Snyder v. United States

603 U.S. 1

• Court: Supreme Court of the United States
• Decided: June 26, 2024
• Docket: 23-108
• Status: Published

Opinion

PRELIMINARY PRINT

Volume 603 U. S. Part 1 Pages 1–42

OFFICIAL REPORTS OF

THE SUPREME COURT June 26, 2024

REBECCA A. WOMELDORF reporter of decisions

NOTICE: This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors. CASES ADJUDGED IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES AT

OCTOBER TERM, 2023

SNYDER v. UNITED STATES

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the seventh circuit No. 23–108. Argued April 15, 2024—Decided June 26, 2024

Page Proof Federal and state Pending law distinguish Publication between two kinds of payments to public offcials—bribes and gratuities. Bribes are typically payments made or agreed to before an offcial act in order to infuence the public offcial with respect to that future offcial act. Gratuities are typically pay- ments made to a public offcial after an offcial act as a reward or token of appreciation. While American law generally treats bribes as inher- ently corrupt and unlawful, the law's treatment of gratuities is more nuanced. Some gratuities might be innocuous, and others may raise ethical and appearance concerns. Federal, state, and local governments have drawn different lines on which gratuities and gifts are acceptable and which are not. For example, Congress has established comprehensive prohibitions on both bribes and gratuities to federal offcials. If a federal offcial ac- cepts a bribe for an offcial act, federal bribery law provides for a 15- year maximum prison sentence. See 18 U. S. C. § 201(b). By contrast, if a federal offcial accepts a prohibited gratuity, federal gratuities law sets a 2-year maximum prison sentence. See § 201(c). In 1984, Congress passed and President Reagan signed a law now codifed at 18 U. S. C. § 666 that, as relevant here, extended the gratui- ties prohibition in § 201(c) to most state and local offcials. Congress reversed course after two years and amended § 666 to avoid the law's “possible application to acceptable commercial and business practices.” 1 2 SNYDER v. UNITED STATES

Syllabus

H. R. Rep. No. 99–797, p. 30 (1986). As amended, the text of § 666 now closely resembles the bribery provision for federal offcials, § 201(b), and makes it a crime for most state and local offcials to “corruptly” solicit, accept, or agree to accept “anything of value” “intending to be infu- enced or rewarded in connection with” any offcial business or transac- tion worth $5,000 or more. §§ 666(a)(1)(B), (b). That crime carries a 10-year maximum prison sentence. § 666(a). This case involves James Snyder, who is the former mayor of Portage, Indiana. In 2013, while Snyder was mayor, Portage awarded two con- tracts to a local truck company, Great Lakes Peterbilt, and ultimately purchased fve trash trucks from the company for about $1.1 million. In 2014, Peterbilt cut a $13,000 check to Snyder. The FBI and federal prosecutors suspected that the payment was a gratuity for the City's trash truck contracts. But Snyder said that the payment was for his consulting services as a contractor for Peterbilt. A federal jury ulti- mately convicted Snyder of accepting an illegal gratuity in violation of § 666(a)(1)(B). The District Court sentenced Snyder to 1 year and 9 months in prison. On appeal, Snyder argued that § 666 criminalizes only bribes, not gratuities. The Seventh Circuit affrmed Snyder's conviction. Held: Section 666 proscribes bribes to state and local offcials but does not make it a crime for those offcials to accept gratuities for their past acts. Pp. 10–20. (a) Six reasons, taken together, lead the Court to conclude that § 666 is a bribery statute and not a gratuities statute—text, statutory history, statutory structure, statutory punishments, federalism, and fair notice. Pp. 10–18. (1) The statutory text strongly suggests that § 666—like § 201(b)— is a bribery statute, not a gratuities statute. The dividing line between § 201(b)'s bribery provision and § 201(c)'s gratuities provision is that bribery requires an offcial to have a corrupt state of mind and to accept (or agree to accept) a payment intending to be infuenced in an offcial act. Section 666 shares the defning characteristics of § 201(b)'s bribery provision. By contrast, § 666 bears little resemblance to § 201(c), which contains no express mens rea requirement. Pp. 10–12. (2) The statutory history reinforces that result. When enacted, § 666 borrowed language from § 201(c), the gratuities statute for federal offcials. Two years later, Congress amended § 666 to model it instead on § 201(b), the bribery statute. It would be strange to interpret § 666, as the Government suggests, to mean the same thing now that it did before the amendment. P. 12. (3) Statutory structure reinforces that § 666 is a bribery statute, not a two-for-one bribery-and-gratuities statute as the Government pos- its. The Government identifes no other provision in the U. S. Code Cite as: 603 U. S. 1 (2024) 3

that prohibits bribes and gratuities in the same provision. And § 201 does not do so. That is because bribery and gratuities are “two sepa- rate crimes” with “two different sets of elements.” United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U. S. 398, 404. Pp. 12–13. (4) For federal offcials, Congress has separated bribery and gratui- ties into two distinct provisions of § 201 for good reason: The crimes receive different punishments that “refect their relative seriousness.” Sun-Diamond, 526 U. S., at 405. For example, accepting a bribe as a federal offcial is punishable by up to 15 years in prison, while accept- ing an illegal gratuity as a federal offcial is punishable by up to only 2 years. If the Government were correct that § 666 also covered gratui- ties, Congress would have inexplicably authorized punishing gratuities to state and local offcials fve times more severely than gratuities to federal offcials—10 years for state and local offcials compared to 2 years for federal offcials. The Government cannot explain why Con- gress would have created such substantial sentencing disparities. Pp. 13–14. (5) Interpreting § 666 as a gratuities statute would signifcantly in- fringe on bedrock federalism principles. Generally, States have the “prerogative to regulate the permissible scope of interactions between state offcials and their constituents.” McDonnell v. United States, 579 U. S. 550, 576. The differing approaches by the state and local govern- ments refect policy judgments about when gifts expressing apprecia- tion to public offcials for their past acts cross the line from the innocu- ous to the problematic. Those carefully calibrated policy decisions would be gutted if the Court were to accept the Government's interpre- tation of § 666. Reading § 666 to create a federal prohibition on gratui- ties would suddenly subject 19 million state and local offcials to a new and different regulatory regime for gratuities. The Court should hesi- tate before concluding that Congress prohibited gratuities that state and local governments have allowed. After all, Congress does not lightly override state and local governments on such core matters of state and local governance. Pp. 14–15. (6) The Government's interpretation of the statute would create traps for unwary state and local offcials. Sun-Diamond, 526 U. S., at 411. The Government says that the statute would not cover “innocu- ous” or “obviously benign” gratuities, but the Government does not identify any remotely clear lines separating such a gratuity from a crimi- nal gratuity. The Government simply opines that state and local off- cials may not accept wrongful gratuities. The Government's so-called guidance would leave state and local offcials entirely at sea to guess about what gifts they are allowed to accept under federal law, with the threat of up to 10 years in federal prison if they happen to guess wrong. That is not how federal criminal law works. And the Court has re- 4 SNYDER v. UNITED STATES

jected the view that it should construe a criminal statute on the assump- tion that the Government will use it responsibly. See McDonnell, 579 U. S., at 576. Pp. 15–18. (b) Faced with the phalanx of diffculties with its interpretation of § 666, the Government's argument boils down to one main point—that § 666 uses the term “rewarded” as well as “infuenced.” The Govern- ment says that Congress would not have added the term “rewarded” to “infuenced” in § 666 if the statute were meant to cover only bribes and not also gratuities. That argument is misconceived. Contrary to the premise of the Government's argument, bribery statutes sometimes use the term “reward.” See, e. g., 18 U. S. C. § 600; 33 U. S. C. § 447. More- over, without the term “rewarded” in § 666, an offcial might try to de- fend against a bribery charge by saying that the payment was received only after the offcial act and therefore could not have “infuenced” the act. By including the term “rewarded,” Congress made clear that the timing of the agreement is the key, not the timing of payment. Al- though a gratuity or reward offered and accepted by a state or local offcial after the offcial act may be unethical or illegal under other fed- eral, state, or local laws, the gratuity does not violate § 666. Pp. 18–19. 71 F. 4th 555, reversed and remanded.

Page Kavanaugh, Proof J., deliveredPending Publication the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Barrett, JJ., joined. Gorsuch, J., fled a concurring opinion, post, p. 20. Jackson, J., fled a dissenting opinion, in which Sotomayor and Kagan, JJ., joined, post, p. 21.

