MICHAEL A. WOLFF, Judge.
Introduction
Does Missouri’s Motor Fuel Marketing Act protect gas stations from competition, which may raise prices to consumers, or does the act only protect these businesses from injurious competition?
The state brought an action against QuikTrip for pricing its retail gasoline sales below its wholesale cost at its Herculaneum store on 23 days, alleging that QuikTrip violated the act. On stipulated facts, the circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the state and assessed penalties of $3,000 per day.
On appeal, QuikTrip challenges the constitutionality of the statute and, alternatively, argues that the circuit court has misconstrued the statute by holding Quik-Trip liable for selling gas to the public at less than its wholesale cost. Because of the challenge to the validity of the statute, this Court has exclusive appellate jurisdiction. Mo. Const, art. V, sec. 3.
[35]*35The Motor Fuel Marketing Act,1 in section 416.615, makes it unlawful for QuikTrip to sell gas below its cost if the intent or effect of the sale or offer is (1) “to injure competition;” or (2) “to induce the purchase of other merchandise, to unfairly divert trade from a competitor, or otherwise to injure a competitor.” The state’s case rests on the theory that Quik-Trip’s gas pricing unfairly diverted trade from a competitor or otherwise “injured” a competitor. The state does not contend that there was an injury to competition.
What does it mean to “unfairly divert trade from a competitor, or otherwise to injure a competitor?” The circuit court’s decision seems to be premised on the theory that a competitor suffers “injury” from QuikTrip’s below-cost fuel pricing when the competitor lowers its prices and makes a smaller profit on its fuel sales. The statute, however, speaks simply of “a competitor,” and these gas stations compete not just in fuel sales but in sales of many other items, the customer traffic for which may be generated by fuel sales. The statute, moreover, does not define “injure.”
When QuikTrip prices its fuels below cost, and if a competitor must price its fuels below cost to meet this competition, the competitor has two choices: (1) the competitor can resist lowering its prices below its costs, in which case a court could find that the intent or effect of QuikTrip’s below-cost pricing unfairly diverts trade from the competitor; or (2) the competitor can lower its prices below its costs and thus be “injured” by having to sell its fuels below cost, which may threaten its survival in the marketplace unless sales of other items keep the business profitable.
The circuit court’s decision is premised on the theory that QuikTrip’s sales of motor fuels below cost apparently diminished the competitor’s profits. This is not sufficient to make a viable claim for unfairly diverting trade or causing “injury” to a competitor. The state’s claim is, thus, unsupported by evidence of unfair diversion of trade or of injury to a competitor. The circuit court’s judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded.
Facts and Decision of the Circuit Court
The Attorney General brought an enforcement action against QuikTrip in 1999 alleging that QuikTrip had violated the act when it sold motor fuel below cost where the effect of that sale was to unfairly di[36]*36vert trade from a competitor or otherwise to injure a competitor. The state claimed that QuikTrip’s below-cost sales at its Herculaneum, Missouri, store required its competitors either to lower their own prices or lose customers; thus, such sales unfairly diverted trade from competitors or otherwise injured them. The Attorney General sought injunctive relief and the imposition of a civil penalty.
QuikTrip argued that the use of the term “unfair” in the act means that there must be predation; therefore, the state must show predatory effect by either demonstrating the intent to destroy competition or actual destruction of competition. QuikTrip also claimed that the act violates the due process guaranty of the constitution because (1) the act is not reasonably related to the problems it seeks to address, and (2) it is impossible for QuikTrip to comply with the act’s terms.
Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. The state initially alleged sales of motor fuel below cost on 76 days. At trial, the parties limited the motion for partial summary judgment to address only 23 days from March 16, 1997, to July 19, 1999, during which QuikTrip store number 611 in Herculaneum, Missouri, sold motor fuel below its costs and below the prices of its competitors.2 QuikTrip concedes that on 22 days over the 33 months in question, it sold diesel fuel below cost and was not then matching a competitor’s price. On one day, it sold unleaded gasoline below cost.
