Standard Oil Co. of California v. Tide Water Associated Oil Co.

154 F.2d 579, 69 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 41, 1946 U.S. App. LEXIS 3256
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Third Circuit
DecidedMarch 26, 1946
Docket8605, 8658
StatusPublished
Cited by23 cases

This text of 154 F.2d 579 (Standard Oil Co. of California v. Tide Water Associated Oil Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Standard Oil Co. of California v. Tide Water Associated Oil Co., 154 F.2d 579, 69 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 41, 1946 U.S. App. LEXIS 3256 (3d Cir. 1946).

Opinion

GOODRICH, Circuit Judge.

This is a patent suit in the usual form. The plaintiff asked for injunctive relief against further infringement, and an accounting. The trial court found for the defendant and the plaintiff appeals. A brief statement of the facts hack of the patent questions will be helpful to the understanding of the latter.

The Problem.

In the modern use of petroleum products as motor fuels, sulphur content is a serious detriment. The process of the patent in controversy 1 involves removal of sul *580 phur from gasoline. Petroleum oil from the early days of the industry has been refined by distilling off from the crude oil body the various fractions 2 varying in weight from gasoline, one of the lightest, through kerosene to the heavier stock fraction from which lubricating oils are derived. The products of this fractional distillation are known as “straight run.” These straight run fractions have from early practice been treated chemically for various purposes such as securing the desired color and clearness, removing objectionable odors and so on. Sulphuric acid has long been a recognized method of treatment. As the use of gasoline as motor fuel increased, the straight run process was found to be too wasteful; not enough of the oil was used to furnish gasoline. Further, as motors became more complex, the degree of differentiation among motor fuels had to keep pace. Intensive cracking under high pressure of the comparatively heavier straight run products has for many years been utilized as a means to both these objectives. To this new cracked distillate, there has also been application of sulphuric acid for various purposes. But in process of cracking straight run distillate with, high sulphur content, the sulphur bodies are similarly cracked forming new sulphur compounds. These are much more resistant to the acid treatment. Increasing the amount of acid means that a considerable portion of the new sulphur bodies are polymerized into heavier compounds that stay in solution in the distillate, and require redistillation. Additional difficulty lies in the fact that the polymerization of the sulphur bodies is accompanied by polymerization of valuable unsaturated hydrocarbons resulting in substantial loss of the motor fuel which it is the object of the treatment to obtain.

The Plaintiff’s Patent.

On the foregoing there is no serious dispute; beyond it we come upon the facts which separate the parties in this case. Plaintiff, Standard Oil Company of California, claims it solved the problem of sulphur removal by sulphuric acid without relatively high loss of gasoline by a patented process which defendant is using without license. Defendant, Tide Water Associated Oil Company, replies that Standard has no patent rights which need be observed for a number of reasons which constitute the issues in the present litigation. The District Court, in essential agreement with Tide Water, has found as facts from the evidence that “The processes disclosed in claims 1, 2, 3, 5, 9, 10 and 11 of Patent No. 1,869,885 are not new in the petroleum refining art. * * * do not constitute an invention. * * * [and] are not sufficiently definite to enable a person skilled in the art to practice the teachings of the patent.” The claims are set out in the margin. 3

From an inspection of the claims quoted, it is to be seen that the-problem of sul *581 phur removal is alleged to be effectively solved by refrigerating the sulphurized cracked distillate. Here is the core of the two principal issues. Standard claims the patent rights to this refrigerative process, and characterizes it as a means whereby (1) “selective action,” a term of its own devising, is induced and (2) polymerization of hydrocarbons is concurrently decreased. The “selective action” is the solvent action of acid upon sulphur compounds while under refrigeration. This dual action is labelled the “Davis and Hampton two-step sulphur removal process.” In terms of its claims the patent process circumscribes itself to the treatment of cracked motor fuel containing sulphur compounds and unsaturated hydrocarbons. 4 It sets out five coordinated phases of activity: (1) Refrigeration of the fuel, (2) “selective action” under refrigeration, (3) polymerization of sulphur or sulphur compounds under refrigeration, (4) separation of fuel from acid sludge and (5) redistillation to separate the fuel from the polymerized products. The amount of acid needed is described (in the claims already quoted) as “such strength and quantity as to have the capacity [to achieve (2) and (3) above] and to effect a material rise of temperature of reaction unless restrained.” The refrigerative procedure is “by absorbing heat of reaction, at a maximum temperature sufficiently low to permit [ (2) and (3) above] and below the temperature at which the non-sulphur bearing unsaturated hydrocarbons readily polymerize.” It is admitted in plaintiff’s brief that “The method is not dependent upon a critical maximum temperature of treatment nor upon a critical strength or quantity of acid.” From the same source we learn that among the variables admittedly affecting the required degree of refrigeration are: (a) Composition of the cracked fuel; (b) percentage sulphur content; (c) boiling points; (d) specific gravity; (e) “extent of sulphur reduction desired or required”; and (f) “the permissible economic loss of fuel due to polymerization,” which is “determined by comparison of cost of required refrigeration with the comparable value of the motor fuel otherwise lost by polymerization.”

Sufficiency of Description.

In the light of what has just been said our initial problem is whether the patent claims comply with R.S. § 4888, 35 U.S. C.A. § 33, requiring a “full, clear, concise and exact” description so that the process can be utilized by those skilled in the art. 5 The Supreme Court has been concerned *582 with the same general problem on other occasions and has said enough about it to furnish a guide. Three things should be borne in mind, however, before turning our attention to the decisions themselves. First, we are dealing with a factual matter 6 hence prior decisions can only aid us in setting up the tests by which to evaluate the determination of fact. Second, a word may be sufficiently precise in describing one process or product and insufficient for another. Thus while “substantial” is regularly permitted as a descriptive word in most circumstances, 7 it has been regarded as insufficient in other circumstances. 8 Third, as science and art advance, words that once may have had sufficient particularity and precision have a tendency to become too loose and more specific descriptive terms are needed. This means that the illustrative value of the holding in a patent case on this point decreases with the span of years and with the rate of advance of science', though the rationale of the holding may continue to be valid.

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Bluebook (online)
154 F.2d 579, 69 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 41, 1946 U.S. App. LEXIS 3256, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/standard-oil-co-of-california-v-tide-water-associated-oil-co-ca3-1946.