Lisa M. Blatt argued the cause for petitioner. With her on the briefs were Amy Mason Saharia, Sarah M. Harris, Aaron Z. Roper, Kar i M. Lorentson, and Andréa E. Gambino. Colleen E. Roh Sinzdak argued the cause for the United States. With her on the brief were Solicitor General Pre- logar, Acting Assistant Attorney General Argentieri, Dep- uty Solicitor General Feigin, and Kevin J. Barber.*

*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the American Center for Law and Justice by Jay Alan Sekulow, Stuart J. Roth, Jordan A. Sekulow, Craig L. Parshall, and Laura B. Hernandez; for the Interna- tional Union of Operating Engineers, Local 150, AFL–CIO, by Terence H. Campbell and Dale D. Pierson; for the James Madison Center for Free Speech by James Bopp, Jr.; for the Laborers' International Union of North America by Bruce R. Lerner and Leon Dayan; for the National Associa- Cite as: 603 U. S. 1 (2024) 5

Opinion of the Court

Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court. Section 666 of Title 18 makes it a crime for state and local offcials to “corruptly” solicit, accept, or agree to accept “any- thing of value from any person, intending to be infuenced or rewarded” for an offcial act. § 666(a)(1)(B). That law pro- hibits state and local offcials from accepting bribes that are promised or given before the offcial act. Those bribes are punishable by up to 10 years' imprisonment. The question in this case is whether § 666 also makes it a crime for state and local offcials to accept gratuities—for example, gift cards, lunches, plaques, books, framed photos, or the like—that may be given as a token of appreciation after the offcial act. The answer is no. State and local governments often regulate the gifts that state and local of- fcials may accept. Section 666 does not supplement those state and local rules by subjecting 19 million state and local offcials to up to 10 years in federal prison for accepting even commonplace gratuities. Rather, § 666 leaves it to state and local governments to regulate gratuities to state and local offcials. I A Federal and state law distinguish between two kinds of payments to public offcials—bribes and gratuities. As a general matter, bribes are payments made or agreed to be- fore an offcial act in order to infuence the offcial with re- spect to that future offcial act. American law generally treats bribes as inherently corrupt and unlawful. But the law's treatment of gratuities is more nuanced. Gratuities are typically payments made to an offcial after an offcial act as a token of appreciation. Some gratuities can

tion of Criminal Defense Lawyers by Brent T. Murphy and Samir Deger- Sen; for the Separation of Powers Clinic by R. Trent McCotter; and for the Washington Legal Foundation et al. by Christopher D. Man and Abbe David Lowell. 6 SNYDER v. UNITED STATES

be problematic. Others are commonplace and might be in- nocuous. A family gives a holiday tip to the mail carrier. Parents send an end-of-year gift basket to their child's public school teacher. A college dean gives a college sweatshirt to a city council member who comes to speak at an event. A state legislator's neighbor drops off a bottle of wine to con- gratulate her for her work on a new law. As those examples suggest, gratuities after the offcial act are not the same as bribes before the offcial act. After all, unlike gratuities, bribes can corrupt the offcial act—mean- ing that the offcial takes the act for private gain, not for the public good. That said, gratuities can sometimes also raise ethical and appearance concerns. For that reason, Con- gress, States, and local governments have long regulated gratuities to public offcials. Not surprisingly, different governments draw lines in dif- ferent places. For example, some States allow public off- cials to accept gifts below certain threshold amounts. E. g., Colo. Const., Art. XXIX, § 3(6) (allowing gifts under $75); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 46–237(a)(1) (2021) (allowing gifts under $40 per year); Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 268A, §§ 3(b), (f), 23(b), (f) (2020) (allowing gifts under $50); W. Va. Code Ann. § 61– 5A–6(b) (Lexis 2020) (allowing “trivial” gifts that pose “no substantial risk of affecting offcial impartiality”). Some States bar accepting any gifts for specifc activities, like certain speaking engagements. E. g., Ark. Code Ann. § 5–52–108 (2016). Some States make accepting gifts for of- fcial conduct a misdemeanor. E. g., Del. Code Ann., Tit. 11, § 1206 (Cum. Supp. 2022); W. Va. Code Ann. § 61–5A–9(d). Other States make it a felony. E. g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 38–505(A), 38–510(A)(1) (2019). Many States make exceptions for certain gifts, such as gifts from friends or family, travel reimbursements, cam- paign contributions, and ceremonial gifts like honorary de- grees and plaques. E. g., Colo. Const., Art. XXIX, § 3(3); Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 268A, §§ 3(f), 23(f); N. Y. Legis. Law Cite as: 603 U. S. 1 (2024) 7

Ann. § 1–c( j) (West Cum. Supp. 2024); W. Va. Code Ann. § 61– 5A–6(b). Like the States, the counties, cities, and towns of America take various approaches to regulating gratuities to their of- fcials. Just within the State of Indiana, where the current case arose, some local governments set a gift limit of $50, or $100, or $200, or $300. E. g., Butler, Ind., Code of Ordi- nances § 30.27(G) (2019); Gary, Ind., Municipal Code § 2– 472(b)(1) (2021); Valparaiso, Ind., Code of Ordinances § 36.05(B)(6) (2024); Noblesville, Ind., Code of Ordinances § 36.05(B)(2) (2024). Some prohibit gifts only from business entities currently doing business with the local government. E. g., Carmel, Ind., Code of Ordinances § 2–184(f)(3) (2024). Others re- strict gifts from businesses bidding for government con- tracts. E. g., Johnson County, Ind., Code of Ordinances § 4– 6–1–1 (2024). With respect to gratuities to state and local offcials, many of those offcials are part-time and are allowed to hold out- side employment. That reality can create complications for regulating gifts to those offcials, and the rules often refect that reality. Meanwhile, Congress has established federal standards for federal offcials. In 1962, Congress passed and President Kennedy signed into law 18 U. S. C. § 201, which contains comprehensive prohibitions on bribes and gratuities to fed- eral offcials. See 76 Stat. 1119. As to gratuities, that stat- ute imposes criminal penalties on federal offcials who seek or accept “anything of value” for “any offcial act.” 18 U. S. C. § 201(c)(1)(B). The U. S. Offce of Government Ethics, or OGE, has imple- mented § 201 and promulgated numerous gratuities rules and exceptions. See 5 CFR § 2635.202(c) (2023). For example, OGE has stated that federal offcials may accept gifts that are “motivated by a family relationship or personal friend- ship,” not by the “position of the employee.” § 2635.204(b). 8 SNYDER v. UNITED STATES

And OGE has also carved out exceptions for offcials to ac- cept gifts of $20 or less per occasion, awards and honorary degrees, refreshments at social events, and the like. See § 2635.204. Importantly, because bribery can corrupt the offcial act, Congress treats bribery as a far more serious offense than gratuities. For example, if a federal offcial accepts a bribe, federal bribery law provides for a 15-year maximum prison sentence. See 18 U. S. C. § 201(b). By contrast, if a federal offcial accepts a prohibited gratuity, federal gratuities law sets a 2-year maximum prison sentence. See § 201(c).

B In the 1970s and early 1980s, confusion emerged in the Courts of Appeals over whether the federal bribery and gra- tuities laws in § 201(b) and § 201(c) applied not only to federal offcials but also to state and local offcials. See Salinas v. United States, 522 U. S. 52, 58 (1997). In response, Con- gress passed and President Reagan signed a law now codifed at 18 U. S. C. § 666. See 98 Stat. 2143. As relevant here, § 666 originally extended the gratuities prohibition in § 201(c) to most state and local offcials. See Salinas, 522 U. S., at 58; 18 U. S. C. § 666(b) (1982 ed., Supp. II). But after only two years, Congress reversed course. In 1986, Congress amended § 666 and thereby avoided the law's “possible application to acceptable commercial and business practices.” H. R. Rep. No. 99–797, p. 30 (1986); see 100 Stat. 3612–3613. As a result of its amendment in 1986, the text of § 666 for state and local offcials now closely resembles the bribery provision for federal offcials, § 201(b), rather than the gratuities provision for federal offcials, § 201(c). As rel- evant here, § 666 makes it a crime for most state and local offcials to “corruptly” solicit, accept, or agree to accept “any- thing of value” “intending to be infuenced or rewarded in connection with” any offcial business or transaction worth $5,000 or more. §§ 666(a)(1)(B), (b). That crime carries a 10-year maximum prison sentence. § 666(a). Cite as: 603 U. S. 1 (2024) 9

C This case involves the former mayor of Portage, Indiana. Portage is a city in northwest Indiana with a population of about 38,000. Like other States, Indiana criminalizes bribery committed by state and local officials. See Ind. Code § 35–44.1–1– 2(a)(2) (2023). Indiana also prescribes civil penalties such as fnes, reprimands, and disqualifcation from state employ- ment if state offcials accept gratuities in violation of the State's Code of Ethics. See Ind. Code § 4–2–6–12 (2021); 42 Ind. Admin. Code § 1–5–1 (2024). But Indiana does not impose general criminal or civil pro- hibitions on local offcials who accept gratuities, leaving such regulation to the local governments themselves. As rele- vant here, the City of Portage sets limits on the gifts that local offcials can accept from contractors doing business with the City. See Portage, Ind., Municipal Code of Ordinances §§ 2–178(e)–(f) (2024). In 2013, the City of Portage awarded two contracts to a local truck company, Great Lakes Peterbilt, to purchase trash trucks. In total, the City paid about $1.1 million for fve trucks. In 2014, Peterbilt cut a $13,000 check to James Snyder, who was the mayor of Portage (and had been at the time of the contracts). The FBI and federal prosecutors suspected that the payment was a gratuity for the City's trash truck contracts. But Snyder said that he had also agreed to be a contractor for Peterbilt, providing consulting services. (Like many jurisdictions around the country, neither Indiana nor Portage apparently prohibited local offcials from obtain- ing outside employment.) Snyder said that the payment was for his consulting services. Snyder has never been charged by state prosecutors for bribery. And he has never been charged or disciplined by Portage for violating the City's gift rules. The Federal Government charged and a federal jury convicted Snyder of accepting an illegal gratuity (the $13,000 check from Peter- 10 SNYDER v. UNITED STATES

