BATTAGLIA, Judge.
In the appeal now before us, we must consider whether Robert J. Antonetti, Sr., who served as the Administrator for the Prince George’s County Board of Supervisors of Elections violated the provisions of the Public Ethics Law, Md.Code Ann., State Gov’t § 15-101 et seq. (1984, 1995 Repl.Vol.),1 by recruiting, hiring, promoting and supervising his wife and minor children in temporary employment positions spanning a six year period with the Petitioner, the Prince George’s County Board of Supervisors of Elections.
[433]*433I. Facts
The Respondent, Robert J. Antonetti, Sr. (“Antonetti”), served as the Administrator for the Prince George’s County Board of Supervisors of Elections (“the Board”) for thirty years, starting on January 5, 1970. The duties of the Elections Administrator in Prince George’s County have been defined formally in the county’s “Position Description Performance Standards” as:
Chief Executive Officer of and principal advisor to the Board of Supervisors of Elections which regulates all Federal, State and County elections. The Elections Administrator’s primary responsibility is one of management, planning, developing and administering the fiscal functions and general activities of the office of the Board of Supervisors of Elections combining a knowledge of election technology and law with administrative skills. Work is performed with independent judgment within the established policies of the Board and dictates of Federal, State and County law.... An employee in this class counsels and evaluates the work of all employees, elects, assigns and directs the training programs for Board employees including technical, clerical and temporary personnel.2
In Antonetti’s eighteenth year as Elections Administrator, members of his family, including his wife and children, began to work in a number of positions for the Board. Antonetti’s wife, Mary Catherine Antonetti, worked for the Board in 1988, 1992 and 1994 as an election clerk. Antonetti signed the supplemental pay authorization form permitting Mrs. Antonetti to become a temporary employee of the Board and establishing her rate of pay.3 In 1994, Antonetti executed a subse[434]*434quent form authorizing a pay increase for his wife. Mrs. Antonetti was paid $7.00 per hour in 1988 for a total of $234.50, $7.00 per hour in 1990 for a total of $514.50, and $10.00 per hour in 1994 for a total of $530.00.
Antonetti’s eldest son, Robert J. Antonetti, Jr. (“Robert, Jr.”) began working at eleven years of age for the Board in 1988 as a book runner, carrying books, supplies, and other election materials to election judges. Antonetti signed a supplemental pay authorization for Robert, Jr. in 1988 at an hourly pay rate of $6.25. In 1990, Antonetti executed another supplemental pay authorization increasing Robert, Jr.’s salary to $7.00 per hour. As a book runner, Robert, Jr. earned $84.38 in 1988 and $105.00 in 1990.
In 1992 when Robert, Jr. was sixteen, he became a Voting Machine Technician. At that time, there were no other individuals under the age of eighteen who were employed as voting machine technicians with the Board. In this capacity, Robert, Jr. programmed, tested and performed maintenance on the Prince George’s County voting machines. For this, Antonetti signed a supplemental pay authorization form enabling his son’s employment as Voting Machine Technician I at $8.00 per hour. In 1992, Robert, Jr. earned a total of $2,048.50 for his work in this position. In 1993, Antonetti executed a supplemental pay authorization which promoted Robert, Jr. to the position of Voting Machine Technician II, for which Robert, Jr. was paid $10.00 per hour.4 Robert, Jr. [435]*435earned $1,266.00 in this position in 1993, and $4,275.00 in 1994. Robert, Jr. continued his employment with the Board as a Voting Machine Technician II in 1995 and 1996.
In 1988, Antonetti’s second son, John Paul Antonetti (“John”), began his employment with the Board at the age of nine as a book runner, just like his brother, Robert, Jr. He continued working in this position during the 1990, 1992, and 1994 elections. Antonetti executed a supplemental pay authorization form for John in 1988 establishing an hourly pay rate of $6.25. On two subsequent occasions, Antonetti executed additional supplemental pay authorization forms, increasing John’s salary to $7.00 per hour in 1990 and $10.00 per hour in 1992 for the same tasks he performed as a nine year-old. John earned a total of $84.38 in 1988, $105.00 in 1990, $159.50 in 1992, and $150.00 in 1994.
Antonetti’s youngest son, Edward James Antonetti (“Edward”) began working as a book runner for the Board in 1992 when he was eleven and continued to do so in 1994. Antonetti executed a supplemental pay authorization for Edward in 1992, setting his pay rate at $10.00 per hour. Edward earned a total of $150.00 in 1992, and $140.00 in 1994.
In 1990, Antonetti’s daughter, Theresa Caroline Antonetti (“Theresa”) began working for the Board at the age of fifteen as summer help in the Board office. She earned a total of $241.50 at a pay rate of $7.00 per hour in 1990, $1,827.00 in 1992 and $1,998.50 in 1994. Antonetti executed the supplemental pay authorization forms for Theresa’s employment.
Antonetti signed all of the time sheets for his wife and offspring as their supervisor. For the period of 1988 through 1994, Antonetti’s family members earned a total of $13,913.76 as employees of the Board.
