PREGERSON, Circuit Judge:
The United States Army denied Sgt. Perry J. Watkins reenlistment solely because he is a homosexual. The Army refused to reenlist Watkins, a 14-year veteran, even though he had been completely candid about his homosexuality from the start of his Army career, even though he is in all respects an outstanding soldier, and even though the Army, with full knowledge of his homosexuality, had repeatedly permitted him to reenlist in the past. The Army did so despite its longstanding policy that homosexuality was a nonwaivable disqualification for reenlistment. The issue before the en banc court is whether the Army may deny reenlistment to Watkins solely because of his acknowledged homosexuality.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1
In August 1967, at the age of 19, Perry Watkins was drafted into the United States Army. In filling out the Army’s preinduction medical form, he marked “yes” in response to a question asking whether he had homosexual tendencies. The Army nonetheless found Watkins “qualified for admission” and inducted him into its ranks.
During Watkins’ initial three-year tour of military duty, he served in the United States and Korea as a chaplain’s assistant, personnel specialist, and company clerk. A year after his induction, in 1968, Watkins signed an affidavit stating that he had been a homosexual from the age of 13 and that, since his enlistment, he had engaged in sodomy with two other servicemen, a crime under military law. The Army, which received this affidavit as part of a criminal investigation into Watkins’ sexual conduct, [702]*702dropped the investigation because of insufficient evidence.
When his first enlistment period expired in 1970, Watkins received an honorable discharge, but his reenlistment eligibility code was listed as “unknown.” In 1971, Watkins requested correction of the reenlistment designation and the Army corrected the code to category 1, “eligible for reentry on active duty.” Shortly thereafter, he reenlisted for a second three-year term. In 1972, Watkins was denied a security clearance because of his homosexuality, and the Army again investigated him for allegedly committing sodomy and again terminated the investigation for insufficient evidence. Following another honorable discharge in 1974, the Army accepted Watkins’ application for a six-year reenlistment.
In 1975, the Army convened a board of officers to determine whether Watkins should be discharged because of his homosexual tendencies. On this occasion his commanding officer, Captain Bast, testified that Watkins was “the best clerk I have known,” that he did “a fantastic job — excellent,” and that Watkins’ homosexuality did not affect the company. A sergeant testified that Watkins’ homosexuality was well-known but caused no problems and generated no complaints from other soldiers. The four officers on the board unanimously found that “Watkins is suitable for retention in the military service” and stated, “In view of the findings, the Board recommends that SP5 Perry J. Watkins be retained in the military service because there is no evidence suggesting that his behavior has had either a degrading effect upon unit performance, morale or discipline, or upon his own job performance. SP5 Watkins is suited for duty in administrative positions and progression through Specialist rating.” The board’s recommendation became the final decision of the Secretary of the Army.
In November 1977, the United States Army Artillery Group (the USAAG) granted Watkins a security clearance for information classified as “Secret.” His application for a position in the Nuclear Surety Personnel Reliability Program (the PRP), however, was initially rejected because his records — specifically, his own admissions— showed that he had homosexual tendencies. After this initial rejection, Watkins’ commanding officer in the USAAG, Captain Pas tain, requested that Watkins be requali-fied for the position. Captain Pastain stated, “From daily personal contacts I can attest to the outstanding professional attitude, integrity, and suitability for assignment within the PRP, of SP5 Watkins. In the 6 months he has been assigned to this unit SP5 Watkins has had no problems what-so-ever in dealing with other assigned members. He has, in fact, become one of our most respected and trusted soldiers, both by his superiors and his subordinates.” An examining Army physician concluded that Watkins’ homosexuality appeared to cause no problem in his work, and the decision to deny Watkins a position in the Nuclear Surety Personnel Reliability Program was reversed.
Watkins worked under a security clearance without incident until he again stated, in an interview on March 15, 1979, that he was homosexual. This prompted yet another Army investigation which, in July 1980, culminated in the revocation of Watkins’ security clearance. As the notification of revocation makes clear, the Army based this revocation on Watkins’ 1979 admission of homosexuality, on medical records containing Watkins’ 1968 affidavit stating that he had engaged in homosexual conduct, and on his history of performing (with the permission of his commanding officer) as a female impersonator in various revues. The Army did not rely on any evidence of homosexual conduct other than Watkins’ 1968 affidavit. In October 1979, the Army accepted Watkins’ application for another three-year reenlistment.