bilt) in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 666(a)(1)(B). The Govern- ment asked for about a 4- to 5-year prison sentence. The District Court sentenced Snyder to 1 year and 9 months in prison. App. to Pet. for Cert. 47a. On appeal, Snyder argued that § 666 criminalizes only bribes, not gratuities. The U. S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit disagreed based on that court's precedent interpreting § 666 to cover both bribes and gratuities. 71 F. 4th 555, 578–580 (2023). So the Court of Appeals affrmed the conviction. In light of a split in the Courts of Appeals over whether § 666 criminalizes gratuities as well as bribes, this Court granted certiorari. 601 U. S. ––– (2023). Compare United States v. Hamilton, 46 F. 4th 389, 397 (CA5 2022); United States v. Fernandez, 722 F. 3d 1, 26 (CA1 2013), with United States v. Abbey, 560 F. 3d 513, 520 (CA6 2009); United States v. Zimmermann, 509 F. 3d 920, 927 (CA8 2007); United States v. Agostino, 132 F. 3d 1183, 1190 (CA7 1997); United States v. Bonito, 57 F. 3d 167, 171 (CA2 1995). II A The question in this case is whether 18 U. S. C. § 666(a) (1)(B) makes it a federal crime for state and local offcials to accept gratuities for their past offcial acts. The answer is no. Six reasons, taken together, lead us to conclude that § 666 is a bribery statute and not a gratuities statute—text, statutory history, statutory structure, statutory punish- ments, federalism, and fair notice. First is the text of § 666. Section 666(a)(1)(B) makes it a crime for state and local offcials to “corruptly” accept a pay- ment “intending to be infuenced or rewarded” for an offcial act.1 Congress modeled the text of § 666(a)(1)(B) for state 1 Section 666(a)(1)(B) provides: “Whoever . . . being an agent of an organization, or of a State, local, or Indian tribal government, or any agency thereof [that receives more than Cite as: 603 U. S. 1 (2024) 11

and local offcials on § 201(b), the bribery provision for fed- eral offcials. Section 201(b) similarly makes it a crime for federal offcials to “corruptly” accept a payment “in return for” “being infuenced” in an offcial act.2 By contrast, § 666 bears little resemblance to § 201(c), the gratuities provision for federal offcials, which contains no express mens rea re- quirements and simply makes it a crime for federal offcials to accept a payment “for or because of any offcial act.” 3 Therefore, the dividing line between § 201(b)'s bribery pro- vision and § 201(c)'s gratuities provision is that bribery re- quires that the offcial have a corrupt state of mind and accept (or agree to accept) the payment intending to be infuenced in the offcial act. See United States v. Sun-

$10,000 in federal funds annually] corruptly solicits or demands for the beneft of any person, or accepts or agrees to accept, anything of value from any person, intending to be infuenced or rewarded in connection with any business, transaction, or series of transactions of such organiza- tion, government, or agency involving any thing of value of $5,000 or more; . . . shall be fned under this title, imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.” 2 Section 201(b)(2)(A) provides: “Whoever . . . being a public offcial or person selected to be a public offcial, directly or indirectly, corruptly demands, seeks, receives, accepts, or agrees to receive or accept anything of value personally or for any other person or entity, in return for: being infuenced in the performance of any offcial act; . . . shall be fned under this title or not more than three times the monetary equivalent of the thing of value, whichever is greater, or imprisoned for not more than ffteen years, or both, and may be disquali- fed from holding any offce of honor, trust, or proft under the United States.” 3 Section 201(c)(1)(B) provides: “Whoever otherwise than as provided by law for the proper discharge of offcial duty . . . being a public offcial, former public offcial, or person selected to be a public offcial, otherwise than as provided by law for the proper discharge of offcial duty, directly or indirectly demands, seeks, receives, accepts, or agrees to receive or accept anything of value person- ally for or because of any offcial act performed or to be performed by such offcial or person . . . shall be fned under this title or imprisoned for not more than two years, or both.” 12 SNYDER v. UNITED STATES

Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U. S. 398, 404–405 (1999). Section 666 shares the defning characteristics of § 201(b)'s bribery provision: the corrupt state of mind and the intent to be infuenced in the offcial act. The statutory text there- fore strongly suggests that § 666—like § 201(b)—is a bribery statute, not a gratuities statute. Second is the statutory history, which reinforces that tex- tual analysis. In 1984, when frst enacting § 666 for state and local offcials, Congress borrowed language from the gra- tuities statute for federal offcials, § 201(c). See 18 U. S. C. § 666(b) (1982 ed., Supp. II). But just two years later, in 1986, Congress overhauled § 666, eliminated the gratuities language, and instead enacted the current language that re- sembles the bribery provision for federal offcials, § 201(b). Perhaps Congress in 1986 concluded that federally criminal- izing state and local gratuities would signifcantly intrude on federalism. Whatever the impetus, we know that Congress decided in 1986 to change the law and to model § 666 on § 201(b), the bribery statute, and not on § 201(c), the gratui- ties statute. It therefore would be strange to interpret § 666, as the Government suggests, to mean the same thing now that it meant back in 1984, before the 1986 amendment. We must respect Congress's choice in 1986. Third is the statutory structure. The Government posits that Congress prohibited bribes and gratuities to state and local offcials in a single statutory provision, § 666(a)(1)(B). Such a statute would be highly unusual, if not unique. The Government identifes no other provision in the U. S. Code that prohibits bribes and gratuities in the same provision.4

4 At most, the Government points to 18 U. S. C. § 215(a)(2), which bars employees of fnancial institutions from “corruptly” soliciting or accepting “anything of value . . . intending to be infuenced or rewarded in connec- tion with any business or transaction of such institution.” That language simply mirrors § 666's language. But because this Court has never inter- preted § 215 (and therefore has never said whether § 215 covers only brib- ery), that statute is a null data point. Cite as: 603 U. S. 1 (2024) 13

That is because bribery and gratuities are “two separate crimes” with “ two different sets of elements. ” Sun- Diamond, 526 U. S., at 404. Therefore, § 201(b) makes it a crime for federal offcials to accept bribes, while a separate provision, § 201(c), makes it a crime for federal offcials to accept certain gratuities. The absence of a separate gra- tuities provision in § 666 reinforces that § 666 is a bribery statute for state and local offcials, not a two-for-one bribery- and-gratuities statute. Fourth are the statutory punishments. For federal off- cials, Congress has separated bribery and gratuities into two distinct provisions of § 201 for good reason: The crimes re- ceive different punishments that “refect their relative seri- ousness.” Sun-Diamond, 526 U. S., at 405. For example, accepting a bribe as a federal offcial is punishable by up to 15 years in prison, while accepting an illegal gratuity as a federal offcial is punishable by only up to 2 years. Compare § 201(b) with § 201(c). If the Government were correct that § 666 also covered gratuities, Congress would have created an entirely inexpli- cable regime for state and local offcials. For one, even though bribery has been treated as a far more serious of- fense, Congress would have authorized the same 10-year maximum sentences for (i) gratuities to state and local off- cials and (ii) bribes to state and local offcials. See Sun- Diamond, 526 U. S., at 405. In addition, Congress would have authorized punishing gratuities to state and local off- cials fve times more severely than gratuities to federal off- cials—10 years for state and local offcials compared to 2 years for federal offcials. The Government cannot explain why Congress would have created such substantial sentencing disparities. We cannot readily assume that Congress authorized a 2-year sentence for, say, a Cabinet Secretary who accepts an unlawful gratu- ity while authorizing a 10-year sentence on a local school board member who accepts an identical gratuity. What 14 SNYDER v. UNITED STATES

sense would that make? In short, the inexplicable anoma- lies ushered in by the Government's approach powerfully demonstrate that § 666 is a bribery statute. Fifth is federalism. Interpreting § 666 as a gratuities statute would signifcantly infringe on bedrock federalism principles. As this Court has long recognized, a State “de- fnes itself as a sovereign through the structure of its gov- ernment, and the character of those who exercise govern- ment authority.” McDonnell v. United States, 579 U. S. 550, 576 (2016) (quotation marks omitted). Therefore, as a gen- eral matter, States have the “prerogative to regulate the permissible scope of interactions between state offcials and their constituents.” Ibid.; see United States v. Bass, 404 U. S. 336, 350 (1971). As noted above, state and local governments have adopted a variety of approaches to regulating state and local offcials' acceptance of gratuities. See supra, at 6–7. Those differ- ing approaches refect nuanced state and local policy judg- ments about when gifts expressing appreciation to public offcials for their past acts cross the line from the innocuous to the problematic. The carefully calibrated policy decisions that the States and local governments have made about gratuities would be gutted if we were to accept the Government's interpretation of § 666. After all, § 666 covers virtually all state and local offcials—about 19 million nationwide. So reading § 666 to create a federal prohibition on gratuities would suddenly subject 19 million state and local offcials to a new and dif- ferent regulatory regime for gratuities. In other words, a county offcial could meticulously comply with her county's local gratuities rules—say, by declining a $200 gift card but accepting a $100 gift card from a neighbor as thanks for her diligent work on a new park—but still face up to 10 years in federal prison because she accepted a thing of value in connection with an offcial act. Cite as: 603 U. S. 1 (2024) 15

