GOODRICH, Circuit Judge.
This is a patent suit in the usual form. The plaintiff asked for injunctive relief against further infringement, and an accounting. The trial court found for the defendant and the plaintiff appeals. A brief statement of the facts hack of the patent questions will be helpful to the understanding of the latter.
The Problem.
In the modern use of petroleum products as motor fuels, sulphur content is a serious detriment. The process of the patent in controversy
involves removal of sul
phur from gasoline. Petroleum oil from the early days of the industry has been refined by distilling off from the crude oil body the various fractions
varying in weight from gasoline, one of the lightest, through kerosene to the heavier stock fraction from which lubricating oils are derived. The products of this fractional distillation are known as “straight run.” These straight run fractions have from early practice been treated chemically for various purposes such as securing the desired color and clearness, removing objectionable odors and so on. Sulphuric acid has long been a recognized method of treatment. As the use of gasoline as motor fuel increased, the straight run process was found to be too wasteful; not enough of the oil was used to furnish gasoline. Further, as motors became more complex, the degree of differentiation among motor fuels had to keep pace. Intensive cracking under high pressure of the comparatively heavier straight run products has for many years been utilized as a means to both these objectives. To this new cracked distillate, there has also been application of sulphuric acid for various purposes. But in process of cracking straight run distillate with, high sulphur content, the sulphur bodies are similarly cracked forming new sulphur compounds. These are much more resistant to the acid treatment. Increasing the amount of acid means that a considerable portion of the new sulphur bodies are polymerized into heavier compounds that stay in solution in the distillate, and require redistillation. Additional difficulty lies in the fact that the polymerization of the sulphur bodies is accompanied by polymerization of valuable unsaturated hydrocarbons resulting in substantial loss of the motor fuel which it is the object of the treatment to obtain.
The Plaintiff’s Patent.
On the foregoing there is no serious dispute; beyond it we come upon the facts which separate the parties in this case. Plaintiff, Standard Oil Company of California, claims it solved the problem of sulphur removal by sulphuric acid without relatively high loss of gasoline by a patented process which defendant is using without license. Defendant, Tide Water Associated Oil Company, replies that Standard has no patent rights which need be observed for a number of reasons which constitute the issues in the present litigation. The District Court, in essential agreement with Tide Water, has found as facts from the evidence that “The processes disclosed in claims 1, 2, 3, 5, 9, 10 and 11 of Patent No. 1,869,885 are not new in the petroleum refining art. * * * do not constitute an invention. * * * [and] are not sufficiently definite to enable a person skilled in the art to practice the teachings of the patent.” The claims are set out in the margin.
From an
inspection
of the claims quoted, it is to be seen that the-problem of sul
phur removal is alleged to be effectively solved by refrigerating the sulphurized cracked distillate. Here is the core of the two principal issues. Standard claims the patent rights to this refrigerative process, and characterizes it as a means whereby (1) “selective action,” a term of its own devising, is induced and (2) polymerization of hydrocarbons is concurrently decreased. The “selective action” is the solvent action of acid upon sulphur compounds while under refrigeration. This dual action is labelled the “Davis and Hampton two-step sulphur removal process.” In terms of its claims the patent process circumscribes itself to the treatment of cracked motor fuel containing sulphur compounds and unsaturated hydrocarbons.
It sets out five coordinated phases of activity: (1) Refrigeration of the fuel, (2) “selective action” under refrigeration, (3) polymerization of sulphur or sulphur compounds under refrigeration, (4) separation of fuel from acid sludge and (5) redistillation to separate the fuel from the polymerized products. The amount of acid needed is described (in the claims already quoted) as “such strength and quantity as to have the capacity [to achieve (2) and (3) above] and to effect a material rise of temperature of reaction unless restrained.” The refrigerative procedure is “by absorbing heat of reaction, at a maximum temperature sufficiently low to permit [ (2) and (3) above] and below the temperature at which the non-sulphur bearing unsaturated hydrocarbons readily polymerize.” It is admitted in plaintiff’s brief that “The method is not dependent upon a critical maximum temperature of treatment nor upon a critical strength or quantity of acid.” From the same source we learn that among the variables admittedly affecting the required degree of refrigeration are: (a) Composition of the cracked fuel; (b) percentage sulphur content; (c) boiling points; (d) specific gravity; (e) “extent of sulphur reduction desired or required”; and (f) “the permissible economic loss of fuel due to polymerization,” which is “determined by comparison of cost of required refrigeration with the comparable value of the motor fuel otherwise lost by polymerization.”
