NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 28 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
PARMINDER SINGH; KULVIR No. 23-4126 KAUR; FATEHVIR SINGH; BIR KAUR, Agency Nos. A241-911-201 Petitioners, A241-911-202 A241-911-203 v. A241-911-204 PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General, MEMORANDUM* Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted March 6, 2025** San Francisco, California
Before: WARDLAW, PAEZ, and LEE, Circuit Judges. Partial Dissent by Judge LEE.
Parminder Singh, his spouse, and his two minor children (“Petitioners”),
natives and citizens of India, petition for review of a decision of the Board of
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing their appeal from the order of an
Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying their applications for asylum and withholding of
removal. Where, as here, the BIA affirms the IJ “and also adds its own reasoning,
we review the decision of the BIA and those parts of the IJ’s decision upon which
it relies.” Duran-Rodriguez v. Barr, 918 F.3d 1025, 1027–28 (9th Cir. 2019). “We
review the BIA’s determinations of purely legal questions de novo, and factual
findings for substantial evidence.” Singh v. Whitaker, 914 F.3d 654, 658 (9th Cir.
2019). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We grant the petition for
review and remand for further proceedings.
1. The BIA’s determination that Singh did not suffer past persecution is
not supported by substantial evidence.1 Singh, who claims persecution on account
of his political opinion as a member of the Mann Party, fled India after he was
repeatedly assaulted and threatened with death by members of the opposing
Bharatiya Janata Party (“BJP”). “[W]hen the incidents [that a petitioner
experienced] have involved physical harm plus something more, such as credible
1 “We have held that ‘[w]hether particular acts constitute persecution for asylum purposes is a legal question reviewed de novo.’” Singh v. Garland, 57 F.4th 643, 651 (9th Cir. 2023) (citation omitted). But, we have also reviewed the agency’s past persecution determination for substantial evidence. Id. at 652. We decline to decide the standard of review here because we would reverse the BIA’s past persecution determination in this case under either standard.
2 23-4126 death threats, we have not hesitated to conclude that the petitioner suffered
persecution.” Aden v. Wilkinson, 989 F.3d 1073, 1082 (9th Cir. 2021).
The IJ assumed that Singh testified credibly. Singh testified that in 2017, he
began organizing and attending Mann Party rallies advocating for the release of
Sikh political prisoners, and for the creation of Khalistan, a separate Sikh state. He
became a Mann Party member in 2018 and helped organize more political rallies in
2018 and 2019. On September 4, 2019, local members of the BJP, the governing
party in the Indian national government, threatened Singh’s mother that if Singh
did not leave the Mann Party, “the consequences will be bad.” In response to this
threat, Singh ceased his political activities for nearly a year, until he helped
organize another Mann Party rally in August 2020.
On October 16, 2020, BJP members kidnapped Singh and took him to the
police station and asked the officers to detain Singh because of his political
activities. The officers complied and then detained, beat, and threatened Singh.
Again, on December 11, 2021, six BJP members attacked Singh after he
participated in a Farmers’ Protest, and they told him that his days were numbered.
Three weeks later, Singh fled to Haryana, another state in India. While he was
away, two BJP members stopped Singh’s wife and asked her where Singh was,
threatening that “[o]nce we find him, we will not leave him alive.” Shortly after
Singh left the house where he had stayed in Haryana, police came to the house and
3 23-4126 asked about him.
Thus, because Singh faced repeated physical violence coupled with several
death threats that were directly tied to his political activities, the record compels
the conclusion that he experienced past persecution. See Aden, 989 F.3d at 1082.
We remand to the BIA to reconsider Singh’s claims for asylum and withholding of
removal. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1). On remand, if Singh is able to demonstrate
that his persecution was “on account of a statutorily protected ground at the hands
of [the government or] individuals whom the government was unable or unwilling
to control,” then the BIA must afford him the “presumption of a well-founded fear
of future persecution.” Singh, 57 F.4th at 657–58 (citation omitted).
2. The BIA erred in determining that Singh could reasonably relocate in
India to avoid future persecution. The BIA improperly placed the burden on Singh
to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he could not reasonably relocate
in India, but the applicable regulation places the burden of proof on the
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) “[i]n cases in which the persecutor is a
government or is government-sponsored.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(3)(ii). Singh
fears persecution by the national governing party of India, as well as by the police,
which are the “prototypical state actor for asylum purposes.” Boer-Sedano v.
