Nelson, Justice.
Appeals from two separate orders denying motions by two sets of defendants for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial.
This action grows out of the collision of plaintiff’s tractor-trailer unit with the rear end of another tractor-trailer unit which was parked on the concrete pavement directly behind still another tractor-trailer unit which was disabled. All three units were headed in the same direction. Plaintiff, the owner and driver of a tractor en route from Winnipeg to Arkansas with a trailer loaded with 15 tons of eggs, was proceeding easterly on Highway No. 10. At a point about one mile east of the village of Bluffton, Minnesota, or about four miles west of Wadena, he collided with the rear end of a tractor-trailer unit operated by defendant Williamson. The latter unit, owned by the defendant Farmers Union Federated Co-op Shipping Association, was parked in its driving lane on the concrete pavement directly behind a disabled third unit driven by defendant [317]*317Sime. Defendant Shue, who owned his tractor, was hauling defendant Seath’s trailer which was used to transport property of the defendant National Eeefer Service, Inc. For convenience herein we shall refer to the disabled unit which was parked first in line on the pavement as the Shue unit; the second parked vehicle, not a disabled unit, will be designated as the Williamson unit; and plaintiff’s approaching vehicle will be referred to as the Shastid unit or simply as the plaintiff.
The accident occurred about midnight on January 21, 1954. Highway No. 10, at the locus of the accident, consists of a 22-foot wide concrete pavement flanked on each side with a tarvia-surfaced shoulder 7% feet wide. It was a clear, bright night. The pavement was free of ice and in excellent condition for travel. Likewise, the tarvia road shoulders were in excellent condition for use. Although the night was clear, the atmospheric conditions were not ordinary. The night was bitterly cold with a 40-degree below zero temperature. Travel on highways naturally became more difficult under those conditions. Shue had been having engine trouble because the congealing of the fuel in the fuel line restricted the flow of the gas to the carburetor. At a point approximately one-half mile east of the foot of a slight incline, and from 1,000 to 1,300 feet west of the crest of the same incline, or about one mile east of Bluffton, Shue’s engine stopped abruptly with the result that his unit was left standing on the pavement directly in the middle of the eastbound traffic lane. As he came to a stop, he saw in his rearview mirror the Williamson unit approaching from behind. He immediately blinked his lights on and off as a signal to Williamson. The latter heeded the signal and brought his unit to a halt five or six feet directly behind the Shue unit. In other words, both vehicles were then standing still, tandem fashion, in the center of the eastbound traffic lane. As soon as Williamson stopped, Shue, without first attempting to set out flares, ran back to Williamson to ask for a push to Wadena or a push onto the shoulder of the road. As he jumped up on Williamson’s running board he heard a noise and looked around to the rear where he saw Shastid’s unit approaching. [318]*318Shue testified that Williamson immediately began working his traffic signals and that they were in fact working. The Shastid unit continued to approach at a speed of about 40 to 45 miles per hour.
Plaintiff testified that he did not at any time see any lights on the rear end of the Williamson unit. The rear of the Williamson unit was a dirty gray color so as to blend into the color of the concrete pavement. Photographs submitted in evidence show a dark-colored undercarriage on the Williamson unit, but apparently the appearance of the rear of the trailer in the middle of the night would not be significantly changed by the black undercarriage. There was snow on the back of the truck. Plaintiff testified that the Shue and Williamson units, which were stopped on the incline, backgrounded against the concrete highway and did not produce a silhouette, visible to him, against the sky. This may to some extent be at odds with the physical possibilities and of course conflicts with the views contended for by defendants. Both Shue and Williamson testified that the lights were burning on the Williamson unit, but there is no testimony that either, immediately before the collision, had viewed the Williamson trailer directly from the rear. The trailer bodies were both about 8 feet wide and Shout 12 feet high and therefore the Williamson trailer concealed the rear lights of the Shue unit. In addition to plaintiff’s testimony that there were no “lights showing or displayed on the back of that trailer” visible to him, plaintiff further testified that there were “no flares or fuses or signals of any kind” visible to him while moving toward the stalled vehicles. Because of the 40-degree below zero temperature, there were certain mechanical disabilities in the units involved in the accident, including a frozen or near-frozen fifth wheel on the Shastid unit.