Sufficiency of Description.
In the light of what has just been said our initial problem is whether the patent claims comply with R.S. § 4888, 35 U.S. C.A. § 33, requiring a “full, clear, concise and exact” description so that the process can be utilized by those skilled in the art.
The Supreme Court has been concerned
with the same general problem on other occasions and has said enough about it to furnish a guide. Three things should be borne in mind, however, before turning our attention to the decisions themselves. First, we are dealing with
a
factual matter
hence prior decisions can only aid us in setting up the tests by which to evaluate the determination of fact. Second, a word may be sufficiently precise in describing one process or product and insufficient for another. Thus while “substantial” is regularly permitted as a descriptive word in most circumstances,
it has been regarded as insufficient in other circumstances.
Third, as science and art advance, words that once may have had sufficient particularity and precision have a tendency to become too loose and more specific descriptive terms are needed. This means that the illustrative value of the holding in a patent case on this point decreases with the span of years and with the rate of advance of science', though the rationale of the holding may continue to be valid.
The public policy of §, 4888 has been clearly expressed by the Supreme Court. “The limits of - a patent must be known for the protection of the patentee, the encouragement of the inventive genius of others, and the assurance that the subject of the patent will be dedicated ultimately to the public. The statute seeks to guard against unreasonable advantages to the patentee and disadvantages to others arising from uncertainty as to their rights. The inventor must ‘inform the public during the life of the patent of the limits of the monopoly asserted, so that it may be known which features may be safely used or manufactured without a license and which may not.’ The claims ‘measure the invention.’ * * * In a limited field, the variant must be-clearly defined.” General Electric Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp. et al., 1938, 304 U.S. 364, 369, 58 S.Ct. 899, 902, 82 L.Ed. 1402. The same language is used in United Carbon Co. et al. v. Binney & Smith Co., 1942, 317 U.S. 228, 232, 63 S.Ct. 165, 168, 87 L.Ed. 232. The latter decision goes on to point out that “The courts *
* *
no less than the parties-litigant, need and may insist upon the precision enjoined by the statute.” The public policy behind the statute may be seen to be as strongly grounded in the necessity for adequate notice
as it is in the necessity to teach. The burden is on the inventor to say precisely what he has done. He must speak so clearly that he does not shift that burden to others who because of his failure to be more explicit may unwittingly invade the field covered by the patentee.
The most immediate test of suffi-
ciency of precision in description following from the policy just outlined is that no inventor may compel independent experimentation by others to ascertain the bounds of his claims. This Court in the Standard Brands case
so ruled before and the Supreme Court in the same case
agreed. Equally necessary in derivation is the rule that difficulty in securing exactness does not mean a description may fall short of the requirements of the statute. In the General Electric case, supra, the Supreme Court said, “The Circuit Court of Appeals below suggested that ‘in view of the difficulty, if not impossibility of describing adequately a number of microscopic and heterogeneous shapes of crystals, it may be * * * the best disclosure possible * * But congress requires, for the protection of the public, that the inventor set out a definite limitation of his patent; that condition must be satisfied before the monopoly is granted.” A caveat contained in a note
may have raised some doubts but if so they have since been resolved by the language of the United Carbon case, supra, “Whether the vagueness of the claim has its source in the language employed or in the somewhat indeterminate character of the advance claimed to have been made in the art is not material. An invention must be capable of accurate definition, and it must be accurately defined, to be patentable. Cf. General Electric Co. v. Wabash Corp., 304 U.S. [364] at pages 372, 373, 58 S.Ct. [899] 903, 82 L.Ed. 1402.”
In a recent decision,
where determination of an infringement issue turned “on the construction to be given the words, ‘without substantial vaporization’,
as they are used in the claim,” the Supreme Court said, “We are of the view that ‘without substantial vaporization’ as used in the patent means * * * cracking as nearly as may be in the liquid phase.”
No independent experimentation was necessary to determine the liquid phase of the process. The claim description was thus sufficiently clear despite its use of a word that taken superficially lacked precision. The use of the language “not substantially less than 66° Baumé.” in referring to acid concentration in the instant case is not on its face bad for lack of clarity, therefore. This alone cannot establish or deny the compliance with the statute. We must examine the descriptions as a whole.
The District Judge found as a fact that the claims here involved “are not sufficiently definite to enable a person skilled in the art to practice the teachings of the patent.” As would be expected, the plaintiff attacks this conclusion; the defendant
supports it. We think it correct and will endeavor to state why we do.
