United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co.

317 U.S. 228, 63 S. Ct. 165, 87 L. Ed. 232, 1942 U.S. LEXIS 1190
Supreme Court of the United States·Decided December 14, 1942·No. 71·Published·Cited by 245 cases

Opinion

Mr. Justice Jackson

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Respondent sued for infringement of Patent No. 1,889,-429, issued to Weigand and Venuto, relating to carbon black in aggregated form and a process for its conversion *229 to that form. Its complaint was particularized to apply only to claims 1 and 2 of the patent, which are product claims and not process claims. The District Court found these claims invalid as lacking novelty and invention and because they failed to define the product asserted to have been invented in such clear, definite, and exact terms as required by patent law. It also found no infringement. 37 F. Supp. 779. The Circuit Court of Appeals held to the contrary on each of these propositions and reversed. 125 F. 2d 255. The importance of the questions in the case prompted us to grant certiorari. 316 U. S. 657.

Carbon black has been manufactured from natural gas since the 1870’s. At present the most extensive of its many uses is as a binder in automobile tires. 1 The particles of carbon black in its original form are extremely fine and dispersible. They are smaller than the length of a light wave, having a diameter of about one-millionth of an inch. One pound of them is said to present surfaces sufficient to cover 12 or 13 acres. Unprocessed carbon black weighs but ten pounds or less per cubic foot.

The fineness and dispersibility of the substance causes it to raise in clouds of dust when handled, with consequent losses, discomfort to workmen, and difficulties in manufacturing processes. Since 1915, when carbon black first came to be widely used in the manufacture of rubber, many attempts have been made to cope with the dust problem. In many cases, mixing rooms were segregated at great expense from other parts of rubber factories, and the mills where the carbon black was mixed into the rubber were enclosed to confine the clouds of dust.

Efforts were made to prevent as well as to control the dust. Compressing the carbon black to force out the *230 air and increase its density met with some, but only indifferent, success. Attempts were made to prevent dust by the use of binders in the carbon black to make the particles adhere. These were not satisfactory, since the binders were unwanted and sometimes injurious substances and, at best, foreign matter to rubber formulas. Wetting and drying the carbon black also proved unsatisfactory, since this caused the particles to adhere in such manner that the aggregate product was not sufficiently friable (i. e., breakable) and dispersible when mixed with other substances.

Weigand and Yenuto experimented extensively, and the patent in litigation is the outcome. They mixed carbon black with a liquid such as water; displaced the water with another liquid, such as gasoline, which was substantially immiscible with the first and had a greater ability to wet the carbon particles; agitated the mixture until the water was substantially free from carbon; and finally removed the gasoline by evaporation. As it apparently must in order to assert invention and infringement, respondent argues that Weigand and Venuto solved the problem of carbon black dust by a product consisting of carbon black aggregates formed without the use of any binder, sufficiently hard and flowable to prevent the formation of dust, yet sufficiently friable and dispersible for use as a component in the manufacture of rubber and other products.

Manufacture was undertaken, one Glaxner being employed to put into use the process taught by this patent. He soon bettered his instruction by devising a simpler and much less expensive process employing but one liquid. His process was the subject of another patent, 2 and at once superseded that of the patent in suit, which thereupon became obsolete. Several other processes to achieve *231 very similar results, including those used by the petitioner, have also been developed and patented. 3 Commercial success of respondent’s process was short-lived, and the really impressive commercial success has been achieved since the development of the Glaxner process. 4

The product claims which respondent says the petitioner’s product infringed, regardless of the process by which it was made, read as follows: “1. Sustantially (sic) pure carbon black in the form of commercially uniform, comparatively small, rounded, smooth aggregates having a spongy or porous interior. 2. As an article of manufacture, a pellet of approximately one-sixteenth of an inch in *232 diameter and formed of a porous mass of substantially pure carbon black.”

Section 4888 of the Revised Statutes, 35 U. S. C. § 33, requires that the applicant for a patent “shall particularly point out and distinctly claim the part, improvement, or combination which he claims as his invention or discovery.” As the Court recently stated in General Electric Co. v. Wabash Corp., 304 U. S. 364, 369:

“Patents, whether basic or for improvements, must comply accurately and precisely with the statutory requirements as to claims of invention or discovery. The limits of a patent must be known for the protection of the patentee, the encouragement of the inventive genius of others and the assurance that the subject of the patent will be dedicated ultimately to the public. The statute seeks to guard against unreasonable advantages to the patentee and disadvantages to others arising from uncertainty as to their rights. The inventor must ‘inform the public during the life of the patent of the limits of the monopoly asserted, so that it may be known which features may be safely used or manufactured without a license and which may not/ The claims ‘measure the-invention/ ... In a limited field the variant must be clearly defined.”

The District Court found that the claims did not meet these requirements, and the Circuit Court of Appeals held that they did. Much testimony was directed to this question at the trial, and it has been discussed in the briefs and argument in this Court. Petitioner seeks reversal on the grounds of anticipation and non-infringement. The scope and sufficiency of the claims in suit necessarily present themselves as preliminary problems in the resolution of these ultimate issues. The courts in determining the questions of invention and infringement brought to them by respondent, no less than the parties-litigant, need and may insist upon the precision enjoined by the statute. *233 To sustain claims so indefinite as not to give the notice required by the statute would be in direct contravention of the public interest which Congress therein recognized and sought to protect. Cf. Muncie Gear Works v. Outboard, Marine & Mfg. Co.,

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United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 63 S. Ct. 165, 87 L. Ed. 232, 1942 U.S. LEXIS 1190 (1942).

317 U.S. 228 (United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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