Plaintiff testified that as he approached defendants’ trailers, for the last 250 feet or more, he was watching “right down the road” but that they did not come into view until he was within 75 feet, and immediately prior to the collision, while he was driving his unit at a speed of about 40 miles per hour. He had placed his lights on low beam when he passed an approaching car shortly before the [319]*319accident. He had kept the lights on low beam because he thought another car was approaching. While proceeding up the slight upgrade, plaintiff admits that with his lights on dim he could easily distinguish objects — such as mailboxes — up to a distance of 250 or 300 feet ahead. Despite such unimpeded vision for at least 250 feet, plaintiff testified that he proceeded along his traffic lane without the Williamson unit becoming visible to him until it was only 75 feet away. According to his own testimony, he traveled another 40 or 45 feet before he reacted by attempting to apply the brakes and to turn to the left. In the remaining 30 feet he turned about four feet to the left with the result that the right front of his tractor struck the Williamson unit and drove the same against the Shue unit. Apparently plaintiff’s brakes did not take hold until approximately the moment of the impact.
The testimony of the state highway patrolman, who was called to the scene of the accident shortly after its occurrence, to some extent corroborated plaintiff’s claim that the trailer and highway were of a color that might cause them to blend. He testified:
“Q. And tell us if you can how that color of that trailer compared with respect to the color of the concrete highway there?
“A. Well, aluminum when it is new is bright and shiny but as it is used it darkens and it takes on a gray color and the highway, of course, is gray, the concrete highway.”
The testimony of a Wadena police officer, who was at the scene of the accident shortly after its occurrence, was to the same effect. He testified as follows:
“Q. How did it [the trailer] compare with the color of the concrete there, Mr. Warwick?
“A. Well, it would be somewhat of the same color, I would say, in the condition that it was in.”
There is also support for this contention in the testimony of the defendant Shue that with the snow on his truck it was just about the color of the highway. Likewise, photographs submitted in evidence show a dark-colored undercarriage on the Williamson trailer [320]*320and the usual highway discoloration which matches the approximate parking alignment at the time of the accident.
In view of such evidence it would seem that whether the Williamson trailer was silhouetted against the sky, taking into account the manner of the tandem parking of the two tractor-trailers with their forward lights on, or whether it was obscured within the color of the concrete highway or through a blending with it, so as to excuse plaintiff’s failure to observe it sooner, were questions for the jury’s determination.
The accident occurred about a quarter of a mile before the crest of a moderate three-quarter-mile incline. The record is silent as to the topography of fluctuation of the incline. There is nothing to indicate that it was wholly of an even plane to the extent the defendants suggest. It is often true that highways appearing even and level may actually undulate to an extent almost inperceptible to the eye. Such variations may result in material and sometimes substantial differences in the appearance of vehicles traveling or parked thereon as they fall within the range of the headlights of other vehicles approaching them. Whether such was the situation here and, if so, whether it might further excuse plaintiff’s failure to observe the trailer sooner seem likewise proper issues for a jury’s determination.
With reference to reflectorized warning signals on the Williamson trailer, we feel that there also a jury issue was indicated. Plaintiff testified that his view was directly forward; that he had good vision; and that he saw no lights either operating or displayed upon the trailer. Photographs taken immediately after the accident indicate that the rear of the Williamson trailer, including its rear lights, was partially covered with snow and dirt. It seems clear therefrom that a jury may have properly concluded that the position and condition of the required reflectors were such as to render them ineffective as warning signals and thus further excuse plaintiff’s failure to observe the trailer until almost upon it.
