Shaw v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co.

164 A. 916, 310 Pa. 213, 1932 Pa. LEXIS 766
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania·Decided October 12, 1932·No. Appeal, 203·Published·Cited by 10 cases

Opinion

Opinion by

Mr. Justice Kephart,

Appellant gave its bond to secure the .payment of rent. It contained the following condition: “That upon the *215 obligee’s becoming aware of any default in any of the covenants and conditions of the lease, either in the payments or the performance by the said Halle......the said obligee shall give immediate notice thereof in writing to the surety......and if said notice is not given within thirty days after the discovery of such breach ......then this bond shall be void.” The difference between the parties is over the word “default” in the bond. Appellant urges that any default on the day fixed for payment was within the meaning of the bond though the rent was paid the following day or later, while appellee contends that “default” does not contemplate a mere failure to pay on the due day but means a default in the payment of any month’s rent which the surety is called on to pay.

In surety or other contracts where the parties prescribe fixed times for notice of loss or default and also provide that if notice is not given within the prescribed time the contract shall be void, or there shall be no right of action on it, the terms of the contract require the courts to enforce the forfeiture: Coventry Mut. Live Stock Ins. Assn. v. Evans, 102 Pa. 281, 284; Windsor Mfg. Co. v. Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co., 277 Pa. 374, 379. Where the language is clear and unambiguous there is no doubt that this rule should be carried out literally: U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Rice, 148 Fed. 206; Odegard v. General Casualty & Surety Co., 44 Fed. (2d) 31, 34, but we encounter difficulties in the bond and lease which do not permit the application of these principles.

There is no effort to collect on the bond except for rent in default for which proper notice was given, but it is the position of the surety that for two years prior to July, 1931 (the beginning of appellee’s claim), rents fell due which were not promptly paid on the due date though they were later paid; that the failure to give notice of the first breach, August, 1929, rendered the bond null and void according to its tenor, and, once void, it is *216 immaterial whether notice was given of defaults occurring in the lease subsequent to that time. The rule of strict construction which applies to contracts of accommodation sureties does not apply to those of compensated sureties; such instruments are liberally construed and the surety may be relieved only by showing a material variance prejudicial to his rights: Young v. American Bonding Co., 228 Pa. 373; Sokoloff v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N. Y., 288 Pa. 211; S. Phila. State Bank v. Nat. Surety Co., 288 Pa. 300; Purdy v. Massey, 306 Pa. 288.

If a contract is ambiguous as to what shall constitute a default, strict enforcement of forfeiture for failure to give notice of any default should not be permitted. The bond provides that on default immediate notice in writing shall be given and if notice is not given thirty days after discovery then the bond shall be null and void. Here is an ambiguity as to when the notice shall be given: was it immediate or thirty days after failure to pay on the due date or thirty days after the landlord learned that the tenant did not intend to pay? When the interpretation of a contract is doubtful it is strictly construed against the party who used the ambiguous language: Coates v. Cotteral, 290 Pa. 237; Sunseri v. Garcia & Maggini Co., 298 Pa. 249.

Assuming for the moment that there is no ambiguity, a reasonable and fair interpretation of the bond inclines one to the belief that the failure to give notice of a certain default would destroy liability only for the particular default in question, but would not prevent recovery for other defaults where due notice was given: 30 C. J. 171. Bearing in mind that the law abhors forfeiture, this interpretation becomes more certain from the lease which the bond secured. The bond and the lease must be construed together as relating to the same matter. It is fair to presume the parties had in contemplation the liability incurred by- the primary instrument, the lease, and a .construction should be adopted *217 which effects that intention unless it does violence to the instruments involved. A principal should not be held liable beyond the precise terms of his contract. Under a strict literal interpretation of the bond, such as the surety urges, it would fail of its purpose, and this certainly was not the intention of the parties; unless immediate notice was given of a breach of one of the many covenants by lessee, no matter how trivial, the bond would be void. As stated above the lease and bond should have a reasonable interpretation consistent with all matters involved therein and the word “default” must be related to the lease in its entirety.

The lease provides: “If any part of the rent shall be in arrears' and unpaid......then in any such case the rent for the entire unexpired part of the term...... shall at once become due and payable...... In case of a breach by lessee of any of the covenants......lessor may terminate this lease...... Upon the expiration or other determination of this lease, any attorney may appear for lessee in an amicable action of ejectment...... and......confess judgment...... If the rent...... shall not be paid promptly......any attorney...... may confess judgment......for the amount so owing or any parts thereof...... In case any one or more of the foregoing judgments shall be confessed...... In every suit or action......lessor shall have the right to recover an attorney’s commission of $50...... The acceptance of rent......shall not be deemed a waiver of the right to terminate this lease...... In case of a breach......lessor may elect that......the rent shall be increased.”

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Shaw v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 164 A. 916, 310 Pa. 213, 1932 Pa. LEXIS 766 (Pa. 1932).

164 A. 916 (Shaw v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Koss v. Commissioner
1989 T.C. Memo. 330 (U.S. Tax Court, 1989)
Fidelity Fund, Inc. v. Di Santo
500 A.2d 431 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1985)
Kalina v. Eckert
497 A.2d 1384 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1985)
Miller v. Richland Greens Golf Center, Inc.
75 Pa. D. & C.2d 454 (Cambria County Court of Common Pleas, 1974)
Haddock Construction Co. v. Wilber
169 P.2d 599 (Oregon Supreme Court, 1946)
Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission v. Girard Construction Co.
38 Pa. D. & C. 1 (Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, 1940)
Dairymen's Co-Operative Sales Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co.
11 F. Supp. 423 (W.D. Pennsylvania, 1934)
Philadelphia v. National Surety Co.
173 A. 181 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1934)
Gentile v. American State Bank & Trust Co.
172 A. 303 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1934)
Keowee Textile Co. v. Noggle
20 Pa. D. & C. 480 (Lancaster County Court of Common Pleas, 1934)