In 1981 the Army promulgated Army Regulation (AR) 635-200, chpt. 15, which mandated the discharge of all homosexuals regardless of merit. Pursuant to this new discharge regulation, another Army board convened to consider discharging Watkins. Although this board explicitly rejected the evidence before it that Watkins had engaged in homosexual conduct after 1968, the board recommended that Watkins bé separated from the service “because he has [703]*703stated that he is a homosexual.” Major General Elton, the discharge authority overseeing the board, approved this finding and recommendation and directed that Watkins be discharged.2
In May 1982, after the Army board voted in favor of Watkins’ discharge, but before the discharge actually issued, District Judge Rothstein enjoined the Army from discharging Watkins on the basis of his statements admitting his homosexuality. 541 F.Supp. at 259.3 The district court reasoned that the discharge proceedings were barred by the Army’s regulation against double jeopardy, AR 635-200, ¶ l-19(b), because they essentially repeated the discharge proceedings of 1975. Id. at 258-59.4
During oral argument before the district court, counsel for the Army declared that if the Army were enjoined from discharging Watkins, it would deny Watkins reenlistment, pursuant to AR 601-280, ¶ 2-21(c),5 when his current tour of duty expired in October 1982.6 This reenlistment regulation, which was promulgated in 1981 along with the discharge regulation AR 635-200, chpt. 15, is simply a clarification of the earlier regulation which had always made homosexuality a nonwaivable disqualification for reenlistment. The district court nonetheless enjoined Watkins’ discharge, and the Army fulfilled its promise by rejecting Watkins’ reenlistment application “[bjecause of self admitted homosexuality as well as homosexual acts.”
On October 5, 1982, the district court enjoined the Army from refusing to reenlist Watkins because of his admitted homosexuality, holding that the Army was equitably estopped from relying on the non-waivable disqualification provisions of AR 601-280, ¶ 2-21(c). Watkins v. United States Army, 551 F.Supp. 212, 223 (W.D.Wash.1982).7 The Army reenlisted Watkins for a six-year term on November 1, 1982, with the proviso that the reenlistment would be voided if the district court’s injunction were not upheld on appeal.
While the Army’s appeal of the district court injunction was pending, the Army rated Watkins’ performance and professionalism. He received 85 out of 85 possible points. His ratings included perfect [704]*704scores for “Earns respect,” “Integrity,” “Loyalty,” “Moral Courage,” “Self-discipline,” “Military Appearance,” “Demonstrates Initiative,” “Performs under pressure,” “Attains results,” “Displays sound judgment,” “Communicates effectively,” “Develops subordinates,” “Demonstrates technical skills,” and “Physical fitness.” His military evaluators unanimously recommended that he be promoted ahead of his peers. The Army’s written evaluation of Watkins’ performance and potential stated:
SSG Watkins is without exception, one of the finest Personnel Action Center Supervisors I have encountered. Through his diligent efforts, the Battalion Personnel Action Center achieved a near perfect processing rate for SIP-DERS transactions. During this training period, SSG Watkins has been totally reliable and a wealth of knowledge. He requires no supervision, and with his “can do” attitude, always exceeds the requirements and demands placed upon him. I would gladly welcome another opportunity to serve with him, and firmly believe that he will be an asset to any unit to which he is assigned.
SSG Watkins should be selected to attend ANCOC and placed in a Platoon Sergeant position. [Rater’s Evaluation of Watkins’ performance and potential.]
SSG Watkins’ duty performance has been outstanding in every regard. His section continues to set the standard within the Brigade for submission of accurate, timely personnel and financial transactions. Keeping abreast of ever-changing personnel regulations and directives, SSG Watkins has provided sound advice to the commander as well as to the soldiers within the command. His suggestion to separate S-l and Personnel Action Center functions and to colocate the Personnel Action Center with the Company Orderly Rooms was adopted and immediately resulted in improved service by both offices. SSG Watkins’ positive influence has been felt throughout the Battalion and will be sorely missed.