In the instant case, experimentation is the only means for ascertaining the claims. When Mr. Graves, plaintiff’s chemist, was asked what he meant in stating the desired ends could be achieved under the process without laboratory analysis or testing he indicated that this was possible only by assuming a typical cracked distillate.
But as the District Court pointed out, the variation in gasoline stocks is of paramount significance.
Hence, the assumption is one that does not fit the facts.
As already pointed out, [1] the amount of acid needed is described as [a] of “such strength and quantity as to have the capacity at low temperatures of selectively removing a part of the sulphur bodies and to polymerize a further part of said bodies and [b] to effect a material rise of temperature of reaction unless restrained.” Part [a] simply talks in terms of effects. It requires that amount of acid, whatever it may be, that will achieve the results of selective action and polymerization under refrigeration. Such a statement is void for want of particularity just as a functional description of a product patent would be.
Part [b] is also deficient on its face.
It is insufficient in still another respect i.e. as a suggested temperature range, for reasons to be discussed presently. The refrigerative method is described as [2] “by absorbing heat of reaction, [a] at a maximum temperature of treatment sufficiently low to permit a part of the sulphur bodies to be selectively removed by said acid and a part thereof to be polymerized and [b] below the temperature at which the non-sulphur bearing unsaturated hydrocarbons readily polymerize.” Again it will be seen that part [a] speaks in terms of results; it specifies a temperature low enough- to achieve selective action and polymerization. It must fail for the same reasons that part [a] of the acid description failed.
Part [b] brings us directly to the question of temperature range which part [b] of the acid description tacitly suggested. Mr. Halloran, plaintiff’s research and development department head, could not establish an upper limit of temperature range for the process,
and Mr. Day, a skilled refinery technician appearing as witness for plaintiff, could not set out the lower limit of temperature range for the process.
It is obvious that precision is completely lacki
ng.
There are no critical limits which set off the new results claimed.
We may obtain the same kind of results outside the limits as within.
The temperature range is neither clear nor concise.
Not even Dr. Hampton himself, one of the inventors, could add particularity or render the situation more concise and clear as his testimony shows.
After what has been said, it is not necessary to do more than mention in passing that the record also reveals instances where the same conclusions are reached on the actual mathematics of given situations. The “variant factors presented by the instant compositions of the cracked distillate” are the only determinants
and these clearly require experimentation in each specific case. Perhaps this is che best that could he done under the circumstances. But as pointed out before, this is not enough when the requirements of the statute are not met. Notice to the industrial public is manifestly lacking here; and the teaching help furnished is of the type that aids him who aids himself. The language of the patent claims becomes conveniently inexact and lacking in clarity “at the exact point of novelty.”
To put the matter as to this phase of the case in nontechnical language, it seems to us to come to about this : The patentee says to the petroleum industry and the public: “Refrigeration of cracked distillate before sulphuric acid treatment will largely solve the problem of getting rid of sulphur compounds without losing the valuable unsaturated hydrocarbons. That will give you the solvent action of the acid upon some of the sulphur and the polymerization of most of the remainder. We cannot tell you how cold to make and keep your distillate for that depends upon a number of factors. Strength of acid is one: as to this we recommend it be not less than 66° Baumé. Quantity of acid is another factor. As to this we make no specification at all beyond such amount as the circumstances indicate. Length of exposure of distillate to acid is also a factor; likewise the chemical composition of your cracked distillate. Within limits, the more rigidly you confine your temperature rise, the smaller your loss of the valuable hydrocarbons will be. But, of course, your refrigeration costs will also be higher. You must decide which is the more advantageous to you, less end product but less refrigeration cost or more hydrocarbons and greater expense for ice. Here are some tables which show results under some of the conditions which have
been met. But our patent is not to be limited in its application to conditions set out in this data.”
We think the District Judge was correct in concluding that the description was insufficient to meet the statutory' requirements.
Prior Art.
The second question is whether the process of the instant case is invalid for lack of invention and novelty over the prior art, because anticipated by it. Upon this question of fact the District Court made a specific finding that “The processes disclosed in * * * Patent No. 1,869,885 are not new in the petroleum refining art.” The support for that conclusion must now be examined.
First a brief history of the litigation pri- or to this appeal is indicated. After dismissal on stipulation in another district,
plaintiff filed suit in the District of Delaware. The same cause of action was set out as in the California suit, viz., infringement of three patents.