[436]*436On September 25, 1995, the State Ethics Commission (“the Commission”) issued a complaint against Antonetti, stating that in his capacity as Administrator for the Board of Supervisors of Elections of Prince George’s County, Antonetti was “a public official of the State subject to the conflict of interest and the financial disclosure provisions of the Ethics Law.” The complaint alleged Antonetti had violated the Public Ethics Law in that he had:
1. Participated in his official capacity in the hiring of his wife and children for part time and temporary positions with the Board of Supervisors of Elections of Prince George’s County in violation of Sections 3-101(a) and 3-104 of the Ethics Law; and
2. Failed to timely disclose the employment of his wife and dependent children on his annual financial disclosure statements for calendar years 1988 through 1994 in violation of Section 4-103 of the Ethics Law.5
The alleged violations covered the period of time from 1988 through 1994 and involved Antonetti’s recruitment of his family members to fill positions with the Board, enabling their employment by signing the supplemental pay authorization forms, supervising them by authorizing payment for their work, promoting Robert, Jr. to Voting Technician II, a position for which he had not qualified, increasing their salaries •without requiring additional work performance and for failing to disclose the employment activities of his family members on his annual financial disclosure statements as required by Subtitle 6 of the Ethics Law.
A hearing was held before the Commission on January 21, 1997 at which time the Commission made the following findings of fact:
1. Respondent is now and was at the times relevant to this complaint employed as Elections Administrator for the Prince George’s County Board of Supervisors of Elec[437]*437tions (the Board). In this capacity he serves as the Chief Executive Officer and principal advisor to the Board in regulation and administration of all Federal, State and County elections in the County. The position is one of management, planning, developing and administering the fiscal and general activities of the agency, and entails performance of duties with independent judgment within the established policies of the Board and Federal, State and County law. The position involves substantial responsibilities relating to direction and supervision of Board employees as required to carry out elections in the County.
2. Though responsibility for final budget development is vested in the Board and ultimately the County government, we find that Respondent plays a key advisory role in budget development, including recommending numbers and types of employees and rates of pay. The Board relies substantially on the initial budget proposed by Respondent, seldom changing pay rates or numbers of positions. Moreover, it is clear from the record that Respondent’s key operational responsibilities for managing the Board’s program and activities involve substantial judgment and discretion in filling positions authorized by the Board in its budget development process. Witnesses testified that the Board was “kept aware” of persons hired by Respondent, was “notified” of hirings, or was given a list of recommendations. It is clear to us from the record that wherever the technical legal hiring authority lay, this is a citizen board that relies substantially on the efforts and recommendations of its full-time professional staff administrator to make hiring decisions, and that he in fact functions in this capacity.
3. During the period of time relevant to this complaint (1988 to 1994), Respondent in his official capacity as Elections Administrator took many actions involving his spouse Mary Antonetti and his four children (Robert, Jr., Teresa [sic], Edward, and John), all of whom were, [438]*438at most times involved in this matter, minor children. These actions involved signatures on no fewer than 11 Supplemental Pay Authorizations, 4 Employment Eligibility Verifications, and 36 Time Sheets. The Supplemental Pay Authorizations were the key hiring documents, attesting to the employment of individuals with the Board and authorizing the agency to compensate them for services. The Eligibility Verifications were essential legal documents reflecting a finding by the Respondent on behalf of the agency that individuals met Federal citizenship requirements and were eligible to be employed by the Board. The Time Sheets were the key fiscal documents allowing the County payroll authorities to issue checks compensating individuals for work performed as set forth in the document. The testimony in this matter was that these documents were essential for payment to be made and that they could be signed only by the Respondent. It was stated that without Respondent’s signature, an individual would not be paid.
4. As set forth in paragraph 3 above, these actions involved the Respondent’s spouse and four minor children. All of these documents established or implemented an employment relationship between these members of Respondent’s immediate family and his agency, the Board, and all were undertaken with the anticipation that the individuals would receive compensation for this employment and would in fact receive economic benefits from the transaction. The record clearly shows that these individuals were compensated and did in fact benefit economically as a result of Respondent’s actions.
5. The record also indicates that Respondent on more than one occasion, in his official capacity recruited individuals who were his relatives or took actions designed to result in an employment relationship between them and the agency, which was intended to benefit them economically. Testimony by Respondent’s spouse and at least one of his sons was that “my husband” or “my father” suggested their employment with the Board. Lists were generated and included in the record that include [439]*439Respondent’s relatives’ names as recommended by him for employment, and on one occasion minutes of the Board meeting reflect a recommendation by Respondent for the employment by the Board of his daughter Teresa [sic] (then an adult).
6. According to Time Sheet documents and testimony in the record, Respondent’s now-adult son Robert, Jr. continued as recently as Summer 1996 to be employed by the Board as a voting machine technician. Though the record reflects his direct supervision primarily by Sam McAfee, another senior employee in charge of the Board’s warehouse and voting machine maintenance program, Respondent continues to be responsible for signature of his son’s Time Sheets, and there is no indication in the record of any action taken to formally separate Respondent from ultimate responsibility for his son’s employment activities for the Board.