We should hesitate before concluding that Congress pro- hibited gratuities that state and local governments have al- lowed for their offcials. After all, Congress does not lightly override state and local governments on such core matters of state and local governance. And the principle articulated by this Court in Sun-Diamond fts this case as well: A “nar- row, rather than a sweeping, prohibition is more compatible with the fact that” this statute “is merely one strand of an intricate web of regulations, both administrative and criminal, governing the acceptance of gifts and other self- enriching actions by public offcials.” 526 U. S., at 409. In short, federalism principles weigh heavily in favor of reading § 666 as a bribery statute and not as a gratuities law. Sixth is fair notice. The Government's interpretation of the statute would create traps for unwary state and local offcials. Sun-Diamond, 526 U. S., at 411. The Government had to choose between two options for how to read § 666. The Government could read § 666 to ban all gratuities, no matter how trivial, in connection with cov- ered offcial acts. That option might be clear enough. But that draconian approach would border on the absurd and ex- acerbate the already serious federalism problems with the Government's reading of § 666. Alternatively, the Government could recognize the irratio- nality of reading § 666 to criminalize all such gratuities. And to deal with the overbreadth problems, the Government could make atextual exceptions on the fy. The Government opted for the second approach, seeking to soothe concerns about overbreadth by saying that the statute, even under its view, would not cover “innocuous” or “obviously benign” gratuities. Brief for United States 39; Tr. of Oral Arg. 41, 45–49. But that effort to address those overbreadth concerns has simply moved the Government from one sinkhole to another. The faw in the Government's approach—and it is a very seri- 16 SNYDER v. UNITED STATES

ous real-world problem—is that the Government does not identify any remotely clear lines separating an innocuous or obviously benign gratuity from a criminal gratuity. The Government simply opines that state and local offcials may not accept “wrongful” gratuities. Brief for United States 39; Tr. of Oral Arg. 46. That is no guidance at all. Is a $100 Dunkin' Donuts gift card for a trash collector wrongful? What about a $200 Nike gift card for a county commissioner who voted to fund new school athletic facilities? Could students take their col- lege professor out to Chipotle for an end-of-term celebration? And if so, would it somehow become criminal to take the professor for a steak dinner? Or to treat her to a Hoosiers game? The Government offers no clear federal rules for state and local offcials. So how are state legislators, city council members, school board offcials, building code inspectors, probation offcers, human resource directors, police offcers, librarians, snow plow drivers, court clerks, prison guards, high school basketball coaches, mayors, zoning board mem- bers, animal control offcers, social workers, frefghters, city planners, and the entire army of 19 million state and local offcials to know what is acceptable and what is criminalized by the Federal Government? They cannot. The Govern- ment's so-called guidance would leave state and local offcials entirely at sea to guess about what gifts they are allowed to accept under federal law, with the threat of up to 10 years in federal prison if they happen to guess wrong. That is not how federal criminal law works.5

5 The Government's interpretation seems all the more unbelievable be- cause § 666 applies to the gift-givers as well as the state and local offcials accepting the gifts. Specifcally, § 666(a)(2) makes it a crime punishable by 10 years' imprisonment for someone to “corruptly” offer or give “any- thing of value” to state and local offcials “with intent to infuence or re- ward.” So under the Government's approach, families, students, constit- uents, and other members of the public would be forced to guess whether they could even offer (much less actually give) thank-you gift cards, steak Cite as: 603 U. S. 1 (2024) 17

Responding to the legitimate concern that the federal lines are unknown and unknowable to state and local offcials, the Government advances the familiar plea that federal prosecu- tors can be trusted not to enforce this statute against small- time violators. But as this Court has said time and again, the Court “cannot construe a criminal statute on the assump- tion that the Government will use it responsibly.” McDon- nell, 579 U. S., at 576 (quotation marks omitted); see Percoco v. United States, 598 U. S. 319 (2023); Ciminelli v. United States, 598 U. S. 306 (2023); Kelly v. United States, 590 U. S. 391 (2020); Skilling v. United States, 561 U. S. 358 (2010). The lack of fair notice for state and local offcials is high- lighted by comparing the non-existent federal gratuities guidance given to state and local offcials with the extensive federal gratuities guidance given to federal workers. The Offce of Government Ethics has promulgated comprehen- sive and detailed regulatory guidelines specifying what gifts are allowed and prohibited for federal workers. For in- stance, the guidelines for federal offcials set forth cost thresholds, exempt certain gifts from friends or family, clar- ify what discounts are acceptable, and explain which social invitations an offcial may accept—all with multiple examples to guide federal offcials' conduct. See 5 CFR § 2635.204. Nothing for state and local offcials. It is unfathomable that Congress would authorize a 10-year criminal sentence for gifts to 19 million state and local offcials without any coherent federal guidance (or any federal guidance at all) about how an offcial can distinguish the innocuous from the criminal. When construing a statute like this that regulates state and local offcials, this Court's precedents caution against leaving the statute's “outer boundaries ambiguous” and in- volving the “Federal Government in setting standards of good government for local and state offcials.” McDonnell,

dinners, or Fever tickets to their garbage collectors, professors, or school board members, for example. 18 SNYDER v. UNITED STATES

579 U. S., at 577 (quotation marks omitted). And the Court has emphasized that a “statute in this feld that can linguisti- cally be interpreted to be either a meat axe or a scalpel should reasonably be taken to be the latter. ” Sun- Diamond, 526 U. S., at 412. So it is here.

B Faced with that phalanx of diffculties with its interpret- ation of § 666, the Government offers little. The Govern- ment's argument boils down to one main point—that § 666 uses the term “rewarded” as well as “infuenced.” And that, too, is the dissent's main point. The Government (echoed by the dissent) says that Congress would not have added the term “rewarded” to “infuenced” in § 666 if the statute were meant to cover only bribes and not also gratuities. That argument is misconceived. In isolation, the word “rewarded” could be part of a gratui- ties statute or a bribery statute—either (i) a reward given after the act with no agreement beforehand (gratuity) or (ii) a reward given after the act pursuant to an agreement be- forehand (bribe). But as noted above, the word “corruptly” in the text of § 666 helps resolve the issue here. The bribery statute for federal offcials, § 201(b), uses the term “cor- ruptly.” But the gratuities statute for federal offcials, § 201(c), does not. The term “corruptly” therefore signals that § 666 is a bribery statute. And statutory history, statu- tory structure, statutory punishments, federalism, and fair notice strongly reinforce that textual signal and together es- tablish that § 666 is a bribery statute. Contrary to the premise of the Government's argument, moreover, bribery statutes sometimes use the term “re- ward.” See, e. g., 18 U. S. C. § 600; 33 U. S. C. § 447. The term “rewarded” closes off certain defenses that otherwise might be raised in bribery cases. Consider a bribe where the agreement was made before the act but the payment was made after the act. An offcial might try to defend against Cite as: 603 U. S. 1 (2024) 19

the bribery charge by saying that the payment was received only after the offcial act and therefore could not have “in- fuenced” the act. By including the term “rewarded,” Con- gress made clear that the timing of the agreement is the key, not the timing of the payment, and thereby precluded such a potential defense. And think about the offcial who took a bribe before the offcial act but asserts as a defense that he would have taken the same act anyway and therefore was not “infuenced” by the payment. To shut the door on that potential defense to a § 666 bribery charge, Congress sensibly added the term “rewarded.” So even if “infuenced” alone might have covered the wa- terfront of bribes, adding “rewarded” made good sense to avoid potential ambiguities, gaps, or loopholes. Congress commonly writes federal statutes, including bribery statutes, in such a belt and suspenders manner. Here, the term “re- warded” does not transform § 666 into a gratuities statute. In sum, § 666 tracks § 201(b), the bribery provision for fed- eral offcials. A state or local offcial can violate § 666 when he accepts an up-front payment for a future offcial act or agrees to a future reward for a future offcial act. See United States v. Fernandez, 722 F. 3d 1, 23 (CA1 2013) (the word “reward” “clarifes that a bribe can be promised before, but paid after, the offcial's action” (quotation marks omit- ted)). But a state or local offcial does not violate § 666 if the offcial has taken the offcial act before any reward is agreed to, much less given. Although a gratuity offered and accepted after the offcial act may be unethical or illegal under other federal, state, or local laws, the gratuity does not violate § 666. * * * The Government asks this Court to adopt an interpreta- tion of § 666 that would radically upend gratuities rules and turn § 666 into a vague and unfair trap for 19 million state and local offcials. We decline to do so. Section 666 is a 20 SNYDER v. UNITED STATES

Gorsuch, J., concurring

vital statute, but its focus is targeted: Section 666 proscribes bribes to state and local offcials, while allowing state and local governments to regulate gratuities to state and local offcials. Within constitutional bounds, Congress can always change the law if it wishes to do so. But since 1986, it has not, presumably because Congress understands that state and local governments may and often do regulate gratuities to state and local offcials. We reverse the judgment of the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Justice Gorsuch, concurring. Call it what you will. The Court today speaks of infer- ences from the word “corruptly,” the statute's history and structure, and associated punishments. See ante, at 10. It discusses concerns of fair notice and federalism. Ibid. But the bottom line is that, for all those reasons, any fair reader of this statute would be left with a reasonable doubt about whether it covers the defendant's charged conduct. And when that happens, judges are bound by the ancient rule of lenity to decide the case as the Court does today, not for the prosecutor but for the presumptively free individual. See United States v. Davis, 588 U. S. 445, 464–465 (2019). Lenity may sometimes, as it does today, go unnamed. It may be deployed under other guises, too. “Fair notice” or “fair warning” are especially familiar masks. See, e. g., ante, at 10, 15, 17; Marinello v. United States, 584 U. S. 1, 6– 7, 9–10 (2018); McDonnell v. United States, 579 U. S. 550, 576 (2016). Cf. Wooden v. United States, 595 U. S. 360, 389 (2022) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in judgment) (“Lenity works to enforce the fair notice requirement”); Yates v. United States, 574 U. S. 528, 548 (2015) (plurality opinion) (same). Other times, we clothe lenity in its corollary—that courts Cite as: 603 U. S. 1 (2024) 21

Jackson, J., dissenting

cannot “rely upon prosecutorial discretion to narrow the” scope of an “otherwise wide-ranging” criminal law. Ma- rinello, 584 U. S., at 11; see, e. g., ante, at 17; Dubin v. United States, 599 U. S. 110, 131 (2023). And in still other in- stances, we do much the same when we speak of the “re- straint” necessary “in assessing the reach of a federal crimi- nal statute.” Id., at 129 (internal quotation marks omitted); accord, Marinello, 584 U. S., at 6–7, 11; Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U. S. 696, 703 (2005). But make no mistake: Whatever the label, lenity is what's at work behind today's decision, just as it is in so many oth- ers. Rightly so. I am pleased to join.

