Stair v. Lehigh Valley Carpenters LoCal Union No. 600 of United Brotherhood of Carpenters

813 F. Supp. 1112, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2516, 62 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 42,601, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1468, 1993 WL 41378
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
DecidedJanuary 12, 1993
DocketCiv. A. 91-1507
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 813 F. Supp. 1112 (Stair v. Lehigh Valley Carpenters LoCal Union No. 600 of United Brotherhood of Carpenters) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Stair v. Lehigh Valley Carpenters LoCal Union No. 600 of United Brotherhood of Carpenters, 813 F. Supp. 1112, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2516, 62 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 42,601, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1468, 1993 WL 41378 (E.D. Pa. 1993).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM

HUYETT, District Judge.

Plaintiff Adrienne G. Stair is a former member of Defendant Lehigh Valley Carpenters Local Union No. 600 of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America (Local 600 or Union)- and a former *1114 participant in the apprenticeship program operated by Defendant United Brotherhood of Carpenters Local 600 Joint Apprenticeship and Training Trust Fund (JATC). Defendant James Filyac is a business agent of Local 600 and a member of the Board of Trustees of the JATC. Defendant United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America (International Union) is the international union of which Local 600 is a member.

Plaintiff has alleged that Defendants have violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17. Count I of Plaintiffs complaint alleges that Defendant Local 600 failed to refer Plaintiff for employment, in a way that deprived her of employment opportunities because of her sex. Count I further alleges that Defendant Local 600 terminated her from its membership because of her sex. In Count II Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Local 600 created an intimidating, hostile or offensive work environment by promoting calendars of nude women and by failing to take action on Plaintiffs behalf when she complained of sexual harassment and discrimination. Count III of Plaintiffs complaint alleges that Defendant JATC discriminated against Plaintiff because of her sex by placing her on probation and later terminating her from participation in the apprenticeship program. In Count IV Plaintiff alleges that Defendant James Filyac sexually harassed Plaintiff by making sexually derogatory comments to her. Plaintiff is suing Defendant Filyac in his individual capacity, a business agent for Local 600, and as trustee of the JATC. Finally, Count V alleges that Defendant International Union discriminated against Plaintiff because of her sex by failing to supervise its local union affiliate properly and stop the alleged harassment and discrimination. The Court granted summary judgment in favor of the International Union on Count V. Stair v. Lehigh Valley Carpenters Local Union No. 600, No. 91- 1507 (E.D.Pa. July 15, 1992).

Defendants Local 600 and Filyac and Defendant JATC have filed motions in limine seeking an order precluding Plaintiff from offering evidence relating to an alleged remark made by Defendant Filyac to Plaintiff on or before September 23, 1988. Defendants argue that the Court should exclude the evidence because it falls outside the applicable 300-day period of limitations and because Plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to support a continuing violation theory. Plaintiff responds that she has alleged sufficient facts to support a continuing violation theory, and that, therefore, she should be allowed to litigate based upon an act outside the limitations period.

In order to sustain a claim for discrimination under Title VII a plaintiff must file a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) within 180 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred, or within 300 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred if the person has initially instituted proceedings with a state or local fair employment practices agency. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 706(e), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). A Title VII plaintiff may only litigate acts within the charge-filing period. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 558, 97 S.Ct. 1885, 1889, 52 L.Ed.2d 571 (1977).

Plaintiff has alleged that sometime between June 23 and September 23, 1988 when she was in the union hall with Defendant Filyac, he stated “Boy, your ass is looking nice, Adrienne. Don’t you think so Colin?” Plaintiff filed the underlying charge in this matter with the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission on August 10,1989, 322 days after September 23, 1988, the latest day that Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Filyac made the remark. Defendants argue, therefore, that the 300 day filing period prevents Plaintiff from maintaining her Title VII claim for sexual harassment based upon this alleged remark.

The Supreme Court has stated that “[fjiling a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC is not a. jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in federal court, but a requirement that, like a statute of limitations, is subject to waiver, estoppel, and *1115 equitable tolling.” Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393, 102 S.Ct. 1127, 1132, 71 L.Ed.2d 234 (1982). One of the equitable exceptions to the 180/300 day filing period limitation is the continuing violation theory. Under this theory a plaintiff may pursue a Title VII claim for discriminatory conduct that began outside the limitations period if she can demonstrate that the act is part of an ongoing practice or pattern of discrimination effected by the defendant. Jewett v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp,, 653 F.2d 89, 91 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 969, 102 S.Ct. 515, 70 L.Ed.2d 386 (1981). To rely on this theory the plaintiff must prove that a violation occurred within the limitations period and that such violation is “reasonably related” to prior discriminatory acts alleged. Bronze Shields, Inc. v. New Jersey Dep’t of Civil Service, 667 F.2d 1074, 1080-84 (3d Cir.1981), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1122, 102 S.Ct. 3510, .73 L.Ed.2d 1384 (1982). “[T]he plaintiff must show more than the occurrence of isolated or sporadic acts of intentional discrimination. The preponderance of the evidence must establish that some form of intentional discrimination against the class of which plaintiff was a member was the company’s ‘standard operating procedure.’ ” Jewett, 653 F.2d at 91-92.

The Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff can bring a claim for sexual harassment based upon acts that created a hostile, offensive, or intimidating work environment. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986). As the Fifth Circuit has noted:

The Meritor Savings Bank decision is relevant to the continuing violation theory because a hostile environment claim usually involves a continuing violation. In a hostile environment, an individual feels constantly threatened even in the absence of constant harassment. Thus, in looking at the frequency of harassment, the focus should not be a mechanical calculation. Rather, in light of Meritor Savings Bank,

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813 F. Supp. 1112, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2516, 62 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 42,601, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1468, 1993 WL 41378, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/stair-v-lehigh-valley-carpenters-local-union-no-600-of-united-brotherhood-paed-1993.