We have frequently held that distractions occasioned by the lights of approaching vehicles or other objects on the highway may [321]*321constitute circumstances which, a jury might find, excused a driver’s failure to observe a car on the highway before him. Johnson v. Kutches, 205 Minn. 383, 285 N. W. 881; Brown v. Raymond Bros. Motor Transp. Inc. 186 Minn. 321, 243 N. W. 112. It is true that plaintiff here admitted he could see mailboxes, houses, trees, poles, and like objects located to the sides of the highway for a distance of 250 to 300 feet, but his ability to do this would not seem to lead to an absolute conclusion that the trailer parked on the highway would likewise appear within his view at about the same distance, in view of the evidence that because of its color it may have been so merged and blended with the highway as to become indistinct. Further, plaintiff testified that before the collision he had “just met an automobile or vehicle down the road between the little bridge down there and the scene of the accident”; that he had then switched his lights to dim and was traveling thus at the time of the accident because “up ahead of me it looked to me like lights coming over a grade and I didn’t switch them back on bright.” Within the principles outlined in the decisions above cited, all such factors would appear to give rise to an issue as to whether there were distracting circumstances present which may have been the cause of plaintiff’s failure to sooner observe the trailer.
The Shue unit was stopped on the pavement with the Williamson unit approaching from the rear and finally stopping within six feet of the Shue unit. Both trucks had headlights shining out ahead of the unit. The Williamson headlights conceivably were reflected off the rear of the Shue unit. The shining of the lights could, no doubt in some respects, be seen from the rear. All of these factors could have contributed to the plaintiff’s impression that he was merely meeting another vehicle coming from the opposite direction, especially when coupled with the driver’s normal expectation of not finding other vehicles stopped dead in the middle of the driving lane. Of course, all of these factors were for the consideration of the jury. As pointed out by the trial court in its instructions to the jury:
[322]*322“* * * It should not be difficult for you to form a mental picture of the situation and of the events that occurred at the time and place in question. I presume that each and everyone present has upon many occasions met vehicles of this kind as they traverse our highways at all times of the day and night and in all kinds of weather.”
We must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. We have often said that it is only where evidence of contributory negligence is so clear and conclusive as to leave no room for differences of opinion among reasonable men that a court may enter the province of the jury in determining the issue. Carpenter v. Birkholm, 242 Minn. 379, 65 N. W. (2d) 250; Johnson v. Mancilman, 241 Minn. 461, 63 N. W. (2d) 569; Ryan v. Griffin, 241 Minn. 91, 62 N. W. (2d) 504; Schleuder v. Soltow, 239 Minn. 453, 59 N. W. (2d) 320; Ranum v. Swenson, 220 Minn. 170, 19 N. W. (2d) 327. Likewise, we have held one is not bound at all times or under all circumstances to discover at his peril every obstruction to travel within the range of his headlights. Twa v. Northland Greyhound Lines, Inc. 201 Minn. 234, 275 N. W. 846. The case of Orrvar v. Morgan, 189 Minn. 306, 249 N. W. 42, relied upon by defendants, appears distinguishable under the facts here present. In that case plaintiff testified that he could only see 25 to 40 feet ahead of him with his traveling lights tilted downward. Testimony of a mechanic, however, clearly established that the lights cast a ray sufficient to light the highway for a distance of 150 feet ahead. Plaintiff offered no explanation of his failure to see a truck parked on the highway ahead of him. There was no claim that it blended with the highway or that other distracting circumstances may have excused his observation thereof.
The decision of this court in Vogel v. Nash-Finch Co. 196 Minn. 509, 265 N. W. 350, wherein the Orrvar case was distinguished and a verdict in favor of the plaintiff was sustained, appears applicable. There we held that because a jury might find that the driver of the parked car had obscured its taillight from plaintiff’s oncoming vehicle, and because the color of the parked car may have caused [323]*323it to blend with the highway, the issue of plaintiff’s contributory negligence was one for the jury’s determination. In Jurgensen v. Schirmer Transp. Co. 242 Minn. 157, 162, 64 N. W. (2d) 530, 534, we limited the Orrvar case as follows:
“* * * We feel that the Orrvar case has been distinguished so often that it can no longer be considered, as an authority except in the limited field covered by its facts.” (Italics supplied.)