Justice Jackson, with whom Justice Sotomayor and Justice Kagan join, dissenting. Offcials who use their public positions for private gain threaten the integrity of our most important institutions. Greed makes governments—at every level—less responsive, less effcient, and less trustworthy from the perspective of the communities they serve. Perhaps realizing this, Con- gress used “expansive, unqualifed language” in 18 U. S. C. § 666 to criminalize graft involving state, local, and tribal entities, as well as other organizations receiving federal funds. Salinas v. United States, 522 U. S. 52, 56 (1997). Section 666 imposes federal criminal penalties on agents of those entities who “corruptly” solicit, accept, or agree to ac- cept payments “intending to be infuenced or rewarded.” § 666(a)(1)(B). Today's case involves one such person. James Snyder, a former Indiana mayor, was convicted by a jury of violating § 666 after he steered more than $1 million in city contracts to a local truck dealership, which turned around and cut him a $13,000 check. He asks us to decide whether the language of § 666 criminalizes both bribes and gratuities, or just bribes. And he says the answer matters because bribes re- 22 SNYDER v. UNITED STATES

quire an upfront agreement to take offcial actions for pay- ment, and he never agreed beforehand to be paid the $13,000 from the dealership. Snyder's absurd and atextual reading of the statute is one only today's Court could love. Ignoring the plain text of § 666—which, again, expressly targets offcials who “cor- ruptly” solicit, accept, or agree to accept payments “intend- ing to be infuenced or rewarded”—the Court concludes that the statute does not criminalize gratuities at all. This is so, apparently, because “[s]tate and local governments often regulate the gifts that state and local offcials may accept,” ante, at 5, which, according to the majority, means that § 666 cannot. The Court's reasoning elevates nonexistent federalism con- cerns over the plain text of this statute and is a quintes- sential example of the tail wagging the dog. Section 666's regulation of state, local, and tribal governments refects Congress's express choice to reach those and other entities receiving federal funds. And Congress not only had good reasons for doing so, it also had the authority to take such legislative action, as this Court has already recognized. See Sabri v. United States, 541 U. S. 600, 605, 608 (2004). We have long held that when Congress has appropriated federal money, it “does not have to sit by and accept the risk of operations thwarted by local and state improbity.” Id., at 605. Both the majority and Snyder suggest that interpreting § 666 to cover gratuities is problematic because it gives “fed- eral prosecutors unwarranted power to allege crimes that should be handled at the State level.” App. 14–15 (emphasis added); see also ante, at 14–15. But woulds, coulds, and shoulds of this nature must be addressed across the street with Congress, not in the pages of the U. S. Reports. We have previously and wisely declined “to express [a] view as to [§ 666's] soundness as a policy matter.” Sabri, 541 U. S., at 608, n. But, today, the Court can stay silent no longer. Its decision overrides the intent of Congress—and the policy Cite as: 603 U. S. 1 (2024) 23

preferences of the constituents that body represents—as un- equivocally expressed by the plain text of the statute. Re- spectfully, I dissent. I Section 666 is a relatively recent solution to an old prob- lem. It seeks to ensure that “taxpayer dollars . . . are in fact spent for the general welfare, and not frittered away in graft.” Id., at 605. Accordingly, the statute applies to certain entities that receive a threshold amount of federal funds. It covers any “agent of an organization, or of a State, local, or Indian tribal government, or any agency thereof.” § 666(a)(1). The entity must “receiv[e], in any one year pe- riod, benefts in excess of $10,000 under a Federal program involving a . . . form of Federal assistance.” § 666(b). If an entity meets that description, the statute imposes federal criminal penalties on any agent who “corruptly solicits or demands for the beneft of any per- Page son, orProof accepts orPending Publication agrees to accept, anything of value from any person, intending to be infuenced or rewarded in connection with any business, transaction, or series of transactions of such organization, government, or agency involving any thing of value of $5,000 or more.” § 666(a)(1)(B). In short, § 666(a)(1)(B) makes it a federal crime for state, local, or tribal offcials to corruptly solicit, accept, or agree to accept certain payments in connection with business worth $5,000 or more. A neighboring provision similarly imposes penalties on the giver—i. e., anyone who “corruptly gives, offers, or agrees to give” payments “with intent to infuence or reward” these offcials. § 666(a)(2). For offend- ers of either provision, the penalty is a fne, a maximum of 10 years in prison, or both. § 666(a). There is no dispute that § 666 criminalizes bribes. See ante, at 5. This Court has also been clear about what a bribe requires: “a quid pro quo.” United States v. Sun- Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U. S. 398, 404 (1999). A quid 24 SNYDER v. UNITED STATES

pro quo means “a specifc intent to give or receive something of value in exchange for an offcial act.” Id., at 404–405. So, for a payment to constitute a bribe, there must be an upfront agreement to exchange the payment for taking an offcial action. See ibid. Legislatures have also considered it similarly wrongful for government offcials to accept gratuities under certain cir- cumstances, but unlike bribes, gratuities do not have a quid pro quo requirement. Generally speaking, rather than an actual agreement to take payment as the impetus for engag- ing in an offcial act (a quid pro quo exchange), gratuities “may constitute merely a reward for some future act that the public offcial will take (and may already have determined to take), or for a past act that he has already taken.” Id., at 405. We took this case to resolve “[w]hether section 666 crimi- nalizes gratuities, i. e., payments in recognition of actions the offcial has already taken or committed to take, without any quid pro quo agreement to take those actions.” Pet. for Cert. I. The majority today answers no, when the answer to that question should be an unequivocal yes. II A To reach the right conclusion we need not march through various auxiliary analyses: We can begin—and end—with only the text. See National Assn. of Mfrs. v. Department of Defense, 583 U. S. 109, 127 (2018). We “understan[d] that Congress says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.” Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N. A., 530 U. S. 1, 6 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). 1 By its plain terms, § 666 imposes criminal penalties on state, local, and tribal offcials who “corruptly” solicit, accept, or agree to accept “anything of value from any person, in- Cite as: 603 U. S. 1 (2024) 25

tending to be infuenced or rewarded.” § 666(a)(1)(B). Use of the term “infuenced” captures quid pro quo bargains struck before an offcial act is taken—and therefore bribes— as everyone agrees. Brief for Petitioner 17; Brief for United States 21; cf. Sun-Diamond, 526 U. S., at 404–405. The term “rewarded” easily covers the concept of gratuities paid to corrupt offcials after the fact—no upfront agreement necessary. As a general matter (and setting aside for the moment that § 666 covers only offcials who act “corruptly”), everyone knows what a reward is. It is a $20 bill pulled from a lost wallet at the time of its return to its grateful owner. A surprise ice cream outing after a report card with straight As. The bar tab picked up by a supervisor celebrating a job well done by her team. A reward often says “thank you” or “good job,” rather than “please.” Dictionary defnitions confrm what common sense tells us about what it means to be rewarded. A “reward” is “[t]hat which is given in return for good or evil done or received,” in- cluding “that which is offered or given for some service or at- tainment.” 3 Webster's New International Dictionary 2136 (2d ed. 1957). The verb form of the word is no different. To “reward” means “to . . . recompense.” Ibid. (defning “to reward” as “[t]o make a return, or give a reward, to (a per- son) or for (a service, etc.); to requite; recompense; repay”). Both defnitions thus encompass payment in recognition of an action that an offcial has already taken or committed to taking. And neither requires there to be some beforehand agreement about that exchange, i. e., a quid pro quo. Snyder concedes that the term “rewarded” can encompass the concept of gratuities. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 5; see also Reply Brief 3 (quoting Sun-Diamond, 526 U. S., at 405). The majority—which doesn't bother to interpret “rewarded” until the end of its opinion—eventually admits the same. See ante, at 18 (“[T]he word `rewarded' could be part of a gratuities statute”). By that point in its analysis, however, 26 SNYDER v. UNITED STATES

the majority has already characterized § 666 as a bribery statute. And then, because we typically seek to give effect to each word of a statute, see TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U. S. 19, 31 (2001), the majority must strain to make the word “rewarded” as it appears in § 666 relevant, rather than mean- ingless. It offers rank speculation as to why “rewarded” in § 666 might mean something other than what it ordinarily does, ultimately assigning the word some busy work relating to potential defenses to bribery charges. See ante, at 18– 19. But whatever the merits of the majority's assertions involving waterfronts, belts, and suspenders, its interpreta- tion of § 666 fnds little grounding in the actual text of the statute. See Luna Perez v. Sturgis Public Schools, 598 U. S. 142, 150 (2023) (“ `[W]e cannot replace the actual text with speculation as to Congress' intent' ”).

