Glass, J.
The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the statewide grievance committee1 (SGC) is an administrative agency as defined in General Statutes § 4-166 (l)2 of our Uniform Administrative Procedure Act (UAPA). The plaintiff, Nancy L. Sobocinski, has appealed, from a decision of the trial court dismissing her appeal from a decision of the SGC. The trial court held that the SGC is not an administrative agency as defined by § 4-166 (1), and, as a result, dismissed the plaintiffs appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We agree with the trial court’s determination.
[519]*519The record reveals the following facts. In August, 1984, the plaintiff was injured as a result of a collision between her automobile and an automobile owned and operated by Dennis Edgeworth. The plaintiff retained the services of attorneys Bruce L. Levin and Ernest Teitell, and brought suit against Edgeworth in the federal court in Connecticut. Edgeworth then instituted a negligence action against the plaintiff in Connecticut state court. The Great American Insurance Company, the insurance carrier for the plaintiff, retained attorney William J. Curran to represent its interest and the interest of the plaintiff in the state court negligence action. On February 25,1987, Curran filed an appearance as the plaintiffs attorney in the state court action. Thereafter, Barton J. Craig, who is an attorney and the husband of the plaintiff, wrote Curran requesting that copies of all documents filed in the state court action be forwarded either to the plaintiff or himself. On November 25,1987, the Great American Insurance Company, acting through its adjuster, Charles Vaiciulis, settled the state court action with the attorney representing Edgeworth. Curran then filed a release and withdrawal of the state court action without notifying the plaintiff of the settlement. Curran did, however, notify Levin, her attorney, of the settlement. According to the plaintiff, she first learned of the settlement from Teitell, also her attorney, in December, 1987, on the eve of the jury selection in her action against Edge-worth in the federal court.
On May 6, 1988, the plaintiff filed a complaint with the SGC alleging a violation by Curran of Rules 1.2,3 [520]*5201.3 and 1.4 of the Rules of Professional Conduct for attorneys. On May 16,1988, pursuant to General Statutes § 51-90e,* **4 the plaintiffs complaint was'^ref erred to the grievance panel for the Fairfield judicial district. On June 23, 1988, the Fairfield judicial district griev[521]*521anee panel filed a determination of no probable cause in regard to the plaintiffs complaint. On October 20, 1988, contrary to the finding of the Fairfield judicial district grievance panel, the SGC made a determination that there was probable cause that Curran had violated Rules 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4 of the Rules of Professional Conduct. On December 14,1988, a reviewing committee of the SGC conducted a hearing based on the probable cause finding of the SGC.* ***5 At this hearing, the [522]*522plaintiff and Craig testified in support of the allegations in the complaint, and Curran and Vaiciulis, the adjuster, testified in opposition to the allegations in the complaint. On February 24,1989, the reviewing committee, in its proposed decision, concluded that Cur-ran was responsible for keeping the plaintiff informed about her case and that, by failing to inform the plaintiff or Craig of the settlement, Curran had violated Rule 1.4. The reviewing committee, however, found insufficient proof of violations of Rules 1.2 and 1.3 The reviewing committee then recommended that the SGC [523]*523reprimand Curran. Thereafter, the plaintiff claims that, unbeknownst to her, Curran filed statements with the SGC opposing the recommendation of the reviewing panel.
On May 1,1989, the statewide bar counsel sent a letter to the plaintiff and Curran informing them that the SGC, at a meeting held on April 20,1989, had decided not to adopt the proposed decision of the reviewing committee, even though the SGC had determined that Curran’s failure to inform the plaintiff of the settlement directly did constitute a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The letter concluded: “[I]n reviewing the entire record, including [Curran’s] good faith disclosure of the settlement to [the plaintiff’s] counsel of record on the federal action, and [Curran’s] recognition of the importance of direct attorney-client communication, the Committee concluded that the imposition of discipline on [Curran] for this matter was not warranted. Accordingly, the complaint is hereby DISMISSED by the Statewide Grievance Committee.”
On June 2, 1989, the plaintiff filed an appeal to the Superior Court from the decision of the SGC, claiming that the SGC is an agency of the state of Connecticut as defined in § 4-166 (1), and that she was therefore entitled to appeal its decision pursuant to § 4-183 (b).6 [524]*524The SGC moved to dismiss the plaintiffs appeal, claiming that service on it was improper and that the SGC is not an agency as defined by § 4-166 (1). Curran also filed a motion to dismiss. He claimed that the SGC is an arm of the court and is not an agency as set forth in § 4-166 (1), and that proceedings before the SGC are neither contested nor adversarial, but rather are an investigation by the court into the conduct of one of its officers.