7. During the time period that is relevant to this complaint, the personnel rules of Prince George’s County did not apply to prohibit employment in the particular jobs at issue of individuals who were related to employees in the agency, and in fact during this and earlier periods individuals related to various Board members and employees were employed by the Board in positions similar to those involving Respondent’s family members. Testimony was that employment of such persons was relied upon to meet pressing needs at election times to recruit reliable and competent persons for low paying but essential jobs.
8. During the years 1988 through 1994 Respondent filed financial disclosure statements with the State Ethics Commission pursuant to the requirements of Subtitle 6 of the Ethics Law (formerly Title 4 of Article 40A). These statements, however, did not include disclosure of his spouse’s or children’s employment generally, or the employment relationships of his relatives with the Board as set forth above, even though the form and the instructions to it clearly indicate that disclosure is re[440]*440quired of any employment of a spouse or • dependent children. Subsequent amendments to these forms have been submitted and Respondent’s financial disclosure status now is current and complete.
The Commission found that Antonetti, as a public official serving in an executive unit of Maryland State Government, must comply with “the requirements and limitations of the Ethics Law,” Md. Ann.Code, State Gov’t, § 15-101 et seq. (1984, 1995 Repl.Vol.)6, and with the personnel provisions of Prince George’s County, Md., Code §§ 16-117 through 16-120 (1995 ed.):
“[w]e further conclude as a matter of law that Respondent’s actions relating to the employment of his relatives as set forth in paragraphs 3 through 6 of the Findings of Fact constituted participation covered by § 15-501 of the Ethics Law .... each of the types of transactions involved a discrete decision, determination or finding, and Respondent’s actions in each of these types of matters affected the final decisions as to the matters, involved his discretion and judgment, and in most situations was an essential action to reaching a particular result for the employee-relative (either establishing the employment relationship, reflecting a finding of eligibility, or processing a claim for payment). Moreover, these actions all related to determinations that would lead to compensation that would accrue directly to the economic benefit of his spouse or minor children. Under the circumstances, it is our conclusion as a matter of law that Respondent’s actions constituted nonministerial participation in matters in which his relatives had an interest, as prohibited by § 15-501 of the Law.”
The Commission determined that Antonetti did not violate the strictures of § 15-506 of the Public Ethics Law, Md.Code Ann., State Gov’t (1984,1995 Repl.Vol.), since it
“define[s] a stricter standard for application, and that a violation should be found only where there is a clear show[441]*441ing of intentional and improper abuse of position. While we therefore believe that the circumstances here could suggest a violation of this section, given the agency’s concerns and the long-standing practice [of other Board employees family members working for the Board], we decline to exercise our enforcement discretion to find [Antonetti] in violation of this section of the Law.”
Additionally, the Commission found that Antonetti was required by § 15-607 of the Public Ethics Law to disclose the employment of his spouse and children on his annual financial disclosure statements and failed to properly do so for calendar years 1988 through 1994.7
Accordingly, on May 1, 1997, the Commission ordered that Antonetti stop employing his wife and children at the Prince George’s County Board of Elections and terminate any further supervisory actions, including signing supplemental pay authorizations and time sheets8 concerning any continued employ[442]*442ment by his son, Robert, Jr., with the Board. The Commission recommended that either the Board or Prince George’s County order that Antonetti endure “not less than 15 days of suspension without pay, and further, direct the staff of the Ethics Commission to take appropriate action pursuant to § 15-902 to petition the Circuit Court for imposition of a civil fine of $7,500.” With regard to his improperly filed financial disclosure statements, Antonetti was ordered to pay a late filing fee of $1,000.00. The Commission also officially reprimanded Antonetti.
Antonetti filed an action for judicial review of the Commission’s decision in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County pursuant to Maryland Rule 7-201. The Circuit Court for Prince George’s County vacated the Commission’s decision and remanded the case to the Commission solely for a redetermination as to an appropriate sanction for Antonetti’s failure to file properly completed financial disclosure statements pursuant to Md.Code Ann., State Gov’t. § 15-607. The Court found that although Antonetti had complied with the employment provisions of the Prince George’s County Code,9 he also had a duty to comply with the Public Ethics Law, covering the employment issues related to the facts of this case. Pursuant to its review of the record, however, the Circuit Court exonerated Antonetti in the following:
the Commission, itself, has expressly acknowledged it was the Board of Elections, and not Antonetti, that made the final hiring and compensations decisions. The record is clear that not only was the Board of Elections well aware that the Petitioner’s relatives were occasionally working for the Board, but that the Board approved of their hiring.
