Per Curiam.
Respondent filed his petition for naturalization in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California on September 13, 1967. The District Court granted the petition, rejecting the negative recommendation of the naturalization examiner appointed by the Attorney General pursuant to § 335 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 66 Stat. 255, 8 U. S. C. § 1446. The Court of Appeals affirmed, 475 F. 2d 7 (CA9 1973), holding that even though the deadline fixed by Congress for the filing of applications such as respondent’s had expired more than 20 years earlier, petitioner was “estopped” from relying on this fact.
Respondent was born in Manila in 1917, and in February 1941 enlisted in the Philippine Scouts, a unit that was part of the United States Army. He was captured by the Japanese Armed Forces and released after six months’ internment. In April 1945 after the liberation of the Philippines by Allied Forces, he rejoined the Scouts [6]*6and served until his discharge in December 1945.
Sections 701 and 702 of the Nationality Act of 1940, as amended, provided for the naturalization of non-citizens who served honorably in the Armed Forces of the United States during World War II.
Respondent entered the United States for the first and only time on April 25, 1964, more than 17 years after the expiration of the time limit established by Congress for claiming naturalization under the “exemptions of the Act.” He entered on a visitor-for-business visa, which expired on June 30, 1964. His subsequent petition for naturalization was based on the assertion that the Government was estopped from relying on the statutory time limit which Congress had attached to the provisions under which he claimed. The estoppel was said to arise from petitioner’s failure to advise him, during the time he was [8]*8eligible, of his right to apply for naturalization, and from petitioner’s failure to provide a naturalization representative in the Philippines during all of the time respondent and those in his class were eligible for naturalization. The District Court adopted respondent’s contention, and its conclusions were upheld by the Court of Appeals.
It is well settled that the Government is not in a position identical to that of a private litigant with respect to its enforcement of laws enacted by Congress.
“As a general rule laches or neglect of duty on the part of officers of the Government is no defense to a suit by it to enforce a public right or protect a public interest. ... A suit by the United States to enforce and maintain its policy respecting lands which it holds in trust for all the people stands upon a different plane in this and some other respects from the ordinary private suit to regain the title to real property or to remove a cloud from it.” Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U. S. 389, 409 (1917).
Here the petitioner has been charged by Congress with administering an Act which both made available benefits of naturalization to persons in respondent’s class and established a cutoff date for the claiming of such benefits. Petitioner, in enforcing the cutoff date established by Congress, as well as in recognizing claims for the benefits conferred by the Act, is enforcing the public policy established by Congress.
While the issue of whether “affirmative misconduct” on the part of the Government might estop it from denying citizenship was left open in Montana v. Kennedy, 366 U. S. 308, 314, 315 (1961), no conduct of the sort there adverted to was involved here. We do not think that the failure to fully publicize the rights which Congress ac[9]*9corded under the Act of 1940, or the failure to have stationed in the Philippine Islands during all of the time those rights were available an authorized naturalization representative, can give rise to an estoppel against the Government.
Respondent’s effort to claim naturalization under a statute which by its terms had expired more than 20 years before he filed his lawsuit must therefore fail. The petition for certiorari is granted and the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
Sections 701, 702, and 705 of the Nationality Act of 1940, added by the Second War Powers Act, 1942, 56 Stat. 182, as amended, 8 U. S. C. §§ 1001, 1002, 1005 (1940 ed., Supp. V), provided in pertinent part:
Sec. 701. “[A]ny person not a citizen, regardless of age, who has served or hereafter serves honorably in the military or naval forces of the United States during the present war and [w]ho shall have been at the time of his enlistment or induction a resident thereof and who (a) was lawfully admitted into the United States, including its Territories and possessions, or (b) having entered the United States, including its Territories and possessions, prior to September 1, 1943, being unable to establish lawful admission into the United States serves honorably in such forces beyond the continental limits of the United States or has so served may be naturalized upon compliance with all the requirements of the naturalization laws except that (1) no declaration of intention, no certificate of arrival for those described in group (b) hereof, and no period of residence within the United States or any State shall be required; (2) the petition for naturalization may be filed in any court having naturalization jurisdiction regardless of the residence of the petitioner; (3) the petitioner shall not be required to speak the English language, sign his petition in his own handwriting, or meet any educational test; . . . Provided, however, That ... (3) the petition shall be filed not later than December 31, 1946. . . .”
Sec. 702. “During the present war, any person entitled to naturalization under section 701 of this Act, who while serving honorably in the military . . . forces of the United States is not within the jurisdiction of any court authorized to naturalize aliens, may be naturalized in accordance with all the applicable provisions of section 701 without appearing before a naturalization court.
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Per Curiam.
Respondent filed his petition for naturalization in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California on September 13, 1967. The District Court granted the petition, rejecting the negative recommendation of the naturalization examiner appointed by the Attorney General pursuant to § 335 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 66 Stat. 255, 8 U. S. C. § 1446. The Court of Appeals affirmed, 475 F. 2d 7 (CA9 1973), holding that even though the deadline fixed by Congress for the filing of applications such as respondent’s had expired more than 20 years earlier, petitioner was “estopped” from relying on this fact.
