have been made voluntarily and with knowledge of their meaning and legal effect and (b) are not inconsistent with any facts otherwise established by the record. We hence approve and adopt the parties’ tendered stipulations.
A
Count
I
— The
McMinn Grievance
¶ 9 Count one is predicated upon a grievance by Perry A. McMinn [McMinn]. McMinn hired respondent to assist in a criminal appeal filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma.
He paid respondent on 4 September 1997 the sum of $2,000 by cashier’s cheek as part of the agreed fee of $10,000 and gave Schraeder an additional $800 on 21 January 1998.
¶ 10 After writing McMinn in February, March and May of 1998, respondent ceased communicating with his client and failed to file any motions or briefs in his appeal. Following respondent’s inactivity, McMinn filed a motion on his own behalf and wrote respondent a letter, dated 5 May 1999, asking him to review and revise the document. When respondent failed to reply, McMinn wrote him again on 2 June 1999 and enclosed copies of several eases that he wanted him to review. Respondent did not answer the June 2 letter; he claims that he never received the letter or the enclosed cases.
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OPALA, J.
¶ 1 In this disciplinary proceeding against a lawyer, the issues to be decided are: [1] Does .the record
submitted for our examination provide sufficient evidence for a meaningful
de novo
consideration of the complaint and of its disposition? and [2] Is a license suspension for thirty (30) days an appropriate disciplinary sanction for respondent’s breach of professional ethics? We answer both questions in the affirmative.
I
INTRODUCTION TO THE RECORD
¶ 2 On 26 January 2001 the Oklahoma Bar Association [Bar] commenced this disciplinary proceeding against Fred M. Schraeder [Schraeder or respondent], a licensed lawyer, by filing a formal complaint in accordance with the provisions of Rule 6 of the Rules Governing Disciplinary Proceedings [RGDP].
The complaint alleges in four counts multiple violations of the Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct [ORPC]
and of the RGDP. The charges include two grievances advanced by separate clients and respondent’s failure to respond to the Bar’s investigative inquiries in both matters. The Bar has since
withdrawn its reliance
on ORPC Rules 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 3.2 and 8.4(c) in Count I (the
McMinn
grievance); ORPC Rules 1.1, 1.3, 1.5, 1.16(b)(2), (d), 3.2 and 8.4(c) in Count II (the
Parsons
grievance); and on ORPC Rule 8.4(c) in Counts II and IV (for respondent’s failure timely to respond to the Bar’s inquiries).
The Bar now rests the four counts solely on:
(1) ORPC Rules 1.4,1.5,1.15(b), 1.16(b)2, (d), 3.2, 8.4(a) and RGDP Rule 1.3 in Count I; (2) ORPC Rules 1.4, 1.15(b), 8.4(a) and RGDP Rule 1.3 in Count III; and (3) ORPC Rules 8.1(b), 8.4(a) and RGDP Rules 1.3 and 5.2 in Counts II and IV.
¶ 3 At the commencement of its hearing on 16 May 2001 a trial panel of the Professional Responsibility Tribunal [panel or PRT] recognized for the record the admission of the parties’ stipulations of fact, conclusions of law and an agreed disciplinary recommendation. As for mitigation, the parties agreed that respondent had never before been disciplined (by the Professional Responsibility Commission or by this court) or been the subject of a formal investigation by the Bar’s counsel. The parties submit
professional burnout syndrome
as a factor to be considered in mitigation of respondent’s culpability.
.¶4 Upon completion of the hearing and consideration of the stipulations and testimony on file, the trial panel issued its report (which incorporates the parties’ stipulations). The panel recommended that respondent receive a private reprimand and be directed to pay the costs of this proceeding.
II
THE RECORD BEFORE THE COURT PROVIDES SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE FOR A MEANINGFUL
DE NOVO
CONSIDERATION OF ALL FACTS RELEVANT TO THIS PROCEEDING
¶ 5 In a bar disciplinary proceeding the court functions as an adjudicative licensing authority that exercises exclusive original cognizance.