Thus, the Circuit Court found that Antonetti’s participation with regard to the hiring and payment of his family members [443]*443fell within the exceptions set forth in § 15 — 501 (b)(2) and 15-501(c).10
The Court also disagreed with the Commission’s finding that Antonetti’s execution of supplemental pay authorizations for his family members amounted to unlawful participation under § 15-501(a) of the Public Ethics Law. The Circuit Court reasoned that Antonetti’s actions, which the Court characterized as “mechanical act[s] merely to insure payroll,” were permissible under the statute because Antonetti was the only individual authorized by the Prince George’s County Office of Finance to sign payroll authorizations. The Court concluded that “[t]he administrative record shows no indications of improper bias or influence” on the part of Antonetti. The Circuit Court ordered that the State Ethics Commission’s Order of May 1, 1997, be vacated and remanded to the Commission for a proper determination of a sanction for Antonetti’s failure to file properly completed financial disclo[444]*444sure statements covering the period from 1988 through 1994 pursuant to Md.Code Ann., State Gov’t. § 15-607, a violation from which Antonetti had not appealed.
On March 19, 1999, the State Ethics Commission noted an appeal from the Memorandum and Order of Court of the Circuit Court of Prince George’s County. In an unreported decision the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the Circuit Court decision, agreeing, in part, with the Circuit Court’s reasoning, stating that “[s]ome, but not all, of Antonetti’s actions that the Commission found violated the Ethics Laws come within the ambit of the exception set forth in section 15-501(c)(3).” The Court stated that,
the trial judge was correct when he reversed the decision of the Commission to the extent that the Commission punished Antonetti for violating the Ethics Laws by signing his name to documents relating to employment of members of his immediate family. Thus, the Commission’s order that Antonetti desist from performing any ‘signature actions’ relating to any continuing employment of Robert, Jr., with the Board must be reversed.
With regard to findings of fact, the Court of Special Appeals stated that,
Antonetti was never the direct supervisor of his wife or any of his children. Furthermore, Antonetti did not have dejure authority to hire or fire any Board employees. Only the Board itself had such authority. In some instances, however, he did have de facto power to hire temporary employees.
Petitioner, the State Ethics Commission (“Commission”), filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari to this Court on October 30, 2000, asking us to consider whether the Public Ethics Law prohibits a public official from recruiting, recommending, hiring, promoting, or placing under his supervision the members of his immediate family, where such actions result in a direct monetary benefit to his household as a result of their employment. We granted certiorari and now reverse the Court of Special Appeals and determine that Antonetti’s conduct with [445]*445regard to the recruitment, hiring, promoting, and supervising of his family members as employees of the Board violates the conflicts of interest provisions set forth in Md.Code Ann., State Gov’t. §§ 15-501(a) and 15-506.
II. Standard of Review
The Maryland Administrative Procedures Act, Md.Code Ann., State Gov’t. § 10-101 et seq. (1984, 1995 Repl.Vol.), sets forth the options of a circuit or appellate court reviewing the final decision or order of an administrative agency. Section 10-222(h) specifies that:
In a proceeding under this section, the court may:
(1) remand the case for further proceedings;
(2) affirm the final decision; or
(3) reverse or modify the decision if any substantial right of the petitioner may have been prejudiced because a finding, conclusion, or decision:
(i) is unconstitutional;
(ii) exceeds the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the final decision maker;
(iii) results from an unlawful procedure;
(iv) is affected by any other error of law;
(v) is unsupported by competent, material, and substantial evidence in light of the entire record as submitted; or
(vi) is arbitrary and capricious.
Md.Code Ann., State Gov’t § 10-222(h). Therefore, we must determine whether the Commission’s decision was affected by an error of law in concluding that Antonetti violated the Public Ethics Law. See Register of Wills for Baltimore County v. Arrowsmith, 365 Md. 237, 249, 778 A.2d 364, 371 (2001).
In reviewing this matter, “we reevaluate the decision of the agency, not the decision of the lower court.” Gigeous v. Eastern Correctional Institution, 363 Md. 481, 495-96, 769 A.2d 912, 921 (2001). Thus, our role is “limited to determining if there is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to [446]*446support the agency’s findings and conclusions,” and to ascertain whether the Commission’s decision was based upon “an erroneous conclusion of law.” United Parcel v. People’s Counsel, 336 Md. 569, 577, 650 A.2d 226, 230 (1994). In order to find that there was substantial evidence on the record to support the Commission’s conclusions, we must determine that based on the record, a reasonable mind could have arrived at the same conclusions as the Commission. See Alviani v. Dixon, 365 Md. 95, 108, 775 A.2d 1234, 1241 (2001); Anderson v. Department of Public Safety, 330 Md. 187, 213, 623 A.2d 198, 210 (1993); Bulluck v. Pelham Wood Apartments, 283 Md. 505, 512, 390 A.2d 1119, 1123 (1978). This requires us to ask whether it could reasonably be said that the agency’s conclusions may be based upon the facts set forth before the agency, -without substituting our own judgment as to whether the agency’s inferences were the best ones which could have been made based on the record. See Supervisor of Assessments of Montgomery County v. Asbury Methodist Home, Inc., 313 Md. 614, 625-26, 547 A.2d 190, 195 (1988); Mayor & Aldermen of Annapolis v. Annapolis Waterfront Co., 284 Md. 383, 398, 396 A.2d 1080, 1089 (1979); Bulluck v. Pelham Wood Apartments, 283 Md. at 513, 390 A.2d at 1124. In so doing, we are deferential towards the agency’s findings of fact and the inferences drawn by the agency from those facts. See State Administration Board of Election Laws v. Billhimer, 314 Md. 46, 58-59, 548 A.2d 819, 826 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1007, 109 S.Ct. 1644, 104 L.Ed.2d 159 (1989).
