KAUGER, J.
11 The complainant, Oklahoma Bar Association (Bar Association), charged the respondent, John Barry Albert (attorney/respondent), with eleven counts of professional misconduct resulting from irresponsible and neglectful representation of clients. The Bar Association alleged that the attorney's actions involved ineffective communication with clients, neglecting clients, mishandling cases, and failing to appear in court in behalf of clients in violation of Rules 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.16, 8.2, 8.1(b), and 84(a) and (d) of the Rules of Professional Conduct1 and Rules [530]*5301.3, 5.2, and 10 of the Rules Governing Disciplinary Proceedings.2 The Bar Association also sought an interim suspension of the attorney pursuant to Rule 6.2A of the Rules Governing Disciplinary Proceedings, 5 O.S. 2001 Ch. 1, App. 1-A 3 alleging that he was incapable of practicing law due to drug and alcohol abuse. We suspended him on April 24, 2006. Upon a de novo review,4 we hold that: 1) the attorney met the requisite burden of proof necessary for reinstatement; 2) the attorney's misconduct warrants discipline of a retroactive suspension from the practice of law from March 9, 2006, until the day this opinion is issued; and 3) attorney is responsible for partial payment of costs in the amount of $912.00 to be paid in three monthly installments beginning 90 days after this opinion is issued.5
[531]*531FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
12 Respondent became a member of the Oklahoma Bar Association in 1992. He worked as a public defender for three years before going into private practice in which he represented mostly criminal defendants. According to the attorney, in March and April of 2005, his life began to crumble when he started drinking heavily and abusing cocaine. It was during this time that respondent began avoiding clients and neglecting cases. He attributes his drug and aleohol abuse and client neglect to the way in which he handled marital problems and the death of his father.
13 On April 29, 2005, the Bar Association received the first of eleven grievances from respondent's clients (spanning from April of 2005 to March of 2006) regarding his neglectful representation. After an in-court intervention on March 9, 2006, respondent entered Valley Hope treatment center in Cushing, Oklahoma, to receive treatment for alcohol and cocaine abuse. On March 24, 2006, the Bar Association filed a complaint against the attorney with an application for an order of emergency interim suspension.6
14 The application alleged that the attorney was incapable of practicing law as defined by Rule 10.1(a)(b) and (c) of the Rules Governing Disciplinary Proceedings, 5 0.8. 2001, Ch. 1, App. 1-A.7 We entered an order on April 3, 2006, directing the attorney to show cause why such an interim suspension should not be entered. On the same day, respondent was discharged from Valley Hope after completing an in-patient treatment program. On April 12, 2006, the attorney filed a response to our order, agreeing to an immediate interim suspension until he could demonstrate his fitness to resume the practice of law. On April 24, 2006, we determined that respondent was incapable of practicing law and suspended him from the practice of law.
5 On May 28, 2006, the trial panel held a closed evidentiary hearing in which the parties offered joint exhibits, stipulated to the complaint, and presented the testimony of witnesses and arguments before the tribunal. On May 26, 2006, the parties jointly moved and were allowed to supplement the record with additional exhibits. On July 7, 2006, the attorney and the Bar Association, conceding confusion as to the proper procedures to follow, moved to supplement the record and filed a petition for rehearing, which was in actuality a petition for reinstatement. The confusion arose concerning whether the attorney needed to seek a separate reinstatement because he had been suspended, or whether the disciplinary hearing was sufficient to include a request for reinstatement. The trial panel determined on May 283, 2006, that a sufficient record was made to determine both reinstatement as well as discipline.
16 The trial panel filed its report on August 4, 2006, recommending reinstatement from the interim suspension and a one year suspension for the attorney's misconduct with supervision or probation for three years with stipulations.8 The trial panel also recommended that respondent pay the costs of the proceeding and any costs associated with the terms of his probation. On December [532]*53212, 2006, we remanded the matter to the trial panel for another hearing on reinstatement because the attorney failed to meet the burden of proof necessary for reinstatement.9
17 A hearing was held before the trial panel on January 28, 2007, and the trial panel issued its report on March 9, 2007. The trial panel recommended reinstatement, placement under supervision or probation with stipulations for three years, and discipline and costs be imposed. The briefing cycle was complete on March 29, 2007, when the parties filed a joint brief in support of reinstatement and a waiver of further briefs.
I.
T8 THE ATTORNEY MET THE BURDEN OF PROOF NECESSARY FOR REINSTATEMENT.