The court’s jurisdiction rests
on the eourt’s constitutionally vested, nondel-egable power to regulate the practice of law, including the licensure, ethics, and discipline of this State’s legal practitioners.
In deciding whether discipline is warranted and what sanction, if any, is to be imposed for the misconduct charged, the court conducts a full-scale, nondeferential,
de novo
examination of all relevant facts,
in which the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the trial panel are neither binding nor persuasive.
In its task, the court is not guided by the scope-of-review rules that govern corrective relief on appeal or in certiorari proceedings in which another tribunal’s findings of fact may have to be left undisturbed by adherence to some law-imposed standards of deference.
¶ 6 The court’s duty can be discharged only if the trial panel submits a complete record of the proceedings.
Our initial task is to ascertain whether the tendered record is sufficient to permit (a) an independent on-the-record determination of the critical facts and (b) the crafting of an appropriate discipline.
The latter is that which (1) is consistent with the discipline imposed upon other lawyers who have committed similar acts of professional misconduct and (2) avoids the vice of visiting disparate treatment of an offending lawyer.
¶ 7 Having carefully scrutinized the record submitted, we conclude that it is adequate for
de novo
consideration of the respondent’s alleged professional misconduct and of the discipline to be imposed.
Ill
FACTS ADMITTED BY STIPULATION
¶ 8 The parties have tendered their stipulations by which respondent admits the facts which serve as the basis of the charges against him. A stipulation of fact is an agreement by the parties that a particular fact (or facts) in controversy stands admitted. It serves as an evidentiary substitute that dispenses with a need for proof of facts that are conceded by the parties’ agreement. Stipulations are subject to the approval of the court in which they are entered.
Re
spondent’s stipulations of facts (a) have been made voluntarily and with knowledge of their meaning and legal effect and (b) are not inconsistent with any facts otherwise established by the record. We hence approve and adopt the parties’ tendered stipulations.
A
Count
I
— The
McMinn Grievance
¶ 9 Count one is predicated upon a grievance by Perry A. McMinn [McMinn]. McMinn hired respondent to assist in a criminal appeal filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma.
He paid respondent on 4 September 1997 the sum of $2,000 by cashier’s cheek as part of the agreed fee of $10,000 and gave Schraeder an additional $800 on 21 January 1998.
¶ 10 After writing McMinn in February, March and May of 1998, respondent ceased communicating with his client and failed to file any motions or briefs in his appeal. Following respondent’s inactivity, McMinn filed a motion on his own behalf and wrote respondent a letter, dated 5 May 1999, asking him to review and revise the document. When respondent failed to reply, McMinn wrote him again on 2 June 1999 and enclosed copies of several eases that he wanted him to review. Respondent did not answer the June 2 letter; he claims that he never received the letter or the enclosed cases. By letter dated 27 September 1999 McMinn requested a detailed accounting of all costs and legal services expended on his behalf and a refund of the unearned portion of the $2,800 fee.
Respondent failed to answer the September 27 letter.
¶ 11 Schraeder
insists
(1) that he filed no briefs or pleadings in the McMinn case because he was waiting to receive pertinent information from McMinn’s family to proceed with the appeal
and
claims
(2) that he neither responded to the September 27 letter nor provided the requested accounting because he believed that he had earned the $2,800 fee by (a)
researching
the various issues in the McMinn appeal, (b)
speaking
on several occasions to members of McMinn’s family and (e)
traveling
twice to visit McMinn at the Adult Detention Center in Tulsa, Oklahoma.
¶ 12 The Bar and respondent agree that the latter’s misconduct violates the mandatory provisions of ORPC Rules 1.4
(failure promptly to communicate with his client’s request for information),1.5
(failure to charge reasonable fees), 1.15(b)
(failure promptly to account
for
and return any unearned fees), 1.16(b)(2) and (d)
(failure
promptly to notify McMinn of his withdrawal from the appeal), 8.4(a)
(misconduct) and RGDP Rule 1.3
(bringing discredit upon the legal profession). Upon
de novo
review of the record, we hold the charges are supported by clear and convincing proof that respondent’s conduct warrants the imposition of discipline.