Where the agency’s findings of fact and inferences are supported by the evidence in the record, the reviewing court must defer to the agency. See Board of Physician Quality Assurance v. Banks, 354 Md. 59, 68, 729 A.2d 376, 380-81 (1999). Therefore, we “review the agency’s decision in the light most favorable to it; ... the agency’s decision is prima facie correct and presumed valid, and ... it is the agency’s province to resolve conflicting evidence and to draw inferences from that evidence.” CBS, Inc. v. Comptroller, 319 Md. 687, 698, 575 A.2d 324, 329 (1990)(quoting Ramsay, [447]*447Scarlett & Co. v. Comptroller, 302 Md. 825, 834-35, 490 A.2d 1296, 1301 (1985))(internal quotations omitted).
With regard to the Commission’s conclusions of law, Antonetti argues that reviewing courts may substitute their own judgment for that of the administrative agency. That is true, but it is also the case that reviewing courts should give some degree of deference to the legal conclusions of the administrative agency: “an administrative agency’s interpretation and application of the statute which the agency administers should ordinarily be given considerable weight by reviewing courts.” Banks, 354 Md. at 69, 729 A.2d at 381; see Lussier v. Maryland Racing Commission, 343 Md. 681, 696-697, 684 A.2d 804, 811-812 (1996); McCullough v. Wittner, 314 Md. 602, 612, 552 A.2d 881, 886 (1989). Nevertheless, we owe no deference to agency conclusions based upon errors of law. Belvoir Farms Homeowners Association, Inc. v. North, 355 Md. 259, 267, 734 A.2d 227, 232 (1999); Catonsville Nursing Home, Inc. v. Loveman, 349 Md. 560, 569, 709 A.2d 749, 753 (1998).
III. Discussion
Petitioner argues that Antonetti’s involvement in the employment of his family members with the Board exceeds any “administrative duty” as he played a direct and substantial role in obtaining their employment and in the management and supervision of his family members as employees of the board. Antonetti would have the employment of his offspring, even at the tender ages of nine and eleven years old, and his wife be seen as a conundrum of the election process, because he asserts that no one else was available to perform the jobs. The perceived lack of skilled or unskilled labor cannot overwhelm the inappropriateness of Antonetti’s continuous decisions with respect to his relatives’ employment.
Public confidence in the performance of government officials is of paramount importance. See Carroll County Ethics Commission v. Lennon, 119 Md.App. 49, 61, 703 A.2d 1338, 1344 (1998)(emphasizing that the need to investigate and [448]*448sanction alleged ethical violations is “perhaps even more acute ... at the local government level, where the government and its citizens have greater contact with one another”).11 Legislative recognition of this tenet is embodied in § 15-101 of the Public Ethics Law, which explains its purpose and policy, stating as follows:
(a) Legislative findings. — (1) The General Assembly of Maryland, recognizing that our system of representative government is dependent upon the people maintaining the highest trust in their government officials and employees, finds and declares that the people have a right to be assured that the impartiality and independent judgment of those officials and employees will be maintained.
(2) It is evident that this confidence and trust is eroded when the conduct of the State’s business is subject to improper influence or even the appearance of improper influence.
(b) Policy. — For the purpose of guarding against improper influence, the General Assembly enacts this Maryland Public Ethics Law to require certain government officials and employees to disclose their financial affairs and to set minimum ethical standards for the conduct of State and local business.
(c) Liberal construction of title. — The General Assembly intends that this title, except its provisions for criminal sanctions, be liberally construed to accomplish this purpose.
Md.Code Ann., State Gov’t. § 15-101 (1984, 1995 Repl.Vol.).12
The prohibition of public officials’ involvement in the employment of their relatives is embodied in the proscriptions of § 15-501 of the Public Ethics Law:
(a) In general. — Except as otherwise provided in subsection
(c) of this section, an official or employee may not participate in a matter if:
[449]*449(1) the official or employee or a qualifying relative of the official or employee has an interest in the matter and the official or employee knows of the interest;
(b) Exceptions. — (1) The prohibitions of subsection (a) of this section do not apply if participation is allowed:
(1) as to officials and employees subject to the authority of the Ethics Commission, by regulation of the Ethics Commission;
(ii) by the opinion of an advisory body; or
(iii) by another provision of this subtitle.
(2) This section does not prohibit participation by an official or employee that is limited to the exercise of an administrative or ministerial duty that does not affect the disposition or decision with respect to the matter involved.
