Scott v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

KENNETH SCOTT,

Plaintiff,

v. No. 24-cv-00487 (DLF) WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

Kenneth Scott brings this action against Kamilia Harden and Washington Metropolitan

Area Transit Authority (“WMATA”) alleging negligence claims arising from a multi-vehicle

traffic incident. Before the Court is Harden’s Motion to Dismiss. Dkt. 7. For the reasons that

follow, the Court will grant the motion.

I. BACKGROUND

On November 3, 2021, Kenneth Scott was involved in a multi-vehicle traffic incident with

Kamilia Harden and a driver for WMATA. Harden filed suit in Maryland state court against

WMATA, alleging negligence claims stemming from the crash. Harden v. Ricarda, No. 05-02-

3388-2022 (Md. Cir. Ct. 2022). WMATA removed that case to the United States District Court

for Maryland. Harden v. WMATA (“Maryland Case”), No. 22-cv-2835 (PJM) (D. Md.). In federal

court, Harden filed an amended complaint bringing claims against WMATA and Kenneth Scott,

and Scott answered. Third Am. Compl., No. 22-cv-2835, Dkt. 29; Scott Answer, No. 22-cv-2835,

Dkt. 34. After all the parties entered a settlement agreement, the district court entered a settlement order dismissing with prejudice all claims and counterclaims that were not reopened within 30

days. Order Dismissing Case, No. 22-cv-2835, Dkt. 50. Scott did not move to reopen.

Then, in 2024, Scott filed a complaint in D.C. Superior Court alleging claims stemming

from the same incident. D.C. Compl. ¶¶ 2–7, Dkt. 1-1. WMATA subsequently removed this case

to federal court in D.C. Notice of Removal, Dkt. 1. Harden filed a motion to dismiss the complaint

under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Mot. to Dismiss, Dkt.

7; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), (6). The Court denies her 12(b)(1) motion because the defense

of res judicata does not affect the subject matter jurisdiction of the court. Smalls v. United States,

471 F.3d 186, 189 (D.C. Cir. 2006). The Court instead will consider Harden’s res judicata

argument under 12(b)(6).

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

Rule 12(b)(6) allows a defendant to move to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a Rule

12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must contain factual matter sufficient to “state a claim to relief that

is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A facially plausible

claim is one that “allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for

the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Well-pleaded factual

allegations are “entitled to [an] assumption of truth,” id. at 679, and the court construes the

complaint “in favor of the plaintiff, who must be granted the benefit of all inferences that can be

derived from the facts alleged,” Hettinga v. United States, 677 F.3d 471, 476 (D.C. Cir. 2012)

(quotation marks omitted). When deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court may consider only

the complaint, documents attached to or incorporated by reference in the complaint, and judicially

2 noticeable materials. 1 EEOC v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial Sch., 117 F.3d 621, 624 (D.C. Cir.

1997).

III. ANALYSIS

Harden argues Scott fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because Scott’s

claim is barred by res judicata. “The doctrine of res judicata prevents repetitious litigation

involving the same causes of action or the same issues.” I.A.M. Nat’l Pension Fund v. Indus. Gear

Mfg. Co., 723 F.2d 944, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1983). “Under the claim preclusion aspect of res judicata,

a final judgment on the merits in a prior suit involving the same parties or their privies bars

subsequent suits based on the same cause of action.” Jacobsen v. Oliver, 201 F. Supp. 2d 93, 102

(D.D.C. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). This “prevents parties from relitigating issues

they raised or could have raised in a prior action on the same claim.” Id. (internal quotation marks

omitted). The Court will apply federal common law to determine the preclusive effect of a federal-

court judgment, Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 891 (2008), rather than District of Columbia’s

three-prong claim preclusion test, see Mot. to Dismiss at 5, Opp’n at 3, Dkt. 8, because the

judgment at issue was issued by the United States District Court for Maryland and the court’s

jurisdiction was not based on diversity of citizenship, Sturgell, 553 U.S. at 891 & n.4. Under

federal common law, claim preclusion bars a plaintiff’s claims when “there has been prior

litigation (1) involving the same claims or cause of action, (2) between the same parties or their

privies, and (3) there has been a final, valid judgment on the merits, (4) by a court of competent

1 Because Harden filed an affidavit discussing the previous court proceedings, Harden treated her motion to dismiss as a converted motion for summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. But this Court may take judicial notice of court records without converting a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. See Vance v. Chao, 496 F. Supp. 2d 182, 184 n.1 (D.D.C. 2007). The Court will not convert the motion or consider Harden’s affidavit and will instead take judicial notice of the Maryland case and all relevant prior legal proceedings and filings.

3 jurisdiction.” Smalls, 471 F.3d at192. Scott does not contest that the Maryland Case involved the

same parties before a court of competent jurisdiction.

A. Final Judgment on the Merits

To bar future litigation, the prior judgment must be on the merits of the claim. Stanton v.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 127 F.3d 72, 78 (D.C. Cir. 1997). But claim preclusion

also bars “matter[s] that never ha[ve] been litigated,” if they “should have been raised in an earlier

suit.” Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 77 n.1 (1984). Scott argues

the Maryland court did not render a final judgment on the issue of negligence because the

settlement order did not rule on the merits of the underlying claim, and he was not obligated to

raise his counterclaim in that case.