The circuit court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the state. The court ruled that the act satisfied substantive due process and that the state had made its prima facie showing that Quik-Trip had made below-cost sales with the effect of either injuring a competitor or of unfairly diverting trade from a competitor.3 Following QuikTrip’s motion for rehearing and the state’s dismissal of its other allegations based on other dates of selling below cost, the circuit court entered judgment in favor of the state, finding 23 violations of the act and assessing civil penalties against QuikTrip.
The circuit court found that there were no material facts in dispute regarding QuikTrip’s liability for the 23 dates “considering that the statute is constitutional without a predation requirement.” The court stated, “On every day where Quik-Trip priced below cost without a valid statutory defense, there is no dispute that such pricing caused injury to competitors.”
The state may recover civil penalties of $1,000 up to $5,000 per violation of section 416.615. The circuit court ordered QuikTrip to pay the state $75,000, claiming to assess a $3,000 penalty for each day of the 23 days QuikTrip violated the Act.4 QuikTrip appeals.5
[37]*37“To Unfairly Divert Trade” or “Otherwise to Injure a Competitor”
Section 416.615 makes it unlawful for QuikTrip to sell motor fuel below cost if, as the state contends in this case, “the intent or effect of the sale is ... to unfairly divert trade from a competitor, or otherwise to injure a competitor.”
The question is whether the statute protects the QuikTrip competitor from the effects of competition or, more narrowly, protects only against competition that injures a competitor or that unfairly diverts trade from its business.
“The primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain the intent of the legislature from the language used, to give effect to that intent if possible, and to consider the words used in their plain and ordinary meaning.” Wolff Shoe Co. v. Director of Revenue, 762 S.W.2d 29, 31 (Mo. banc 1988). When construing a statute, the Court considers the object the legislature seeks to accomplish and aims to resolve the problems addressed therein. Gott v. Director of Revenue, 5 S.W.3d 155, 159 (Mo. banc 1999).
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MICHAEL A. WOLFF, Judge.
Introduction
Does Missouri’s Motor Fuel Marketing Act protect gas stations from competition, which may raise prices to consumers, or does the act only protect these businesses from injurious competition?
The state brought an action against QuikTrip for pricing its retail gasoline sales below its wholesale cost at its Herculaneum store on 23 days, alleging that QuikTrip violated the act. On stipulated facts, the circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the state and assessed penalties of $3,000 per day.
On appeal, QuikTrip challenges the constitutionality of the statute and, alternatively, argues that the circuit court has misconstrued the statute by holding Quik-Trip liable for selling gas to the public at less than its wholesale cost. Because of the challenge to the validity of the statute, this Court has exclusive appellate jurisdiction. Mo. Const, art. V, sec. 3.
[35]*35The Motor Fuel Marketing Act,1 in section 416.615, makes it unlawful for QuikTrip to sell gas below its cost if the intent or effect of the sale or offer is (1) “to injure competition;” or (2) “to induce the purchase of other merchandise, to unfairly divert trade from a competitor, or otherwise to injure a competitor.” The state’s case rests on the theory that Quik-Trip’s gas pricing unfairly diverted trade from a competitor or otherwise “injured” a competitor. The state does not contend that there was an injury to competition.
What does it mean to “unfairly divert trade from a competitor, or otherwise to injure a competitor?” The circuit court’s decision seems to be premised on the theory that a competitor suffers “injury” from QuikTrip’s below-cost fuel pricing when the competitor lowers its prices and makes a smaller profit on its fuel sales. The statute, however, speaks simply of “a competitor,” and these gas stations compete not just in fuel sales but in sales of many other items, the customer traffic for which may be generated by fuel sales. The statute, moreover, does not define “injure.”
When QuikTrip prices its fuels below cost, and if a competitor must price its fuels below cost to meet this competition, the competitor has two choices: (1) the competitor can resist lowering its prices below its costs, in which case a court could find that the intent or effect of QuikTrip’s below-cost pricing unfairly diverts trade from the competitor; or (2) the competitor can lower its prices below its costs and thus be “injured” by having to sell its fuels below cost, which may threaten its survival in the marketplace unless sales of other items keep the business profitable.
The circuit court’s decision is premised on the theory that QuikTrip’s sales of motor fuels below cost apparently diminished the competitor’s profits. This is not sufficient to make a viable claim for unfairly diverting trade or causing “injury” to a competitor. The state’s claim is, thus, unsupported by evidence of unfair diversion of trade or of injury to a competitor. The circuit court’s judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded.