(c) Participation notwithstanding conflict. — An official or employee who otherwise would be disqualified from participation under subsection (a) of this section shall disclose the nature and circumstances of the conflict, and may participate or act, if:
(1) the disqualification would leave a body with less than a quorum capable of acting;
(2) the disqualified official or employee is required by law to act; or
(3) the disqualified official or employee is the only individual authorized to act.
Md.Code Ann., State Gov’t. § 15-501.13 For purposes of this statute, a “qualifying relative” is defined as “a spouse, parent, [450]*450child, brother, or sister,” while an “employee” is anyone who is employed by an executive unit, the Legislative Branch, or the Judicial Branch of Maryland State Government, excluding those individuals who may be otherwise classified as public or State officials. §§ 15-102(g) and (ff). The statute defines an “interest” as:
(1) “Interest” means a legal or equitable economic interest that is owned or held wholly or partly, jointly or severally, or directly or indirectly, whether or not the economic interest is subject to an encumbrance or condition.
(2) “Interest” does not include:
(i) an interest held in the capacity of agent, custodian, fiduciary, personal representative, or trustee, unless the holder has an equitable interest in the subject matter;
(ii) an interest in a time or demand deposit in a financial institution;
(iii) an interest in an insurance policy, endowment policy, or annuity contract by which an insurer promises to pay a fixed amount of money in a lump sum or periodically for life or a specified period; or
(iv) a common trust fund or a trust that forms part of a pension or a profit-sharing plan that:
1. has more than 25 participants; and
2. is determined by the Internal Revenue Service to be a qualified trust under § 401 or § 501 of the Internal Revenue Code.
Md.Code Ann., State Gov’t § 15-102(t).14
The Public Ethics Law also prohibits State employees, such as Antonetti, from “intentionally us[ing] the prestige of office or public position for that public official’s or employee’s private gain or that of another.” § 15-506. We have often stated that the basic premise of statutory interpretation is to [451]*451“ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.” Tipton v. Partner’s Management Co., 364 Md. 419, 434, 773 A.2d 488, 497 (2001); Total Audio-Visual Systems, Inc. v. Department of Labor, Licensing & Regulation, 360 Md. 387, 411-12, 758 A.2d 124, 137 (2000); Langston v. Riffe, 359 Md. 396, 410, 754 A.2d 389, 396 (2000)(internal citations omitted). To ascertain the legislative intent and the scope and applicability of the Public Ethics Law to the case sub judice, we must look first at the plain meaning of the words of the statute. See Marriott Employees Federal Credit Union v. Motor Vehicle Administration, 346 Md. 437, 444-45, 697 A.2d 455, 458 (1997). Where the statute does not contain obscure or ambiguous language, “and expresses a definite and simple meaning,” we need not look beyond the plain language of the statute in order to understand the legislative intent. Board of License Commissioners for Charles County, Maryland v. Toye, 354 Md. 116, 122, 729 A.2d 407, 410 (1999); see Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co. of Maryland v. Director of Finance for Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 343 Md. 567, 578-79, 683 A.2d 512, 517 (1996). Ultimately, we must construe the words of the statute such that we avoid a result which is absurd, illogical, unreasonable, or inconsistent with common sense. See Edgewater Liquors, Inc. v. Liston, 349 Md. 803, 811, 709 A.2d 1301, 1304 (1998); Frost v. State, 336 Md. 125, 137, 647 A.2d 106, 112 (1994), Tracey v. Tracey, 328 Md. 380, 387, 614 A.2d 590, 594 (1992).
In determining whether the Commission’s decision to sanction Antonetti for violating the Public Ethics Law was supported by substantial evidence, we must consider the factual basis for each of Antonetti’s alleged violations of the statute and the application of the statutory language to these instances of misconduct. Antonetti asserts that he did not violate the Public Ethics Law through his involvement in the recruiting, hiring, supervising, and promoting of his spouse and children.
The Public Ethics Law prohibits public officials from participating in matters where either the public official or the public official’s qualifying relatives have an interest in the [452]*452matter. Md.Code Ann., State Gov’t. § 15-501. The statute also precludes public officials from using their positions to benefit their own “private gain, or that of another.” Md.Code Ann., State Gov’t. § 15-506. Here, we are confronted with a situation where Antonetti and his wife and minor children, who are all “qualifying relatives” as defined by § 15 — 102(f), had a direct interest in the income generated by their employment with the Board. Although the Public Ethics Law does not define what constitutes “participation” in a matter for purposes of the conflicts of interest section, Webster’s New World College Dictionary at 1050 (4th ed.1999) defines the verb “participate” as “to have or take a part or share with others (in some activity, enterprise, etc.).” We have stated that “the analysis of the statute’s language must be undertaken from a commonsensical rather than a technical, perspective, always seeking to avoid giving the statute a strained interpretation ...” Langston v. Riffe, 359 Md. 396, 445-46, 754 A.2d 389, 416 (2000)(quoting Bane v. State, 327 Md. 305, 309, 609 A.2d 313, 314-15 (1992)). In the absence of any additional statutory language or legislative history indicating a contrary intent, we ascribe to the phrase “participate in” as used in § 15-501(a) its ordinary and commonly understood meaning. See Metheny v. State, 359 Md. 576, 618, 755 A.2d 1088, 1111 (2000)(using dictionary to define the conjunction “while” in interpreting Md.Code Ann. art. 27A, § 413(d)(10)); Riemer v. Columbia Medical Plan, Inc., 358 Md. 222, 237, 747 A.2d 677, 685 (2000)(using dictionaries to define the terms copayment and deductible in interpreting Md.Code Ann., Health-Gen. §§ 19-701(f), 19-710(b) and (o)).
