Smith v. Whitfield

38 Fla. 211
CourtSupreme Court of Florida
DecidedJune 15, 1896
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 38 Fla. 211 (Smith v. Whitfield) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Smith v. Whitfield, 38 Fla. 211 (Fla. 1896).

Opinion

Mabry, C. J.:

From the transcript of the record filed here in the appeal of Smith against Whitfield and Sanders it appears that an injunction was granted on the original bill filed by Smith, the complainant below and that the court refused to dissolve this injunction on motion made for that purpose. The order of the court allowing this injunction is not found in the record, but the order denying its dissolution is presented. The injunction granted on the amended and supplemental bill was dissolved on the 3d of January, 1896, in the [220]*220same order in which the dissolution of the injunction on the original bill was denied, and it is an alleged violation of the supersedeas based on the appeal from that portion of the order dissolving the injunction that is the subject-matter of the present investigation. The supplemental bill alleges that pending the application for an injunction on the original bill, defendants Whitfield and Sanders dug from the land in question phosphate rock and moved it to other land nearby where they had mining operations, and the injunction granted on this bill was against shipping, removing selling or encumbering the rock that had been so dug and removed. The appeal from the order dissolving the injunction was entered on the 31st of January, 1896, and the supersedeas on this appeal was perfected on the 3d of the following month. Whitfield and Sanders were served with notice of the supersedeas when perfected, but Trubenbaoh was not, and he was not a party to the litigation between them and Smith. The rule charges that Whitfield and Sanders, in open violation of the injunction or supersedeas order, did, on April 11th, 1896, sell, ship and remove about ten car loads — two hundred tons — of the rock from the land therein mentioned, being the same described in the bill, and that Trubenbaoh with knowledge of the injunction and all the proceedings in the cause, aided and assisted them therein. Considered as an entirety, the rule sufficiently alleges that Whitfield and Sanders, on the date mentioned, in violation of the supersedeas order granted, did sell, ship and remove a portion of the rook dog on the land described in the bill, and removed it to land nearby, and that Trubenbaoh, with knowledge, aided and assisted them in so doing.

Dealing with the case against Trubenbaoh'first, it is [221]*221made to appear that he, as agent for the Anglo-Continental U-uano Works, entered into contracts, in December, 1894, with Whitfield and Sanders for the purchase of five thousand tons of phosphate hard rock to be delivered in 1895. The contracts recite that Whitfield and Sanders had, on the dates mentioned, sold to the Anglo-Continental (ruano Works live thousand tons of dried Florida hard rock, of specified quality, and at price mentioned free on cars at a designated place. One-half the rock was to be delivered June-August, and the other half August-October, at buyer’s option, in the year, 1895, and there were stipulations as to the weighing, sampling, analyzing and paying-for the rock. The railroad weights, less one per cent., were to be taken, and the moisture (determined at 212 degs. F.) to be deducted from weight, not to exceed two per cent. The sampling at port of shipment was at sellers’ expense, and certain named persons were to analyze for the respective parties, and in case of difference of more than one per cent, a third analysis was to be made, and the mean of the nearest result taken for the invoice. Payment was to be made net cash on receipt of analysis. The Augnst-October delivery was not made at the time specified in the contract, but the postponement was at the instance and for the convenience of the buyer. In consequence of trouble in securing transportation, or the condition of the market, Trnbenbach asked that the second delivery be postponed, and after some delay Whitfield and Sanders-demanded that the rock be shipped, or paid for without shipping, as they needed money. It appears that advancements of money had been made on the contract,, and some time between the 20th and 27th of January, 1896, Trnbenbach caused an estimate of the rook on [222]*222hand to be made, and upon this estimate paid Whitfield and Sanders $2,600 more on the rock. The latter on the date last mentioned executed and delivered the following paper, viz:

“A. Trubenbach, Esq.,

Agent Anglo-Continental (late Ohlendorffs) Guano Works.

We, the undersigned Whitfield and Sanders, hereby deliver possession to yon of certain phosphate rook (about 3,500 tons) now lying and piled at our mine, Early Bird, Fla., and being the same rock upon which you hold sundry bills of sale or mortgages. We authorize you to remove and dispose of same as you may see fit, you accounting to us for value of said rock against, any indebtedness due upon contract after deducting the necessary expense of removal of said rock from the point where it now lies to the main track of the F. C. & P. R. R.” Trubenbach immediately took possession of the rock under this instrument, posting notices that the same belonged to the Anglo-Continental Guano Works, and retained possession until the rock was removed in April following. All the parties regarded the transaction of January 27th as an absolute transfer of the rock to the Anglo-Continental Guano Works in consideration of what had previously been advanced, and what was at that time paid, on the rock. The estimate upon which the further sum of $2,600 was paid proved to be too large, and Whitfield and Sanders were in fact then over paid for what rock was delivered. On the 6th of April, 1896, Trubenbach instructed one Gibson to load the rock on cars for shipment, and he proceeded to the mine where the rock was situated, some fifteen miles from Ocala, and commenced loading on the 11th of the month. On that [223]*223day five or six cars were loaded, and by the 25th. following all the rock was shipped.- The shipping of the rock was under the exclusive management of Gibson, who was acting under written instructions from Trubenbach, and the testimony shows that the latter had no knowledge, on the 27th of January, 1896, when the transaction of that date took place, of any litigation between Smith and Whitfield and Sanders. He had, of course; no knowledge then of any supersedeas order made in the litigation, as there was none in existence at the time. Whether Trubenbach had knowledge of the supersedeas order on the 6th of April when he directed Gibson to move the rock, is not clear from the evidence. Trubenbach says he did not know of it at that time. Sanders testified that he spoke to him about the injunction against mining 'rock along after Christmas, but did not tell him at any time of the injunction against removing the rock in question. They seem to make a distinction between knowledge of the injunction against mining the land and the supersedeas granted on the order dissolving the one against selling or removing the rock that had been dug and removed from the premises. There are circumstances independent of the testimony of Sanders and Trubenbach bearing on the question of the latter’s knowledge of the supersedeas order when the rock was ordered to be moved by Gibson, but without determining this point, it is clear that when the transaction of January 27th, 1896, took place the injunction against removing the rock had been dissolved, and Trubenbach then' had no knowledge in fact of any litigation between Smith and Whitfield and Sanders. The appeal, subsequently entered from the order dissolving the injunction mentioned did not, of itself, reinstate the injunction, but [224]

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Bluebook (online)
38 Fla. 211, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/smith-v-whitfield-fla-1896.