The trial court concluded that the SGC is not an agency under § 4-166 (1). Consequently, the trial court ruled that the plaintiff could not pursue her appeal pursuant to § 4-183, and granted the SGC’s and Curran’s motions to dismiss. The plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court, and pursuant to Practice Book § 4023, this court transferred the appeal to itself. On appeal, the plaintiff claims: (1) that the trial court should have concluded that §§ “4-166, 4-183 and 51-90 mandate an appeal pursuant to § 4-166 et seq. as the only statutorily approved method by which a citizen may obtain judicial review of an erroneous decision of the [SGC] by means of mailed service of process on the [SGC]”; and (2) that “the trial court’s ruling contravene[d] the public policy motivating the decision of [this] court in Statewide Grievance Committee v. Rozbicki, [211 Conn. 232, 558 A.2d 986 (1989),] which supports [her] claim [525]*525that a citizen may appeal the dismissal of her meritorious complaint by the [SGC] via the mailed service of process provisions of Connecticut’s Uniform Administrative Procedure Act.”
Because we agree with the trial court that the SGC is not an agency within the definition provided in § 4-166 (1), it is unnecessary to consider the other issues raised by the plaintiff on this appeal.
At the time of this appeal, “[ajgency” under § 4-166 (1) was defined as follows: “ ‘Agency’ means each state board, commission, department or officer, other than the legislature, courts,
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Glass, J.
The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the statewide grievance committee1 (SGC) is an administrative agency as defined in General Statutes § 4-166 (l)2 of our Uniform Administrative Procedure Act (UAPA). The plaintiff, Nancy L. Sobocinski, has appealed, from a decision of the trial court dismissing her appeal from a decision of the SGC. The trial court held that the SGC is not an administrative agency as defined by § 4-166 (1), and, as a result, dismissed the plaintiffs appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We agree with the trial court’s determination.
[519]*519The record reveals the following facts. In August, 1984, the plaintiff was injured as a result of a collision between her automobile and an automobile owned and operated by Dennis Edgeworth. The plaintiff retained the services of attorneys Bruce L. Levin and Ernest Teitell, and brought suit against Edgeworth in the federal court in Connecticut. Edgeworth then instituted a negligence action against the plaintiff in Connecticut state court. The Great American Insurance Company, the insurance carrier for the plaintiff, retained attorney William J. Curran to represent its interest and the interest of the plaintiff in the state court negligence action. On February 25,1987, Curran filed an appearance as the plaintiffs attorney in the state court action. Thereafter, Barton J. Craig, who is an attorney and the husband of the plaintiff, wrote Curran requesting that copies of all documents filed in the state court action be forwarded either to the plaintiff or himself. On November 25,1987, the Great American Insurance Company, acting through its adjuster, Charles Vaiciulis, settled the state court action with the attorney representing Edgeworth. Curran then filed a release and withdrawal of the state court action without notifying the plaintiff of the settlement. Curran did, however, notify Levin, her attorney, of the settlement. According to the plaintiff, she first learned of the settlement from Teitell, also her attorney, in December, 1987, on the eve of the jury selection in her action against Edge-worth in the federal court.
On May 6, 1988, the plaintiff filed a complaint with the SGC alleging a violation by Curran of Rules 1.2,3 [520]*5201.3 and 1.4 of the Rules of Professional Conduct for attorneys. On May 16,1988, pursuant to General Statutes § 51-90e,* **4 the plaintiffs complaint was'^ref erred to the grievance panel for the Fairfield judicial district. On June 23, 1988, the Fairfield judicial district griev[521]*521anee panel filed a determination of no probable cause in regard to the plaintiffs complaint. On October 20, 1988, contrary to the finding of the Fairfield judicial district grievance panel, the SGC made a determination that there was probable cause that Curran had violated Rules 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4 of the Rules of Professional Conduct. On December 14,1988, a reviewing committee of the SGC conducted a hearing based on the probable cause finding of the SGC.* ***5 At this hearing, the [522]*522plaintiff and Craig testified in support of the allegations in the complaint, and Curran and Vaiciulis, the adjuster, testified in opposition to the allegations in the complaint. On February 24,1989, the reviewing committee, in its proposed decision, concluded that Cur-ran was responsible for keeping the plaintiff informed about her case and that, by failing to inform the plaintiff or Craig of the settlement, Curran had violated Rule 1.4. The reviewing committee, however, found insufficient proof of violations of Rules 1.2 and 1.3 The reviewing committee then recommended that the SGC [523]*523reprimand Curran. Thereafter, the plaintiff claims that, unbeknownst to her, Curran filed statements with the SGC opposing the recommendation of the reviewing panel.
On May 1,1989, the statewide bar counsel sent a letter to the plaintiff and Curran informing them that the SGC, at a meeting held on April 20,1989, had decided not to adopt the proposed decision of the reviewing committee, even though the SGC had determined that Curran’s failure to inform the plaintiff of the settlement directly did constitute a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The letter concluded: “[I]n reviewing the entire record, including [Curran’s] good faith disclosure of the settlement to [the plaintiff’s] counsel of record on the federal action, and [Curran’s] recognition of the importance of direct attorney-client communication, the Committee concluded that the imposition of discipline on [Curran] for this matter was not warranted. Accordingly, the complaint is hereby DISMISSED by the Statewide Grievance Committee.”