SSG Watkins’ potential is unlimited. He has consistently demonstrated the capacity to manage numerous complex responsibilities concurrently. He is qualified for promotion now and should be selected for attendance at ANCOES at the earliest opportunity. [Indorser’s Evaluation of Watkins’ performance and potential.]
On appeal, a panel of this court reversed the district court’s injunction. Watkins v. United States Army, 721 F.2d 687, 691 (9th Cir.1983) [hereinafter Watkins I]. The panel reasoned that the equity powers of the federal courts could not be exercised to order military officials to violate their own regulations absent a determination that the regulations were repugnant to the Constitution or to the military’s statutory authority. Id. On remand, the district court held that the Army’s regulations were not repugnant to the Constitution or to statutory authority and accordingly denied Watkins’ motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment in favor of the Army. Watkins again appealed and a divided panel of this court reversed the district court’s ruling. The panel held that the Army’s reenlistment regulations violate the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws because they discriminate against persons of homosexual orientation and because the regulations are not necessary to promote a legitimate compelling governmental interest. Watkins v. United States Army, 847 F.2d 1329, 1352-53 (9th Cir.1988) [hereinafter Watkins II]. The full court granted review to address the issues raised in Watkins I8 and Watkins II. We hold that the Army is estopped from barring Watkins’ [705]*705reenlistment on the basis of his homosexuality. Accordingly, Watkins I no longer states the law of this circuit. Moreover, it is unnecessary to reach the constitutional issues raised in Watkins II.
II. EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES
Before considering Watkins’ estoppel claim, we must determine the preliminary question whether Watkins has exhausted available intraservice remedies. Watkins submitted a timely application for reenlistment to his commanding officer, Captain Scott, on July 26, 1982. Following an interview with Watkins, Captain Scott denied his reenlistment request on July 28, 1982 because of Watkins’ admitted homosexuality.9 The Army’s position is that Watkins is ineligible for reenlistment due to a nonwaivable disqualification. Any further pursuit of intraservice remedies would therefore be fruitless. See Watkins, 551 F.Supp. at 217. As the district court stated, “This court will not require plaintiff to exhaust futile remedies.” Id. at 218. See Southeast Alaska Conservation Council, Inc. v. Watson, 697 F.2d 1305, 1309 (9th Cir.1983) (“Exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required where administrative remedies are inadequate or not efficacious, [or] where pursuit of administrative remedies would be a futile gesture_”). Because we find that Watkins has exhausted all effective intraservice remedies, we now proceed to review the merits of his estoppel claim.
III. EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL
A. Reviewability
This circuit and others have noted that not all actions by the military are reviewable in the courts. See Note, “Judicial Review of Constitutional Claims Against the Military,” 84 Colum.L.Rev. 387, 397-403 (1984). In Mindes v. Seaman, 453 F.2d 197, 201 (5th Cir.1971), the Fifth Circuit articulated a test for ascertaining whether a particular internal military decision should be reviewed. Mindes cautioned that a court should not review internal military affairs in the absence of (a) an allegation of the deprivation of a constitutional right, or an allegation that the military has acted in violation of applicable statutes or its own regulations and (b) exhaustion of available intraservice corrective measures. Id. If the plaintiff meets both prerequisites, the court must weigh several factors to determine whether to grant review. These factors are (1) the nature and strength of the plaintiff’s claim; (2) the potential injury to the plaintiff if review is refused; (3) the extent of interference with military functions; and (4) the extent to which military discretion or expertise is involved. Id.
We have adopted in part the Mindes test for judicial reviewability of internal military affairs. See Wallace v. Chappell, 661 F.2d 729, 733 n. 4 (9th Cir.1981), rev’d on other grounds, 462 U.S. 296, 103 S.Ct. 2362, 76 L.Ed.2d 586 (1983). In Wallace, we applied the Mindes factors to constitutional claims, but declined to hold that the Mindes factors should be weighed in considering nonconstitutional claims. We stated that “[w]e express no view as to whether the Mindes test should govern federal nonconstitutional claims.” Id. at 733 n. 5.10 Because in this case the district court [706]*706found in favor of Watkins on the nonconsti-tutional ground of equitable estoppel, we are now faced with the question whether the Mindes test is applicable to equitable estoppel.