Facts and Decision of the Circuit Court
The Attorney General brought an enforcement action against QuikTrip in 1999 alleging that QuikTrip had violated the act when it sold motor fuel below cost where the effect of that sale was to unfairly di[36]*36vert trade from a competitor or otherwise to injure a competitor. The state claimed that QuikTrip’s below-cost sales at its Herculaneum, Missouri, store required its competitors either to lower their own prices or lose customers; thus, such sales unfairly diverted trade from competitors or otherwise injured them. The Attorney General sought injunctive relief and the imposition of a civil penalty.
QuikTrip argued that the use of the term “unfair” in the act means that there must be predation; therefore, the state must show predatory effect by either demonstrating the intent to destroy competition or actual destruction of competition. QuikTrip also claimed that the act violates the due process guaranty of the constitution because (1) the act is not reasonably related to the problems it seeks to address, and (2) it is impossible for QuikTrip to comply with the act’s terms.
Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. The state initially alleged sales of motor fuel below cost on 76 days. At trial, the parties limited the motion for partial summary judgment to address only 23 days from March 16, 1997, to July 19, 1999, during which QuikTrip store number 611 in Herculaneum, Missouri, sold motor fuel below its costs and below the prices of its competitors.2 QuikTrip concedes that on 22 days over the 33 months in question, it sold diesel fuel below cost and was not then matching a competitor’s price. On one day, it sold unleaded gasoline below cost.
The circuit court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the state. The court ruled that the act satisfied substantive due process and that the state had made its prima facie showing that Quik-Trip had made below-cost sales with the effect of either injuring a competitor or of unfairly diverting trade from a competitor.3 Following QuikTrip’s motion for rehearing and the state’s dismissal of its other allegations based on other dates of selling below cost, the circuit court entered judgment in favor of the state, finding 23 violations of the act and assessing civil penalties against QuikTrip.
The circuit court found that there were no material facts in dispute regarding QuikTrip’s liability for the 23 dates “considering that the statute is constitutional without a predation requirement.” The court stated, “On every day where Quik-Trip priced below cost without a valid statutory defense, there is no dispute that such pricing caused injury to competitors.”
The state may recover civil penalties of $1,000 up to $5,000 per violation of section 416.615. The circuit court ordered QuikTrip to pay the state $75,000, claiming to assess a $3,000 penalty for each day of the 23 days QuikTrip violated the Act.4 QuikTrip appeals.5
[37]*37“To Unfairly Divert Trade” or “Otherwise to Injure a Competitor”
Section 416.615 makes it unlawful for QuikTrip to sell motor fuel below cost if, as the state contends in this case, “the intent or effect of the sale is ... to unfairly divert trade from a competitor, or otherwise to injure a competitor.”
The question is whether the statute protects the QuikTrip competitor from the effects of competition or, more narrowly, protects only against competition that injures a competitor or that unfairly diverts trade from its business.
“The primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain the intent of the legislature from the language used, to give effect to that intent if possible, and to consider the words used in their plain and ordinary meaning.” Wolff Shoe Co. v. Director of Revenue, 762 S.W.2d 29, 31 (Mo. banc 1988). When construing a statute, the Court considers the object the legislature seeks to accomplish and aims to resolve the problems addressed therein. Gott v. Director of Revenue, 5 S.W.3d 155, 159 (Mo. banc 1999).
The statute does not define “competitor.” Is a “competitor” of QuikTrip simply another business that sells motor fuel, or is a “competitor” one who sells motor fuel and the other things that are sold in gas stations or truck stops, including soda, snacks, and other merchandise commonly purchased by travelers? “The plain and ordinary meaning of a word is derived from the dictionary.” Hemeyer v. KRCG-TV, 6 S.W.3d 880, 881 (Mo. banc 1999). The dictionary definition of “competitor” is “one that is engaged in selling or buying goods or services in the same market as another.”6 Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 464 (1993). If “competitors” are viewed as businesses that compete in fuel and the other items sold to travelers, then the record does not disclose the extent to which QuikTrip’s below-cost pricing, on the days involved, may or may not have affected total sales at a business location on those days.
