Sears v. United States

132 Fed. Cl. 6, 2017 U.S. Claims LEXIS 483, 2017 WL 1929087
CourtUnited States Court of Federal Claims
DecidedMarch 8, 2017
Docket12-889L and 13-404L (Consolidated)
StatusPublished
Cited by13 cases

This text of 132 Fed. Cl. 6 (Sears v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Federal Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Sears v. United States, 132 Fed. Cl. 6, 2017 U.S. Claims LEXIS 483, 2017 WL 1929087 (uscfc 2017).

Opinion

Post-trial determination of the just compensation due in a rails-to-trails case; value of the agricultural land taken for trail use; cost to reclaim; severance damages attributable to “point rows;” no preemption of Iowa statute guaranteeing access to fields otherwise landlocked by the trail

OPINION AND ORDER

LETTOW, Judge.

This post-trial opinion addresses claims by a subclass of plaintiffs who own sixteen parcels attendant to the right-of-way of a railroad line formerly operated by the Iowa River Railroad in Hardin and Marshall Counties, Iowa, that has been converted into a recreational trail under Section 208 of the National Trails System Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 98-11, § 208, 97 Stat. 42, 48 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d)) (“Trails Act”). All issues of liability were resolved prior to trial, see Sears v. United States, 124 Fed.Cl. 444, 446 (2015) (“Sears I”), and therefore the trial solely focused on the valuation of the land underlying the right-of-way and the effect of the right-of-way on the value of plaintiffs’ adjacent parcels.

A five-day trial was held in Eldora, Iowa, commencing on August 1, 2016 and ending on August 5, 2016. Following post-trial briefing, the court heard closing arguments on December 20,2016.

After a decision and judgment were issued on March 8, 2017, defendant filed a motion for reconsideration limited to analysis of point row damages. The court called for and received a response, and, upon consideration, grants the motion for reconsideration in part and amends its prior decision and judgment, as stated infra,

INTRODUCTORY SYNOPSIS OF FACTS 1

The land at issue was previously held as a right-of-way for railroad purposes by the Iowa River Railroad, “extending from milepost 248.35 near Marshalltown, Iowa, to milepost 209, outside Steamboat Rock, Iowa, a total distance of 34.35 miles, in Marshall and Hardin Counties, Iowa.” Sears I, 124 Fed.Cl. at 446 (quoting Second Am. Compl. ¶ 4, ECF No. 33). On August 2, 2012, the Surface Transportation Board (“STB”) issued a Notice of Interim Trail Use (“NITU”) pursuant to the Trails Act. Id. The NITU “allowed] the general public to use the [Iowa River Railroad] right-of-way as a trail” while pre *10 serving the corridor for potential future railroad use. Id.

On July 10, 2013, the court certified a class of “[a]U persons who ... own an interest in lands constituting part of the railroad line that was formerly operated by the [Iowa River Railroad] in Marshall and Hardin Counties, Iowa.” Sears I, 124 Fed.Cl. at 446 (quoting Class Certification Order at 1, EOF No. 14) (alteration in original). The parties resolved all issues of liability following discovery and reached a tentative settlement in principle regarding valuation and compensation for the 269 parcels at issue in the class. See id. at 446-47. The owners of 21 of the 269 parcels withdrew from the settlement negotiations before the negotiations were completed, however, and those owners sought a trial regarding the valuation of their particular parcels. Id. at 447. The 21 parcels all “are agricultural properties that are angularly bifurcated by the former rail line.” Id. On December 22, 2016, the court approved the division of the class into separate trial and settlement subclasses pursuant to RCFC 23. Id. at 451. 2

Prior to trial, plaintiffs who collectively own five parcels opted out of the trial subclass and decided to join the settlement subclass. See Pre-Trial Conference Tr. 16:7-13 (July 25, 2016). Thus, the trial subclass consists of sixteen parcels of land, all of which are agricultural parcels in central Iowa that are bisected by the right-of-way at issue, See Pis.’ Post-Trial Br. at 1, EOF No. 113. The parcels were addressed at trial in five clusters, delineated by ownership. See id. Parcels 77.A and 77.B are owned by Jay Denzil Gould; parcels 87.A and 87.B are owned by John and June Bradley; parcels 89.A, 89.B, and 89.C are owned by Norval Mosher; parcels 91.A, 91.B, 91.C, and 91.D are owned by Charles Heene; and parcels 120.A, 120.B, 120.C, 120.D, and 120.E are owned by the Estate of Richard K. Richards, care of Virginia Richards and Beth Richards. Id.-, see also PX 1.A (Gould Ownership Deed for the 77 Parcels); PX 2.A (Bradley Ownership Deed for the 87 Parcels); PX 3.A (Mosher Ownership Deed for the 89 Parcels); PX 4.A (Heene Ownership Deed for the 91 Parcels); PX 5.A (Richards Ownership Deed for the 120 Parcels). 3 Each owner is a plaintiff in the subclass.

On the first day of trial, the court conducted site visits to the Richards, Mosher, and Gould parcel clusters, and viewed the Heene parcel cluster at a distance. See Pis.’ Post-Trial. Br. at 1; Tr. 109:12 to 160:7. The property owners or operators testified at trial, as did the parties’ experts who addressed (1) the value of the properties subject to the taking in their before and after condition, (2) the cost to reclaim the railbed such that the land could again be used for agricultural purposes, (3) any diminution of value attributable to “point rows” caused by the angular bisecting of fields by the railbed as a trail, and (4) any diminution in value due to loss of access to landlocked fields. In addition, the court heard testimony from the officials heading the trail commissions in Hardin and Marshall Counties that are now responsible for developing and maintaining the trail for public use.

STANDARDS FOR DECISION

The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that “private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation.” U.S. Const, amend. V. This court has jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ takings claims under the Tucker Act, which grants jurisdiction over “any claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.” 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). The Fifth Amendment is a money-mandating provision upon which plaintiffs may seek damages *11 against the government under the Tucker Act. See Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 494 U.S. 1, 11-12, 110 S.Ct. 914, 108 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990); Schooner Harbor Ventures, Inc. v. United States, 569 F.3d 1359, 1361-62 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citing Moden v. United States, 404 F.3d 1335, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
132 Fed. Cl. 6, 2017 U.S. Claims LEXIS 483, 2017 WL 1929087, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sears-v-united-states-uscfc-2017.