In Watkins I, a panel of this court applied the Mindes doctrine to hold, in effect, that the only issues that can be reviewed in a suit against the military are claims that the Constitution, a statute, or a regulation has been violated. See Watkins v. United States Army (Watkins I), 721 F.2d 687, 690 (9th Cir.1983). Watkins I, which no longer states the law of this circuit, held that our district courts may not use equitable estoppel principles to decide a case on its particular facts when the application of a statute or regulation is challenged as to one individual. Such an extension of the Mindes reviewability doctrine to bar equitable relief would improperly require cases against the military to be decided on the broadest possible grounds rather than on the narrowest. In this case, the panel’s decision in Watkins I caused the district court and the three-judge panel to reach constitutional issues when the case could have been decided narrowly under the doctrine of equitable estoppel.
Accordingly, we conclude that the Mindes doctrine should not be extended to bar equitable estoppel against the military. The special factors that must be found before equitable estoppel can be applied against the government protect the same interests that the Mindes test was designed to protect. See Helm v. State of California, 722 F.2d 507, 509-10 (9th Cir.1983) (applying the Mindes test to a constitutional claim against the military but not applying it to an assertion of equitable estoppel). The Mindes test was created to shield the military from unnecessary disruption. The estoppel doctrine, like the Mindes test, addresses the concerns of comity, prudence, and deference. To estop an agency of the government a court must find affirmative misconduct by the government and must also find that the government’s conduct will cause a serious injustice and that estoppel will not cause undue harm to the public interest. Wagner v. Director, Federal Emergency Management Agency, 847 F.2d 515, 519 (9th Cir.1988) (quoting Morgan v. Heckler, 779 F.2d 544, 545 (9th Cir.1985)). The stringent requirements that must be satisfied before the government will be estopped safeguard the military from unjustified interference by the courts. Thus where estoppel obtains, there is simply no need to apply the reviewability factors of the Mindes test.
The facts of the instant case support this conclusion. To estop the Army from denying Sgt. Watkins reenlistment on the basis of his homosexuality would not disrupt any important military policies or adversely affect internal military affairs. It would simply require the Army to continue to do what it has repeatedly done for fourteen years with only positive results: reenlist a single soldier with an exceptionally outstanding military record.
B. Equitable Estoppel Against the Government
The Supreme Court has expressly left open the issue whether estoppel may run against the government, refusing to hold “that there are no cases in which the public interest in ensuring that the Government can enforce the law free from estoppel might be outweighed by the countervailing interest of citizens in some minimum standard of decency, honor, and reliability in their dealings with their Government.” Heckler v. Community Health Services of Crawford County, Inc., 467 U.S. 51, 60-61, 104 S.Ct. 2218, 2224, 81 L.Ed.2d 42 (1984). It is well settled, however, that the government may not be estopped on the same terms as a private litigant. Id. at 60, 104 S.Ct. at 2224.
Our court has held that “ ‘where justice and fair play require it,’ estoppel will be applied against the government....” Johnson v. Williford, 682 F.2d 868, 871 (9th Cir.1982) (quoting United States v. Lazy FC Ranch, 481 F.2d 985, 988-89 (9th [707]*707Cir.1973)).11 Our eases indicate that the principles allowing estoppel against the government also apply to the military when justified by the facts. See, e.g., Helm v. State of California, 722 F.2d 507 (9th Cir.1983); Jablon v. United States, 657 F.2d 1064 (9th Cir.1981); Lavin v. Marsh, 644 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir.1981). Before the government will be estopped, however, two additional elements must be satisfied beyond those required for traditional estop-pel.12 First, “[a] party seeking to raise estoppel against the government must establish ‘affirmative misconduct going beyond mere negligence’; even then, ‘estop-pel will only apply where the government’s wrongful act will cause a serious injustice, and the public’s interest will not suffer undue damage by imposition of the liability.’ ” Wagner v. Director, Federal Emergency Management Agency, 847 F.2d 515, 519 (9th Cir.1988) (quoting Morgan v. Heckler, 779 F.2d 544, 545 (9th Cir.1985)).13 In the instant case, we must first determine whether the two threshold requirements for estopping the government are satisfied before deciding whether the traditional elements of estoppel are present.