Gonzales, 418 F.3d 1082, 1088 (9th Cir. 2005). Because the BIA placed the
burden of proof on the wrong party in its analysis, on remand it shall place the
4 23-4126 burden of demonstrating that relocation is reasonable on the DHS. Singh v.
Garland, 97 F.4th 597, 607–08 (9th Cir. 2024) (granting petition for review and
remanding for the BIA to impose the proper burden in the relocation analysis).
Additionally, the specific factual basis for the BIA’s decision is not supported by
substantial evidence. The BIA states that Petitioners “were able to relocate to
another city in India and live without incident for several months.” However, there
was an incident after he relocated: within a month of his moving, police came
looking for Singh at one of his relative’s homes in Haryana. Further, there is no
evidence that Singh could continue his political activities with the Mann Party
while living in Haryana, and the record shows that Singh moved to Haryana to lay
low after the December 2021 attack. That Singh was not attacked while being in
hiding cannot support the assertion that Singh is able to relocate incident-free. See
Akosung v. Barr, 970 F.3d 1095, 1102 (9th Cir. 2020) (noting that “an applicant
can[not] be said to have the ability to ‘relocate’ within [his] home country if [he]
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 28 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
PARMINDER SINGH; KULVIR No. 23-4126 KAUR; FATEHVIR SINGH; BIR KAUR, Agency Nos. A241-911-201 Petitioners, A241-911-202 A241-911-203 v. A241-911-204 PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General, MEMORANDUM* Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted March 6, 2025** San Francisco, California
Before: WARDLAW, PAEZ, and LEE, Circuit Judges. Partial Dissent by Judge LEE.
Parminder Singh, his spouse, and his two minor children (“Petitioners”),
natives and citizens of India, petition for review of a decision of the Board of
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing their appeal from the order of an
Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying their applications for asylum and withholding of
removal. Where, as here, the BIA affirms the IJ “and also adds its own reasoning,
we review the decision of the BIA and those parts of the IJ’s decision upon which
it relies.” Duran-Rodriguez v. Barr, 918 F.3d 1025, 1027–28 (9th Cir. 2019). “We
review the BIA’s determinations of purely legal questions de novo, and factual
findings for substantial evidence.” Singh v. Whitaker, 914 F.3d 654, 658 (9th Cir.
2019). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We grant the petition for
review and remand for further proceedings.
1. The BIA’s determination that Singh did not suffer past persecution is
not supported by substantial evidence.1 Singh, who claims persecution on account
of his political opinion as a member of the Mann Party, fled India after he was
repeatedly assaulted and threatened with death by members of the opposing
Bharatiya Janata Party (“BJP”). “[W]hen the incidents [that a petitioner
experienced] have involved physical harm plus something more, such as credible
1 “We have held that ‘[w]hether particular acts constitute persecution for asylum purposes is a legal question reviewed de novo.’” Singh v. Garland, 57 F.4th 643, 651 (9th Cir. 2023) (citation omitted). But, we have also reviewed the agency’s past persecution determination for substantial evidence. Id. at 652. We decline to decide the standard of review here because we would reverse the BIA’s past persecution determination in this case under either standard.
2 23-4126 death threats, we have not hesitated to conclude that the petitioner suffered
persecution.” Aden v. Wilkinson, 989 F.3d 1073, 1082 (9th Cir. 2021).
The IJ assumed that Singh testified credibly. Singh testified that in 2017, he
began organizing and attending Mann Party rallies advocating for the release of
Sikh political prisoners, and for the creation of Khalistan, a separate Sikh state. He
became a Mann Party member in 2018 and helped organize more political rallies in
2018 and 2019. On September 4, 2019, local members of the BJP, the governing
party in the Indian national government, threatened Singh’s mother that if Singh
did not leave the Mann Party, “the consequences will be bad.” In response to this
threat, Singh ceased his political activities for nearly a year, until he helped
organize another Mann Party rally in August 2020.
On October 16, 2020, BJP members kidnapped Singh and took him to the
police station and asked the officers to detain Singh because of his political
activities. The officers complied and then detained, beat, and threatened Singh.
Again, on December 11, 2021, six BJP members attacked Singh after he
participated in a Farmers’ Protest, and they told him that his days were numbered.
