State ex rel. Cowles v. Schively

114 P. 901, 63 Wash. 103, 1911 Wash. LEXIS 1164
CourtWashington Supreme Court
DecidedApril 11, 1911
DocketNo. 9451
StatusPublished
Cited by19 cases

This text of 114 P. 901 (State ex rel. Cowles v. Schively) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Washington Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State ex rel. Cowles v. Schively, 114 P. 901, 63 Wash. 103, 1911 Wash. LEXIS 1164 (Wash. 1911).

Opinions

Parker, J.-

This is an original application for a writ of mandamus, in this court, wherein the relator seeks to compel the insurance commissioner to designate the Spokesman-Review as the newspaper in which the insurance companies doing business in this state shall publish their annual statements for the present year, in compliance with Rem. & Bal. Code, § 6119, which provides:

“Every insurance company, corporation or association doing business in the state of Washington shall cause to be published once each year, during the month of March or of April, in two daily papers of the largest general circulation, to be designated by the insurance commissioner, one in western Washington and one in eastern Washington, a full synopsis of its annual statement as prepared by the insurance commissioner: Provided, the secretary of state shall under this act have the right to make a personal examination of the books and records of any such paper, when not satisfied with the affidavits, to determine which are the two papers of such largest circulation. The cost of such examination, when made, shall be paid by the newspapers whose books have been examined; and the refusal of the owner, manager or editor to permit of such examination will be considered prima facie evidence that such paper has not the largest paid circulation.”

The case is before us upon demurrer to the petition for the writ, and also upon answer to the petition. Our conclusion upon the demurrer, however, renders it unnecessary to notice the answer. The substance of the allegations of the petition may be stated as follows: The relator is the publisher of the Spokesman-Review, a daily newspaper published at Spokane. This paper has the largest general circulation [105]*105of any paper in eastern Washington. Its daily circulation is 30,000 and its Sunday circulation is 49,000. The defendant on about March ——, 1909, designated the Inland Herald, a daily newspaper published at Spokane, as a paper in which the insurance companies doing business in the state should publish their annual statements. This paper does not have a general circulation equal to one-fifth of the largest circulation in eastern Washington. The amount of its circulation is not alleged, but from the allegation made by the relator, it may be assumed that its circulation is nearly one-fifth of that of the largest circulation in eastern Washington. There are from two to five daily newspapers published in eastern Washington having a larger general circulation than the Inland Herald. Prior to March 1, 1909, the relator requested the defendant to designate the Spokesman-Review as the newspaper in which the insurance companies should publish their annual statements for the present year. Thereafter he designated the Inland Herald as such newspaper for eastern Washington. Following the allegations showing these facts, the relator alleges, “Said defendant has, as aforesaid, wrongfully and unlawfully designated said Inland Herald as such paper” ; and prays that the defendant be required to designate the Spokesman-Review as the newspaper in which such publication shall be made in eastern Washington, and that his designation of the Inland Herald be annuled.

It is contended by counsel for the relator that the commissioner has no discretion in the designation of the newspaper in which the publications shall be made; that he only has to determine the fact as to which paper has the largest circulation, and then designate that paper; and that such determination of fact does not involve discretion. It is contended by counsel for the defendant that the discretion of the commissioner in designating the newspaper, is, under the law, such that the courts cannot interfere therewith, especially in the absence of action on his part amounting to an arbitrary designation of a newspaper without any exercise of honest judg[106]*106ment; that the law does not require the commissioner to designate the newspaper having the largest circulation, but only to designate a newspaper from the class having the largest circulation, leaving it discretionary with him as to which one of that class he may designate; and that in any event his decision upon the fact as to which paper has the largest circulation, involves discretion, is final, and not reviewable by the courts.

It is important that we first determine the nature of this duty of the commissioner and to what extent it is discretionary. We may concede, for the sake of argument, that the commissioner is not entirely beyond judicial restraint in the designation of the newspapers for these publications, and still find that his discretion is such that we should not interfere with in in this case. We must first ascertain the bounds of his discretion before we can determine whether or not it has been exceeded. Now, if the commissioner’s discretion is limited only to designating one of the class of newspapers having the largest circulation in each division of the state, it is manifestly much broader than if his designation is limited to the single newspaper having the largest circulation in each division of the state. We have noticed that, by the terms of the law, the publications are to be made “In two daily papers of the largest general circulation, to be designated by the insurance commissioner.” The correct construction of this provision rests largely upon the sense in which the word “of” .is used in this paragraph. On March 6, 1905, the secretary of state, who was then under the law ex-officio insurance commissioner, requested an opinion from the attorney general upon this exact question. In compliance with that request, as was his duty under Rem. & Bal. Code, § 9037, the attorney general rendered a written opinion in which he said:

“I believe that the law, clearly indicates that the publication of the reports referred to therein, is to be in a paper which is in a class of those having the largest general circulation, and that it is not mandatory that such paper shall be [107]*107specifically one having the largest number of subscribers; for if that were the intention of the statute, most of the remainder of the section would be more or less without meaning, especially the clause that states that the paper is ‘to be designated by the insurance commissioner, one in western Washington, and one in eastern Washington.’ It seems to me that the intention of the .statute is that these reports shall not be published in' certain smaller papers, of limited county or local district circulation; but in papers that largely and generally circulate in the two sections of western and eastern Washington, respectively.”

This opinion, with others of the attorney general, was published in usual manner, in his report to the governor and the legislature for the year 1905, at page 50. Three legislative sessions have been held since then and no change made in this law. This court has recognized the rule that the construction of a law of doubtful meaning, by the department of a state or government charged with its administration, and by its highest law officer, when such law has to do with a matter of public concern, is entitled to considerable weight in determining the intention of the legislature, though, of course, such construction is not binding upon the courts. Spokane & Eastern Trust Co. w. Young, 19 Wash. 122, 52 Pac. 1010; Hicks v. King, 21 Wash. 567, 58 Pac. 1070.

The word “of” is defined in Webster’s new International Dictionary as,

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
114 P. 901, 63 Wash. 103, 1911 Wash. LEXIS 1164, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-ex-rel-cowles-v-schively-wash-1911.