Page SpeakingProof Pending of text: The Publication language of other statutes demon- strates that Congress uses the word “reward” when it wants to criminalize gratuities. For example, in 18 U. S. C. § 1912, Congress imposed criminal penalties on any federal offcer “engaged in inspection of vessels” who “receives any fee or reward for his services, except what is allowed to him by law.” (Emphasis added.) And in 22 U. S. C. § 4202, Con- gress provided for the sanctioning of “any consular off- cer . . . who demands or receives for any offcial services . . . any fee or reward other than the fee provided by law for such service.” (Emphasis added.) Snyder admits that these statutes target gratuities by virtue of Congress's use of the term “reward.” Brief for Petitioner 31. But rather than simply calling a statute that penalizes ac- cepting a “reward” for public business what it is—a wrongful or illegal gratuities statute—the majority insists that, some- times, when Congress uses “reward,” it is still just criminal- izing quid pro quo bribery, mustering up examples to show that “bribery statutes sometimes use the term `reward.' ” Cite as: 603 U. S. 1 (2024) 27

Ante, at 18. However, none of the majority's examples use the term “reward” in a way that is relevantly similar to § 666. For one thing, the majority's examples do not use the phrase “infuenced or rewarded” to delineate between bribes and gratuities, while covering both, as § 666 does. In addition, each of the statutes the majority points to explicitly links the forbidden “reward” to an agreement to take some specifc action; in other words, the majority's examples specify, by their plain text, a quid pro quo. For example, 18 U. S. C. § 600 imposes federal criminal penalties on anyone who “promises,” inter alia, jobs or benefts “provided for or made possible in whole or in part by any Act of Congress” to an- other person “as consideration, favor, or reward for” certain political activity. That statute identifes both a forbidden quid (a future job) and quo (political activity).1 In contrast with those statutes, when § 666 uses “re- warded,” it never connects that term to some upfront ex- change. What the majority's examples actually show, then, is that when Congress wants to use the term “reward” to encompass only bribes, it knows just how to do so. See Hen- son v. Santander Consumer USA Inc., 582 U. S. 79, 86 (2017) (“[W]e presume differences in language like this convey dif- ferences in meaning”). B In an attempt to shore up its unnatural reading of § 666, the majority turns to statutory and legislative history. Ante, at 8, 12. Where appropriate, I, too, fnd statutory and legislative history to be useful tools that this Court can and should consult. See, e. g., Delaware v. Pennsylvania, 598 U. S. 115, 138–139 (2023). But resort to these tools is ques- tionable under certain circumstances. See Milner v. 1 See also 33 U. S. C. § 447 (imposing penalties on “[e]very person who . . . gives any sum of money or other bribe, present, or reward . . . to any . . . employee of the offce of any supervisor of a harbor with intent to infuence such . . . employee to permit or overlook any violation of the provisions of this subchapter”). 28 SNYDER v. UNITED STATES

Department of Navy, 562 U. S. 562, 574 (2011) (“When pre- sented, on the one hand, with clear statutory language and, on the other, with dueling committee reports, we must choose the language”). In any event, here, the statutory and legislative history only make matters worse for the ma- jority's analysis. Section 666 traces its lineage to 18 U. S. C. § 201, though the kinship is more attenuated than the majority lets on. Section 201 indeed “contains comprehensive prohibitions on bribes and gratuities to federal offcials.” Ante, at 7–8 (dis- cussing §§ 201(b)–(c)). But initially, it was not entirely clear which offcials that federal statute covered. By its terms, § 201 applies broadly to “public offcials,” see § 201(a), and confusion arose among some lower courts as to “whether state and local employees could be considered `public off- cials' ” under the statute. Salinas, 522 U. S., at 58. With- out awaiting our resolution of the issue, Congress enacted § 666 in 1984. Ibid.; see also 98 Stat. 2143. In § 666, Congress expressly sought to reach state and local offcials “to protect the integrity of the vast sums of money distributed through Federal programs.” S. Rep. No. 98–225, p. 370 (1983). As originally enacted, § 666 barred those offcials from soliciting, accepting, or agreeing to accept “anything of value . . . for or because of the recipi- ent's conduct,” § 666(b) (1982 ed., Supp. II), using language similar to that in § 201(c), the federal-offcial gratuities provi- sion. Crucially, no one disputes that when it was initially enacted, § 666 prohibited both bribes and gratuities. Ante, at 8. Similarly signifcant (though unmentioned by the ma- jority), Congress imposed the same 10-year maximum term of imprisonment for a violation then as it does now. See § 666(b) (1982 ed., Supp. II); cf. ante, at 17 (describing it as “unfathomable that Congress would authorize a 10-year criminal sentence for gifts to 19 million state and local off- cials” without federal guidance). Cite as: 603 U. S. 1 (2024) 29

Starting with this historical disadvantage regarding the scope of the statute, the majority must show that Congress made major changes to § 666 that might account for the sans- gratuity interpretation the majority adopts today. But sev- eral features of the statutory and legislative history convince me of the opposite. For one, Congress said that it was not making major changes to the statute. The 1986 revisions to § 666 were part of a package of changes that Congress specifcally deemed “technical and minor.” H. R. Rep. No. 99–797, p. 16 (1986); see also Criminal Law and Procedure Technical Amendments Act of 1986, 100 Stat. 3592. And the revisions themselves are largely in keeping with this characterization. Relevant here, Congress teased out a “corruptly” mens rea requirement and swapped the previous “for or because of ” language for the current “intending to be infuenced or re- warded” phrasing. Id., at 3613. None of this, on its face, evinces clear congressional intent to extract an entire cate- gory of previously covered illicit payments from § 666. Undeterred, the majority says that when Congress amended § 666, it was attempting to fashion that provision after § 201(b)—the bribery statute that covers federal off- cials. See ante, at 12.2 Again, the statutory and legislative record suggests otherwise: In fact, history establishes that Congress had a different model statute in mind. Congress had used a phrase identical to § 666's “intending to be infuenced or rewarded” language just a few months before when it amended 18 U. S. C. § 215, an anticorruption statute that applies to bank employees. See 100 Stat. 779. That provision imposes criminal penalties on any bank em- ployee who “corruptly solicits or demands . . . or corruptly

2 Section 201(b)(2)(A) imposes federal criminal penalties on “[w]hoever . . . being a public offcial . . . corruptly demands, seeks, receives, accepts, or agrees to receive or accept anything of value . . . in return for . . . being infuenced in the performance of any offcial act.” 30 SNYDER v. UNITED STATES

accepts or agrees to accept, anything of value from any per- son, intending to be infuenced or rewarded in connection with any business or transaction.” Ibid. (emphasis added); see also § 215(a)(2). And this similarity was no coincidence. The House Report the majority quotes as explicating § 666 confrms that § 666 was meant to track § 215—not § 201(b), as the majority claims. See H. R. Rep. No. 99–797, at 30, n. 9. This means, of course, that if § 215 criminalizes gratuities, it is likely § 666 does as well. But the majority labels § 215 “a null data point,” evidently because this Court has never interpreted that statute. Ante, at 12, n. 4. Section 215's rel- evance to § 666 does not come from any interpretation, how- ever—it is plain on the face of that statute, which uses the exact same “infuenced or rewarded” phrase. And the his- tory of that model provision indicates that Congress meant for § 215 to reach gratuities, too. For example, a House Re- port directly speaks of § 215 as a statute criminalizing gratui- ties: It says that, before 1986, § 215 made “it criminal for a bank offcial to accept any gratuity, no matter how trivial, after that offcial ha[d] taken offcial action on bank busi- ness.” H. R. Rep. No. 99–335, p. 6, n. 25 (1985) (emphasis added). Congress amended § 215 in 1986 to “narro[w]” the statute, but not by carving out gratuities altogether. Ibid. Rather it narrowed the “law by requiring that the accept- ance of the gratuity be done corruptly.” Ibid. (emphasis added).3 Astute readers will recall that Congress made ex- actly this same narrowing edit to § 666. See supra, at 29. In short, Congress tailored § 215 in an effort to stem “ `cor- ruption in the bank industry,' ” and it seemed to think that both bribes and gratuities contributed to that problem.

3 Piling on, I note that the 1986 amendments to § 215 also required fed- eral agencies with responsibility for regulating a fnancial institution to “establish . . . guidelines” to help bank employees comply with the statute. See 18 U. S. C. § 215(d) (1982 ed., Supp. IV). When those agencies fol- lowed through, they too expressly assumed that § 215 covered gratuities. See, e. g., 52 Fed. Reg. 46046 (1987); id., at 43940. Cite as: 603 U. S. 1 (2024) 31

H. R. Rep. No. 99–335, at 5. So, too, with § 666 and public corruption. III To recap what we know thus far: The question in this case is whether § 666 criminalizes gratuities in addition to bribes. The text and purpose of § 666 alone provide an easy answer. The word “rewarded” means to have been given a reward for some action taken. So gratuities are plainly covered. To be sure, if the Court had given that straight- forward answer, we might eventually have confronted a fol- lowup question: Are all gratuities covered? Said differ- ently: Even if gratuities generally are criminalized by § 666, are there circumstances in which certain gratuities are not criminalized? The case in front of us does not require us to reach that question. We have not been asked to settle, once and for all, which gratuities are corrupt and which are quotidian. Snyder did not argue that his $13,000 check was part of some subset of noncriminalized gratuities. Rather (and this is im- portant to note), Snyder has taken an all-or-nothing ap- proach to the argument he makes in this case. He insists that all gratuities—every type in the entire class—are ex- cluded from § 666. Because the statute's plain text says oth- erwise, that should have been the end of this case, even if a future petitioner might have asked us to do a more nuanced analysis. But, no matter—the majority today skips ahead, complain- ing that the Government has “not identif[ied] any remotely clear lines separating an innocuous or obviously benign gra- tuity from a criminal gratuity.” Ante, at 16. This omission is a huge problem, the majority says, because without those lines, “19 million state and local offcials” could be imprisoned “for accepting even commonplace gratuities.” Ante, at 5. The majority's fretting falls fat, especially in the context of this case. There is no question that state, local, and tribal offcials deserve “clear lines,” but we were not asked to pro- 32 SNYDER v. UNITED STATES

vide all of them at this moment.4 And, perhaps even more important, nothing about the facts of this case even remotely implicates a reasonable concern about the criminalization of innocuous conduct on the part of an unwary offcial. Fur- thermore, most of the clear lines the majority seeks already exist—they come from the text of the statute. Limits within the text of § 666 provide “fair notice” that common- place gratuities are typically not within the statute's reach, contra, ante, at 15, and they suffce to prevent prosecution of the gift cards, burrito bowls, and steak dinners that derail today's decision.5 A If one simply accepts what the statute says it covers— local offcials who corruptly solicit, accept, or agree to accept rewards in connection with offcial business worth over a cer- tain amount—Snyder's case is an easy one. Perhaps that is why the majority spends so little time describing it. Snyder took offce as mayor of the city of Portage, Indiana, in January 2012. As mayor, Snyder and his appointees sat on the Portage Board of Works and Public Safety, the entity that managed public bidding on city contracts. Snyder put one of his friends, Randy Reeder, in charge of the bidding process, despite Reeder's lack of experience in administering public bids. Evidence presented at Snyder's trial showed that Reeder tailored bid specifcations for two different city contracts to favor Great Lakes Peterbilt, a truck dealership