T9 The genesis of this cause is Rule 10, Rules Governing Disciplinary Proceedings, 5 0.98.2001 Ch.1, App-1, which concerns suspension of a lawyer from the practice of law due to personal incapacity. Personal incapacity includes mental or physical illness, active misfeasance, or repeated neglect or habitual use of alcohol, drugs, or other mentally or physically disabling substances.10 Respondent's incapacity and his threat of substantial and irreparable public harm became obvious, and the Bar Association properly sought an immediate interim suspension of the attorney's license to practice law.11 Respondent agreed to the interim suspension and admitted that he was incapable of practicing law.12 We agreed and suspended respondent on April 24, 2006, until further order of the Court.
10 Once the Court issues an interim suspension, the next questions in the proceedings become: 1) whether the attorney can make an adequate showing that the incapacity is removed-i.e., that the attorney now has the personal capacity to resume the practice of law; and 2) what amount of discipline, if any, is due for the attorney's misconduct toward clients. The Bar Association and the attorney argue that he has demonstrated proof that; 1) the attorney is no longer threatened by a personal incapacity; 2) the attorney's conduct will conform to the high standards required of a member of the bar; and 8) the attorney has demonstrated that he satisfies the other pertinent criteria for reinstatement.
{111 The responsibility of this Court in disciplinary proceedings is not to punish but rather to inquire into and to gauge a lawyer's continued fitness to practice law, with a purpose of safeguarding the in[533]*533terest of the public, of the courts, and of the legal profession.13 The nondelegable, constitutional responsibility to regulate the practice and the ethics, licensure, and discipline of legal practitioners is solely vested in this Court.14
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KAUGER, J.
11 The complainant, Oklahoma Bar Association (Bar Association), charged the respondent, John Barry Albert (attorney/respondent), with eleven counts of professional misconduct resulting from irresponsible and neglectful representation of clients. The Bar Association alleged that the attorney's actions involved ineffective communication with clients, neglecting clients, mishandling cases, and failing to appear in court in behalf of clients in violation of Rules 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.16, 8.2, 8.1(b), and 84(a) and (d) of the Rules of Professional Conduct1 and Rules [530]*5301.3, 5.2, and 10 of the Rules Governing Disciplinary Proceedings.2 The Bar Association also sought an interim suspension of the attorney pursuant to Rule 6.2A of the Rules Governing Disciplinary Proceedings, 5 O.S. 2001 Ch. 1, App. 1-A 3 alleging that he was incapable of practicing law due to drug and alcohol abuse. We suspended him on April 24, 2006. Upon a de novo review,4 we hold that: 1) the attorney met the requisite burden of proof necessary for reinstatement; 2) the attorney's misconduct warrants discipline of a retroactive suspension from the practice of law from March 9, 2006, until the day this opinion is issued; and 3) attorney is responsible for partial payment of costs in the amount of $912.00 to be paid in three monthly installments beginning 90 days after this opinion is issued.5
[531]*531FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
12 Respondent became a member of the Oklahoma Bar Association in 1992. He worked as a public defender for three years before going into private practice in which he represented mostly criminal defendants. According to the attorney, in March and April of 2005, his life began to crumble when he started drinking heavily and abusing cocaine. It was during this time that respondent began avoiding clients and neglecting cases. He attributes his drug and aleohol abuse and client neglect to the way in which he handled marital problems and the death of his father.
13 On April 29, 2005, the Bar Association received the first of eleven grievances from respondent's clients (spanning from April of 2005 to March of 2006) regarding his neglectful representation. After an in-court intervention on March 9, 2006, respondent entered Valley Hope treatment center in Cushing, Oklahoma, to receive treatment for alcohol and cocaine abuse. On March 24, 2006, the Bar Association filed a complaint against the attorney with an application for an order of emergency interim suspension.6
14 The application alleged that the attorney was incapable of practicing law as defined by Rule 10.1(a)(b) and (c) of the Rules Governing Disciplinary Proceedings, 5 0.8. 2001, Ch. 1, App. 1-A.7 We entered an order on April 3, 2006, directing the attorney to show cause why such an interim suspension should not be entered. On the same day, respondent was discharged from Valley Hope after completing an in-patient treatment program. On April 12, 2006, the attorney filed a response to our order, agreeing to an immediate interim suspension until he could demonstrate his fitness to resume the practice of law. On April 24, 2006, we determined that respondent was incapable of practicing law and suspended him from the practice of law.