The argument before the circuit court solely concerned the sale of fuel. However, competition in the sale of motor fuel by the posting of fuel prices presumably is intended to generate customer traffic so that other items, such as snacks and travel supplies, can be sold from the location. The record in this case provides only scant information about the businesses’ competition in the sale of items other than motor fuel. The record includes financial statements from a Mr. Fuel station in Herculaneum, which sells diesel and unleaded fuel, and from a Citgo station in Imperial, which does not sell diesel fuel. Financial statements from Arogas’ Mr. Fuel indicate that the sale of merchandise during 1997 through 2000 accounted for approximately $90,000 of its gross profit each year. The sale of merchandise in each of these years was 13.4 percent to 19 percent of the total gross profits. In over-all volume it appears that the sales of items other than fuels is a fairly small part of these businesses’ gross receipts, but the profit margins may be much higher than for the sale of fuels.
When QuikTrip posts lower fuel prices, the two choices faced by a QuikTrip com[38]*38petitor are, as stated, to (1) resist lowering its prices because to do so would threaten its financial viability; or (2) lower its fuel prices to a point that its over-all financial viability is threatened. The first option would lead to the conclusion that QuikTrip had lowered its prices below costs unfairly to divert trade from its competitor. The competitor’s second option is to lower its prices below its costs and thereby suffer an injury.7
The record does not disclose whether QuikTrip’s actions unfairly diverted trade from its competitors because the competitors were unable to lower prices to compete with QuikTrip’s pricing. This is a question that can be explored on remand.
Was There “Injury?”
The other theory, also to be explored on remand, is whether QuikTrip’s competitors suffered “injury.” The statute does not say what it means to act with the intent or effect “to injure a competitor.” The concept of “injury” is not defined.
The statute’s use of the common word “injury”8 allows for two plausible interpretations:
(1) “To injure a competitor” could mean simply a diminution of motor fuel sales by the competitor because of a posted lower price at the QuikTrip store. Under this interpretation, any diminution of sales volume in dollars, even though the competitor is still earning a profit, would be an “injury” because the competitor was not making as much as it would have made in the absence of the lower price at QuikTrip.
(2) The competitor could be deemed to suffer an injury only if it is forced, by virtue of the lower QuikTrip prices, to price its fuel product below its cost. In this interpretation, an “injury” only occurs when the competitor is in effect forced to operate its over-all business at a loss.
If (1) constitutes an “injury to a competitor,” the statute shields the competitor from the ordinary effects of competition. One would assume that in a competitive market, a lowering of price by a competitor is intended to divert business from the competitor to one’s self. In this interpretation, competition itself is injurious.
To interpret the statute in this way would be to assume that the general assembly intended by the statute greatly to diminish or eliminate competition in the sales of motor fuel and, thus, to create a state-enforced cartel of motor fuel sellers. Such an interpretation of the statute’s concept of injury would result in injury to the public’s interest in competition, with consumers thereby having to pay higher fuel prices at retail.
In the absence of a statutory definition, the concept of injury should be confined to the action of lowering posted prices to injure a competitor by forcing the competitor to sell below its cost. That kind of injury, if sustained over a period of time, would drive the competitor out of business, thus eliminating competition, and resulting ultimately in higher prices to the consum[39]*39ing public. If the public interest is the interest to be protected by the statute, the interpretation in (2) is the correct one.
Comparison to Missouri’s Unfair Milk Sales Practices Act
QuikTrip claims that the word “unfairly” in section 416.615.1(2) modifies both “divert trade” and “otherwise to injure a competitor,” asserting that only those below-cost sales that unfairly divert trade or unfairly injure competitors are illegal. A reading of the statute demonstrates that the word “unfairly” only applies to “divert trade from a competitor.”
QuikTrip relies on cases interpreting the Unfair Milk Sales Practices Act, sections 416.410 to 416.560, to argue that the state must show that QuikTrip unfairly injured a competitor. QuikTrip claims that State ex rel. Davis v. Thrifty Foodliner, Inc., 432 S.W.2d 287 (Mo.1968), and State ex rel. Thomason v. Adams Dairy Co., 379 S.W.2d 553 (Mo.1964), hold that “unfairly” modifies both “diverting trade” and “otherwise injuring a competitor.” Instead, these cases address the prohibition against “unfairly diverting trade” and do not suggest that “unfairly” modifies the provision involving injury to a competitor. QuikTrip correctly asserts that cases interpreting the milk statute hold that a below-cost sale or free distribution of milk is not illegal unless the intent or effect is unfairly to divert such trade. Davis, 432 S.W.2d at 291; Thomason, 379 S.W.2d at 556.
