Darnell v. Edwards

244 U.S. 564, 37 S. Ct. 701, 61 L. Ed. 1317, 1917 U.S. LEXIS 1663
CourtSupreme Court of the United States
DecidedJune 11, 1917
Docket216
StatusPublished
Cited by65 cases

This text of 244 U.S. 564 (Darnell v. Edwards) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Darnell v. Edwards, 244 U.S. 564, 37 S. Ct. 701, 61 L. Ed. 1317, 1917 U.S. LEXIS 1663 (1917).

Opinion

Mr. Justice Pitney

delivered the opinion of the court.

Appellant filed his bill in the District Court against the members of the Mississippi Railroad Commission, an administrative body having the usual powers, in which he sought relief by injunction against an order prescribing maximum rates on logs in carload lots transported in intrastate commerce, upon a railroad operated by him; the ground of his complaint being that the rates were so low as to be confiscatory and therefore violative of the due process of law'provision of the Fourteenth Amend *566 ment. The court refused a preliminary injunction (209 Fed. Rep. 99), and, upon final hearing, dismissed the bill. The case is brought here by direct appeal because of the constitutional question, under § 238, Jud. Code.

The railroad in question is known as the Batesville Southwestern, and extends from a junction with the Illinois Central at Batesville for-a distance of about 17 miles through a timber country, its entire line being within the State of Mississippi. It was built jointly by appellant and the Illinois Central Railroad Company, under a contract pursuant to which he disbursed approximately $146,000 and the company approximately $98,000. The contract was made in 1910, and by its terms Darnell was to maintain and operate the road for twenty years, the company to pay him for maintaining it $143 per mile per annum, and the road was to become the property of the company at the end of twenty years without further payment; the agreement, however, being subject to termination by the company prior to the expiration of the twenty years upon specified terms. The building of the road was commenced about June, 1911. Darnell began operating it as a common carrier in March, 1912, but its construction was not finally completed until about the middle of June, 1914.

The road is of standard gauge and construction, ballasted, and built in a first-class manner. Its traffic consists almost wholly of shipments of logs in carload lots from points along the line to the terminus at Batesville.

Pending the construction of the road, the Batesville Southwestern Railroad Company was organized as a corporation to take over the property, but the road remained in the hands of Darnell as lessee. In April, 1912, he established and promulgated a tariff providing a uniform rate for freight on logs in carload lots, with a minimum of 4,500 feet, regardless of the kind or character of the timber; which was, for 10 miles and under, $2.80 per thousand *567 feet; 10 to 15 miles, $3.35 per thousand; 15 to 20 miles, $3.90 per thousand. Complaint having been made to the Mississippi Railroad Commission, by citizens interested in the logging business, that these rates were extortionate, unjust, and confiscatory, a hearing was had, and, as a result, the commission, in July, 1913, made an order reducing the rates nearly 50 per cent, on oak, ash, and hickory, and more than 50 per cent, on other kinds of logs.

It appears that at the time of the construction of the railroad Darnell individually was the owner of a large amount (at the time of the hearing he owned 19,000 acres) of timber land in the country through which the road was projected, and that this furnished the reason for his interest in its construction and operation. At the same time he owned the principal part of the stock of R. J. Darnell, Incorporated, a lumber-milling corporation; but between that time and the time of the hearing the bulk of the stock had passed into the hands of his sons, he still remaining president of the company, and having sold to it the timber on the lands owned by him, the company agreeing to cut it, have it hauled, and loaded on the cars, and to pay him a fixed amount per stump.

The bill of complaint showed gross receipts from the operation of the railroad for the year ending June 30, 1913, amounting to $15,553.01, and operating expenses $4,296.20, leaving net earnings of $11,256.81. Against this, however, complainant charged as an annual rental $8,133.39, this being 1/20 of $162,667.69, then stated to be the amount invested by him in the construction of the road. Deducting this so-called rental charge left only $3,123.42, or less than 2 per cent, on the sum alleged to have been expended by complainant. These figures were the result of the rates established by him; and it was alleged that at the much lower rates established by the commission the road would yield no return above operating expenses.

*568 The bill was filed in September, 1913, the commission’s rates not having as yet been put into effect. At the preliminary hearing the District Court held (209 Fed. Rep. '99) that upon the showing then made it would not interfere with the commission’s rates at least until final hearing, thus affording a period for experiment as to whether new business would be developed in volume sufficient to make those rates remunerative.

Upon the final hearing, evidence having been submitted by both sides, the court’s decree was to the effect that the rates established by the commission were reasonable and should be enforced.

In this court appellant insists, first, that the District Court erred in holding that he was not entitled to charge against the annual operating revenue 1/20 of the amount expended by him in the construction of the road. We are clear that this contention is untenable. In determining whether rates are confiscatory because not yielding a proper return, the basis of calculation is the fair value of the property used in the service of the public. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 546; Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352, 434. The hypothetical annual payments of 1/20 of the cost of the road to Darnell were not a proper rent charge, and bore no relation to the actual value of the property. They arose out of the contractual arrangement between Darnell and the Illinois Central, and were in the nature of an amortization charge to take account of his diminishing interest in the road. But, upon that theory, the interest of the Illinois Central increased in value by as much as that of Darnell decreased. In any aspect, the transference of his interest to the Illinois Central, and any charge on that account, made by him for purposes of his own bookkeeping, had no proper relation to the question of the value of the property, and hence were of no concern to the public.

It is insisted that upon the proofs, and especially by *569 actual experiment, the rates established by the commission were shown to be confiscatory.

It is well established that in a question of rate-making there is a strong presumption in favor of the conclusions reached by an experienced administrative body after a full hearing. Besides this, there was affirmative evidence before the District Court to the effect that the rates were reasonable. The evidence for complainant, tending to show they were non-remunerative, while based upon actual experience in the operation of the road, yet relates to only a brief period when conditions were abnormal. The road was a new one, not completed until June, 1914, that is, after the filing of the bill and shortly before the final hearing.

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Bluebook (online)
244 U.S. 564, 37 S. Ct. 701, 61 L. Ed. 1317, 1917 U.S. LEXIS 1663, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/darnell-v-edwards-scotus-1917.