Singh v. Bondi

Procedural entryThis page is a short order in Singh v. Bondi. Read the opinion of the Court — 130 F.4th 1142
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit·Decided May 20, 2025·No. 23-3854·Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 20 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

GURDEV SINGH, et al., No. 23-3854

Petitioners, Agency Nos. A220-350-486 v. A220-350-485 A220-350-487 PAMELA J. BONDI, A220-350-488 United States Attorney General,

Respondent. MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted May 16, 2025** San Francisco, California

Before: M. SMITH and BRESS, Circuit Judges, and MORRIS, Chief District Judge.***

Petitioners Gurdev Singh (“Singh”), Simarjit Kaur, Sahibjot Singh, and

Arashdeep Kaur (collectively “Petitioners”) seek review of the Board of

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Brian M. Morris, United States District Judge for the District of Montana, sitting by designation. Immigration Appeals (“Board”) decision affirming the Immigration Judge’s denial

of asylum and withholding Singh’s removal to India. Petitioners entered the United

States unlawfully on November 27, 2021, near San Luis, Arizona. The Department

of Homeland Security (“DHS”) issued them Notices to Appear on charges of

inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). Singh sought asylum,

withholding of removal, and Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) protection.1 We

have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1) and deny the petition.

We apply a highly deferential “substantial evidence” standard to the Board

and Immigration Judge’s findings of fact. See Ruiz-Colmenares v. Garland, 25 F.4th

742, 748 (9th Cir. 2022). Their findings of fact are considered “conclusive unless

any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8

U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). We review de novo questions of law. Ruiz-Colmenares, 25

F.4th at 748. When “the [Board] issues its own decision but relies in part on the

immigration judge’s reasoning, we review both decisions.” Tzompantzi-Salazar v.

Garland, 32 F.4th 696, 702 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Flores-Lopez v. Holder, 685

F.3d 857, 861 (9th Cir. 2012)).

1 The Immigration Judge granted Singh withholding of removal, but this form of relief does not extend to his wife and children, who are derivative applicants. In addition, before the Board, Petitioners did not challenge the IJ’s finding that they were ineligible for protection under CAT. This claim is thus unexhausted and forfeited.

2 24-116 An alien is ineligible for asylum if he has “firmly resettled in another country

prior to arriving in the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(vi). Determining

whether the firm resettlement rule applies involves a two-step process: “First, the

government presents ‘evidence of an offer of some type of permanent resettlement,’

and then, second, ‘the burden shifts to the applicant to show that the nature of his [or

her] stay and ties was too tenuous, or the conditions of his [or her] residence too

restricted, for him [or her] to be firmly resettled.’” Arrey v. Barr, 916 F.3d 1149,

1159 (9th Cir. 2019) (alterations in original) (quoting Maharaj v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d

961, 976–77 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc)). The focus of the firm resettlement inquiry is

on whether there has been “an offer of permanent, not temporary, residence in a third

country where the applicant lived peacefully and without restriction.” Maharaj, 450

F.3d at 969; see also Matter of A-G-G-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 486, 501 (B.I.A. 2011).

The Immigration Judge and Board found that the government had met its

burden to provide evidence that Singh was offered some type of permanent

resettlement in Italy. Singh’s long term residence permit and long-standing

connection to Italy provided sufficient evidence to support a finding of firm

resettlement. The burden shifted to Singh to show that he was not offered some type

of permanent residency. Singh failed to rebut the showing that he had firmly resettled

in Italy. Singh freely could travel from India to Italy, two of his children were born

in Italy, his family lived with him for years at a time, he paid taxes to the Italian

3 24-116 government, and he enjoyed rights similar to those of Italian citizens. Singh’s

subjective intent regarding whether to remain in Italy was appropriately disregarded.

“If the government establishes that an applicant has firmly resettled, we then

look to whether the applicant qualifies for either of two exceptions to the firm-

resettlement bar.” Aden v. Wilkinson, 989 F.3d 1073, 1079–80 (9th Cir. 2021). As

relevant here, the “restricted-residence exception” applies if the applicant can show

that a country’s government consciously and substantially restricts their living

circumstances. Id. That exception also assists an applicant who can show future or

past persecution on a statutorily protected ground in the country of resettlement. 8

U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42)(A), 1158(b)(1)(B)(i), 1231(b)(3)(A); see Aden, 989 F.3d at

1080.

The restricted-residence exception does not apply here. Singh freely travelled

between India and Italy between 2002 and 2021. The Italian and Indian governments

did not restrict Singh’s ability to travel during this time frame.

Nor has Singh shown future or past persecution in Italy on a statutorily

protected ground. Singh allegedly was assaulted by the Italian drug mafia in 2021.

Singh failed to report the assault to the Italian police for fear of being assaulted again.

Singh also reported that he received a call, while in Italy, from people claiming to

be members of the Bhartiya Janata Party (“BJP”) in India. Singh alleges the callers

threatened to kill him because he supported the Shiromani Akali Dal Amritsar Mann

4 24-116 Party (“Mann Party”). Singh did not report the threat to the Italian police. Singh

failed to supply evidence that reporting the mafia assault or the BJP threats to the

Italian police would have been futile. Singh failed to establish that the Italian

government would not protect him. Singh also presented no evidence that the Italian

drug mafia were targeting Singh based on any protected ground.

PETITION DENIED.

5 24-116

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A-G-G
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