St. Louis Southwestern Railway Company v. Duke

424 S.W.2d 896, 11 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 127, 1967 Tex. LEXIS 254
CourtTexas Supreme Court
DecidedDecember 13, 1967
DocketB-262
StatusPublished
Cited by30 cases

This text of 424 S.W.2d 896 (St. Louis Southwestern Railway Company v. Duke) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Texas Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
St. Louis Southwestern Railway Company v. Duke, 424 S.W.2d 896, 11 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 127, 1967 Tex. LEXIS 254 (Tex. 1967).

Opinion

GREENHILL, Justice.

The decision in this case turns upon applications of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure dealing with the filing of, or the failure to file, a motion for new trial. After the jury had returned its answers to special issues, counsel for the plaintiffs filed a “motion for mistrial” because of alleged conflicts in the jury’s answers. The motion was overruled, and a judgment was entered upon the verdict for the defendant. The plaintiffs thereafter filed no motion for new trial but sought a reversal in the Court of Civil Appeals on the sole basis of the alleged conflicts. As will be developed below, it is contended that no motion for new trial should be required under the circumstances. It is further asserted that the pleading called a motion for mistrial was in substance a motion for new trial, or that it served that function.

The defendant filed a motion in the Court of Civil Appeals to dismiss the appeal because no motion for new trial had been filed in the trial court raising the question of conflicting answers in the jury’s verdict. The Court of Civil Appeals overruled that motion and entered a judgment reversing the judgment of the trial court and ordering a new trial because of the conflicts. 413 S.W.2d 813. We granted a writ of error on the procedural problems.

The action arose out of an automobile-train collision. The jury found the railroad guilty of negligence and also found the driver of the automobile, Mrs. Duke, guilty of contributory negligence. But the jury found that neither the railroad’s nor Mrs. Duke’s negligence was a proximate cause of the collision, and that the collision was not an unavoidable accident. Counsel for the plaintiffs thereupon moved that the court retire the jury for further deliberations because of alleged conflicts in the above findings. The court overruled that motion and received the verdict of the jury. Ten days later plaintiffs’ counsel filed “plaintiffs’ motion for a mistrial made subject to the action of the court on their motion for judgment on the verdict.” It again asserted the conflict in the jury’s answers. Its prayer, if the court failed to enter judgment for the plaintiffs on the verdict, was: “the Plaintiffs respectfully pray the Court to declare a mistrial and set this cause for another trial.” The judgment of the trial court, entered several weeks later, overruled the “plaintiffs’ motion for mistrial”," and, based upon the verdict of the jury, it decreed that plaintiffs take nothing.

The plaintiffs gave timely notice of appeal and filed an appeal bond after judgment was entered. But, as stated, they filed no motion for new trial. And, as stated, the Court of Civil Appeals, after overruling the defendant’s motion to dismiss the appeal, reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded the cause for a new trial. We do not reach the question of conflicts in the answers to the special issues upon which the Court of Civil Appeals reversed because of the requirements of the rules of civil procedure which require the filing of a motion for new trial to preserve the error complained of.

A motion for new trial is a jurisdictional prerequisite to appeal from a case tried to a jury, with certain specific exceptions. Rule 324 provides that: 1

“In all cases tried in the county or district court, where parties desire to appeal *898 from a judgment of the trial court, a motion for new trial shall be filed as a prerequisite to appeal; provided that neither a motion for new trial nor an assign-ment therein shall be a prerequisite to the right to complain on appeal of the action of the court in giving a peremptory instruction, or in withdrawing the case from the jury and rendering judgment, or 'in rendering or refusing to render judgment non obstante veredicto or notwithstanding the finding of the jury on one or more special issues, or in overruling a motion for jugment on the verdict made by the party who becomes appellant; nor shall a motion for new trial be required in a non-jury case or in a case where the appeal is based upon some error of the "trial court arising after its action upon "the motion for new trial. * * * ”

None of the above exceptions to Rule 324 are applicable in the instant case. The plaintiffs do not complain of a peremptory instruction; the trial court did not withdraw the case from the jury; there was no motion for judgment non obstante veredicto or to disregard special issue findings. Under these circumstances, a motion for new trial was clearly required as a prerequisite to appeal. Assuming, without deciding, that there was an irreconcilable conflict in the jury answers, it was necessary "to file a motion for new trial assigning as error the entry of judgment on conflicting jury findings. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Murphree, 163 Tex. 534, 357 S.W.2d 744 (1962).

It is contended that the function of a motion for new trial is to call the attention of the trial court to errors in the trial so that they may be corrected; that the motion filed by plaintiffs did this; and that it would cause unnecessary expense and delay to require that a motion stating in substance the same thing must be filed again at a later time as a motion for new trial. It is asserted that Rule 1, which calls for a liberal interpretation of the rules to obtain substantial justice, should be used to reach rthat result. This Court, however, in Stillman v. Hirsch, 128 Tex. 359, 99 S.W.2d 270 (1936) laid out the conflicting opinions as to whether matters once complained of during a jury trial must be again called to the trial court’s attention in a motion for new trial. A line of cases was set out which held that if the ruling complained of had once been called to the attention of the trial court, it was not necessary to include again such point or points in a motion for new trial. Cases to the contrary were also set out. There was then before the Court Rule 71a for district and county courts, a predecessor of Rule 324. This Court deliberately chose the interpretation that with exceptions set out in the rule, the errors complained of must be repeated in a motion for new trial. This construction of Rules 1 and 324 was reaffirmed in Wagner v. Foster, 161 Tex. 333, 341 S.W.2d 887 (1960). In that case, written objections to the charge which had been presented to the trial court were held to have been waived because they were not properly preserved in a motion for new trial. See also St. Louis Southwestern Railway Company v. Gregory, 387 S.W.2d 27 (Tex.Sup.1965).

This Court recently overruled similar contentions when it approved the opinion in Manning v. Sears, Roebuck & Company, 417 S.W.2d 639 (Tex.Civ.App.1967, writ refused). In that case the plaintiff objected to the number of peremptory challenges to the jury panel allowed the defendants. He had also requested special issues which were marked “refused” and signed by the trial court. He failed to file a motion for new trial, instead relying on bills of exceptions to preserve the alleged errors on appeal.

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Bluebook (online)
424 S.W.2d 896, 11 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 127, 1967 Tex. LEXIS 254, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/st-louis-southwestern-railway-company-v-duke-tex-1967.