1. Affirmative Misconduct
There is no single test for detecting the presence of affirmative misconduct; each case must be decided on its own particular facts and circumstances. Lavin v. Marsh, 644 F.2d at 1382-83 n. 6. Affirmative misconduct does require an affirmative misrepresentation or affirmative concealment of a material fact by the government, United States v. Ruby Co., 588 F.2d 697, 703-04 (9th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 917, 99 S.Ct. 2838, 61 L.Ed.2d 284 (1979), although it does not require that the government intend to mislead a party. Jablon v. United States, 657 F.2d at 1067 n. 5. Finally, it is well settled that the government is not bound by the unauthorized acts of its agents. Saulque v. United States, 663 F.2d at 976 (citing Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389, 409, 37 S.Ct. 387, 391, 61 L.Ed. 791 (1917)); see also Federal Crop Insurance Co. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 384, 68 S.Ct. 1, 3, 92 L.Ed. 10 (1947).
Here, the Army affirmatively misrepresented in its official records throughout Watkins’ fourteen-year military career that he was qualified for reenlistment. On the one occasion when the record was unclear, Watkins sought clarification and his classification was immediately changed from “unknown” to “eligible for reentry on active duty.” During this entire fourteen-year period, the Army’s policy was that homosexuality constituted a nonwaivable disqualification for reenlistment. The Army has acknowledged, both in its brief in Watkins II and at oral argument before the en banc panel, that “[t]he 1981 regulations now in effect [AR 601-280, 112-21], which expressly bar enlistment or reenlistment of homosexuals, are regarded as a clarification, and not a change, of Army policy.” Army’s Brief in Watkins I at 6.14 Thus, the Army affirmatively acted in violation of its own regulations when it repeatedly represented that Watkins was eli[708]*708gible to reenlist, as well as when it reenlisted him time after time.
This case is readily distinguishable from Lavin v. Marsh, 644 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir.1981), where we refused to estop the Army from denying an Army Reserve officer’s entitlement to pension benefits. In Lavin, the court found that while the Army had failed to determine Lavin’s pension eligibility status or to counteract any misunderstanding resulting from recruiters’ representations that benefits would be available to Lavin, this conduct did not amount to a “pervasive pattern of false promises” for which the government could be estopped. Id. at 1383. The court reasoned that although the Army’s conduct was perhaps negligent, the “mere failure to inform or assist does not justify application of equitable estoppel.” Id. at 1384 (citing INS v. Hibi, 414 U.S. 5, 8-9, 94 S.Ct. 19, 21-22, 38 L.Ed.2d 7 (1973)). In addition, we stated that persons dealing with the government assume the risk that government agents may exceed their authority and provide misinformation, and observed that “Lavin chose trust over caution and he never attempted to confirm his eligibility.” Id. at 1383.