4 Given the question presented, the majority's demand for a comprehen- sive interpretation of § 666, for all purposes, is both striking and inconsist- ent with our usual incremental approach. See St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U. S. 727, 730–731 (1968) (observing that the “outer limits” of “many legal standards”—whether they be “provided by the Constitution, stat- utes, or case law”—are “marked out through case-by-case adjudication”). 5 Notably, I am not the only Justice who has viewed § 666 in this way. See Sorich v. United States, 555 U. S. 1204, 1207 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissent- ing from denial of certiorari) (describing § 666(a) as providing a “clear rul[e]” prohibiting “bribes and gratuities to public offcials”). Cite as: 603 U. S. 1 (2024) 33

owned by brothers Robert Buha and Stephen Buha. Evi- dence also showed that during the bidding process, Snyder was in contact with the Buha brothers, but no other bidders. Snyder had campaigned on a platform that included auto- mating trash collection, and by December 2012, the city was looking to buy three garbage trucks. It issued an invitation to bid on the contract, listing specifc requirements for the trucks. Reeder testifed that he crafted some specifcations, including delivery within 150 days, knowing they would favor Great Lakes Peterbilt. The board of works voted to award Great Lakes Peterbilt the contract. Evidence at trial showed that the city could have saved about $60,000 had it not prioritized expedited delivery. In January 2013, the manager of Great Lakes Peterbilt asked Reeder whether the city might want to buy another truck—an unused, 2012 model that had been sitting outside on the dealership's lot over two winters. Snyder frst tried to buy the truck outright, but Portage's city attorney in- formed him he had to go through the public bidding process. So the board of works issued another invitation to bid in November 2013. This invitation sought two more garbage trucks. Reeder again tweaked certain specifications to favor Great Lakes Peterbilt—this time to help it move the older truck sitting on its lot. The board of works voted to award Great Lakes Peterbilt this contract too. Together, the two contracts that Great Lakes Peterbilt “won” totaled some $1.125 million. Shortly after the second contract was awarded, Snyder paid the Buha brothers a visit at their dealership. “I need money,” he said. App. 72. He asked for $15,000; the deal- ership gave him $13,000. When federal investigators heard about the payment and came calling, Snyder told them the check was for information technology and health insurance consulting services that he had provided to the dealership. He gave different explanations for the money to Reeder and a different city employee. 34 SNYDER v. UNITED STATES

Employees at Great Lakes Peterbilt testifed that Snyder never performed any consulting work for the dealership. And during the federal investigation, no written agreements, work product, evidence of meetings, invoices, or other docu- mentation was ever produced relating to any consulting work performed by Snyder. All of this confrmed testimony from the dealership's controller, who had cut the check to Snyder: Snyder had instead been paid for an “ `inside track.' ” App. to Pet. for Cert. 60a–61a. A federal grand jury charged Snyder with violating 18 U. S. C. § 666(a)(1)(B). App. 2–3. The indictment alleged that Snyder “did corruptly solicit, demand, accept, and agree to accept a bank check in the amount of $13,000, intending to be infuenced and rewarded.” Id., at 3. A jury found him guilty of violating § 666 in connection with the garbage truck contracts. It is not diffcult to see why the jury reached that conclusion, having been instructed that the Government needed to prove that Snyder “acted corruptly, with the intent to be infuenced or rewarded.” Id., at 27.6

B One thing is clear from the Court's opinion in this case— the majority isn't much worried about what happens to Sny- der under § 666. It pivots to the other 18,999,999 state, local, and tribal offcials at work throughout the country and 6 Even after its decision to construe § 666 as a bribery-only statute, the Court's decision to reverse Snyder's conviction, rather than vacate and remand, is perplexing. The District Court specifcally found that, “even if ” § 666 were construed to penalize bribes alone, “there was ample evi- dence permitting a rational jury to fnd, from the circumstantial evidence, that there was an up-front agreement to reward Snyder for making sure [Great Lakes Peterbilt] won the contract award(s).” App. to Pet. for Cert. 63a. Thus, the Seventh Circuit should have been permitted to as- sess in the frst instance whether any instructional error was prejudicial. Under our current precedent, Snyder is not entitled to automatic relief due to a mere instructional error. See, e. g., Greer v. United States, 593 U. S. 503, 507, 513 (2021). Cite as: 603 U. S. 1 (2024) 35

laments that there are “no clear federal rules” for them. Ante, at 16. But § 666 was not designed to apply to teachers accepting fruit baskets, soccer coaches getting gift cards, or newspaper delivery guys who get a tip at Christmas. See ibid. (reciting similar examples). We know this because, be- yond requiring acceptance of a reward, § 666 weaves to- gether multiple other elements (that the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt), which collectively do the nuanced work of sifting illegal gratuities from inoffensive ones. Those limits are clear on the face of the statute; when con- strued as a whole, the text of § 666 provides more than ade- quate notice to those this statute covers. Now, for a list of my own: First, § 666 applies only when a state, local, tribal, or private entity “receives, in any one year period, benefts in excess of $10,000 under a Federal program involving” some “form of Federal assistance.” § 666(b). Second, the statute requires that the criminalized payment be “in con- nection with any business, transaction, or series of transac- tions” of the covered entity. §§ 666(a)(1)(B), (a)(2). Third, that “business, transaction, or series of transactions” must involve “[some]thing of value of $5,000 or more.” Ibid. Fourth, § 666 expressly “does not apply to bona fde salary, wages, fees, or other compensation paid . . . in the usual course of business.” § 666(c). Nor does it apply to “ex- penses paid or reimbursed . . . in the usual course of busi- ness.” Ibid. Last, and perhaps most important, the stat- ute specifcally requires that the offcial who solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept the payment do so “corruptly” (the mens rea). § 666(a)(1)(B). This series of carefully delineated cir- cumstances—all of which appear in the text of § 666—means that payments or gifts to offcials will not always be captured by § 666 under any and all circumstances, but only if the vio- lator acts in the ways described and with the required intent. Notably, the majority takes the last statutory check I de- scribe—the “corruptly” mens rea requirement—and trans- 36 SNYDER v. UNITED STATES

forms it into a reason to read the statute to cover only bribes. See ante, at 10–12, 18. The majority maintains that “corruptly” signals that § 666 is a bribery statute because § 201(b), the federal-offcial bribery statute, uses that term. Ibid. But, as I have already explained, the bribery statute for federal offcials is not the blueprint the majority makes it out to be. See Part II–B, supra. And while the majority suggests that “corruptly” just means quid pro quo, see ante, at 11–12, it can give no reason why that must be so in this statute. Instead, the majority gives a practical justifcation for its preferred interpretation. It suggests that if § 666 is read generally to apply to gratuities, and “corruptly” is read as a narrowing mens rea element, then the statute still might sweep in all sorts of innocuous gifts. See ante, at 15–16. Maybe. Maybe not. Again, the precise meaning of the term “corruptly” is not the question before us today. Nor does it really matter here because, whatever “corruptly” means, Snyder's behavior clearly fts the bill, making this case a poor one to explore the contours of that term. See Part III–A, supra. In any event, any uncertainty we might have about “cor- ruptly” seems unwarranted considering the Court's previous definitions of that word. In Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U. S. 696 (2005), we wrote that the term “ `corruptly' ” is “normally associated with wrongful, im- moral, depraved, or evil” conduct. Id., at 705. We there- fore related the term with “consciousness of wrongdoing.” Id., at 706. Applying that standard defnition to § 666's mens rea requirement appears to heave an imposing burden onto the Government. Prosecutors must prove not only that a state, local, or tribal offcial did, in fact, act wrongfully when accepting the gift or payment, but also that she knew that accepting the gift or payment was wrongful.7 The ma- 7 At oral argument, the Government acknowledged that “consciousness of wrongdoing” roughly translates to knowledge of unlawfulness. Tr. of Oral Arg. 74–76. Cite as: 603 U. S. 1 (2024) 37

