MOLLOY, Chief Judge.
This court has issued a special writ to test the propriety of an order entered by a city magistrate granting to the defendant a jury trial in a criminal action in which the defendant is charged with violating two sections of our state statutes pertaining to the operation of motor vehicles. The offenses charged are that the defendant was driving in excess of a reasonable and prudent speed in violation of A.R.S. § 28-701, as amended,1 and failing to stop for a stop sign in violation of A.R.S. § 28-855, as amended.
A similar petition for special writ to the superior court was there denied. We have jurisdiction to test the propriety of the order entered in the magistrate’s court by special writ under A.R.S. § 12-120.21 subsection A, paragraph 4. Shenfield v. City Court of City of Tucson, Pima Co., 8 Ariz.App. 81, 443 P.2d 443 (1968). But see Crouch v. Justice of Peace Court of Sixth Precinct, 7 Ariz.App. 460, 440 P.2d 1000 (1968).
The defendant is not represented by counsel and has filed no formal pleadings in this court in response to the petition of the City of Tucson asking that this court prohibit the respondent-magistrate from according the defendant a jury trial on these charges. The defendant did, however, appear in person at the time that this matter was set down for an “informal hearing,” in pursuance of Rule 1, Rules of the Supreme Court, 17 A.R.S., at which time he stated that, since receiving the two citations which are the foundation for the charges here, he has received an additional [523]*523citation for a traffic offense. He argued that there is a substantial probability that a conviction here will enhance the penalties which may be imposed upon him if he is found guilty of these various offenses.
The pertinent statute provides that, on a first conviction for either one of these traffic offenses, the maximum penalty is a fine of not to exceed one hundred dollars or by imprisonment for not more than ten days; for a second conviction within one year thereafter, the maximum is a fine of not more than two hundred dollars or by imprisonment for not more than twenty days, or both; and, upon a third or subsequent conviction within one year after the last conviction, a person may be punished by a fine of not more than three hundred dollars or by imprisonment for not more than six months, or both. See A.R.S. § 28-1031, suhsec. B.
In proposing to grant defendant’s request for a jury trial, the magistrate was undoubtedly following the pronouncements of this court in Tsipai v. State, 8 Ariz.App. 3, 442 P.2d 167 (1968). The reasoning employed in that opinion clearly supports the proposition that, in a criminal trial for a violation of a state statute, the defendant is entitled, upon demand, and as a matter of statutory right, to a jury trial. See A.R.S. § 22-320, subsec. A.
Though I am still impressed with the validity of the reasoning employed in Tsipai, I cannot reconcile it with a subsequent decision of our Supreme Court, O’Neill v. Mangum, 103 Ariz. 484, 445 P.2d 843 (1968). Though the statutory language granting the right of a jury trial to either the State or the defendant is explicit2 and though historically jury trials have been allowed in the justice court for any violation of criminal statute,3 nevertheless, our Supreme Court in the O’Neill decision appears to have limited this statutory guarantee of a jury trial to whatever the constitutional guarantee of a jury trial may be. As we understand this decision, its denial of a right to a jury trial pertains to both the justice and police courts:
“In the case at bar, however, we have held that the offense charged is in that category of petty offenses not requiring a jury trial. Such is the case regardless of the forum.” (Emphasis added) 103 Ariz. at 486, 445 P.2d 845.
Porter v. Superior Court in and for Co. of Yavapai, 104 Ariz. 36, 448 P.2d 92 (1968), which involved a reckless driving charge, does not purport to change the rule of O’Neill. This decision allows a demand for a twelve-man jury on appeal to the superior court and it would appear that the possible penalty for reckless driving4 is not sufficiently grave so as to give a constitutional right of jury trial under the test of O’Neill. Though Porter was concerned with a trial in the superior court, and not in an inferior court, as here, it can be argued that its holding is pertinent in view of the categorical pronouncement of our Supreme Court that:
“ * * * where a defendant is not entitled to a jury trial in an inferior court, such as the City Court in this case, he is [524]*524not entitled to a jury on appeal in the superior court.”