In the present case, the Army’s conduct went far beyond a mere failure to inform or assist. As the district court noted, the Army did not stand aside while Watkins reenlisted or accepted a promotion; it plainly acted affirmatively in admitting, reclassifying, reenlisting, retaining, and promoting Watkins. 551 F.Supp. at 221. Furthermore, this case does not merely involve misinformation provided by government agents. Rather, it involves ongoing active misrepresentations by Army officials acting well within their scope of authority. “Without Army approval [Watkins] would not have been able to enter, remain or progress in the Army. The defendants point out that reenlistment is exclusively the Secretary’s function, Here he exercised his authority three times.... To satisfy the element of affirmative misconduct the court need look no further.” Id.15
2. Weighing the Injustice to Watkins against the Possibility of Damage to the Public Interest
Even when affirmative misconduct has been shown, the government cannot be estopped unless its acts also threaten to work a serious injustice and the public’s interest will not be unduly damaged by the imposition of estoppel. Johnson, 682 F.2d at 871. This requirement involves a balancing of interests in individual cases. See Note, Equitable Estoppel of the Government, 79 Colum.L.Rev. 551, 551 (1979); see also, e.g., Johnson, 682 F.2d at 871-72 (where a prisoner was erroneously paroled, his subsequent successful reintegration into the community showed that his continuation on parole release did not seriously threaten the public interest. Furthermore, the frustration of the prisoner’s expectation to continue, during good behavior, on parole release would be a serious injustice); Gestuvo v. District Director of INS, 337 F.Supp. 1093, 1102 (C.D.Cal.1971) (estopping INS from refusing to revalidate approval of an immigrant’s third preference classification partly because “[a]ny disruption of the nation’s immigration policies that might result from the admission of this single individual into the country would, in short, be miniscule in comparison [709]*709to the hardship to which he would be subjected by a failure to estop the Service”).
The record in the instant case shows that Sgt. Watkins has greatly benefitted the Army, and therefore the country, by his military service. Even the Army’s most recent written evaluation of Watkins, completed during the course of this legal action, contains nothing but the highest praise, describing Watkins’ duty performance as “outstanding in every regard” and his potential as “unlimited.” In addition, Watkin’s homosexuality clearly has not hurt the Army in any way. In the words of an Army review board, “there is no evidence suggesting that [Watkins’] behavior has had either a degrading effect upon unit performance, morale or discipline, or upon his own job performance.” As the district court aptly concluded:
The injury to plaintiff from having relied on the Army’s approval of his military career — and being denied it now — is the loss of his career. The harm to the public interest if reenlistment is not prevented is nonexistent. Plaintiff has demonstrated that he is an excellent soldier. His contribution to this Nation’s security is of obvious benefit to the public. Furthermore, when the government deals “carefully, honestly and fairly with its citizens,” the public interest is likewise benefited.
551 F.Supp. at 223 (citation omitted).
C. Traditional Elements of Estoppel
Having concluded that this is a case in which estoppel may be asserted against the government, we must now decide whether the traditional elements of estoppel are present. Traditional estoppel requires the following:
(1) The party to be estopped must know the facts; (2) he must intend that his conduct shall be acted on or must so act that the party asserting the estoppel has a right to believe it is so intended; (3) the latter must be ignorant of the true facts; and (4) he must rely on the former’s conduct to his injury.
United States v. Wharton, 514 F.2d 406, 412 (9th Cir.1975) (quoting United States v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 421 F.2d 92, 96 (9th Cir.1970)). We adopt district judge Roth-stein’s thorough analysis of this question as follows.
1. Did the Army know the facts?
The district court recited the following as evidence that the Army knew about Watkins’ homosexuality throughout his entire military career.
At his preinduction physical examination in August 1967 plaintiff checked the box on his medical history chart indicating that he had homosexual tendencies. The examining psychiatrist apparently did not believe plaintiff and designated plaintiff as qualified for admission. In November 1968 plaintiff admitted his homosexuality to an Army Criminal Investigation Division agent. Plaintiff was honorably discharged in May 1970 and his reenlistment code was listed as “unknown.” Plaintiff requested correction of that code. The Army reclassified plaintiff as eligible for reentry on active duty, and in June 1971 plaintiff reenlisted for three years. In January 1972 plaintiff was denied a security clearance based on his 1968 admission of homosexuality. After another honorable discharge, in March 1974 plaintiff reenlisted for a six year term. In 1975 plaintiff’s commander initiated discharge proceedings against plaintiff for unsuitability due to homosexuality. A four member board composed of a Major, two Captains and a First Lieutenant heard testimony establishing that plaintiff was homosexual. Plaintiff’s commander, Captain Albert J. Bast III testified that plaintiff, who had told Bast he was homosexual, was "the best clerk I have known.” First Sergeant Owen Johnson testified that everyone in the company knew plaintiff was homosexual and that plaintiff’s homosexuality had not caused any problems. As noted earlier, the board recommended retention. In November 1977 plaintiff was granted a security clearance for information classified as “Secret.” Plaintiff then applied for a position in the Nuclear Surety Personnel Reliability Program. Plaintiff was ini[710]*710tially rejected because his medical records reflected his homosexuality. Plaintiff appealed. His commanding officer, Captain Dale E. [Pastain], wrote in support of plaintiff's appeal, requesting that plaintiff be requalified notwithstanding plaintiff’s record. An examining physician concluded that plaintiff’s homosexuality caused no problems in his work. The Army requalified plaintiff for admission into the Program in July 1978. In October 1979 plaintiff reenlisted for three years.
