So. Bell T. T. Co. v. Georgia Pub. Ser. Comm.

49 S.E.2d 38, 203 Ga. 832, 1948 Ga. LEXIS 564
CourtSupreme Court of Georgia
DecidedJuly 15, 1948
Docket16241, 16248, 16249.
StatusPublished
Cited by58 cases

This text of 49 S.E.2d 38 (So. Bell T. T. Co. v. Georgia Pub. Ser. Comm.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
So. Bell T. T. Co. v. Georgia Pub. Ser. Comm., 49 S.E.2d 38, 203 Ga. 832, 1948 Ga. LEXIS 564 (Ga. 1948).

Opinions

1. "Bills of exception shall be tendered to the judge who presided in the cause within 20 days from the date of the decision complained of." Ga. L. 1946, pp. 726, 734; Code (Ann. Supp.), § 6-902. This 20 days' limitation of time within which to tender is applicable to exceptions pendente lite. Ga. L. 1946, pp. 726, 738; Code (Ann. Supp.), § 6-905. The ruling here complained of is a judgment overruling a motion to dismiss the petition, which was rendered February 23, 1948. The exceptions pendente lite were tendered March 26, 1948, and the main bill of exceptions was tendered April 8, 1948. It follows that neither exception was tendered in time to require a ruling on the exceptions pendente lite, and, therefore, they can not be considered by this court.

2. The exceptions to the rulings on the special demurrers are not argued and, hence, are abandoned and will not be here ruled upon.

3. The exceptions to the rulings on objections to the admissibility of evidence are too incomplete to present any question for decision by the *Page 833 Supreme Court, in that the evidence objected to is not specified, nor are the grounds of the objections made at the time the evidence was offered set forth.

4. The petition of Georgia Hotel Association to intervene, in so far as it purports to allege any interest of the intervenor in the litigation, merely alleges, "Now comes Georgia Hotel Association on behalf of its member hotels," and was properly disallowed because no interest of the intervenor is shown.

5. Utility rate making is legislative in nature, and the power to make such rates in this State is by the Constitution and laws vested exclusively in the Georgia Public Service Commission.

6. While courts of equity have and can exercise no jurisdiction to make public-utility rates, yet they do have jurisdiction in all cases properly brought before them to render judgments enjoining confiscatory rates, thus preventing impingement of the constitutional rights of public-utility companies. And where it is shown that utility rates fixed by the Public Service Commission are confiscatory and, therefore, result in taking the private property of a public-utility company for public use without due process, a court of equity will not hesitate to take judicial action and enjoin the enforcement of such confiscatory rates.

7. While the order of the Public Service Commission fixing rates is presumed to be valid, and the burden rests upon the telephone company, in attacking that order, to carry the burden of rebutting this presumption with evidence which clearly shows the order to be invalid; yet where, as here, the uncontradicted evidence shows confiscation, the court did not err in granting an interlocutory injunction prohibiting the commission from putting that confiscatory order into operation and from interfering with the action of the utility company in collecting rates sufficient to avoid confiscation.

8. Although a court of equity can not make utility rates, such a court can, in the exercise of its jurisdiction, attach to the judgment enjoining the confiscatory rates a condition that the public-utility company may not collect rates that will produce revenue in excess of a stated amount which in the judgment of the court is the amount necessary to avoid confiscation. Where the rate order is enjoined, the utility company could fix its rates until reasonable rates are fixed by the Public Service Commission.

9. But where, as here, it is conceded by all parties to the suit that the telephone company must have additional revenue in the amount of $3,715,000 per year to avoid confiscation, it was error for the trial court to attach as a condition to its injunction against confiscatory rates that the utility company not collect rates that will produce additional revenue in excess of $360,765. The least maximum of additional revenue that such condition can allow is the full amount shown to be necessary to avoid confiscation.

Nos. 16241, 16248, 16249. JULY 15, 1948. REHEARING DENIED JULY 28, 1948.
Jenkins, Chief Justice, and Atkinson and Candler, Justices, being disqualified, Judges Knox, George S. Carpenter, and Sloan were designated to preside in their places. Justice Bell, being ill, Judge A. M. Anderson was designated to preside in his place.

STATEMENT OF FACTS BY DUCKWORTH, PRESIDING JUSTICE.
On January 30, 1948, Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company filed a petition in the Superior Court of Fulton County against the Georgia Public Service Commission and Walter R. McDonald, Chairman, Matt L. McWhorter, Allen Chappell, Perry T. Knight, and James A. Perry, composing the membership of the same, seeking to enjoin the defendants from interfering with the petitioner, hereinafter called the company, or obstructing it from placing into effect a schedule of rates attached to the petition and marked Exhibit "B", which would meet the emergency needs of the company to avoid confiscation. It was alleged that the rates fixed by the commission by its order of January 23, 1948, were wholly inadequate and confiscatory, and that if the company be required to operate under such rates, its property would be daily confiscated and taken without due process of law in violation of article 1, section 1, paragraph 3 of the Constitution of Georgia and of the 14th amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The petition prayed: that the court determine and decree that the company had the constitutional right to charge its customers at least an amount which would be produced by the schedule of rates shown by Exhibit "B", and that the commission be enjoined form obstructing the company in putting into force immediately the said rates and from imposing or seeking to impose any penalties, civil or criminal, upon the petitioner or any of its officers or representatives in virtue of the petitioner putting into effect the said schedule of rates, and from seeking further to maintain in force or effect the rate schedule heretofore ordered by the commission on January 23, 1948, or any schedule of rates inconsistent with the schedule of rates as shown by Exhibit "B;" for such and further relief as may to justice and equity appertain; and for process.

A rule nisi was issued returnable on February 23, 1948. At the hearing the defendants filed a written motion to dismiss the petition. The court, on February 23, 1948, overruled the motion, *Page 835 and the defendants filed exceptions pendente lite on March 26, 1948.

The petitioner introduced in evidence the petition as amended, together with certain exhibits attached thereto. The petitioner also introduced evidence by affidavits, exhibits, and documents. The defendant introduced evidence by affidavits and exhibits attached thereto. After introducing such evidence the defendants, on February 26, 1948, filed an answer, together with an amendment.

The petitioner, on March 5, 1948, filed written objections to certain portions of an affidavit of the defendants, entitled "General," and having to do with the commission's actions and reasons for promulgating its rate order of January 23, 1948. The court subsequently sustained certain portions of the objections.

The petitioner, on March 5, 1948, demurred specially to certain portions of the defendants' answer, and by amendment added additional grounds of special demurrer on March 8, 1948. On March 9, 1948, the court entered an order sustaining in part the demurrers and striking portions of the answer. The defendants excepted pendente lite.

The defendants introduced further evidence by affidavits, and then the petitioner introduced rebuttal evidence by affidavits.

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Bluebook (online)
49 S.E.2d 38, 203 Ga. 832, 1948 Ga. LEXIS 564, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/so-bell-t-t-co-v-georgia-pub-ser-comm-ga-1948.