While the act uses language similar to Missouri’s Unfair Milk Sales Practices Act, passed in 1959,9 these statutes differ in important ways. First, the milk statute does not prohibit the use of loss leaders— the pricing of one product in order to induce the customer to buy other products — while the use of motor fuel as a loss leader is expressly forbidden by section 416.615.1(2). Second, the milk statute specifically allows pricing below cost when sales are made in an isolated transaction and not in the usual course of business. Section 416.445(1).
The State Must Show That QuikTrip’s Posted Prices Unfairly Diverted Trade or Injured a Competitor’s Over-all Operations
The state argues that below-cost sales injure QuikTrip’s competitors because competitors must either lower their prices or lose customers. While every below-cost sale produces this kind of “injury,” not every below-cost sale is illegal. The parties agree that the act does not prohibit all below-cost sales of motor fuel. The legislature included subdivisions (1) and (2), which make it unlawful to sell or offer to sell motor fuel below cost with the intent or effect of injuring competition, inducing the purchase of other merchandise, unfairly diverting trade from a competitor, or otherwise injuring a competitor. The statute, therefore, allows below-cost sales that do not fit the criteria of subdivisions (1) and (2) that make such sales illegal.
Some of the sales of which the state complains are violations that are one-hundredth or one-thousandth of a cent per gallon below cost. For example, the state alleged that, on March 14 and 15, 1999, QuikTrip violated the act by charging one-thousandth of a cent per gallon below its costs. Because the only pricing information available to competitors is the price posted on the pump or advertised outside [40]*40of the gas station, competitors are only-aware of the price QuikTrip charges to one-tenth of a cent per gallon. Violations below one-tenth of a cent, therefore, presumably would not affect competitors’ pricing decisions.
QuikTrip claims that in almost every case, the cause of the below-cost sale was an increase in QuikTrip’s costs, rather than a reduction in price that would cause competitors to lower their prices. According to QuikTrip, on only five of the 76 days on which the state alleged QuikTrip sold below cost did QuikTrip reduce the price it charged to consumers. On three of those days, QuikTrip sold above cost, and on a fourth it was matching the price a competitor, Mr. Fuel, charged.
The state has not demonstrated that QuikTrip’s occasional below-cost sales had an adverse effect on QuikTrip’s competitors. Between March 1997 and August 1999, there were at least 11 stores within three miles of Herculaneum that competed with QuikTrip’s store number 611. According to the record, no competing gas station exited the market during that period and one new entrant joined it.
QuikTrip’s nearest competitors are Midwest Petroleum, which operates a Citgo station in Imperial, but does not sell diesel fuel at this station, and Arogas, which operates a Mr. Fuel in Herculaneum. The Citgo station had a gross margin of 5.8 percent in 1998 and 6.4 percent in 1999 on its gasoline sales, earning a profit every year. The Mr. Fuel station earned gross margins of 5.3 percent in 1997, 7.6 percent in 1998, 6.6 percent in 1999, and 6.8 percent in 2000 on its motor fuel operations. No station appears to have been in danger of going out of business.
Conclusion
This Court concludes that, under the act, the state must show that QuikTrip posted prices, when lower than its costs, caused an unfair diversion of trade or an injury to a competitor’s over-all operations. Otherwise, the effect of the statute is to increase the profits of already healthy private businesses at the expense of consumers. There is no need, with this interpretation of the statute, to consider Quik-Trip’s due process arguments.
The circuit court’s decision is not supported by evidence of unfair diversion of trade or of injury to a competitor as this Court interprets the act. The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded.
WHITE, C.J., PRICE and TEITELMAN, JJ., concur.
LIMBAUGH, J., dissents in separate opinion filed.
BENTON and STITH, JJ., concur in opinion of LIMBAUGH, J.