The 809 complaint was dismissed, with prejudice, on plaintiff’s motion. Of the other two, both of which the District Court found against, only the decision upon the 885 patent was appealed. Our first consideration is the effect of this 809 patent on 885, which it preceded.
There is no question that 809 in every way preceded 885 and is part of the prior art. The 809 patent according to the sworn statements of Davis and Hampton, preceded 885 in conception,
explanation,
reduction to practice,
drawings
and utilization.
Claim 4 of the 809 patent shows a striking similarity to the 885 claims.
Claim 4 reads: “In a process of treating cracked petroleum naphtha and similar high sulphur petroleum distillates with sulphuric acid to remove sulphur bodies, substantially reducing the polymerization of unsulphured bodies by cooling the oil to below 38° F. and treating the cool oil with an acid of lower freezing point than the reaction temperature.” It is at once apparent that the differences between the two patents are that (a) 885 is not limited to temperature below 38° F. as in 809 and (b) 809 requires an acid of lower freezing point than the reaction temperature. But the very differences only emphasize the essential point of similarity, namely — refrigeration
for the very same purposes
as the 885 patent and force the conclusion that
the 885 patent is preceded in the art hy 809. What plaintiff claims to be a generic invention following a specific improvement, we think is more accurately regarded as an attempt to enlarge a pre-existing patent to cover a field whose boundaries are marked by no monuments. The 885 patent is simply a broad attempt to preempt and monopolize the use of refrigeration in petroleum refining.
What has already been said is sufficient to support the conclusion of the District Court with regard to the 885 patent. But the dispute between these parties is obviously of considerable commercial importance both to them and to the petroleum industry generally. We shall, therefore, review the earlier inventions and publications which counsel for both sides, in what is an unusually competent and thorough presentation, have given us. Little comment will be added for the setting out of the facts of the prior art is more convincing than argument could be.
(1) In 1909, Robinson (U.S. Patent No. 910,584) patented a process of refining under refrigeration to remove sulphur. While kerosene obtained from Lima oil (descriptive of a type found near Lima, Ohio) was what the inventor was chiefly concerned with, his process covered the refining of cracked hydrocarbon distillates,
including cracked naphtha. The cracking methods in use at the time of the Robinson patent did not result in so high a percentage of unsaturates in the cracked distillates as modern methods give. But this factor is not a determinative one. The 885 patent does not delimit percentages of unsaturates in the cracked distillates. Moreover, Robinson describes refining of (bituminous) shale oil which contains a relatively high percentage of unsaturates. The treating temperatures Robinson recommends range from 48° to 70° F. These cut across the range used in the 885 illustration. Furthermore the limitation of temperature by Robinson is economic rather than scientific, a position strikingly similar to that of the 885 patentees.
Robinson speaks by way of explanation of “ * * * the ability of a smaller proportion of * * * extra strong acid * * * to accomplish the same desulphurizing effect as a larger proportion of the same acid * * * ” under proper conditions of low temperature; the range used being given.
We must agree with the District Court in saying, “It seems obvious, therefore, that Robinson’s process is substantially the same as the process in the ‘885’ patent.”
(2) In 1911 the Singer article
appeared. It discussed the treatment of “mineral oil” distillates with sulphuric acid and noted amongst the resulting desirable changes a “smaller sulphur content.”
Polymerization of the unsaturated hydrocarbons was discussed as a manifestation of the chemical action of the sulphuric acid.
The importance of temperature
was clearly recognized.
Low temperatures were specifically recommended.
(3) In 1920, Hamor and Padgett, published their study
on the subj ect. The sulphuric acid they specify is 66° Bé. acid,
thé same as in the patent before .us now. Similarly, quantity, treatment and time are regarded as variables to be determined for each case separately.
The nature of the chemical action of sulphuric acid on petroleum distillates is said to be polymerization.
Sulphur is explicitly indicated as one of the compounds acted upon and temperature is stated to be one of the factors determining the completeness of the reaction.
(4) In 1917 Ellis filed application for a patent
on the “production of acid liquor by the treatment of olefin material with an extractive acid, such as sulphuric acid * * In this process he teaches what is very close to the essence of the process of the instant case, though of course that teaching is only incidental to his main purpose. The olefin material of which he speaks may contain such cracked saturates as petroleum oils.
He indicates sulphuric acid of 1.84 specific gravity (66° Bé.)
Low temperature is pointed out particularly. The stronger the acid, the lower the temperature.