State v. Cousins, 97 Ariz. 105, 109, 397 P.2d 217, 219 (1964).
However, our construction of Porter is that it is not intended to modify the law of either Cotisins or O’Neill but to answer only the question of whether, if a jury trial is to be had on appeal to the superior court, a six or a twelve-man jury is proper:
“The only question to be answered for a proper disposition of this petition is whether a defendant in a trial de novo in the Superior Court, after a trial by a six member jury in a court of non-record, is entitled to a six member or twelve member jury.” 448 P.2d at 92.
Hence, we do not consider Porter to be pertinent here. Under the test of O’Neill, the offenses here charged are clearly “petty,” both from the standpoint of the possible penalty and the social stigma attached. Therefore, reluctantly,5 I accept the law to be that the real party in interest here has no right to a jury trial as to these offenses.
The question remains whether the respondent-magistrate may, as a matter of discretion, grant a jury in a case not trialbe of right in this manner. Applicable city ordinance provides:
“In the trial of offense for the viola- ■ tion of the charter and ordinances of the city and the laws of the State of Arizona which are within the jurisdiction of the city court, and which by common law were not triable before a jury, no jury trial shall he granted. * * * ” (Emphasis added)
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MOLLOY, Chief Judge.
This court has issued a special writ to test the propriety of an order entered by a city magistrate granting to the defendant a jury trial in a criminal action in which the defendant is charged with violating two sections of our state statutes pertaining to the operation of motor vehicles. The offenses charged are that the defendant was driving in excess of a reasonable and prudent speed in violation of A.R.S. § 28-701, as amended,1 and failing to stop for a stop sign in violation of A.R.S. § 28-855, as amended.
A similar petition for special writ to the superior court was there denied. We have jurisdiction to test the propriety of the order entered in the magistrate’s court by special writ under A.R.S. § 12-120.21 subsection A, paragraph 4. Shenfield v. City Court of City of Tucson, Pima Co., 8 Ariz.App. 81, 443 P.2d 443 (1968). But see Crouch v. Justice of Peace Court of Sixth Precinct, 7 Ariz.App. 460, 440 P.2d 1000 (1968).
The defendant is not represented by counsel and has filed no formal pleadings in this court in response to the petition of the City of Tucson asking that this court prohibit the respondent-magistrate from according the defendant a jury trial on these charges. The defendant did, however, appear in person at the time that this matter was set down for an “informal hearing,” in pursuance of Rule 1, Rules of the Supreme Court, 17 A.R.S., at which time he stated that, since receiving the two citations which are the foundation for the charges here, he has received an additional [523]*523citation for a traffic offense. He argued that there is a substantial probability that a conviction here will enhance the penalties which may be imposed upon him if he is found guilty of these various offenses.
The pertinent statute provides that, on a first conviction for either one of these traffic offenses, the maximum penalty is a fine of not to exceed one hundred dollars or by imprisonment for not more than ten days; for a second conviction within one year thereafter, the maximum is a fine of not more than two hundred dollars or by imprisonment for not more than twenty days, or both; and, upon a third or subsequent conviction within one year after the last conviction, a person may be punished by a fine of not more than three hundred dollars or by imprisonment for not more than six months, or both. See A.R.S. § 28-1031, suhsec. B.
In proposing to grant defendant’s request for a jury trial, the magistrate was undoubtedly following the pronouncements of this court in Tsipai v. State, 8 Ariz.App. 3, 442 P.2d 167 (1968). The reasoning employed in that opinion clearly supports the proposition that, in a criminal trial for a violation of a state statute, the defendant is entitled, upon demand, and as a matter of statutory right, to a jury trial. See A.R.S. § 22-320, subsec. A.