On June 2, 1989, the plaintiff filed an appeal to the Superior Court from the decision of the SGC, claiming that the SGC is an agency of the state of Connecticut as defined in § 4-166 (1), and that she was therefore entitled to appeal its decision pursuant to § 4-183 (b).6 [524]*524The SGC moved to dismiss the plaintiffs appeal, claiming that service on it was improper and that the SGC is not an agency as defined by § 4-166 (1). Curran also filed a motion to dismiss. He claimed that the SGC is an arm of the court and is not an agency as set forth in § 4-166 (1), and that proceedings before the SGC are neither contested nor adversarial, but rather are an investigation by the court into the conduct of one of its officers.
The trial court concluded that the SGC is not an agency under § 4-166 (1). Consequently, the trial court ruled that the plaintiff could not pursue her appeal pursuant to § 4-183, and granted the SGC’s and Curran’s motions to dismiss. The plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court, and pursuant to Practice Book § 4023, this court transferred the appeal to itself. On appeal, the plaintiff claims: (1) that the trial court should have concluded that §§ “4-166, 4-183 and 51-90 mandate an appeal pursuant to § 4-166 et seq. as the only statutorily approved method by which a citizen may obtain judicial review of an erroneous decision of the [SGC] by means of mailed service of process on the [SGC]”; and (2) that “the trial court’s ruling contravene[d] the public policy motivating the decision of [this] court in Statewide Grievance Committee v. Rozbicki, [211 Conn. 232, 558 A.2d 986 (1989),] which supports [her] claim [525]*525that a citizen may appeal the dismissal of her meritorious complaint by the [SGC] via the mailed service of process provisions of Connecticut’s Uniform Administrative Procedure Act.”
Because we agree with the trial court that the SGC is not an agency within the definition provided in § 4-166 (1), it is unnecessary to consider the other issues raised by the plaintiff on this appeal.
At the time of this appeal, “[ajgency” under § 4-166 (1) was defined as follows: “ ‘Agency’ means each state board, commission, department or officer, other than the legislature, courts, judicial review council, council on probate judicial conduct, governor, lieutenant governor, attorney general, town or regional boards of education, or automobile dispute settlement panels established pursuant to section 42-181, authorized by law to make regulations or to determine contested cases.” (Emphasis added.) An administrative agency within the meaning of the UAPA has been defined as “a body in which the legislature has reposed general powers of administration of a particular state program in connection with which it has been given statutory authority to act for the state in the implementation of that program.” Catholic Family & Community Services v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 3 Conn. App. 464, 467, 489 A.2d 408 (1985).
Judges of the Superior Court possess the “inherent authority to regulate attorney conduct and to discipline the members of the bar.” Heslin v. Connecticut Law Clinic of Trantolo & Trantolo, 190 Conn. 510, 523, 461 A.2d 938 (1983). “It is their unique position as officers and commissioners of the court . . . which casts attorneys in a special relationship with the judiciary and subjects them to its discipline.” Id., 524. “In exercising their inherent supervisory authority, the judges have authorized grievance panels and reviewing committees [526]*526to investigate allegations of attorney misconduct and to make determinations of probable cause. See Practice Book § 27B et seq. Further, the judges have empowered the statewide grievance committee to file presentments in Superior Court seeking judicial sanctions against those claimed to be guilty of misconduct. See Practice Book § 27M. In carrying out these responsibilities, these bodies ‘act as an arm of the court.’ Statewide Grievance Committee v. Rozbicki, 211 Conn. 232, 239, 558 A.2d 986 (1989).” Statewide Grievance Committee v. Presnick, 215 Conn. 162, 167, 575 A.2d 210 (1990). In sum, the SGC is an “arm of the court,” and is not a body in which the legislature has reposed general powers of administration of a particular state program with which it has been given statutory authority to act for the state in the implementation of that program. We therefore hold that the SGC is excluded under the definition of “agency” set forth in § 4-166 (1).
The plaintiff additionally argues that “the public policy motivating” this court’s decision in Statewide Grievance Committee v. Rozbicki, supra, supports her claim that a citizen may appeal, via the UAPA, the dismissal of her meritorious complaint by the SGC. We are unpersuaded. In Rozbicki, the SGC brought a presentment against the defendant attorney charging him with misconduct outside the presence of the court. Id., 234. The trial court granted the defendant attorney’s motion to dismiss the presentment for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the subcommittee appointed by the SGC to review the charges had not rendered its proposed decision on the complaint within ninety days as specified under General Statutes § 51-90g (c). Id., 237. The SGC then appealed the trial court’s dismissal, and this court held that the SGC had not lost subject matter jurisdiction as a result of the subcommittee’s failure to adhere to the aforementioned time constraint. Id. There is nothing in Rozbicki, how[527]*527ever, to support the plaintiffs claim that a complainant may invoke the provisions of the UAPA in order to appeal the dismissal by the SGC of her complaint. Rather, Rozbicki concerns an appeal by the SGC from the trial court’s dismissal, on procedural grounds, of a presentment that was, jurisdictionally speaking, properly before the court.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.