5 On May 28, 2006, the trial panel held a closed evidentiary hearing in which the parties offered joint exhibits, stipulated to the complaint, and presented the testimony of witnesses and arguments before the tribunal. On May 26, 2006, the parties jointly moved and were allowed to supplement the record with additional exhibits. On July 7, 2006, the attorney and the Bar Association, conceding confusion as to the proper procedures to follow, moved to supplement the record and filed a petition for rehearing, which was in actuality a petition for reinstatement. The confusion arose concerning whether the attorney needed to seek a separate reinstatement because he had been suspended, or whether the disciplinary hearing was sufficient to include a request for reinstatement. The trial panel determined on May 283, 2006, that a sufficient record was made to determine both reinstatement as well as discipline.
16 The trial panel filed its report on August 4, 2006, recommending reinstatement from the interim suspension and a one year suspension for the attorney's misconduct with supervision or probation for three years with stipulations.8 The trial panel also recommended that respondent pay the costs of the proceeding and any costs associated with the terms of his probation. On December [532]*53212, 2006, we remanded the matter to the trial panel for another hearing on reinstatement because the attorney failed to meet the burden of proof necessary for reinstatement.9
17 A hearing was held before the trial panel on January 28, 2007, and the trial panel issued its report on March 9, 2007. The trial panel recommended reinstatement, placement under supervision or probation with stipulations for three years, and discipline and costs be imposed. The briefing cycle was complete on March 29, 2007, when the parties filed a joint brief in support of reinstatement and a waiver of further briefs.
I.
T8 THE ATTORNEY MET THE BURDEN OF PROOF NECESSARY FOR REINSTATEMENT.
T9 The genesis of this cause is Rule 10, Rules Governing Disciplinary Proceedings, 5 0.98.2001 Ch.1, App-1, which concerns suspension of a lawyer from the practice of law due to personal incapacity. Personal incapacity includes mental or physical illness, active misfeasance, or repeated neglect or habitual use of alcohol, drugs, or other mentally or physically disabling substances.10 Respondent's incapacity and his threat of substantial and irreparable public harm became obvious, and the Bar Association properly sought an immediate interim suspension of the attorney's license to practice law.11 Respondent agreed to the interim suspension and admitted that he was incapable of practicing law.12 We agreed and suspended respondent on April 24, 2006, until further order of the Court.
10 Once the Court issues an interim suspension, the next questions in the proceedings become: 1) whether the attorney can make an adequate showing that the incapacity is removed-i.e., that the attorney now has the personal capacity to resume the practice of law; and 2) what amount of discipline, if any, is due for the attorney's misconduct toward clients. The Bar Association and the attorney argue that he has demonstrated proof that; 1) the attorney is no longer threatened by a personal incapacity; 2) the attorney's conduct will conform to the high standards required of a member of the bar; and 8) the attorney has demonstrated that he satisfies the other pertinent criteria for reinstatement.
{111 The responsibility of this Court in disciplinary proceedings is not to punish but rather to inquire into and to gauge a lawyer's continued fitness to practice law, with a purpose of safeguarding the in[533]*533terest of the public, of the courts, and of the legal profession.13 The nondelegable, constitutional responsibility to regulate the practice and the ethics, licensure, and discipline of legal practitioners is solely vested in this Court.14
112 In a Rule 10 proceeding the main objective is to minimize the potential risk to the public of harm from a practitioner's incapacity. The focus is not exelusively on the past; rather the focus is on the practitioner's present condition and its future consequences.15 A disability does not shield a practitioner from professional responsibility. Where the facts so warrant, discipline could be imposed even when the attorney is also found to be personally incapable of practicing law.16 However, the disability may serve as a mitigating factor when searching for suitable discipline.17 For instance, alcohol abuse or alcoholism may serve as a mitigating factor where the offending attorney recognizes the problem and seeks and cooperates in treatment,18 as the attorney did in this case.