Three weeks later, Singh fled to Haryana, another state in India. While he was
away, two BJP members stopped Singh’s wife and asked her where Singh was,
threatening that “[o]nce we find him, we will not leave him alive.” Shortly after
Singh left the house where he had stayed in Haryana, police came to the house and
3 23-4126 asked about him.
Thus, because Singh faced repeated physical violence coupled with several
death threats that were directly tied to his political activities, the record compels
the conclusion that he experienced past persecution. See Aden, 989 F.3d at 1082.
We remand to the BIA to reconsider Singh’s claims for asylum and withholding of
removal. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1). On remand, if Singh is able to demonstrate
that his persecution was “on account of a statutorily protected ground at the hands
of [the government or] individuals whom the government was unable or unwilling
to control,” then the BIA must afford him the “presumption of a well-founded fear
of future persecution.” Singh, 57 F.4th at 657–58 (citation omitted).
2. The BIA erred in determining that Singh could reasonably relocate in
India to avoid future persecution. The BIA improperly placed the burden on Singh
to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he could not reasonably relocate
in India, but the applicable regulation places the burden of proof on the
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) “[i]n cases in which the persecutor is a
government or is government-sponsored.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(3)(ii). Singh
fears persecution by the national governing party of India, as well as by the police,
which are the “prototypical state actor for asylum purposes.” Boer-Sedano v.
Gonzales, 418 F.3d 1082, 1088 (9th Cir. 2005). Because the BIA placed the
burden of proof on the wrong party in its analysis, on remand it shall place the
4 23-4126 burden of demonstrating that relocation is reasonable on the DHS. Singh v.
Garland, 97 F.4th 597, 607–08 (9th Cir. 2024) (granting petition for review and
remanding for the BIA to impose the proper burden in the relocation analysis).
Additionally, the specific factual basis for the BIA’s decision is not supported by
substantial evidence. The BIA states that Petitioners “were able to relocate to
another city in India and live without incident for several months.” However, there
was an incident after he relocated: within a month of his moving, police came
looking for Singh at one of his relative’s homes in Haryana. Further, there is no
evidence that Singh could continue his political activities with the Mann Party
while living in Haryana, and the record shows that Singh moved to Haryana to lay
low after the December 2021 attack. That Singh was not attacked while being in
hiding cannot support the assertion that Singh is able to relocate incident-free. See
Akosung v. Barr, 970 F.3d 1095, 1102 (9th Cir. 2020) (noting that “an applicant
can[not] be said to have the ability to ‘relocate’ within [his] home country if [he]
would have to remain in hiding there”); Singh, 57 F.4th at 658 (same); Singh, 97
F.4th at 608 (requiring the BIA to analyze whether Singh could continue party
activities wherever he went).
PETITION GRANTED; REMANDED.2
2 Singh’s Motion to Stay Removal (Dkt. 4) is denied as moot.
5 23-4126 FILED MAR 28 2025 Parminder Singh v. Bondi, No. 23-4126 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK LEE, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part: U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
I agree that we must grant and remand Singh’s petition as to the internal
relocation question. But I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that Singh faced
past persecution. While the majority describes some facts supporting a claim of past
persecution, the record also contains substantial evidence refuting it. Given that
mixed evidence, I cannot say that the record “compels” a conclusion contrary to the
BIA’s. Sharma v. Garland, 9 F.4th 1052, 1060 (9th Cir. 2021).
For instance, the two threats and two physical attacks took place over the span
of almost three years. Despite traveling back and forth to a farmers’ protest in Delhi
for a year, Singh faced trouble on the road only once. He suffered no injuries from
either attack except for bruises and, in his words, a “very small amount” of blood on
his legs after the police detention. See Sharma, 9 F.4th at 1063 (no past persecution
where petitioner suffered no injuries from beating during police detention). That
detention lasted less than 24 hours, see Gu v. Gonzales, 454 F.3d 1014, 1017 (9th
Cir. 2006) (no past persecution despite police detaining petitioner for three days),
and the police never charged him with any crimes, see Prasad v. I.N.S, 47 F.3d 336,
339 (9th Cir. 1995) (no past persecution where petitioner was never charged with a
crime after police detention). Further, none of Singh’s family members were harmed
or threatened.
I thus respectfully dissent in part.