Respondent was born in Manila in 1917, and in February 1941 enlisted in the Philippine Scouts, a unit that was part of the United States Army. He was captured by the Japanese Armed Forces and released after six months’ internment. In April 1945 after the liberation of the Philippines by Allied Forces, he rejoined the Scouts [6]*6and served until his discharge in December 1945.
Sections 701 and 702 of the Nationality Act of 1940, as amended, provided for the naturalization of non-citizens who served honorably in the Armed Forces of the United States during World War II.
Respondent entered the United States for the first and only time on April 25, 1964, more than 17 years after the expiration of the time limit established by Congress for claiming naturalization under the “exemptions of the Act.” He entered on a visitor-for-business visa, which expired on June 30, 1964. His subsequent petition for naturalization was based on the assertion that the Government was estopped from relying on the statutory time limit which Congress had attached to the provisions under which he claimed. The estoppel was said to arise from petitioner’s failure to advise him, during the time he was [8]*8eligible, of his right to apply for naturalization, and from petitioner’s failure to provide a naturalization representative in the Philippines during all of the time respondent and those in his class were eligible for naturalization. The District Court adopted respondent’s contention, and its conclusions were upheld by the Court of Appeals.
It is well settled that the Government is not in a position identical to that of a private litigant with respect to its enforcement of laws enacted by Congress.
“As a general rule laches or neglect of duty on the part of officers of the Government is no defense to a suit by it to enforce a public right or protect a public interest. ... A suit by the United States to enforce and maintain its policy respecting lands which it holds in trust for all the people stands upon a different plane in this and some other respects from the ordinary private suit to regain the title to real property or to remove a cloud from it.” Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U. S. 389, 409 (1917).
Here the petitioner has been charged by Congress with administering an Act which both made available benefits of naturalization to persons in respondent’s class and established a cutoff date for the claiming of such benefits. Petitioner, in enforcing the cutoff date established by Congress, as well as in recognizing claims for the benefits conferred by the Act, is enforcing the public policy established by Congress.
While the issue of whether “affirmative misconduct” on the part of the Government might estop it from denying citizenship was left open in Montana v. Kennedy, 366 U. S. 308, 314, 315 (1961), no conduct of the sort there adverted to was involved here. We do not think that the failure to fully publicize the rights which Congress ac[9]*9corded under the Act of 1940, or the failure to have stationed in the Philippine Islands during all of the time those rights were available an authorized naturalization representative, can give rise to an estoppel against the Government.
Respondent’s effort to claim naturalization under a statute which by its terms had expired more than 20 years before he filed his lawsuit must therefore fail. The petition for certiorari is granted and the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
Sections 701, 702, and 705 of the Nationality Act of 1940, added by the Second War Powers Act, 1942, 56 Stat. 182, as amended, 8 U. S. C. §§ 1001, 1002, 1005 (1940 ed., Supp. V), provided in pertinent part:
Sec. 701. “[A]ny person not a citizen, regardless of age, who has served or hereafter serves honorably in the military or naval forces of the United States during the present war and [w]ho shall have been at the time of his enlistment or induction a resident thereof and who (a) was lawfully admitted into the United States, including its Territories and possessions, or (b) having entered the United States, including its Territories and possessions, prior to September 1, 1943, being unable to establish lawful admission into the United States serves honorably in such forces beyond the continental limits of the United States or has so served may be naturalized upon compliance with all the requirements of the naturalization laws except that (1) no declaration of intention, no certificate of arrival for those described in group (b) hereof, and no period of residence within the United States or any State shall be required; (2) the petition for naturalization may be filed in any court having naturalization jurisdiction regardless of the residence of the petitioner; (3) the petitioner shall not be required to speak the English language, sign his petition in his own handwriting, or meet any educational test; . . . Provided, however, That ... (3) the petition shall be filed not later than December 31, 1946. . . .”
Sec. 702. “During the present war, any person entitled to naturalization under section 701 of this Act, who while serving honorably in the military . . . forces of the United States is not within the jurisdiction of any court authorized to naturalize aliens, may be naturalized in accordance with all the applicable provisions of section 701 without appearing before a naturalization court. The petition for naturalization of any petitioner under this section shall be made and sworn to before, and filed with, a representative of the Immigration and Naturalization Service designated by the Commissioner or a Deputy Commissioner, which designated representative is hereby authorized to receive such petition in behalf of the Service, to conduct hearings thereon, to take testimony concerning any matter [7]*7touching or in any way affecting the admissibility of any such petitioner for naturalization, to call witnesses, to administer oaths, including the oath of the petitioner and his witnesses to the petition for naturalization and the oath of renunciation and allegiance prescribed by section 335 of this Act, and to grant naturalization, and to issue certificates of citizenship . . . .”
Sec. 705. “The Commissioner, with the approval of the Attorney General, shall prescribe and furnish such forms, and shall make such rules and regulations, as may be necessary to carry into effect the provisions of this Act.”