Securities & Exchange Commission v. Collins & Aikman Corp.

256 F.R.D. 403, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3367
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedJanuary 13, 2009
DocketNo. 07 Civ. 2419(SAS)
StatusPublished
Cited by44 cases

This text of 256 F.R.D. 403 (Securities & Exchange Commission v. Collins & Aikman Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Securities & Exchange Commission v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 256 F.R.D. 403, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3367 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).

Opinion

OPINION AND ORDER

SHIRA A. SCHEINDLIN, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Several discovery disputes have arisen in the context of a large securities fraud ease brought by the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) against the Collins & Aikman Corporation (“C & A”) and a number of individual defendants. Specifically, defendant David A. Stockman — former CEO of C & A — has challenged the SEC’s response to his requests for production. These disputes present important questions concerning the Government’s discovery obligations in civil litigation.

II. BACKGROUND1

The Complaint alleges that the defendants were involved in a securities fraud from late 2001 through early 2005. The SEC asserts that C & A perpetrated various accounting [406]*406frauds “designed in part to create the appearance that C & A’s financial performance was improving under Stockman’s direction.”2 In 2001, C & A solicited a three million dollar loan that would be represented for accounting purposes as income. The lender transferred the money to C & A in January 2002, and C & A recognized it as a reduction of costs that had the effect of increasing income. Pursuant to its understanding with the lender, C & A later transferred three million dollars in equipment to the lender. In late 2002, C & A further inflated its reported income by purchasing assets from the same lender at a price exceeding their market value in return for “rebates” of the excess.

Supply contracts sometimes provide for suppliers to pay rebates if the parties conduct a specified volume of business. However, Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (“GAAP”) permit customers to take such rebates into account as purchase price reductions only when the specified business has been affected. In 2002, C & A’s purchasing department arranged for suppliers to create documents that tied rebates to past purchases so that the rebates would have the immediate effect of increasing reported income.

A variation of the false rebate transaction involved purchases of capital equipment. Under GAAP and federal income tax law, the purchase price of capital equipment cannot be immediately deducted as an expense in the period it is incurred but can be depreciated over a time period that bears some relation to the expected lifetime of the equipment. GAAP specifies that because rebates on capital equipment affect the purchase price of the equipment, they cannot be recognized as immediate income. Nevertheless, C & A improperly characterized rebates received on capital purchases as income. Stockman and others produced false documentation to support the fraudulent accounting treatment.

C & A also misstated its earnings in the Forms 10-Q and 10-K that it filed with the SEC from 2001 through 2004 and repeatedly misrepresented its financial condition to investors. It additionally misstated its finances to the General Electric Capital Corporation in order to enhance its ability to borrow money. The SEC alleges that Stock-man made each of these misstatements or that they were made at his behest.

In connection with these and other transactions, the SEC asserts that all defendants violated section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”) and Exchange Act Rule 10b-5. The SEC also asserts a variety of other claims against defendants.3

III. THE DISCOVERY DISPUTES

This opinion addresses four distinct but related discovery disputes. Stockman served a document request pursuant to Rule 34, asking the SEC to “produce for inspection and copying the documents and things identified” in fifty-four separate categories.4 In [407]*407response, the SEC produced 1.7 million documents (10.6 million pages) maintained in thirty-six separate Concordance databases— many of which use different metadata protocols.5 Stockman raises the following objections. First, the SEC failed to identify documents responsive to requests for documents supporting particular factual allegations in the Complaint, preferring instead to “dump” 1.7 million potentially responsive documents on Stockman and then suggesting that he is capable of searching them to locate those that are relevant. Second, the SEC failed to perform a reasonable search for documents relating to accounting principles governing supplier rebates — both in general and with respect to the automobile industry. Instead, the SEC unilaterally limited its search to three of its divisions — and only if those divisions possessed “centralized compilations of non-privileged documents dealing specifically with rebates or accounting for rebates in the automobile industry.”6 Third, the SEC improperly asserted the deliberative process privilege with regard to certain documents. Fourth, the SEC failed to search its own emails, attachments thereto, and other records created and maintained solely in an electronic format that related to either “(i) the investigation and litigation of this matter or (ii) the handling of several large cases unrelated to C & A and the Commission’s regulatory role in matters relating to rebates and rebate accounting.”7 The objections were raised in a series of letters rather than by formal motion.8

These disputes raise four important questions concerning the responses of a government agency to routine discovery requests. (1) Whether identifying responsive documents that have been organized by the producing party invades the protection accorded to attorney work-product and how a government agency — acting in its investigative capacity — must respond to a request for the production of documents. (2) Whether a government agency may unilaterally restrict the scope of its search based on an assertion of an “undue burden” on limited public resources. (3) How much information the Government must disclose in order to allow an adversary — and the court — to assess an objection based on the deliberative process privilege. (4) Whether a government agency may unilaterally exclude its own e-mail from document production on the ground that most — but not all — will be privileged.

IY. PRODUCTION OF RESPONSIVE DOCUMENTS

A. Request and Response

The SEC responded to each request for documents supporting a factual allegation in the Complaint by claiming that it “does not maintain a document collection relating specifically to the subject addressed.”9 Rather it provided an omnibus collection of indices, investigative documents, scanned paper documents, and audio/video media.10 It also provided the location within Concordance document databases of documents identified in the Complaint. The SEC contends that this [408]*408production comports with the manner in which the documents “ ‘are kept in the usual course of business.’ ”11

Stockman notes that the SEC has in fact already segregated documents into “ ‘approximately 175 file folders’” that correlate to specific factual contentions and that these documents are now maintained in the usual course of agency business.12

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Bluebook (online)
256 F.R.D. 403, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3367, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/securities-exchange-commission-v-collins-aikman-corp-nysd-2009.