1. Settlement Order

The settlement order functioned as a final, valid judgment on the merits. A dismissal with

prejudice is on the merits. Belizan v. Hershon, 434 F.3d 579, 583 (D.C. Cir. 2006). Although the

order in the Maryland Case dismissed all claims and counterclaims without prejudice for the first

30 days, those 30 days expired without Scott filing a motion to reopen. Thus, the dismissal became

a dismissal with prejudice.

Scott resists this conclusion by pointing out there was no trial on the merits, nor was

negligence determined by a trier of fact. Opp’n at 3. But factual determination of a particular

issue is relevant for issue preclusion, not claim preclusion. Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392,

414 (2000). All that is necessary for claim preclusion is a final judgment. See Bailey v. DiMario,

925 F. Supp. 801, 810 (D.D.C. 1995) (“Under the related doctrines of res judicata and collateral

estoppel, a final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties from relitigating issues

that were or could have been finally decided. . . .” (emphasis added)). Here, the parties entered

4 into a settlement. The court then issued an order integrating the settlement agreement into a formal

judgment of the court. See Lindell v. Landis Corp. 401(k) Plan, 640 F. Supp. 2d 11, 16 (D.D.C.

2009). A settlement order from the court dismissing all claims with prejudice qualifies as a final

judgment on the merits and precludes relitigating the claims that were or should have been raised.

Bailey, 925 F. Supp. at 810 (citing United States v. Southern Ute Indians, 402 U.S. 159, 174

(1971)).

2. Compulsory or Permissive Counterclaim

“[R]es judicata may generally bar compulsory counterclaims, but not always permissive

ones.” Capitol Hill Grp. v. Pillsbury, Winthrop, Shaw, Pittman, LLC, 569 F.3d 485, 492 (D.C.

Cir. 2009). The question of whether Scott’s claim was compulsory or permissive hinges on what

rule of procedure we apply. Under Maryland rules, where the case was initially filed, a

defendant has no compulsory counterclaim. See Md. R. Civ. P. Cir. Ct. 2-331. Under the Rule

13(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a claim is a mandatory counterclaim if it “arises

out of the [same] transaction or occurrence.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(a)(1)(A). Scott argues the

Maryland rule applies. The Court disagrees.

“One of the shaping purposes of the Federal Rules [of Civil Procedure] is to bring about

uniformity in the federal courts by getting away from local rules.” Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S.

460, 472 (1965) (cleaned up). Once a federal court determines it has jurisdiction, the “strong

policy of uniformity, and the equally strong policy of Rule 13(a) to prevent a multiplicity of

litigation arising out of a single transaction or occurrence” are best supported by applying the

federal rules to “such procedural matters as the assertion of counterclaims.” Tolson v. Hodge,

411 F.2d 123, 128 (4th Cir. 1969) (holding that Rule 13’s counterclaims requirements governed,

despite state law applying to the suit generally under Rule 17(b)). Here, the United States

5 District Court for Maryland had jurisdiction over the case. Harden filed an amended complaint

adding Scott as a defendant in federal court, and Scott filed an answer to that complaint in

federal court. Third Am Compl., No. 22-cv-2835; Scott Answer, No. 22-cv-2835. Thus, the

federal rules applied, despite any “inevitabl[e] differ[ence] from comparable state rules.”

Hanna, 380 U.S. at 473.

Under the Rule 13(a), Scott’s claim is compulsory. His claim arises out of the traffic

incident that occurred in November of 2021. That same incident served as the basis for Harden’s

claim in the Maryland Case. Thus, Scott’s negligence claim “arises out of the . . . occurrence

that is the subject matter” of Harden’s claim and ought to have been raised in the prior action.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(a)(1)(A).

B. Same Claims or Cause of Action

Scott’s claim here is the same cause of action that was raised in the Maryland case. To

determine whether a plaintiff’s new suit raises the same “claim or cause of action,” courts ask if

the suit “arise[s] from the same transaction” or involves “a common nucleus of operative facts,”

Lucky Brand Dungaress, Inc. v. Marcel Fashions Grp., Inc., 590 U.S. 405, 412 (2020) (cleaned

up). As the Court previously discussed, see Section III.A.2, Scott’s claim is based on the same

underlying facts as the Maryland Case: the 2021 traffic crash. Indeed, Scott raised Harden’s

contributory negligence as an affirmative defense in his answer to Harden’s complaint in the

Maryland Case. Scott Answer at 1, No. 22-cv-2835.

Scott’s only rejoinder is that the element of damages and causation in this case are

different because he was a defendant in the Maryland Case but a plaintiff here. That argument

misses the point. The question is whether the underlying facts to his claim are the same as the

prior case. They clearly are.

6 CONCLUSION

Scott had the opportunity in 2022 to raise his counterclaim of negligence. He chose not to,

and instead entered into a settlement agreement dismissing all claims and counterclaims with

prejudice. As such, his negligence claim today is barred by claim preclusion.

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED that Harden’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED; it is further

ORDERED that the defendant Harden be dismissed from this case.

So Ordered.

________________________ DABNEY L. FRIEDRICH United States District Judge December 2, 2024