In Orrvar v. Morgan, supra, this court reasoned that the driver of plaintiff’s car either must not have been maintaining a proper lookout or was traveling so fast that he could not stop within the range of his vision. The evidence in the instant case does not establish either of those conditions conclusively, thus the issue of contributory negligence as well as the issue of negligence was properly left to the jury by the court below.
More recently in Schubitzke v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. R. Co. 244 Minn. 156, 160, 69 N. W. (2d) 104, 107, we stated:
“To adopt the ‘range of vision’ rule as a rigid formula to be applied regardless of the circumstances would be unnecessarily severe as well as impractical in many situations. In accordance with the more recent decisions of this and other courts, * * * the determination in each case should be made on the basis of the underlying concept involved, namely: Did the driver adhere to the standard of care to be expected from a reasonably prudent person under similar circumstances? If, under the particular facts of a given case, the failure to drive within the range of vision does not conclusively constitute a deviation from the standard of care exercised by the ordinarily prudent person, then the driver’s failure to operate the vehicle at such a speed should be submitted to the jury merely as evidence bearing on his negligence. To do otherwise would be to apply an arbitrary standard of behavior without regard to surrounding circumstances — a policy which we have expressly denounced.”
Because of the evidence above outlined, and in view of the limited application of the Orrvar case, it is somewhat difficult to escape the [324]*324conclusion that the issue of plaintiff’s contributory negligence was properly one for the jury.
In its instructions to the jury, the court stated:
“A sudden emergency exists when the driver of a motor vehicle is suddenly placed in a position of imminent peril, great mental stress, or danger, which situation has not been brought about by his own negligence, but in which instant action is necessary to avoid a threatened danger. A lesser degree of care may then be sufficient, but the driver must use that care which the ordinarily prudent person would exercise under like or similar circumstances. One suddenly confronted with a peril through no fault of his own, who in attempting to escape does not choose the best or safest way should not be held negligent because of such choice, unless it was so hazardous that an ordinarily prudent person would not have made [it] under similar circumstances.
“You may or may not find that an emergency presented itself in this case, but if you should find that there was an emergency and that it was caused by the negligent act or omission of one of the parties, then that party could not claim the benefit of the emergency rule that I have just explained to you, because the rule applies to a situation not brought about by the negligence of the individual seeking the benefit of the rule.”
Defendants assign as error that portion of the above instruction to the effect that: “A lesser degree of care may then be sufficient * * * » They concede that the remainder of the instructions constitute a correct statement of the emergency rule. If the instructions on the emergency rule are viewed as a whole, they can hardly be construed otherwise than as conveying to the jury the plain meaning that the degree of care required of a driver confronted with an emergency is that which an ordinarily prudent person would exercise under like or similar circumstances. They clearly point out to the jury that a driver when confronted with an emergency is only required to exercise that degree of care which an ordinarily prudent person would exercise under the circumstances created by the emergency.
[325]*325It is an established rule of negligence law in Minnesota “that one, suddenly confronted by a peril, through no fault of his own, who in the attempt to escape does not choose the best or safest way, should not be held negligent because of such choice unless it was so hazardous that the ordinarily prudent person would not have made it under similar conditions.” Johnson v. Townsend, 195 Minn. 107, 110, 261 N. W. 859, 861; Cosgrove v. McGonagle, 196 Minn. 6, 13, 264 N. W. 134, 138; Carlson v. Sanitary Farm Dairies, Inc. 200 Minn. 177, 184, 273 N. W. 665, 669. The trial judge instructed the jury that they “may or may not find that an emergency presented itself in this case * * *.” Although it is established that one who has contributed to the predicament with which he was confronted was not entitled to have his case considered under the sudden emergency rule, Lee v. Zaske, 213 Minn. 244, 6 N. W. (2d) 793, there appears to be doubt as to whether plaintiff contributed to his predicament. By not giving the emergency rule instruction, the trial judge would in effect have found the plaintiff guilty of what is tantamount to contributory negligence as a matter of law.