Though I am still impressed with the validity of the reasoning employed in Tsipai, I cannot reconcile it with a subsequent decision of our Supreme Court, O’Neill v. Mangum, 103 Ariz. 484, 445 P.2d 843 (1968). Though the statutory language granting the right of a jury trial to either the State or the defendant is explicit2 and though historically jury trials have been allowed in the justice court for any violation of criminal statute,3 nevertheless, our Supreme Court in the O’Neill decision appears to have limited this statutory guarantee of a jury trial to whatever the constitutional guarantee of a jury trial may be. As we understand this decision, its denial of a right to a jury trial pertains to both the justice and police courts:
“In the case at bar, however, we have held that the offense charged is in that category of petty offenses not requiring a jury trial. Such is the case regardless of the forum.” (Emphasis added) 103 Ariz. at 486, 445 P.2d 845.
Porter v. Superior Court in and for Co. of Yavapai, 104 Ariz. 36, 448 P.2d 92 (1968), which involved a reckless driving charge, does not purport to change the rule of O’Neill. This decision allows a demand for a twelve-man jury on appeal to the superior court and it would appear that the possible penalty for reckless driving4 is not sufficiently grave so as to give a constitutional right of jury trial under the test of O’Neill. Though Porter was concerned with a trial in the superior court, and not in an inferior court, as here, it can be argued that its holding is pertinent in view of the categorical pronouncement of our Supreme Court that:
“ * * * where a defendant is not entitled to a jury trial in an inferior court, such as the City Court in this case, he is [524]*524not entitled to a jury on appeal in the superior court.”
State v. Cousins, 97 Ariz. 105, 109, 397 P.2d 217, 219 (1964).
However, our construction of Porter is that it is not intended to modify the law of either Cotisins or O’Neill but to answer only the question of whether, if a jury trial is to be had on appeal to the superior court, a six or a twelve-man jury is proper:
“The only question to be answered for a proper disposition of this petition is whether a defendant in a trial de novo in the Superior Court, after a trial by a six member jury in a court of non-record, is entitled to a six member or twelve member jury.” 448 P.2d at 92.
Hence, we do not consider Porter to be pertinent here. Under the test of O’Neill, the offenses here charged are clearly “petty,” both from the standpoint of the possible penalty and the social stigma attached. Therefore, reluctantly,5 I accept the law to be that the real party in interest here has no right to a jury trial as to these offenses.
The question remains whether the respondent-magistrate may, as a matter of discretion, grant a jury in a case not trialbe of right in this manner. Applicable city ordinance provides:
“In the trial of offense for the viola- ■ tion of the charter and ordinances of the city and the laws of the State of Arizona which are within the jurisdiction of the city court, and which by common law were not triable before a jury, no jury trial shall he granted. * * * ” (Emphasis added)
Tucson Code Ch. 8, Article I, Sec. 10.
It is our present view6 that this provision does not run counter to any state statute, and that the power to adopt this restriction is within those granted to the city council. See particularly Ch. VII § 1(2) and Ch. XII § 9, Charter of the City of Tucson. We see no intent in our state statutes, particularly when viewed in the light of the O’Neill decision, to have “ * * appropriated the field * * * ” as to the control of the magistrate’s discretion in granting a jury trial. See Clayton v. State, on rehearing, 38 Ariz. 466, 468, 300 P. 1010 (1931). At least one similar ordinance denying a jury trial has been upheld in an analogous constitutional and statutory setting. Knudsen v. City of Anchorage, 358 P.2d 375, 380 (Alaska 1960).
It appearing, therefore, that there is no right of trial by jury, either under statute or constitution, and that applicable ordinance forbids trial in this manner, it is therefore ordered that the alternative writ heretofore issued be made permanent.
NOTE: Judge HERBERT F. KRUCKER having requested that he be relieved from [525]*525consideration of this matter, Judge GORDON FARLEY was called to sit in his stead and participate in the determination of this decision.