B
Count
III
— The
Parsons Grievance
¶ 13 In Count three of the complaint the Bar charged respondent with failure to communicate with a client and to perform the work for which he was hired. Around
13 February 1999
Loretta Parsons [Parsons] retained Schraeder to represent her grandchildren’s interest in her deceased daughter’s estate. He was also to represent another granddaughter in both a criminal and a domestic matter. Parsons paid him $1,500.00. She also delivered to him several documents relevant to the estate as well as to possible civil litigation pertaining to her daughter’s death. Respondent claims that Parsons paid him the fee to represent two of Parsons’ adult children in three legal matters but that he never agreed to represent her in any wrongful death or other civil action. He insists that he completed the criminal and domestic matters for one granddaughter and performed work in the probate case.
¶ 14 The record is replete with letters from Parsons to respondent in which she insists that her efforts to communicate with respondent and to retrieve from him personal documents relating to a wrongful death suit proved unsuccessful. Schraeder takes the position that he terminated all communications with Parsons because his representation ended after the conclusion of the estate matters for her grandchildren and another family member’s criminal case and annulment.
¶ 15 A constant flow of communication between an attorney and client constitutes a vital part of a lawyer’s professional undertaking.
When a client seeks information from one who is retained for representation, prompt responsive action should be forthcoming.
Prolonged and willful silence by the lawyer’s failure to return calls or answer letters is the very kind of neglect that destroys the public’s confidence in the lawyer’s integrity,
¶ 16 Both the Bar and respondent agree that the latter’s actions
violate
the
mandatory provisions of ORPC Rules 1.4,
1.15(b),
and 8.4(a)
and RGDP Rule 1.3
and
constitute
grounds for the imposition of professional discipline. On
de novo
review of the record, we hold there is clear and convincing probative support in the record for a breach of professional ethics and that the imposition of discipline is warranted.
C
COUNTS II AND
TV
— Failure
Timely to Respond to the Bar’s Investigative Inquiries into the McMinn and Parsons Grievances
¶ 17 Counts II and IV address respondent’s delay in filing his response to the Bar’s investigative inquiries in the McMinn and Parsons grievances. Respondent failed timely to respond to the Bar’s three written requests and promptly to take action with respect to statements he made on two occasions to the Bar’s investigator.
The McMinn Grievance
¶ 18 The Bar notified respondent by letter dated
16 February 2000
that the McMinn grievance was being opened for formal investigation, invoMng the requirement that Schraeder provide a complete response within a twenty-day (20) period.
On
March 14
the Bar notified Schraeder by certified mail containing a warning that failure to respond would result in the issuance of a
subpoena duces tecum
and require his testimony at the Bar Center. Respondent offered an explanation in a belated letter to the Bar (dated
March 13
and postmarked
March
16). He claimed that McMinn failed to provide critical information in a timely fashion and that any delay was caused by the lack of information he needed to proceed with the McMinn appeal.
¶ 19 The Bar’s assigned investigator, Ray Page [Page or investigator] met with Schrae-der concerning the McMinn and Parsons grievances. Schraeder assured Page that he would attempt to resolve with McMinn the dispute over the unearned portion of fees. Respondent’s undated letter to the Bar, received
22 November 2000,
shows that he wrote McMinn asWng what portion of the fee he desired to have returned to him. McMinn’s
November 28
letter to respondent requested a refund of the entire $2,800.