His claims indicate the general mode of procedure: adding sulphuric acid to hydrocarbon material with cooling and separation.
(5) In 1917 Alexander filed patent application for a “method of purifying oils.”
The method, according to the inventor, is shown to be particularly applicable to
cracked, gasolines.
The use of sulphuric acid is regarded as general practice in the industry.
The proportions and strengths of acid to be used are noted as variables.
Sulphuric acid is specifically indicated and the process is said to be applicable to other oils as well as gasoline.
While sulphur removal is not explicitly mentioned, the inventor makes broad statements concerning extraction of detrimental impurities
and improvement of the character of the oil treated.
Finally, temperature control to remove the heat of reaction is also taught.
(6) Temperature of the substance treated, which is the crux of the process claimed as a patent in the case before us, was discussed authoritatively as far back as 1895. Zaloziecki wrote in clear and unmistakable language of it.
His first sentence indicates that the application of temperature upon petroleum refining is his subject matter.
The article points out that final quality of purification is dependent on both temperature and sulphuric acid treatment.
It states “definitely” that the lower the temperature the better the yield, quality, purification and ease of technological method.
Fie concludes this first article of what was to become a series on the same general subject matter by noting that refiners might make use of the information to their own advantage.
Apparently the advice was already superfluous. For in the very next article,
the opening sentence indicates that some refiners were already using the process.
In this article, we are also told that sul
phur derivatives are within the group of constituents acted upon by a solvent action,
and that polymerization of the unsaturated hydrocarbons by the sulphuric acid takes place.
In the third article of the series
we find a succinct statement of the process which indicates that the knowledge available then was essentially the knowledge of the instant patent, though of course no more susceptible to proof or formula statement then than now.
(7) Going back to 1907, some years earlier than any of the patents hitherto discussed, we find the Black patent application.
It. is concerned with refining petroleum whose kerosene fraction is rich in smoky hydrocarbons.
But the specifications' indicate that the process is equally applicable to the sulphur hydrocarbons.
It also emphasizes that treatment with sulphuric anhydrid would similarly follow if sulphur removal were the,desired end.
Temperature is clearly set out as a factor to be controlled, with low temperatures stressed.
The economic limitation to temperature treatment of which the instant patent speaks is also pointed out in this earlier patent by Black.
(8) Finally, one may note the claims in the Isham and Lyons patent
application of 1923, renewed in 1935. Claim 33, specifically covers “removal of contained sulphur” as a purpose in “refining cracked gasoline with concentrated sulphuric acid” * * * “below a temperature of 60° F.” * * * “to prevent substantial polymerization of the unsaturated constituents contained in the gasoline being treated.”
It
is difficult to tell, from the language quoted, whether we are back with the patent of the instant case, or concerned with an older teaching in the art. Claim 36 reads much the same except
that the
temperature specified is “a temperature below that at which the resulting cold concentrated sulphuric acid will cause substantial polymerization of the said unsaturated hydrocarbons.” Claim
37
is the same as 36 but the temperature is given as “below 40° F.” for the mixing of oil and acid and the general language is added that conditions are to be controlled “to prevent a substantial rise in the temperature by the heat evolved from the reaction between the oil and the acid.” Claim 38 uses the same type of general language about temperature with reference to “each stage” of claim 33.
From what has been said the conclusion is inescapable. Plaintiff has clothed old ideas with an ephemeral semblance of novelty. The knowledge it seeks to monopolize was open for the world to see, before plaintiff showed it in his patent.
Additional Points by Defendant.
A few incidental points remain which require brief comment. The questions briefed concerning infringement and license under the 885 patent are no longer material. Defendant urges, however, that the 809 patent should also he held invalid. The grounds are that the public ought to be protected from the threat of suits upon this patent because it is allegedly included within the broad claims of the 885 patent and hence must be equally invalid. The simple answer is that the 809 patent is not in issue before us. It was dismissed with prejudice upon plaintiff’s motion to dismiss.
Defendant also seeks additional costs and expenses incurred in preparing for trial on the 809 patent. The trial court’s examination of the facts led it to say, “There is nothing from which it at all appears that the suit brought by the plaintiff here was either vexatious or oppressive,” and concluded that “there are no circumstances which would justify any imposition on the plaintiff of additional costs and expenses.” The defendant is not an appellant in this Court and we do not see how its argument on this point, even if it had substance, could be considered by us. Nor do we see any reason to disagree with the conclusion reached by the trial judge.
Affirmed.