The record shows that, although the Board needed to fill temporary work positions during every election, neither the Board nor Antonetti in his capacity as Elections Administrator actively advertised for these positions. The only positions for which the Board advertised were for election judges. It is clear from the record, however, that in establishing the original employment relationship with the Board, Antonetti asked his family members to fill the vacant positions.
[453]*453The record also discloses that Antonetti signed at least eleven supplemental pay authorization forms, four employment eligibility verification forms, and thirty-six time sheets on behalf of his family members while acting in his capacity as Administrator. The act of signing a supplemental pay authorization form allows agencies to hire people directly and bypass the Office of Personnel of Prince George’s County. The record indicates that the Board only voted by motion on one occasion to hire one of Antonetti’s relatives, Theresa, once she had attained the age of majority, as a pre-election clerk. On all other occasions, the testimony of the members of the Antonetti family and the Board members at the hearing before the Commission showed that Antonetti either recruited his family members to work for the Board, or they asked him for positions directly. For example, Robert, Jr. testified as follows:
Commission: One final question. How did you decide to become a voting technician, how did that come about?
Robert, Jr.: Well, I was looking for a summer job at the time. I wanted to do something that — I didn’t want to flip burgers like all my friends were doing, and I had been up to the warehouse before prior and I always been interested in what the guys were doing with the machines and I asked my father if I could somehow get a job or be considered for a job, and there was an opening and I applied and I was accepted and the rest is history.
Robert, Jr. never had a formal interview for this position.
Antonetti was not legally obligated to hire his family members as employees of the Board, and therefore, he improperly used his position with the Board to exercise his discretion to do so in violation of §§ 15-501 and 15-506. Antonetti argues that other personnel of the Board office also had their relatives employed in temporary positions with the Board during the time period in question. Although the record disclosed that other personnel of the Prince George’s County Board of Elections may have had family members employed with the Board as temporary part-time employees, the full-time personnel of the Board were not in employment positions where they [454]*454had the authority to hire people, let alone to procure employment for their own relatives. In any event, that would not excuse violations by Antonetti. In contrast, Antonetti, as an agency head who had been vested with hiring authority to use supplemental pay authorization forms to sanction the employment of temporary employees with the Board and so abused his position by hiring his spouse and children.
Although he attempts to do so, Antonetti cannot successfully claim that he was uninvolved in the final phase of hiring his spouse and children for the temporary employment. Antonetti argues that hiring members of his immediate family was conducted by the Board of Elections in conjunction with the Office of Personnel of Prince George’s County. As such, Antonetti would have this Court believe that he disclosed the employment of his family members to the Board in keeping with the exception set forth in § 15-501(c) which allows a public official to participate where there would otherwise be a conflict of interest so long as “the nature and circumstances of the conflict” are disclosed and the public official must participate as required by law, by virtue of the fact that they are the only individuals authorized to act in the circumstance, or in order to prevent a loss of quorum where needed. There is no evidence on the record to suggest that the Office of Personnel of Prince George’s County had any knowledge that Antonetti’s family members were on the county payroll until February 8, 1995, when the Prince George’s County Government Office of Audits and Investigations reviewed the employment practices of the Board.15 Antonetti’s system of using supplemental pay authorization forms allowed him to hire employees without any review by the Office of Personnel. Thus, Antonetti used the authority granted to him by virtue of his position as Elections Administrator to circumvent the Office of Personnel through [455]*455his extensive use of supplemental pay authorization forms to procure employment on behalf of his family.
The record discloses a similar lack of knowledge by the Board of the employment status of Antonetti’s spouse and children. At the hearing before the Commission Jacqueline C. White, who served as President of the Board during the relevant period of inquiry and had previously served as secretary to the Board, testified that after reviewing the minutes of the Board as far back as 1979 she could not find any indication of where the Board had approved the hiring of Antonetti’s wife or children. While other members of the Board testified that they saw Antonetti’s wife and children in and around the office and at the storage warehouse with their father, knowledge of their mere presence and knowledge that these people, including children as young as nine years old, were on the county payroll are two vastly different matters. In addition to Antonetti’s failure to satisfy the disclosure requirement of § 15 — 501(c), the record contains no evidence which could support the argument that Antonetti engaged in this self-serving conduct based on a requirement of the law, because he sought to preserve a quorum on the Board, or because he was the only individual authorized to act.