¶ 20 By a
16 December 2000
facsimile transmission, respondent advised Page of his letter to McMinn and of McMinn’s November 28 response. Contrary to respondent’s statement that he would send Page a copy of his response to McMinn’s November 28 request, the Bar received a
December 26
letter from McMinn advising that
he had not received a response
to his November 28 letter. Respondent concedes that he did not promptly respond to McMinn’s November 28 refund request, but claims that the delay was caused by the closing of his private practice and the moving of his law office. Respondent eventually provided McMinn with a full accounting of legal services and has refunded approximately $1,195.00 of the $2,800 fee. The respondent’s conduct violates the mandatory provisions of ORPC Rules 8.1(b)
and
8.4(a)
and RGDP Rules 1.3
and 5.2
and warrants the imposition of discipline.
The Parsons Grievance
¶21 By letter of
10 May 2000
the Bar advised respondent of Parsons’ complaint and directed him to communicate with her within two weeks. Respondent wrote to Parsons and was informed by her letter of
May 23
which items she wanted him to return. Because respondent neither returned the requested documents nor responded to her letter, the Bar demanded (by letter of
June
5) that respondent return the items to her by
June 13
or at least offer an explanation as to why it would have been impossible for him to do so. Respondent was advised by the Bar’s letter that failure timely to respond would be grounds for discipline and result in a formal investigation.
¶ 22 One
14 June 2000
the Bar received a letter from Parsons stating that respondent had neither communicated with her nor returned the requested items. Two days later the Bar received a letter from respondent, dated
June 12
and post-marked
June 15,
which advised that he had previously forwarded all documents to Parsons and that he could find no additional items in his office.
¶ 23 The Bar notified Schraeder by letter of
10 July 2000
that it was opening the Parsons matter for formal investigation, again invoking the requirement of a written response within twenty days. On
Auyust 1
Parsons notified Page, the Bar’s investigator, that she had entrusted certain documents to respondent when she retained him to file a wrongful death action. She explained that the documents were needed so that a lawsuit could be filed by another lawyer before it became time barred. Page’s
August 11
letter to respondent requested that he again search for the items, stressing that a response was needed within 10 days to prevent the statute of limitations from running out.
No reply was forthcoming from Schraeder.
¶24 After being advised by Parsons on
August 22
that respondent had not contacted her about the missing documents, Page called respondent, leaving a message on his machine to return his call.
Schraeder failed to respond.
¶ 25 Page finally met with respondent at his Drumright office on
7 November 2000.
Respondent assured him that he would contact his former secretary to see if she could help him locate Parsons’ missing documents. The following day respondent telephoned Parsons, advising her of his plan to enlist the aid of his former secretary. On
December 14
respondent advised Page that he had located the missing documents and would mail them to Parsons the next day, as well as send the Bar a copy of the returned mail receipt. Respondent confirmed these plans by
December 16
facsimile transmission to Page. The record indicates
respondent did not return the remainder of Parsons’ files until on or about 21 March 2001.
Respondent insists that the delay was due to activity in closing his private practice.
¶ 26 The terms of RGDP Rule 5.2 provide that the failure of a lawyer to answer the Bar’s request for information
shall be
grounds for discipline.
A lawyer’s obligation to respond to a Bar complaint is mandatory and leaves no room for interpretation about the proper form or time for filing a response.
Respondent admits that he violated the mandatory provisions of ORPC
Rules 8.1(b),
8.4(a)
and RGDP Rules 1.3,
5.2
and that his misconduct constitutes grounds for the imposition of professional discipline. We agree. The only question remaining here is the proper disciplinary measure to be imposed for respondent’s breach of professional ethics.
IY
FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED IN MITIGATION OF DISCIPLINE
¶ 27 Mitigating circumstances may be considered in the process of assessing the appropriate quantum of discipline.
Respondent has raised several factors in mitigation.
¶ 28 Respondent submits medical proof that he suffered from
occupational burnout
diagnosed by his physician during the time of the breach. When the condition is tendered as a mitigating factor for assessment of one’s culpability there must be a causal relationship between a medical condition and the professional misconduct
charged.
Fef
emotional or psychological disability, though it may serve to reduce the actor’s ethical culpability, does not immunize one ñ'om imposition of disciplinary measures that are necessary to protect the public.