This court in Erickson v. St. Paul & D. R. Co. 41 Minn. 500, 506, 43 N. W. 332, 334, 5 L. R. A. 786, as regards an instruction submitting the emergency rule said:
“The sixth and last instruction complained of is but an elaborate statement of the familiar principle that where a person through the negligence of another is suddenly placed in a position of great and imminent danger, in which he is compelled, in an instant, and under the influence of excitement and fear, to decide upon and choose the means of escape, he is not required to exercise the degree of care which a person would if possessed of coolness and presence of mind, but only such care as would be exercised by persons of ordinary prudence placed in the same circumstances, and under a like necessity of immediate decision and action.” (Italics supplied.)
The approved instruction in connection with an emergency as found in Johnson v. Townsend, 195 Minn. 107, 261 N. W. 859, was recited as a part of the charge to the jury. We have held that, if the instructions as a whole convey to the jury a correct statement of [326]*326the law applicable, they will not be disturbed because a part thereof taken out of contest when considered alone might appear to convey a different meaning. We have said that instructions to the jury must be construed together and prove sufficient if, when construed as a whole, they properly state the law. Instructions to the jury must be analyzed as a whole and cannot be successfully attacked by lifting a statement out of contest.1 We find no material or prejudicial error because of the isolated statement referred to above.
The questions on this appeal are not uncommon. Speaking generally, the primary problem is what was the prosimate cause of the accident. “The word ‘prosimate,’ for the want of a better one, is generally used to designate the legal cause of an injury. The prosimate cause is that which caused injury directly and immediately or through natural sequence of events without intervening independent efficient cause,* * *.” 13 Dunnell, Dig. (3 ed.) § 7000. The subject of legal cause is inherently difficult, but much of its difficulty is due to the want of apt terminology. Negligence or an act in violation of statute is not actionable unless it was the prosimate cause of the injury charged, even though the negligent act or omission is declared by statute to be negligence per se. 13 Dunnell, Dig. (3 ed.) § 6999.
The trial judge decided that, under the peculiar circumstances of this case, the issues of negligence, contributory negligence, and prosimate cause were not free from doubt and were for the jury to decide. It seems, a reasonable conclusion, that much here depended upon the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony — matters solely for the consideration of the jury.
Defendants contend, in substance, that the evidence conclusively shows that plaintiff knew or should have known of the presence of the Williamson and Shue units long before he reached them; that he had ample time to stop or slow down and thus avoid colliding with the Williamson unit; and that his failure so to do was negli[327]*327gen.ce as a matter of law and the sole proximate, or at least a contributing, cause of the accident.
Plaintiff contends that defendant Shue was guilty of violation of the Highway Traffic Regulation Act. M. S. A. 169.75 prescribes that, when motor trucks or tractors of the type are operated on the night in question, they must carry flares or other signals as prescribed by statute as a part of the equipment. They must have the same on hand a half hour after sunset to a half hour before sunrise in sufficient number to be put to use if the motor truck or tractor is disabled and cannot immediately be removed from the main traveled portion of the highway, outside of a business district. The required flares or signals must be placed, as required by § 169.75, subd. 5, 100 feet in advance and 100 feet to the rear of the vehicle, and there is no distinction made therein as to whether the night when the motor truck is disabled be a clear or a dark night. Their use is prescribed for nighttime travel, and the matter of the clearness of the night and the visibility thus afforded can only go to the degree to which the act, if a violation, was blameworthy. It is not beyond doubt that the Shue and Williamson units were so disabled and especially the latter that they found it impossible to drive off the main traveled portion of the highway and thus were guilty of prima facie evidence of negligence in violation of § 169.32. This provision of the Highway Traffic Regulation Act prohibits stopping on the main traveled portion of the highway when it is practical to stop off such part of the highway unless the vehicle is disabled and found impossible to drive off the main traveled portion of the highway. The situation here gave rise to plaintiff’s contention that the defendants created a hazardous condition amounting to an emergency requiring only acts necessary in an emergency situation; and that whether, under the circumstances, plaintiff was negligent in failing to avoid a collision with the Williamson unit, whether if so his negligence caused or contributed to the accident, and whether the negligence of the defendants in parking as they did and where they did, without setting out flares, was the cause of the accident, were questions for the jury and not for the court.