551 F.Supp. at 220. Based on these undisputed facts, the district court stated that the Army’s position that Army personnel responsible for Watkins’ enlistment and re-enlistments did not know that he was homosexual was “patently absurd.” Id. “For the Army to acknowledge that it is aware of plaintiff’s homosexuality when it comes to conducting criminal investigations, holding discharge proceedings, and revoking security clearances, but maintain that it is ignorant when four enlistments are at issue, suggests bad faith.” Id. The district court concluded that the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, who is primarily responsible for Army reenlistment, cannot be deemed to be unaware of the contents of Watkins’ personnel file. Id.
2.Did the Army Intend that Watkins Act in Reliance on its Conduct, or Did the Army Act so that Watkins Had a Right to Believe the Army so Intended?
The district court found that this element of estoppel was satisfied because, regardless of what the Army actually intended, Watkins had a right to believe the Army intended him to rely on its acts. 551 F.Supp. at 221-22. The district court rejected the Army’s contention that Watkins had assumed the risk that his Army career would be discontinued at any time because of his homosexuality. Id. at 222. In light of Watkins’ candor from the beginning about his homosexuality and the Army’s ongoing acts in violation of its regulations,16 the district court found that “[tjaken together, over a career spanning more than 14 years, those acts amounted almost to a policy of ignoring this service-member’s homosexuality. As a matter of law, the court concludes that the second element of plaintiff’s estoppel claim has been satisfied.” Id.17 See also Johnson, 682 F.2d at 872 (prisoner had right to believe, after his parole computation erroneously had passed successfully through eight administrative reviews, culminating in his ultimate release on parole for fifteen months, that he would remain on parole during good behavior).
3.Was Watkins Ignorant of the True Facts?
The district court stated that the “true fact” here is that homosexuality is a non-waivable disqualification for reenlistment to which the Army cannot grant exceptions. 551 F.Supp. at 222. The Army’s repeated waiver of this disqualification makes it impossible for us to charge Watkins with the knowledge that the disqualification was in fact nonwaivable. Id. See Johnson, 682 F.2d at 872 (government’s active misadvice to prisoner regarding his eligibility for parole prevented court from charging prisoner with even constructive knowledge of proper meaning of statute in question).
4.Did Watkins Rely to his Injury on the Army’s Conduct Concerning his Homosexuality?
Regarding this fourth element, the district court stated:
Tied up in litigation, less than six years from retirement, having invested a total of more than 14 years in the Army, it is not difficult to see that plaintiff has relied to his injury on the many “green [711]*711lights” he received from Army representatives. Plaintiff developed skills necessary for military employment and refrained from developing skills suitable for civilian jobs. He worked more than 14 years toward a retirement benefit that he could have sought elsewhere. Had the Army refused plaintiff reenlistment in the past, plaintiff would not have lost the opportunity for civilian employment that would have brought him to a point of equivalent achievement.
551 F.Supp. at 223. We agree with District Judge Rothstein that the four elements of traditional estoppel are present in this case.
IV. CONCLUSION
This is a case where equity cries out and demands that the Army be estopped from refusing to reenlist Watkins on the basis of his homosexuality. We therefore reinstate the district court’s October 5, 1982 Order estopping the Army from relying on its reenlistment regulation, AR 601-280 112-24(c), as a bar to Sgt. Watkins’ reenlistment. See 551 F.Supp. at 223.18
Our opinions in Watkins I and Watkins II are withdrawn. The district court Order of June 17, 1985 is vacated and the district court Order of October 5, 1982 is AFFIRMED.