The record provides a sufficient causal connection between respondent’s ethical lapses and his professional burnout syndrome. His condition is now believed by his physician to have been arrested. Respondent continues to be seen once a week as part of an ongoing counseling program.
¶ 29 Shortly after he became aware of his inability fully to serve his clients respondent sought to correct certain deficiencies in the way his office was managed by closing out his private practice and joining an assemblage of practitioners who can assist him.
¶ 30 Respondent has been a member of the bar for over 19 years and his professional record reflects neither previous blemishes nor a pattern of misconduct.
He has acknowledged and accepted responsibility for his professional derelictions. The record shows that respondent’s actions caused no grave economic harm. We note that respondent’s dealings with the Bar,
albeit
dilatory during the initial investigative stages, were characterized by candor and cooperation during the latter stages and in the PRT proceedings.
¶31 We have taken these matters into account in fashioning the appropriate measure of discipline.
Y
RESPONDENT’S MISCONDUCT WARRANTS A LICENSE SUSPENSION FOR THIRTY (30) DAYS TOGETHER WITH PAYMENT OF THE COSTS OF THIS PROCEEDING
¶32 A bar disciplinary process, including that for imposition of a disciplinary sanction, is designed not to punish the delinquent lawyer, but to safeguard the interests of the public, of the judiciary, and of the legal profession.
Neglect of a lawyer’s responsibilities compromises the independence of the profession and the public interest which that independence serves.
A license to practice law is not conferred for the benefit of an individual, but for that of the public.
The disciplinary measure imposed upon an offending lawyer should be consistent with the discipline imposed upon other practitioners for similar acts of professional misconduct
¶ 33 A lawyer’s failure to respond to the bar’s investigative inquiries is a serious offense. This court in
State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Association v.
Robb
imposed a suspension of two years and one day for a lawyer’s
failure to respond
to three client grievances or
appear
for depositions in response to subpoenas and for
failure to respond
to the disciplinary complaint.
¶ 34 The trial panel recommends a private reprimand as a fit discipline for respondent’s breach of professional ethics. After a review of the record and the court’s acceptance of the tendered mitigating factors, we hold that the appropriate disciplinary measure to be imposed is a thirty-day suspension of license to practice law. Today’s decision is based upon the cumulative
effect of the following factors: (1) respondent’s utter failure
promptly
to respond to the bar’s investigative inquires, (2) his lack of concern for a client’s economic interest by
refusal promptly
to account for and restore the unearned portion of fees for nearly a three-year period and (3) his
disreyard
for a client’s right to know the status of her case. Although we take note that upon his own initiative respondent sought to determine if there was an underlying cause for his apathy and lost sense of career satisfaction and now seeks professional counseling on a continual basis, the standards to be followed are those that best protect the public and not those that shield the offending lawyer.
VI
SUMMARY
¶ 35 In sum, the record bears clear and convincing proof that respondent’s participation in several episodes of unprofessional conduct violates the rules governing professional ethics. After a thorough review of the record and recognition of the tendered mitigating factors,
RESPONDENT’S LICENSE TO PRACTICE LAW STANDS ORDERED SUSPENDED FOR THIRTY (30) DAYS AND HE IS DIRECTED TO PAY THE COSTS OF THE INVESTIGATION, RECORD AND PROCEEDING IN THE AMOUNT OF $571.03, WHICH SHALL BECOME DUE NOT LATER THAN THIRTY (30) DAYS AFTER THIS OPINION BECOMES FINAL.
¶ 36 HARGRAVE, C.J., KAUGER, SUMMERS, BOUDREAU and WINCHESTER, JJ., concur.
¶ 37 WATT, V.C.J., HODGES and LAVENDER, JJ., concur in part and dissent in part.
LAVENDER, J., with whom WATT, V.C.J., and HODGES, J., join, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
¶ 11 would administer a public reprimand.