[328]*328There is a striking similarity in the facts with the case of Johnson v. Kutches, supra, where the contention was made on appeal that either the plaintiff’s headlights were defective or else he was inattentive as to what they revealed, and that, in either case, his negligence was conclusively established. This court found otherwise. The evidence in that case discloses that the road for more than a mile in either direction from where the truck was stopped was straight and level, passing through an open farming district. The plaintiff, however, and one of his witnesses testified that just a few moments before the crash came the glare of the headlights of a meeting motor vehicle interfered with their vision and diverted their attention. They also testified, and there was no direct contradiction, that the appearance of defendant’s truck, into the rear of which the plaintiff’s car crashed while it was parked on the pavement, blended with that of the pavement so that its presence could not be detected until they were within 20 feet or less thereof, though the headlights on plaintiff’s car were burning brightly. In that case, however, plaintiff testified that, when nearing the approaching blinding headlights, he reduced his speed from 35 or 40 miles an hour to 20 miles per hour at the time of the impact. This court said that there was (205 Minn. 385, 285 N. W. 882) “no more than the usual conflict met with in auto accident cases, and that was for the jury.” Another action growing out of the same accident is reported in Anderson v. Johnson, 208 Minn. 373, 294 N. W. 224. The testimony in that case discloses that the night when the accident occurred was clear, and there was testimony from which the jury might find that the taillight on the Hutches (defendant’s) truck was lit, the same truck into which plaintiff Johnson crashed. See, Johnson v. Kutches, supra.
This court in Anderson v. Johnson said (208 Minn. 377, 294 N. W. 227) “The question of what constitutes proximate cause is usually for the jury unless the evidence is conclusive, and should be determined by them in the exercise of practical common sense rather than by the application of abstract principles.” In commenting on the evidence, the court said that had Hutches put out flares [329]*329as required by statute they would have served as a warning to Johnson of danger in the distance as he approached from the northwest on the straight, level highway and that (208 Minn. 378, 294 N. W. 227) “Regardless of the statute pertaining to the use of flares, defendant Hutches [the owner of the truck] was required to use ordinary care commensurate with the risks involved.” If anything, these cases seem less strong than the case at hand upon the proposition that the issues of negligence, proximate cause, and contributory negligence, not being free from doubt, were for the jury and not the court.
The burden of proving contributory negligence is on the defendant. Oxborough v. Murphy Transfer & Storage Co. 194 Minn. 335, 260 N. W. 305; Jenson v. Glemaker, 195 Minn. 556, 263 N. W. 624; Ames v. Cramer, 200 Minn. 92, 273 N. W. 361; Anderson v. Johnson, supra.
It is our considered opinion that the inferences which may be properly drawn from all of the evidence disclosed by the record in this case, when taken as a whole, leaves the issue of proximate cause for the jury’s determination, as the trier of fact. Clearly there were conflicts in the evidence. It was the prerogative and the duty of the jury to determine the conflicts in the evidence and it was their sole responsibility to pass upon the credibility of the witnesses. Ordinarily if different persons might reasonably draw different conclusions from the evidence, the verdict should not be disturbed and every doubt should be resolved in its favor. The court below has ruled in favor of the verdict rendered and, by his orders denying the motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial, sustained the findings of the jury. The discretion exercised by the court below, in ruling thereon, is important, and a prerogative which this court will not override unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion or a new trial or other disposition is found to be justified upon other grounds to avoid manifest injustice.2
We cannot say that the record in this case presents a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in determining that the [330]*330issues of negligence, contributory negligence, and proximate cause were for the jury. The orders of the trial court are affirmed.
Affirmed.