' 13 Rule 10.11, Rules Governing Disciplinary Proceedings, 5 0.8.2001 Ch. 1, App. 1-A, directs that the procedures, insofar as they are applicable, for resuming the practice of law after the removal of a personal incapacity are the same as the procedures as those provided in Rule 11,19 following suspension upon disciplinary grounds.20 It makes no difference whether the suspension resulted from an interim suspension for personal incapacity 21 or from a suspension pursuant to a Rule 10 proceeding where no interim suspension was sought.22 In requesting reinstatement, the lawyer must establish by clear and convincing evidence that: 1) the condition is no longer a threat rendering the applicant personally incapable of practicing law; and 2) the applicant's conduct will conform to the high standards required of a member of the Oklahoma Bar. Further, the applicant must present stronger proof of qualifications than one seeking admission for the first time.23
114 We look at several criteria for reinstatement when a lawyer has been either disbarred or has resigned pending disciplinary proceedings while holding to our primary duty of safeguarding the public, the courts, [534]*534and the legal profession.24 The factors include: present moral fitness; consciousness of the wrongfulness and disrepute brought on the profession; extent of rehabilitation; seriousness of the original misconduct; conduct subsequent to discipline; time elapsed since the original discipline; petitioner's character, maturity, and experience; and present competence in legal skills.25 While all the factors are relevant when the suspension results from an incapacity to practice law, those weighing most heavily to the incapacity are: 1) the extent of rehabilitation of the affliction attributable to the incapacity; 2) the conduct subsequent to the suspension and treatment received for the condition; and 3) the time which has elapsed since the suspension.
$15 To be reinstated, the attorney must make a showing that, over a significant amount of time, he has maintained sobriety and refrained from abusing drugs or alcohol; passed random drug tests; attended Aleohol-ies Anonymous meetings; sought necessary counseling and participated in Lawyers Helping Lawyers; has diligently pursued his sobriety; and has met the other factors necessary for reinstatement.
116 At the second reinstatement hearing, respondent demonstrated every factor which we consider for reinstatement due to a personal incapacity: present moral fitness; consciousness of the wrongfulness and disrepute brought on the profession; extent of rehabilitation; seriousness of the original misconduct; conduct subsequent to discipline; time elapsed since the original discipline; petitioner's character, maturity, and experience; and present competence in legal skills.
117 Eleven witnesses who ranged from three district court judges, the director and a mentor from Lawyers Helping Lawyers, respondent's family, and the Oklahoma County Public Defender, all with personal firsthand knowledge of respondent's recovery testified as to all of these factors. Other affidavits and numerous exhibits were submitted to support respondent's reinstatement. Respondent has continually passed monthly random drug tests and over a year has elapsed since he first began treatment. It was undisputed that respondent, prior to his affliction, was an excellent attorney and asset to the Bar. We applaud respondent for his efforts to seek treatment, get sober, remain clean, and overcome his problems of drug and alcohol abuse.
118 Upon de novo review, we find that clear and convincing evidence shows that: 1) respondent is no longer under an incapacity which would preclude him from practicing law; and 2) respondent's conduct will conform to the high standards required of a member of the Oklahoma Bar. We find it unnecessary to impose additional stipulations to the reinstatement because if respondent were to relapse and become incapacitated again, he would be subject to suspension. While the steps recommended by the trial panel are laudable, we are not making them a condition of reinstatement.
IL.
119 THE ATTORNEY'S MISCONDUCT WARRANTS DISCIPLINE OF A RETROACTIVE SUSPENSION FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW FROM MARCH 9, 2006, UNTIL THE DAY THIS OPINION IS ISSUED.
120 In total, respondent's clients, or someone on their behalf, filed eleven griev[535]*535ances against him which culminated in allegations of ten counts of misconduct. The grievances stemmed from clients who hired respondent to represent them in criminal proceedings and involved ineffective or no communication with clients; neglecting cases; neglecting to show up in court on behalf of the client; mishandling the case or incompetent representation; and failure to perform work for which he had been hired.26 The General Counsel also filed a grievance stemming from numerous allegations ranging from failure to appear in court for trials and other proceedings on behalf of clients to demonstrations of disrespectful behavior toward the bench and direct contempt of court.
121 The attorney admitted to all of the allegations of misconduct. The Bar Association and the attorney note that during his interim suspension, the attorney has complied with the terms and conditions of the probation as originally recommended by the trial panel. The record reflects that the attorney was cooperative with the Bar Association in seeing that all of the cases in which he neglected were assigned to other lawyers who handled them as efficiently as possible and have in fact resolved the matters without further complaint. The Bar Association and the attorney ask that based upon his interim suspension for over one year, and the overwhelming mitigation presented, the Court issue a private reprimand with a probationary term and an assessment of costs.
