Singh v. Bondi

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedFebruary 7, 2025
Docket23-3070
StatusUnpublished

This text of Singh v. Bondi (Singh v. Bondi) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Singh v. Bondi, (9th Cir. 2025).

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 7 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

GAGANDEEP SINGH, No. 23-3070 Agency No. Petitioner, A215-674-305 v. MEMORANDUM*

PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted February 3, 2025** San Francisco, California

Before: McKEOWN, FORREST, and SANCHEZ, Circuit Judges.

Gagandeep Singh, a native and citizen of India, seeks review of an order of

the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming denial by an immigration

judge (“IJ”) of Singh’s applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and

protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Singh, a Sikh man,

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** We granted the parties’ joint motion to submit this case on the briefs, without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). alleges that he was physically attacked and threatened by members of the Indian

National Congress (“Congress”) and Bharatiya Janata Party (“BJP”) parties, once

in October 2017 and once in January 2018, because of his work for and

membership in the opposition Mann party. When he went to the police, Singh

claims they refused to make a report and instead threatened to manufacture a false

case against him. After he left India, party members questioned one of his

neighbors about his whereabouts and visited his family home during the election

season. Police, too, came to the family home “during the election time” and

“inquired about” Singh.

The IJ determined that Singh’s testimony was not credible, identifying three

contributing factors to this determination: Singh’s inconsistent account of

harassment of his family after he left India; a lack of certain corroborative

evidence; and his testimony about medical treatment he received after an alleged

attack by Congress and BJP party members. Singh challenges this determination.

We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. Where, as here, the BIA affirms

without opinion, the IJ’s decision is the final agency determination. 8 C.F.R.

§ 1003.1(e)(4). We review de novo the agency’s legal conclusions, and we review

for substantial evidence its factual findings and credibility determinations.

Plancarte Sauceda v. Garland, 23 F.4th 824, 831 (9th Cir. 2022); Lalayan v.

Garland, 4 F.4th 822, 826 (9th Cir. 2021). We deny the petition.

2 23-3070 The IJ identified internal inconsistencies in Singh’s account of his family’s

treatment by police and by party members after his departure from India. Singh’s

account was also inconsistent with affidavits from a friend and local leader on this

issue. These inconsistencies are unexplained and non-“trivial.” Shrestha v. Holder,

590 F.3d 1034, 1044 (9th Cir. 2010).

The IJ also found internal inconsistency in Singh’s two explanations for his

failure to provide the court with an affidavit from his parents about their treatment

since his departure. Considering the “ample deference” given to the agency’s

credibility determinations under the REAL ID Act, we credit the IJ’s conclusion as

reasonably based on the totality of the circumstances. Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1044.

However, contrary to the IJ’s finding, we determine that “any reasonable

adjudicator” would be “compelled to conclude” that Singh’s statements regarding

his medical treatment were consistent, both internally and with the documentary

evidence. Yali Wang v. Sessions, 861 F.3d 1003, 1007 (9th Cir. 2017) (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted). Singh’s affidavit and testimony on direct

examination omitted a detail regarding medical treatment he received after his first

attack: a brief stop to pick up medicine from a clinic. When specifically questioned

about this omission, which was neither self-serving nor weighty, Singh provided a

detailed narrative of the visit that was consistent with documentary evidence,

including a letter from his doctor and an affidavit from the friend who drove him to

3 23-3070 the clinic. Singh explained his initial omission by noting that the treatment he

received after his second attack was far more intrusive and much longer, and that

he did not consider picking up a few “tablets” of medicine to qualify as formal

medical treatment. While “an IJ cannot be required to accept as true any internally

consistent story from the asylum seeker,” the IJ provided no rationale for its

finding that Singh’s ultimate testimony was not reasonable or plausible. Yali Wang,

861 F.3d at 1008 (internal marks and citations omitted).

However, the remaining evidence of inconsistency is substantial, such that

the IJ’s adverse credibility determination is “supported by the totality of the

circumstances.” Kumar v. Garland, 18 F.4th 1148, 1151 (9th Cir. 2021) (citing

Alam v. Garland, 11 F.4th 1133, 1137 (9th Cir. 2021) (en banc)). The IJ identified

“specific and cogent reasons” for its ultimate credibility determination, which only

“the most extraordinary circumstances” warrant overturning. Shrestha, 590 F.3d at

1041–42 (quoting Jibril v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 1129, 1138 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005)).

We deny Singh’s asylum petition based on the adverse credibility

determination. His remaining claim for withholding of removal necessarily fails.

See Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 351, 360 (9th Cir. 2017) (noting the “more

demanding standard of proof in the withholding statute” for likelihood of

persecution). So does Singh’s claim for CAT relief, because the record does not

compel a conclusion that he would likely be tortured by or with the consent or

4 23-3070 acquiescence of the Indian government. See Lalayan, 4 F.4th at 840 (“An adverse

credibility determination does not, by itself, necessarily defeat a CAT

claim . . . [b]ut . . . to reverse the BIA’s decision . . . we would have to find that the

[evidence] alone compelled the [contrary] conclusion”) (internal quotation marks

and citations omitted).

PETITION DENIED.

5 23-3070

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Shrestha v. Holder
590 F.3d 1034 (Ninth Circuit, 2010)
Raul Barajas-Romero v. Loretta E. Lynch
846 F.3d 351 (Ninth Circuit, 2017)
Yali Wang v. Jefferson Sessions
861 F.3d 1003 (Ninth Circuit, 2017)
Zhirayr Lalayan v. Merrick Garland
4 F.4th 822 (Ninth Circuit, 2021)
Morshed Alam v. Merrick Garland
11 F.4th 1133 (Ninth Circuit, 2021)
Bhupinder Kumar v. Merrick Garland
18 F.4th 1148 (Ninth Circuit, 2021)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Singh v. Bondi, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/singh-v-bondi-ca9-2025.