jority worries that it may be unclear to an offcial whether accepting a gift is, in fact, “wrongful.” See ante, at 16. But if “corruptly” is read to require knowledge of wrongful- ness, any lack of clarity benefts the offcial. In such circum- stances, a prosecutor is almost certain to be unable to meet her burden of proof—as the Government acknowledges. See, e. g., Tr. of Oral Arg. 59–60, 107.8 The bottom line is that § 666 is not unique or special. Like other criminal statutes—and especially other anti-public- corruption statutes—§ 666 has various elements, some of which may beneft from further clarifcation. Down the road, this Court could have had that opportunity with re- spect to § 666 if it had chosen to engage in our usual method of parsing statutes. See, e. g., Fischer v. United States, 529 U. S. 667, 677, 681 (2000) (clarifying the meaning of federal “benefts” under § 666); Sun-Diamond, 526 U. S., at 414 (holding that to establish a violation of § 201(c), “the Govern- ment must prove a link between a thing of value conferred upon a public offcial and a specifc `offcial act' for or because of which it was given” (emphasis added)); McDonnell v. United States, 579 U. S. 550, 571–572 (2016) (clarifying the “offcial act” requirement in § 201(a)(3)). Instead, the major- ity washes its hands of this anticorruption provision, an- nouncing that certain wrongful conduct the statute plainly covers just cannot be included. The majority throws in the towel too soon. C As I said earlier, § 666 already provides meaningful guard- rails that protect against the “overbreadth” that the major- ity decries. Ante, at 15. But you don't have to take my 8 Thus, defning “corruptly” in the same way we have in the past would not rely on a prosecutor's discretion to limit the scope of the statute. See ante, at 17; cf. Marinello v. United States, 584 U. S. 1, 11 (2018). Indeed, though the Government could attempt to launch unwarranted prosecu- tions under § 666, that is as true for § 666 as it is for any other federal criminal statute. 38 SNYDER v. UNITED STATES

word for that. Other prosecutions of gratuities that the Government has brought under § 666—successfully or unsuc- cessfully—do not remotely resemble the holiday tips, gift baskets, and sweatshirts around which the majority crafts its decision.9 That is, even as the Government has consist- ently maintained that § 666 covers gratuities, its actual prior prosecutions under § 666 were not the dragnet for public school teachers, soccer coaches, or trash collectors that the majority conjures. Rather, the real cases in which the Gov- ernment has invoked this law involve exactly the type of palm greasing that the statute plainly covers and that one might reasonably expect Congress to care about when tar- geting graft in state, local, and tribal governments. After today, however, the ability of the Federal Government to prosecute such obviously wrongful conduct is left in doubt. It is also noteworthy that the prosecutions that Snyder describes as proof of the Government's “not reassuring” track record, Reply Brief 18–19, look nothing like the acts of gratitude that worry the majority. The “city building in- spector [who] solicit[ed] donations for his favorite youth sports league”? Id., at 18. Well, he admitted to receiving illegal gratuities from an engineer who worked with clients 9 See, e. g., Scarantino v. Public School Employees' Retirement Bd., 68 A. 3d 375, 376–377 (Pa. Commw. 2013) (describing a defendant prosecuted under § 666 for receiving a $5,000 cash gratuity in connection with school district contracts); United States v. Musto, 2012 WL 5879609, *2, n. 2 (MD Pa., Nov. 21, 2012) (defendant prosecuted under § 666 for accepting $1,000 in connection with a municipality's multimillion dollar loan application to a state agency and prior offcial advocacy); United States v. Bahel, 662 F. 3d 610, 620–621, 638 (CA2 2011) (defendant prosecuted under § 666 after receiving fnancial benefts including years of near-monthly cash payments of thousands of dollars, a laptop, frst-class plane tickets to India, seats to the U. S. Open tennis tournament, a reduced-rent apartment, and the eventual purchase of that apartment for below-market value in connection with United Nations contracts); United States v. Zimmermann, 509 F. 3d 920, 926–927 (CA8 2007) (defendant prosecuted for accepting gratuities of $5,000, $1,200, and $1,000 in connection with real-estate development projects). Cite as: 603 U. S. 1 (2024) 39

seeking building permits in San Francisco. The engineer knew that the inspector was a volunteer coach and supporter of “a San Francisco non-proft adult and youth athletic orga- nization,” and the engineer arranged for his clients to donate to that organization in connection with inspections of their properties. Press Release, U. S. Attorney's Offce, ND Cal., San Francisco Senior Building Inspector Pleads Guilty to Ac- cepting Illegal Gratuities (Dec. 9, 2022). “[I]n several in- stances, the engineer advised [the inspector] of a client's donation while asking for a fnal permit or inspection on the client's property.” Ibid. That same inspector also ac- cepted $30,000 in debt forgiveness from a longtime San Fran- cisco real-estate developer and friend. Ibid. And the “county contractor [who] donat[ed] $2,000 for plaques and food at a luncheon honoring female judges”? Reply Brief 18. He was the owner of a debt collection com- pany that had a nonexclusive contract with Cook County, Illinois, to perform debt collection work. A signifcant part of the contract was the chance to collect fnes owed on unpaid traffc tickets. An offcial in the Circuit Court of Cook County Clerk's Offce—the entity responsible for doling out the traffc debt work—gave his frm half of those collections. The owner then underwrote nearly $2,000 in expenses for the court's Women's History Month Celebration. Why did he cover these expenses? “We gotta stay ahead of [the com- petition],” the owner told his staff. United States v. Do- nagher, No. 1:19–cr–00240 (ND Ill.), ECF Doc. 98, pp. 2–5.10 10 Snyder's invocation of United States v. Hamilton, 46 F. 4th 389 (CA5 2022), is neither persuasive nor relevant here. Snyder says Hamilton shows that the Government “has prosecuted campaign contributions.” Reply Brief 19. The defendant in Hamilton was a Dallas real-estate de- veloper who “supported” local politicians. 46 F. 4th, at 391. He gave money to a nonproft owned and operated by the campaign manager of one such politician, a Dallas City Council member. “Some of those donations were used for [the nonproft's] legitimate purposes; others were purport- edly given to [the nonproft], cashed by [the campaign manager], then given to [the politician] personally.” Ibid. Around an election cycle, “[the de- 40 SNYDER v. UNITED STATES

None of this means that courts should trust the Govern- ment when it says that it does and will continue to enforce a statute with care. That is not how we do statutory inter- pretation, and for good reason. See Marinello v. United States, 584 U. S. 1, 11 (2018). But what these examples do show is that § 666's built-in bulwarks seem to be working. Thus, there is simply no reason to think that decades after the courts of appeals frst interpreted § 666 to cover gratui- ties, reading the statute to do so now will “suddenly subject 19 million state and local offcials to a new and different reg- ulatory regime.” Ante, at 14. IV Ultimately, it appears that the real bone the majority has to pick with § 666 is its concern about overregulation—a con- cern born of the relationship between federal and state gov- ernance. The majority's pages of citations to state and local gratuities laws, ante, at 6–7, thus belie its ranking so-called “federalism” interests merely “[f]ifth” on its list of reasons for construing § 666 as a bribery-only statute, ante, at 14 (em- phasis deleted). More than anything, it seems that the ma- jority itself harbors the belief it repeatedly ascribes to Con-

veloper] was trying to secure some low-income-housing tax credits for one of his real-estate ventures, the Royal Crest project,” and that City Council member “lobbied to have the Royal Crest project included.” Ibid. “A few years later, [the developer] needed to get a paid-sick-leave ordinance on the ballot in the upcoming election.” Ibid. So he wrote a $7,000 check to a different member of the Dallas City Council, who made clear that the check “was not a loan” and “had nothing to do with the campaign.” Id., at 392. A jury convicted the developer on two § 666 counts, but the Fifth Circuit later vacated the convictions because, in its view, § 666 did not criminalize gratuities. Id., at 393, 399. On these facts, it is far from clear that Hamilton involved legitimate campaign contributions. But it is abundantly clear that Snyder's case does not. If a § 666 conviction involving real campaign contributions had reached us, it might have been appropriate to read a quid pro quo require- ment into the statute for that particular context. See McCormick v. United States, 500 U. S. 257, 273–274 (1991). Cite as: 603 U. S. 1 (2024) 41

gress: that regulation of gratuities is better left to state, local, and tribal governments, rather than the Federal Gov- ernment. See, e. g., ante, at 15, 20. (No word on why the same could not be said for bribes.) If Congress shared those policy concerns, however, it chose not to act upon them in this statute. Instead, Con- gress reached out to regulate state, local, and tribal entities as well as other organizations that receive federal funds, de- spite the fact that those governments do have their own eth- ics regulations, as the majority is quick to point out. And, of course, if the majority is correct about Congress's commit- ment to federalism principles in this area, one wonders why Congress didn't just leave state, local, and tribal entities alone. Quite to the contrary, Congress chose to enact § 666 “to ensure the integrity of organizations participating in federal assistance programs.” Fischer, 529 U. S., at 678. And that choice was intentional—Congress acted to “addres[s] a legiti- mate federal concern by licensing federal prosecution in an area historically of state concern.” Sabri, 541 U. S., at 608, n. Snyder apparently objects to this policy choice, and fur- ther complained below that “Congress ha[d] yet to take up” any invitation “to consider rewriting the provision.” App. 15. Fortunately for him, today's decision by this Court accom- plishes exactly that result.

* * * State, local, and tribal governments have an important role to play in combating public corruption, and, of course, their regulations should refect the values of the communities they serve. I wholeheartedly agree with the majority's sug- gestion that, because employees of those governments are our neighbors, friends, and hometown heroes, federal law ought not be read to subject them to prosecution when grate- ful members of the community show their thanks. See ante, at 5. 42 SNYDER v. UNITED STATES

But nothing about the facts of this case implicates any of that kind of conduct. And the text of § 666 clearly covers the kind of corrupt (albeit perhaps non-quid pro quo) pay- ment Snyder solicited after steering the city contracts to the dealership. Because reading § 666 to prohibit gratuities— just as it always has—poses no genuine threat to common gift giving, but does honor Congress's intent to punish re- wards corruptly accepted by government offcials in ways that are functionally indistinguishable from taking a bribe, I respectfully dissent.

Reporter’s Note

The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant punctuation. The following additional edits were made:

None