122 Again, our research does not reflect any precedent for such a recommendation particularly when one considers the detriment to the clients, the seriousness of the conduct, the extent of addiction, and the length of time in which the attorney sought help in controlling the addiction.27 We real[537]*537ize of course, as the Bar Association points out, that respondent was not convicted of any crimes and the caselaw often involves attorneys who faced criminal convictions. Nevertheless, the attorney has admitted to criminal conduct which could have resulted in a conviction had the matter been pursued.
123 However, because of mitigating circumstances of respondent's addictions and his cooperation in getting his former clients the help they needed to resolve their cases as well as his conduct since his rehabilitation treatment, we hold that the attorney's misconduct warrants discipline of a retroactive suspension from the practice of law from the date he self-suspended (March 9, 2006) until the day this opinion is issued.
IIL
(24 COSTS ARE ASSESSED IN THE AMOUNT OF $912.00 TO BE PAID N THREE MONTHLY INSTALL MENTS BEGINNING 90 DAYS AFTER THIS OPINION IS ISSUED.
{25 On March 29, 2007, the Bar Association filed an application to assess costs, arguing that pursuant to Rule 11.1 of the Rules Governing Disciplinary Proceedings, 5 O.S. 2001 Ch. 1, App. 1-A,28 it was entitled to be reimbursed for the expenses incurred in investigating and processing the application for reinstatement. The Bar Association seeks reimbursement of $1,824.00 in expenditures relating to the January 23, 2007, reinstatement proceeding. Additionally, on September 7, 2006, the Bar Association, pursuant to Rules 6.13 and 6.16 of the Rules Governing Disciplinary Proceedings, 5 0.$8.2001, Ch. 1, App. 1-A,29 sought an assessment of costs in the amount of $1,854.83 as a result of the reinstatement/disciplinary proceedings of May 23, 2006, but we deferred the matter until the issue of reinstatement was conelud-ed. The costs total $3,178.83.
126 We agree that costs may be imposed in Rule 6, Rules Governing Disciplinary Proceedings, 5 0.98.2001, Ch. 1, App. 1-A, disciplinary matters when good cause is shown.30 When a lawyer seeks reinstatement after a suspension under incapacity proceedings of Rule 10, Rules Governing Disciplinary Proceedings, 5 0.8.2001, Ch. 1, App. 1-A, the reinstatement procedures of Rule 11 are followed only to the extent applicable.31 Rule [538]*53810 includes cost measures which provide that the actual costs of the proceedings for suspension and for reinstatement under Rule 10 shall be assessed unless remitted by the Court for hardship.32
127 Under the facts presented, and because good cause has not been shown, we decline to impose the payment of any costs related to the first reinstatement/disciplinary proceedings of May 23, 2006.33 When we remanded the matter for a second hearing we recognized that the petition for reinstatement and discipline was premature. Respondent has come to recognize that he was not ready for reinstatement at that time and that had he been reinstated he would have likely relapsed.34 More importantly, [539]*539the Bar Association now concedes, at a time when it was exercising its prosecutorial power and had joined with the attorney in seeking reinstatement, it, too, was premature in bringing the matter before the trial panel.35 Nor do we find it necessary to impose the full amount of the costs assessed in the second reinstatement proceeding because the record reflects that the attorney has made a showing of hardship. Consequently, the attorney is responsible for partial payment of costs in the amount of $912.00 to be paid in three monthly installments beginning 90 days after this opinion is issued.36
CONCLUSION
4] 28 The petition for reinstatement of John Barry Albert is granted and the attorney is disciplined by a retroactively suspended from March 9, 2006, until the date this opinion is issued. The attorney is responsible for the payment of costs in the amount of $912.00 to be paid in three monthly installments beginning 90 days after this opinion"is issued.
129 Rule 10 proceedings are ordinarily kept confidential and do not become a matter of public record except where disciplinary proceedings are involved (Rule 6) or otherwise provided by the Court.37 It is for this Court to determine what course to take in this matter. Rule 10 proceedings and their subsequent suspensions are confidential out of respect and as a courtesy to the attorney who is incapacitated. It must then be decided at what point the public should be made aware of such incapacity.38 The attorney testified at trial that he was not opposed to publication,39 and we agree that this matter should be published. Consequently, we suspend confidentiality at this time.
[540]*540REINSTATEMENT GRANTED; DISCIPLINE IMPOSED AND RESPONDENT SUSPENDED; COSTS ASSESSED.
EDMONDSON, V.C.J., LAVENDER, KAUGER, WATT, COLBERT, JJ., concur.
WINCHESTER, C.J., concurs in result.
HARGRAVE, J., dissents.