In an attempt to place himself within the scope of the exceptions set forth in § 15 — 501(b)(2), concerning the non-applicability of the conflicts of interest provisions to the performance of duties which are purely “administrative or ministerial,” Antonetti argues that he acted in a purely ministerial capacity because he was the only person authorized to sign the supplemental pay authorization forms. At the hearing before the Commission on January 21, 1997, the following dialogue took place during Antonetti’s cross-examination:
Q: It’s true, based on testimony we heard today, it’s your practice to sign all the time sheets, it’s your practice to sign all the supplemental payroll?
A: Ministerial responsibility, yes.
Q: I asked — let me ask if you sign all of them?
A: Yes.
[456]*456Q: You believe that to be a ministerial duty?
A: Correct.
Q: If you refused to sign them, what would happen?
A: Nobody would be paid.
Q: It seems to me that’s a major impact.
A: As far as I understand, it is ministerial while I’m there. I’m the only authorized signature by Payroll.
Antonetti’s broad declaration of his opinion that he acted in a ministerial capacity with regard to his signatory actions, however, fails to demonstrate that his conduct falls within the exception to the participation in the employment of family members as set forth in § 15-501(c) of the Public Ethics Law.
In explaining the distinctions between exercising discretion and performing purely ministerial functions, this Court has stated that:
The term “discretion” denotes freedom to act according to one’s judgment in the absence of a hard and fast rule. When applied to public officials, “discretion” is the power conferred upon them by law to act officially under certain circumstances according to the dictates of their own judgment and conscience, and uncontrolled by the judgment or conscience of others.
Ashburn v. Anne Arundel County, 306 Md. 617, 623, 510 A.2d 1078, 1081 (1986)(quoting Schneider v. Hawkins, 179 Md. 21, 25, 16 A.2d 861, 864 (1940)). Thus, a person engages in non-ministerial or discretionary functions when he or she exercises judgment in the process of establishing and maintaining employment relationships for their family members with the Board. See Bovey v. Executive Director, Health Claims Arbitration Office, 292 Md. 640, 649, 441 A.2d 333, 338 (1982)(holding that where the director needed to exercise “his sound judgment and discretion” the director’s actions were not ministerial and thus a writ of mandamus could not be executed “to compel him to follow any stated procedure”).16
[457]*457If someone else had been authorized to sign these forms following approval of employment by the Board, then it could be said that Antonetti’s signatory action may have been merely ministerial. See Freeman v. Local 1802, American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees Council 67, AFL-CIO, 318 Md. 684, 696, 569 A.2d 1244, 1250 (1990). Antonetti was not merely rubber-stamping these forms at the behest of another party. He used the authority granted to him by virtue of his position as Board Administrator to authorize the employment and payment of his relatives with the Board. Thus, the facts and inferences to be drawn from the record support the Commission’s conclusion that Antonetti violated the tenets of Md.Code Ann., State Gov’t, §§ 15-501 and 15-506.
With regard to Antonetti’s transgression in failing to disclose that members of his immediate family were employed by the Board on his annual financial disclosure forms, we conclude that the record supports the Commission’s findings of fact and conclusion of law that Antonetti violated the clear mandate of disclosure set forth in Md.Code Ann., State Gov’t, § 15-607. In his position as the Administrator for the Board, Antonetti was required by law to file under oath annual financial disclosure statements with the Commission. Md. [458]*458Code Ann., State Gov’t. §§ 15-601, 15-602. The statements were to include Antonetti’s interests in real property, in corporations and partnerships, interests in business entities conducting business with the State, gifts, employment by or interest in business entities doing business with the State, indebtedness to entities doing business in the State, family members employed by the State, and sources of earned income. Md.Code Ann., State Gov’t. § 15-607. The relevant subsection of the statute states that:
The statement shall include a schedule listing the name and address of each:
(1) place of salaried employment of the individual or a member of the individual’s immediate family at any time during the applicable period; and
(2) business entity of which the individual or a member of the individual’s immediate family was a sole or partial owner, and from which the individual or family member received earned income, at any time during the applicable period.
Md.Code Ann., State Gov’t. § 15-607(i).
Antonetti conceded his error in completing the financial disclosure forms in his testimony before the Commission. Although he filed additional forms in 1995 to correct his earlier omissions, he nevertheless violated the clear language of Md.Code Ann., State Gov’t. § 15-607 which requires disclosure of all employment for his immediate family members. As a public official, entrusted with upholding high standards of moral and ethical conduct in engendering the support and trust of the community which he served, Antonetti transcended mere offensiveness by omitting in financial disclosure statements filed under oath, to disclose the very employment he procured for his family.
We hold that Antonetti violated §§ 15-501, 15-506 and 15-607 of the Public Ethics Law through his participation in recruiting, hiring, promoting and supervising his family members as employees of the Board, and by failing to file properly [459]*459completed financial disclosure statements, as required by law, from 1988 through 1994.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS REVERSED; CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO VACATE THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY AND TO REMAND THE CASE TO THE CIRCUIT COURT WITH DIRECTIONS TO AFFIRM THE ORDER OF THE STATE ETHICS COMMISSION. COSTS IN THIS COURT AND THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID BY RESPONDENT.